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Abstract 
The following research looks into the concept of sea-air 
intermodality, a combination of two or more modes of 
transport for the carriage of goods from origin to 
destination. The study examines why and how this form of 
transport evolved to become a viable alternative to the 
conventional single modes of ocean and air transport. 
The viability of the sea-air mode depends on various 
equally important factors which are analysed in depth, with 
a special emphasis on the sea-air transfer port. fn this 
context, research findings of the world's existing sea-air 
hubs are recorded and evaluated in terms of their present 
and future trends. 
At a sea-air transfer hub, ocean cargo is converted to direct 
air freight, thus adding new volumes of air cargoes. In this 
respect, sea-air plays a positive role in the present and 
future development of the air freight industry. 
The impact of the sea-air mode can be most clearly seen in 
the case study analysis in Chapter 10 of this thesis, 
whereby the potential for 'convertibility' of large portions 
of low density ocean cargoes to the sea-aix mode, is 
successfully demonstrated. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
1.1 Aim and scope of the field research 
The aim of this research is to examine and throw light on the 
emergence of sea-air intermodality as a reliable mode of transport, 
through an analysis of all available international sea-air routes, 
and especially the route from the Asia-Pacific region, via various 
intercontinental transfer hubs to Europe and other parts of the 
world, such as South America. 
Traditional modes of transport, namely those of direct ocean 
shipping and direct air freight, have also been analysed in 
relation to the sea-air mode, with focus on the transit time and 
costs of each mode, to the general users. 
Sea-air intermodality, as a reliable mode of transport, has an 
important role to play in the future development of the air freight 
industry. 
The main objective of this thesis is to prove that sea-air 
intermodality has a definitive and positive role in the present and 
future development of the air freight industry. Such a positive 
role is fully analysed with respect to its direct effects on the 
main components of the air cargo industry. 
A. To the air carriers of cargo : 
By attracting a higher percentage of specific classes of cargo, 
such as : 
a. high value goods, 
b. high volume, low density cargo shipments having much 
higher cubic volume in relation to their deadweight, 
away from direct all ocean shipping to the sea-air mode, thus 
providing increasing quantities of cargo to many world 
airlines, unutilised cargo capacities. 
To the end users : 
By reducing total distribution costs and transit time, in addition 
to a faster replenishment of capital. 
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C. To the shilDper at oriqin 
By providing his clientele, the importers, with a viable and 
competitive alternative to direct air freight or direct all-ocean 
shipping. 
1.2 Methodolocrv 
The sources and references to the subject of sea-air as a mode of 
transport are limited due to the short period since its emergence. 
1. Records and references were used sparingly as a first step to 
def ine certain processes accurately. Periodicals, papers, 
sea-air conferences, presentations and papers, international 
transport conferences, records, specialised magazines and 
periodicals, were also used to draw up a clear picture of the 
activities of the sea-air industry, such as the sea-air 
routes, statistics and figures relating to costs of transport 
related charges, transit time and ground facilities of the 
transfer point. 
2. The second step was the designing of three types of 
questionnaires which were meant to collect accurate 
information and data about the activity and the role of each 
transfer point. The questionnaires were directed to 
a. Airport Authorities 
b. Seaport Authorities 
C. Freight Forwarders at origin and at the transfer points. 
d. Consignees. 
The questionnaires were designed to create a mini case' study 
of the main sea-air transfer points covering the general 
developments of the sea-air movements from as early as the 
late 1950s up to the late 1980s, with a specific and accurate 
analysis over a five year period starting in 1989 and ending 
in 1994. 
Definition of the current size of the market in the West 
Coast of Canada and the United States (Vancouver, Seattle 
- Tacoma, Los Angeles and San Francisco) , Singapore, U. A. E. and Vladivostok. 
Analysis of the competitive position of each gateway vs 
the other. This included analysis of average total 
transit time, market pricing, availability of air lift, 
carriers and forwarders handling sea-air cargo, dock to 
airport transfer time, handling cost etc. 
III. Identification of the characteristics of the transfer 
hub, including strengths and weaknesses, risks and 
opportunities for growth, identification of new markets 
and service improvements. 
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3. The third step was the f ield research which was by far the 
most important in building up this study, as it f illed, or 
rather bridged, a very important gap caused by: 
a. the inaccuracy of available public data, 
b. the lack of references and serious studies on the subject 
of the sea-air mode. 
The field work was started in March 1992 and terminated in August 
1995, and was divided into stages of field visits and meetings with 
a targeted group of key people and institutions, at the regional 
level of the sea-air transfer hub. 
A. The tar 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
geted groups were: 
Airlines 
Shipping Lines 
Airports 
Sea ports 
Freight forwarders 
B. In the first stage, the targeted hubs were: 
1. North American West Coast 
Vancouver, Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles and 
Miami on the East Coast. 
2. Singapore 
3. United Arab Emirates 
Dubai and Abu Dhabi, with Sharjah being my base. 
4. Vladivostok 
Seoul and Tokyo being the only users. 
C. In the second stage, visits and 
the sea-air originating points: 
1. Hong Kong 
2. Japan 
3. Taiwan 
4. Korea 
5. Singapore 
6. India 
interviews were directed at 
The meetings, whether at the sea-air transfer hubs or at 
originating points, were meant to f ind out accurate data and 
f igures and to identify any apparent trends. More especially, the 
aim was to establish: 
1. Official records of actual 
airline, region and country 
2. Imports/Exports tonnage and 
3. The general attitude of the 
toward sea-air movement. 
a. Facilities 
b. Related charges 
C. Transit, in bondý 
of the total. 
cargo tonnage movement by 
value. 
port and airport authorities 
movements as a percentage 
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4. Attitude of the shipping lines to sea-air cargo, in terms 
of facilities and charges. 
5. For airlines carrying sea-air cargo 
a. Type of commodity - value. 
b. Low density, high volume in relation to weight 
- charges. 
C. Transit time and airport to airport costs. 
d. Shares of each airline of sea-air tonnage and 
future trends. 
For freight forwarders 
a. Volume/tonnage share. 
b. Facilities. 
C. Hindrances and problems. 
d. Transit time, costs of transport and related 
charges. 
e. Market size. 
f. Government rules and regulations in relation 
to sea-air. 
9. Seasonal fluctuations. 
h. Sea-air market trends. 
D. In the final stage, visits to the major sea-air destinations 
in Europe were undertaken. The objective was to determine the 
reasons behind their use of the sea-air mode, in relation to 
other modes - and their future plans. End users were very 
hard to interview. However, through the help of the freight 
forwarders, joint visits were made to consignees, the actual 
decision makers specifying the use of a certain mode of 
transport. Consignees in London, Manchester, Frankfurt, 
Hamburg, Cologne, Amsterdam and Copenhagen were jointly 
visited with the relevant freight forwarders in the area. 
The majority of the questions centred on : 
1. Costs and transit time. 
2. Inventory and stockpiling costs savings. 
3. Arrival of shipments at the airports rather than the 
ports (easier and faster to clear customs clear and get 
the product to the market). 
4. Difficulties at the port of segregating LCLs (less than 
container loads shipments) and the resulting delay of two 
days. 
Sea-air mode as a viable and reliable alternative to the 
other two modes. 
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1.3 Chapter development and scheme 
The research has been divided into three parts. 
Part I defines sea-air intermodality and identifies factors for its 
development. One of the major factors is the availability of air 
cargo capacities at transfer points. To identify this capacity, 
the growth of wide-bodied aircraft from inception in 1969, to 1994, 
is researched together with the degree of utilisation of the huge 
air cargo space that became available. For the first time ever, a 
freight load factor has been derived from world scheduled 
international tonne-kilometres available in relation to tonne- 
kilometres performed. 
Further, on the regional level, distribution of air cargo 
capacities of world scheduled international passenger, pure 
freighter and combi services, by aircraft type and by regions of 
international operations, were computed and a percentage share of 
international air cargo capacity available by type of aircraft and 
region, was reached and then related to the percentage distribution 
of international scheduled air cargo traffic by region, yielding a 
freight load factor, and therefore unutilised air cargo capacities 
by region and route groups, that represent the grounds for 
potential sea-air routes. 
Part II traces the history of the early sea-air routes of the 
1950s, and how they faded away mainly because of air cargo capacity 
problems. Sea-air intermodality had to wait till the late 1970s 
and early 1980s to take its contemporary form and make deep inroads 
into converting large portions of pure ocean cargo into the sea-air 
mode. The present day sea-air routes were divided into two route 
groups. The easterly route covers sea-air traffic moving via the 
transfer hubs of Vladivostok, Singapore and the U. A. E. to Europe 
and parts of Africa, and the westerly route covers traffic moving 
via the North American hubs of Vancouver, Seattle, Los Angeles, San 
Francisco and Miami to Europe and South America. The growth and 
development of the sea-air traffic is subjected to detailed 
analysis in relation to the sea-air transfer points of the world. 
Part III focuses on the characteristics and requirements of viable 
sea-air transfer hubs, their geographic location and the facilities 
provided by governments to the ports and airports. The study 
further provides an in-depth analysis on the role of the key 
players, the ocean and air carriers, in terms of port and airport 
selection strategies and the freight forwarder in his capacity as 
sea-air operator. The 'Conclusions, show that the sea-air mode has 
developed to become a reliable and viable alternative to the 
conventional modes through its ability to convert large portions of 
ocean freight to direct air freight at transfer hubs, which in turn 
opens the door for new freighter services to enter the market at 
these points of conversion. 
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Chapter 2 
The transport system and intermodality 
A Preface 
2.1 The transr)ort svstem 
Transportation is a system that aims at moving people and goods 
from one point to another. The factors that govern this movement 
are: (a) centres generating supply and demand, and (b) the many 
components of the system itself. A proper analysis must take into 
consideration the whole network of variables that make up the 
transport system. These variables may be classified as macro and 
micro variables. The political and economic system generates the 
macro variables, whereas technology, transport modes and logistics 
constitute the micro variables. A brief summary of these 
variables, as an introduction to the more detailed discussion of 
intermodality, becomes necessary. 
2.1.1 The micro variables :' 
The three micro variables (technology, transport modes and 
logistics) are inter-related. 
a) Technology' : Transportation systems have been changing rapidly 
during the last five decades. The period between 1950 and 1960 
witnessed the economic recovery of the western world from the after 
effects of the Second World War. Huge volumes of goods were 
shipped on old and slow fleets of conventional general cargo 
vessels, to many destinations. Ports, however, were unable to cope 
with this increased traffic because of inefficient 15ort facilities 
and old equipment. This led to congestion of ships waiting to 
offload, and effectively a very slow turnround of ships at ports of 
origin and destination, inevitably resulting in significant time 
loss. This necessitated the changes that were required. 
As regards to facilities at ports, the changes came about with the 
introduction of gantry cranes and specialised cargo terminals. 
Available open land space, around the ports, was utilised as cargo 
container stations to meet increased traffic. In many instances 
open land space was not available around the ports, forcing cargo 
terminal construction deeper inland. Further, the introduction of 
newly equipped offloading devices and larger barges resulted in 
much improved ship-to-port handling, all of which achieved a faster 
turnround of ships. Standardisation of cargo handling equipment, 
unitisation and containerisation were introduced. Simultaneously, 
there was the development of new types of vessels in 
the international trade scene (cellular ships, straddle - con bulk 
- vessels, LASH and Roll-on, Roll-off carriers). 
l. Abrahamsson, B. J. (1980) 'International Ocean Shipping - Current Concepts and Principles, (Boulder westview Press) - progress in shipping technology, pp 1- 60. 
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b) Transport modes: are ways and means by which goods move from 
one point to another. General cargo is carried by three major 
means of transport; overland (rail and trucks), water and air. 
The increased flow of international trade called for higher 
efficiency in terms of speed of delivery. This aspect, together 
with competition among various modes of transport, led to further 
development of these modes. Competition was generally limited to 
the speed of delivery of each mode, whereas, the competition 
within each mode was instrumental in bringing about changes in 
the form of innovations in design, size and engines, in the 
components of each mode of transport. 
In ocean transport, the change was from slow and old, 
conventional general cargo ships to faster and specialised bulk 
carriers, faster and larger cellular container vessels, and 
highly efficient barges. In the air transport industry, the 
change was to wide-bodied jet freighters. And in the case of 
overland transport, there were two major changes. First, in the 
trucking system, there was the introduction of a new tractive 
unit and standardised trailers specially designed to load 40 ft 
and 20 ft standard sized containers from onboard ships to onboard 
tractive trailers. Second, in the rail transport system, the 
change was from the old conventional box car to the twin deck 
container cars. 
c) Logistics' : is defined as "the physical distribution of 
goods". Some even go further and define it as "control of 
material flow from the assembly line, ex factory, to the end 
user". In decision making, transport operators consider 
transportation and logistics together. For instance, when the 
selection of a certain mode or modes of transport is made, the 
container size and the choice of a transhipment or a transfer 
port are both considered together. 
Logistics, as the control of the flow of goods from one point to 
another, implies that a workable communication system connecting 
centres of supply and demand, should function in order to achieve 
and maintain control over the flow of goods. This entails co- 
operation between the transport modes and within each transport 
mode itself. Fast, reliable communications are the key to 
effective control over the flow of goods, whether in containers 
or in specialised bulk ships, or onboard trucks, or in air cargo 
containers. To maintain a reliable communication system, co- 
operation becomes necessary within the mode of transport itself, 
and among carriers and operators of that mode. By the same 
token, co-operation among various modes of transport becomes 
necessary when more than one mode of transport is used. Keeping 
track of cargo containers is important to operators, in their 
efforts to maximize container use, and to the consumer, who, by 
an operator's pre-alert message, is informed of the exact arrival 
details of goods ordered. Feedback of information to the shipper 
on the progress of cargo movement generates confidence in the 
system as a whole. 
1 Wallace I. L (1974) 'Transportation Regulation Management and National Policies' (Seattle. university 
of Washington), chapters 1,2,3 and 4. 
2.1.2 The macro variables': 
a) The political and economic system : determines, to a very 
large extent, the framework within which the transportation 
system operates. The economic environment is inter-related with 
the political system, and this interaction determines the degree 
of impact on the transportation system. This relationship 
differs between regions. Productive regions require an efficient 
transportation system to move products from the centres of 
production to the consumer markets. 
Changes in production or consumption patterns, whether domestic 
or international, have a direct and instantaneous effect on the 
transport system as a whole. The demand for a transport mode in 
a region depends largely both on other regions' demand for the 
product of the exporting region and on each region's internal 
demand and production patterns. Therefore, an efficient 
transport mode (efficient is defined as low cost of operation, 
availability of fast and large carriers and proper control 
("logistics") of the flow of goods] , can act as a positive factor in the economic growth of any region. 
The political system or the impact of government intervention on 
the transportation system, and its modes, can be clearly defined. 
b) At the local level : the political and economic environment 
impacts in numerous ways, such as restrictions on vehicle size 
and payload on the motorways and on safety and road maintenance. 
Restrictions on the use of engines, by prohibiting the use of 
diesel engines on heavy-duty transport vehicles (for 
environmental considerations), restrictions on the movement of 
truck transport to certain hours during a working day, and a 
complete ban on trucking during weekends. These restrictions 
have a direct impact on the movement of cargo from the production 
line to the end users, in terms of delays in deliveries and in 
higher costs of transport. 
c) At the state level : the government can impose regulations on 
basic elements of the transportation system. Such regulations 
may include (a) controlling the flow of foreign capital to the 
transportation system, (b) the regulation of the rate structure, 
(c) the allocation of international routes to national carriers, 
(d) the co-ordination between transport modes, (e) the 
application of preferential tariffs on certain classes of goods 
and (g) the creation of barriers and protectionism and so on. 
Therefore, in developed economies, the easing of regulations, the 
cutting of unnecessary red tape, free and open-sky policies, free 
capital inflow and outflow, the availability of facilities at 
ports and airports, the removal of tariffs and other barriers, 
will encourage development by motivating entrepreneurs to 
increase investments in various aspects of the transportation 
system. 
On variable aspects of transportation that can be changed directly by the decision of individuals, 
groups or institutions. See: Manheim, M. L. (1974) Fundamentals of Transportation System Analysis 
(Cambridge: MIT, preliminary edition). 
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2.2 The emercrence of intermodality 
During the period between 1980 and 1990, a very important 
development in the field of transport was witnessed. There was 
a shift of emphasis from equipment innovation, to organisation 
and logistics. The question was, 'How should a transportation 
system operate to ensure maximum efficiency? '. Maximum 
efficiency meant satisfying consumer demand, by in time' 
deliveries of goods f rom the production centres to consumer 
markets, at the lowest possible cost. In order to achieve 
greater efficiency, (a) the costs of the transportation. system, 
as a whole, should be reduced, (b) effective control over the 
flow of cargo should be maintained, and (c) co-operation and co- 
ordination amongst the various transport modes should be geared 
to a high level for the success of the whole system. 
Amongst the factors mentioned above, the key element is the 
control of the flow of cargo. As a result of developments, the 
structure of cargo flow from origin to destination, within a 
specified period of time, involving the use of two or more modes 
of transport, became the order of the day. Therefore, route 
selection and modal choice', together with physical distribution 
and logistics, became a necessity in the control of cargo flow. 
The use of two or more modes of transport entails an interchange 
or a transfer point. The conventional function of a transfer 
point was to transfer goods from one mode of transport to 
another. 
The terms 'break bulk' and 'terminal,, often used in transport 
terminology, indicate clearly the end of one transport mode and 
the beginning of another. To minimize break bulk, or stoppage 
time at transfer points is of crucial importance to the survival 
of intermodality, as cargoes must 'connect' in time, with the 
next mode, at the transfer point. 'Continuity' of the flow of 
cargo must be fully under control. 
Inter-modality' is def ined as the movement of cargo between two 
points from shipper to consignee, using at least two different 
modes of transport, a single rate, and a combined transport 
document (CTD )3 with a defined liability, for the whole journey. 
The objective is to transport goods in a continuous and 
controlled flow, from origin to destination, with the least cost 
and time. Intermodality is a flexible and evolving response to 
the dynamic demand of the market place and its distributional 
requirements. Cargo movement, under intermodality, is viewed in 
the light of the total distribution system, which includes 
producers/shippers, carriers (ocean, land and air), freight 
forwarders, airports/sea ports and inventory - warehousing. 
1. is a choice of a mode of transport. 
2. Faust P. (1985 'Multimodal Transport', Bremen: 'Institute of Shipping Economics and Logistics', 
pages 200 - 236. 
3. Combined Transport Document is a contract combining two or more modes of transport (sea + air, or 
sea + air + overland etc. ) , and is issued by a licensed freight forwarder on behalf of the shipper, for the carriage of goods from one point to another, using various modes of transport, and according 
to 'conditions of carriage, as printed on the back of the CTD. 
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The use of various modes of transport entails an interchange 
point, at which moving goods come to a halt. No matter how brief 
this halt, it does stop the continuous flow of goods, between two 
set points. This is so because the kind of goods transported 
include general cargo that moves in containers, in loose form 
(cartons, crates, boxes etc) , and in a variety of shapes and sizes that may or may not be suitable for the next mode of 
transportation. 
For example, intermodal cargo arriving by ocean at a transfer 
point in standard-sized containers for eventual transfer to other 
modes of transport, will be subject to some delays if the next 
mode of transport is air, since the containers must be offloaded, 
and their contents destuffed, to be then regrouped into air 
pallets, or air containers, for eventual air carriage to final 
destination. 
Thus, the time lapse of this transfer, no matter how brief, 
causes an interruption in the flow of goods. Whereas, in the 
case of overland transfer, (if that happens to be the next mode 
of transport) , there is hardly any stoppage at the transfer 
point, as the ocean container in question is simply required to 
be loaded on flat trailers or chassis on wheels, and hooked on to 
tractive units. Then, provided the in bond' customs clearance 
is done on time, the flow is virtually non-stop to the final 
destination. This transfer of goods, between two or more modes 
of transport, is referred to as an intermodal transfer. 
Stoppage of cargo that occurs at the transfer point is a major 
weakness of intermodality. Hence the availability of transfer 
points, providing transit without any superficial hindrance, 
leading to a minimum of stoppage time, is one of the major 
factors governing intermodality. Sea-air intermodality involves 
most known modes of transport: ocean, air and overland. 
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Chapter 3 
Air carriers and sea-air intermodality 
3.1 Air cargo capacity and freight load factor 
The trend of involving air carriers with sea-air intermodality 
started in the 1980s and is still continuing in full force up to 
the present time. The factors that caused air carriers to get 
involved were : 
The shift of control of cargo movement and cargo flow from 
the air carriers to the intermodal operators, the INVOCCs' 
(Non Vessel Owning Common Carriers) and freight forwarders. 
2. Air carriers, loss of part of their clientele. 
How did that happen? This section attempts to analyse answers to 
this question in detail. 
During the period between 1950 to 1970, there were generally two 
main reasons to use aircraf tf or cargo movement f rom one point to 
another. 
In cases of emergencies and of an urgent need to carry 
certain goods over great distances in a short time. As 
such, the high cost of transporting these goods to their 
destination was justifiable and acceptable in terms of time 
saved. All-cargo aircraft were used to uplift emergency 
goods to remote places where they were most needed, such as 
relief goods, medicines, food, perishables, etc. 
2. Unutilised capacities, available in the compartments and 
holds of passenger aircraft, made it possible for the 
passenger airline to derive extra revenue with hardly any 
increase in the total operational costs. As in the early 
days of cargo handling, goods bound for air freight were 
packed in small packages, on skids with nylon or net 
coverings, in light cardboard boxes, etc, and a light 
conveyor roller was used to transfer cargo to the 
compartments of the aircraft, along with the luggage of the 
passengers. 
The introduction of wide-bodied jets, with special reference to 
the Boeing-747, together with a huge improvement in cargo 
handling at cargo terminals at airports, and the extension and 
expansion of runways, all have set the scene f or a new era of 
massive development of cargo movement by air, which started in 
1970 and is still in full swing up to the present time. Huge air 
cargo capacities became available and the airline industry, as a 
whole, became increasingly concerned about how to fill these air 
cargo capacities, and maintain their growth and profitability. 
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Table 1. The development of wide-bodied aircraft 
vis-g-vis narrow bodied aircraft, 1969 - 19941, 
and the growth per annum, (1969 as base year) 
Jet aircraf t2 - all operators 
Year No. of Increase in t growth No. of Increase in growth 
wide-bodied number of narrow- number of 
aircraft aircraft bodied aircraft 
aircraft 
1969 16 3,456 
1970 82 66 412.5t 3,675 219 6.3t 
1971 153 71 86.6%- 3,845 170 4.6%- 
1972 273 120 78.4%- 3,960 115 3 . 096 
1973 388 115 42.1% 4,145 185 4. Wk 
1974 503 115 29.6% 4,344 199 4.8% 
1975 592 89 17.7! k 4,553 198 5. li; 
1976 671 79 13.31r 4,664 ill 2.4%; 
1977 733 62 9.246 4,773 109 2.3'k 
1978 800 67 9. I%r 4,884 ill 2.3%- 
1979 932 132 16.5% 5,011 127 2.6% 
1980 1,099 167 17.9t 5,129 118 2.41k 
1981 1,200 101 9.2%; 5,141 12 0.216 
1982 1,314 114 9.5%r 5,268 127 2.5%- 
1983 1,404 90 6.8! k 5,314 46 0.9! k 
1984 1,487 83 5.9% 5,317 3 0.1% 
1985 1,559 72 4.8% 5,466 149 2.8% 
1986 1,669 110 7.1k 5,673 207 3.8t 
1987 1,754 85 5.1k 5,953 280 4.9%; 
1988 1,869 115 6.6t 6,217 264 4.4t 
1989 1,955 86 4.6% 6,575 358 5.8% 
1990 2,145 190 9.7k 7,005 430 6.5%- 
1991 2,425 280 14. lt 7,335 330 4.7%- 
1992 2,695 270 11.1%r 7,665 330 4.5! k 
1993 2,761 66 2.4t 8,019 354 4.6%- 
1994* 2,955 194 7.0% 8,459 440 5.5% 
Source: ICAO Circulars 158-AtI57,177-AT167,222-AT190,244-AIP11150-12193 
1994 figures are forecasted. 
1. Excluding China and USSR (at present the CIS) 
2.1969 marks the start of gradual replacements of piston-engined and turbo- 
prop aircraft by turbo jets of minimum of 9000 kgs maximum take-off weight. 
By the mid 1970s, jets increased from 49* to 704- of world total and offered 
over 95t of the world air traffic capacity. Therefore, piston engines and 
turbo props were dropped from all analysis throughout this study. 
The build-up of wide-bodied aircraft from 1969 onward took a 
giant stride. Table 1, above, shows this growth from a mere 
16 wide-bodied aircraft in 1969 to 
503 by the end of 1974, 
932 by the end of 1979, 
1,487 by the end of 1984, 
1,955 by the end of 1989, and up to 1994, a staggering 
number of almost 3,000 wide-bodied aircraft in use. While 
narrow-bodied aircraft grew from approximately 3,500 to almost 
8,500 in the 25 years from 1969 to 1994. 
This development is further detailed by type of aircraft. Table 
2, on the following page, shows wide and narrow bodied aircraft 
growth by type, for the whole period under review, from 1969 to 
1994. 
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Table 2 Development of world wide/narrow 
bodied commercial turbo-jet aircraft by type 
1969 - 1994 (excluding CIS & China) 
World wide-bodied Year of 1st 
aircraft by type entry into 
19942 service 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 19_9ý1 
Boeing 747 1969 14 232 376 538 650 991 1040 
Douglas DC10 1971 - 161 280 323 33S 33ý 330 
Lockheed L-1011 1972 92 160 208 205 200 200 
Airbus 300 1 9'ý4 - 76 222 280 406 430 
.; ý),, 
ing 767 1982 98 26( 407 440 
Airbus 310 1983 41 1610 24S 2BO 
MD -11 1990 - - 122 i5c 
Non-sclieduled 2 18 40 57 65 '7 Q 85 
Total wide-bodied jets 16 503 932 1487 1955 2761 2955 
World narrow-bodied Year of ist 
aircraft by type entry into 
service 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1993 1994 
1958 
1-1ý0 I-II I iln D 0U1, -11 
Boeing 737 1967 185 340 525 880 1500 2400 2540 
Boeing 7S7 1982 - - - 40 225 470 540 
Airbus 320 1988 - - - - 120 400 430 
Airbus 340 1992 - - - - - 20 40 
BAe146/HS85/180 1983 - - - 24 80 220 245 
Fokker 100 1988 - - - - 80 225 255 
Other narrow-bodied jets* 726 854 891 875 631) S83 720 
Non-scheduled : 240 365 410 453 7 15 802 800 
Total narrow-bodied jets 3456 4344 5011 5317 6575 8019 8459 
Grand total wide/narrow 3472 4847 5943 6804 8530 10780 11414 
bodied jets 
Source ICAO Circulars, 158 -AT/57,177 -AT167, 222 -AT190, Doc. - 9180119, 
September 19 94, and 12193, A/Pl /150. 
Other narrow-bodied jets include : British Aircraft Industries : BAe HS 
121 Trident, 13AC ill, BAC HS-125 and the Anglo French SST. 
French Aircraft Industries : Dassault 50 Falcon, Mystere 20 Falcon, 
Mercure, Sud Aviation SE-210. Other European Aircraft : Fokker F 28, 
IL 62, IL 76, TU 134, TU 154, Yak 40-42. Russian made aircraft for use 
outside the CIS and China by the rest of the world. 
1.1993 figures are posted as an indicative factor to 1994 forecast. 
2.1994 forecasted figures Method of forecast depended largely on the 
following facts. 
a. Order placed for turbo jets totalled US$ 21 billion in 1992 while in 1991 
orders were US$ 29 billion, a drop of US$ 8 billion in one year. 
b. major aircraft: producers declared a policy of reducing rate of production 
in 1992. MacDonald Douglas and Boeing up to a 40-s- cut, while Airbus 
declared a 15-' cut. The effect on new deliveries was as follows. -In 1991, " total of 821 turbo jets were delivered while 786 were delivered in 1992, 
" drop of In 1993 only 685 turbo jets were delivered, a drop of 17-iT 
from 1991. 
Shaded areas are meant to show that : 
The B707,727, DC8s, DC9s are fading out of international use and being replaced 
by the B737, B757, B767, Airbus 320,340 and MD 80-90s and MD11 freighter. The 
Douglas DC10 and Lockheed L-1011 are slowly being replaced as from the late 1980S 
onward by the Airbus A300, A310 and Boeing 767s, while McDonald Douglas 
production policy aimed at the MD 80s-90s and MD11s. 
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This massive growth made available huge air capacities on 
international and domestic routes, and on scheduled and non- 
scheduled services of world airlines. However, the objective of 
this section is to show how world airlines became involved with 
sea-air intermodality as a result of their attempt to capitalise 
unutilised air capacities on international scheduled routes. 
The domestic and unscheduled cargo capacities are dropped from 
the analysis because: 
The domestic air cargo capacities that became available were 
used to move all types of general cargo, including 
manufactured goods within regions of the same country. In 
this respect, the domestic movement had hardly any relation 
to the development of sea-air intermodality. Further, most 
of the capacity development on the domestic level was 
centred on passenger traffic. Passengers accounted for an 
average of 831-k by weight of all domestic traffic, while 
cargo (including mail and express parcels) , accounted for an average of 17% for the period between 1969 and 1979, while 
freight share by weight decreased to 13.0% at the end of 
1989, and to 12.5% in 1993, with the general trend on the 
decline. It should be further noted that most of the 
world's domestic traffic is developed and performed by two 
countries. The U. S. A. accounted for 56% and the USSR 2401, 
with both assuming 80-% of world domestic traffic for the 
same period (1969 - 1979). The share of both countries 
changed slightly between 1979 and 1989, when the US assumed 
a share of 57% while the USSR share dropped to 21%. The 
trend is forecasted to continue until the end of this 
century, at 60% for the US and 20% for the USSR (now CIS). 
The source for all the above figures is the ICAO Statistical 
Yearbook Doc 9180/19, Sept. 1994, and 12/93, A/Pl/150. 
As domestic air capacity is 8016 dominated by only two 
countries (USA & USSR), and mostly used for passengers, it 
has, as such, almost no effect on the world airlines 
involvement with sea-air intermodality. 
2. By the same token, non-scheduled air capacities are operated 
on request through charter flights and paid for in full, and 
therefore, do not represent unutilised, and thus non-earning 
capacities for the air carriers. Non-scheduled operators' 
share constituted small percentages of the world's total 
aircraft fleet (Table 3, below). 
Table 3. Non- scheduled operators % of world total aircraf t fleet 
Aircraft Category jet 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1993 1994* 
Wide-bodied 12.5t 3.6t 4.3t 3.8t 3.3t 2.4t 2.7t 
Narrow-bodied 7. Ot 8.4% 8.25 8.5V 10.9k 8.5k 8.4% 
Source: Compiled from Table 2 on page 13. 
1994 figures forecasted. 
16 
The major emphasis is placed on the international development and 
growth of air capacities. Table 4, below, shows the increase in 
the scheduled international air capacities available in Tonne 
Kilometres (TKAs) for passengers and their luggage, freight and 
mail, actual tonne kilometre performed (TKPs) by each, and weight 
load factors showing utilised/unutilised capacities in relation 
to total tonne kilometres available for international scheduled 
services, including passenger, baggage, freight and mail. 
Table 4. Traffic of World* Commercial Air Carriers 
international scheduled services 
(figures in billions - rounded to the nearest 50 million) 
Revenue Traffic 1969' 1 1974 1 1979 1 1984 1 1989 1 1993; -' 1994 
Seat Km 
Pax Load 
available 
factor 
262 .0 
51 1-. 
439 .0 
56 % 
081.0 
63 % 
850 .0 
65 %- 
1203 .0 
68 o-, 
1580.0 
66 96 
1690 0 
65 
Tonne Km Performed 
Pax incl. baggage 12. 5 22.7 40.2 50.9 76.1 97.0 103.8 
Freight 6.1 11.2 18.9 28.9 44.9 55ý6 60.3 
mail 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.4 
Total 19. 9 35.1 60.5 81.6 123.1 154.8 165.7 
Tonne Km available 39. 5 65.9 102.8 130.9 192.0 251.6 271.8 
Weight Load Factor 50 % 53 1 59 *6 62 % 64 *6 62 ý; 61 o6 
Source Compiled from 
-TCAO 
Publications 158-At/57,222-At I90 and Statistical 
Yearbook Doc 9180119, Sept. 1994. 
including the CIS. 
1. 1969 figures are estimated, as figures from the USSR were not 
available for 1969 only, and available from 1970 onward. 
2. 1993 figures are indicative for 1994 forecasted figures. 
The weight load factor in Table 4, above, shows the utilised 
capacities for passenger, baggage, freight and mail in relation 
to total capacity available in tonne-kilometres. Therefore the 
unutilised weight capacity was then available not only for 
freight, but also for passengers, luggage and mail. What this 
study is concerned about is the total capacity available for air 
cargo only. 
ICAO, IATA and other international organisations do not 
calculate, derive or publish any figures relating to freight load 
factors. In this particular respect of load factors, all these 
organisations concentrate their efforts on the computation and 
the publishing of figures relating to 'passenger' load factors 
and 'weight' load factors, as they probably are still adhering to 
the old established conception that revenues and profitability of 
the airline industry depend almost entirely on the passenger load 
factors. It seems that the carriage of freight and mail is still 
considered as a small supporting source of revenue and not enough 
to be worthy of computation and analysis. 
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For example, ICAO Circular 222-AT/90, computes only passenger and 
weight load factors in their analysis of the total international 
movement, including USSR, of passengers, freight and mail, in 
relation to available international capacities, as follows: 
Year Aircraft Aircraft Aircraft Passengers Passenger Seat PAX 
kilometres departures hours carried kilometres kms load 
performed avlbl factcr 
(millions) (millions) (millions) (millions) (millions) (millions) M 
1984 3,870 2.3 5.7 18.4 555,000 851,000 65 
Year Passengers Tonne-kilometres performed Tonne-km Weight 
including available load 
baggage Freight Mail Total factor 
(millions) (millions) (millions) (millions) (millions) (10 
1984 50,970 28,940 1,840 81,750 131,050 62 
Source: ICAO Circular 222-AT190 
In 1984, ICAO computed passenger load factors by dividing 
passenger-km performed by seat-km available, and multiplying the 
result by 100, to qualify the figure in percentage form, i. e. 
(555,000 -- 851,000) x 100 = 65.2-0,;, rounded to 6511. 
While the weight load factor was computed by first converting 
passengers and their luggage to tonne-kms performed (passenger 
weight averaged 75 kgs and passenger luggage weight averaged 20 
kgs). The resulting figure of 50,970 million TKs performed for 
passenger and luggage was added to freight and mail TKs 
performed, to give a total of 81,750 million TKs performed. 
Dividing 81,750 by 131,050 for total TKs available and 
multiplying by 100 gives a 'weight' load factor of 62.0-06. 
(81,750 131,050) x 100 = 62.42ý, rounded to 62%. This weight 
load factor indicates that 62% of available weight capacities for 
passengers, cargo and mail was utilised while the remaining 38% 
of available weight capacities remained unutilised during 1984. 
The question that remains pressing and unanswered is: How much of 
the 380-o unutilised weight capacities was available for freight? 
For the first time ever, in any analysis or research, a freight 
load factor is derived from the analysis that follows. In order 
to segregate available space for air cargo from other capacities, 
the researcher assumed a maximum passenger load factor of 10001 
and derived weight in TKs that a 100% passenger load factor would 
perform. Mail TKs were added as actually performed, then both 
were deducted from total available tonne-kms. The result 
obtained was the minimum' capacity available for freight. 
Example: ICAO data of 1984, as given on the previous page: If 65% 
passenger load factor, including baggage, was converted to equal 
50,970 million tonne-kms, then 100% passenger load factor, 
including baggage would equal (50,970 - 65) x 100 = 78,415 
million TKs (assumed) performed. Add 78,415 to mail TKs 
performed of 1,840 = 80,255 million TKs- 
1ý- Minimum capacity available for air cargo is reached at the maximum 100% passenger load factor; as 
the passenger load factor decreases, weight load capacities for freight and mail increases. 
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The total capacity available for air cargo was reached by 
subtracting 80,255 million TKs from the total capacity available 
for passengers and their luggage, freight and mail, of 131,050 
million TKs = 50,795 TKs. Unutilised air cargo capacity was 
reached by deducting freight TKs performed from the total TKs 
available for freight, i. e. 50,795 - 28,940 = 21,855 million TKs. 
All figures were computed and rounded in billions of TKs, 
beginning in 1969 up to 1994, in the same manner, and tabulated 
in Table 5, below, which shows specifically air capacities 
available for freight (Column 1) and the actual freight performed 
(Column 2) .Af reight load f actor was derived (Column 4) to show the unutilised air capacities available (Column 3) for air cargo. 
Table S. Development of world' derived scheduled 
international tonne-kilometres (ATKs) for 
air cargo at 100% assumed PAX load factor 
and corresponding freight load factors, 1969 - 1994* 
(in billionS2 of TKs) 
Year ATKs (international) Freight TKs Unutilised %; Freight 
for air cargo at 100t (international) ATKS Load factors 
Pax load factor performed (international) 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 
1969' 13.7 6.1 7.6 44.5 
1970 14.0 6.4 7.6 45.7 
1971 17.2 7.1 10.1 41.3 
1972 19.4 8.3 11.1 42.8 
1973 22.3 10.0 12.3 44.8 
1974 24.2 11.2 13.0 46.3 
1975 26.6 11.6 15.0 43.6 
1976 28.9 13.3 15.6 46.0 
1977 32.1 15.1 17.0 47.0 
1978 34.5 16.9 17.6 49.0 
1979 37.6 18.9 18.7 50.3 
1980 40.4 20.3 20.1 50.2 
1981 43.5 21.7 21.8 49.9 
1982 44.2 22.6 21.6 51.1 
1983 46.6 25.2 21.4 54.1 
1984 50.8 28.9 21.9 56.8 
1985 54.8 29.4 25.4 53.6 
1986 58.1 32.2 25.9 55.4 
1987 64.4 36.7 27.7 57.0 
1988 71.5 41.2 30.3 57.6 
1989 78.0 44.9 33.1 57.6 
1990 84.3 46.3 38.0 54.9 
1991 87.1 46.4 40.7 53.3 
1992 101.7 50.8 50.9 50.0 
1993 102.4 55.6 46.8 54.3 
1994* 108.0 60.0 48.0 55.5 
Source: ICAO Circulars, 158-AT157,177-AT/67,222-AT190, Doc. - 9180119, September 1994. 
1994 figures are forecasted. 
1. includes the Commonwealth of independent States (CIS). 
2. Figures are rounded to the nearest 50 million ATKs and t points to nearest 
one tenth of a percentage point. 
3.1969 figures are based on figures for the same year, in Table 4, page 16. 
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In support of the figures, as computed in Table 5, on the 
previous page, the following exercise is meant to show the 
validity of assuming a 100% passenger load factor in order to 
reach realistic figures showing the minimum level of capacities 
that became available for air cargo every year, starting in 1969. 
In 1984, total TKs available on international scheduled services 
of world airlines, passenger, combi and freighter flights was 
131,050 million TKs. Theoretically, the maximum level of air 
cargo capacities that become available can be shown as an actual 
65% passenger load factor by assuming that the balance of total 
capacities (after deducting that of passenger luggage and mail) 
becomes available for freight only. 
Actual TKs performed, at a 65% passenger load factor, was 50,970 
million TKs. Mail TKs performed was 1,840 million TKs. Net TKs 
assumed to have become available for freight is: 131,050 less 
50,970 less 1,840 = 78,240 million TKs. 
This means that this figure of 78,240 includes the 35% balance of 
unutilised passenger and luggage capacity that was available at 
a 65% passenger load factor, becomes available as additional 
cargo capacity on the main passenger deck as the passenger under- 
deck, freighter and combi flights, capacities are already 
accounted for in the world total TKs available, of 131,050 
million TKs. 
However, this could hold true only if passenger aircraft were 
flexible enough to accommodate an increase in freight loading to 
fill the empty space on board the main passenger deck. In fact, 
this is not the case. A passenger aircraft takes off on schedule 
with a 650-. passenger load factor, regardless of the freight 
availability that is able to fill in the balance of available 
passenger space. 
As such, the passenger airline taking off with a 65% passenger 
load factor is as good as a 100% passenger load factor since the 
balance of passenger space could not be readily converted into 
cargo space and, therefore, . cannot be considered as increased 
cargo capacity. 
The passenger aircraft main deck is for the exclusive use of 
passengers, and cannot be utilised for additional cargo in lieu 
of passengers. Further, bellyholds (underfloor -lower deck- 
cargo compartments) can be fully loaded with cargo and yet with 
much less than full passenger occupancy, i. e. passenger aircraft 
cargo compartments are restricted to maximum cargo loads due to 
their limited underfloor volume capacity and structural floor 
tolerance limitation, and therefore these underfloor cargo 
capacities cannot be expanded to accommodate the additional 
weights that become available as a result of less than full 
passenger load. 
Having determined the freight load factors and the growth of air 
cargo capacities over a 25 year period (1969 - 1994), Table 5 
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page 18, it remains to pinpoint how this growth in cargo capacity 
was spread over various categories of aircraft, regions and 
routes, and how the availability of unutilised cargo capacities 
on certain routes made it possible for the sea-air mode to emerge 
and grow. 
3.2 Distribution of air cargo capacity 
by aircraft category and type. 
Boeing's July 1994 'World Air Cargo Forecast' report states that 
total world international air cargo capacities made available in 
1993, was 203 billion TKAs, while this research defines a figure 
of 102.4 billion TKAs for freight on scheduled international 
world services, for the same year (Table 5, page 18). 
However, ICAO states that a total of 251.6 billion TKs were 
available in 1993 for freight, passenger, baggage and mail (Table 
4, row 8, on page 16). ICAO converted passenger and luggage, at 
a 66% passenger load factor, into tonne-km to equal 97.0 billion 
TKs. Therefore the 'weight' capacity that became available, in 
1993, was 251.6 less 97.0 = 154.6 billion TKAs. This weight 
capacity of 154.6 billion TKs was available not only for freight, 
but also for passengers (the balance of a 66t PAX load factor), 
luggage and mail. Therefore, it cannot be considered as 
exclusively available for freight as analysed and confirmed 
earlier in the previous section. The figure of 102.4 billion TKs 
computed by the researcher is most likely to apply for the total 
world international scheduled air cargo capacities, in 1993. 
The discrepancy of 100.4 billion TKAs, between Boeing and the 
researcher, could be attributed to the following Boeing used 
information received directly from airlines. Their market 
research analysis reflects the addition of Canada and the 
People's Republic of China. Boeing did not qualify figures 
relating to total world available cargo capacity. It should have 
specified inclusion or exclusion of domestic and non-scheduled 
flight capacities. In addition, Boeing included FSU/Mongolia 
(i. e countries of the former Soviet Union and Mongolia) , in their historical world airline RTKs (Revenue Tonne-Kilometres), which 
means that the same was included in the computation of TKAs. 
Further, many references', besides ICAO, were cited in the Boeing 
foreword note, which means non-ICAO members were also included. 
As such, Boeing's figure of 203 billion TKA must have included 
total world available capacity for air cargo without exclusions. 
Boeing's forward note to its annual Spring report states that all data presented in the report 
should be considered as estimates based on Boeing analysis. Boeing data was compiled from Air Transport Association (ATA) 
Association of European Airlines (AEA) 
Boeing Foreign Trade Database (TRADE) 
International Air Transport Association UATA) 
Data Resources Inc. (DRI) 
International Civil Aviation Authority (ICAO) 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
Orient Airline Association (OAA) 
US Department of Transportation Form 41 (DOT) 
Wharton Economic Forecasting Associates 
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Therefore, the researcher's computation of available cargo 
capacities on scheduled international services was considered 
throughout this study, while Boeing's assessment of the spread of 
these capacities, by type of aircraft, was accepted. In 1993, 
the shares were as follows: 
Passenger aircraft share 51*6 
Freighter aircraft share 4296 
Combi (PAX + freight) 706 
According to Boeing's 1994 report, the world freighter fleet 
showed a dramatic increase over the 25 year period under analysis 
- from 'slightly over 100' aircraft in 1969 to 1,008 in 1993. 
An addition of 120 freighter aircraft in 1994 is expected. As 
for the air cargo capacity provided by the then jet freighter 
fleet of B707s and DC8s aircraft, it showed an impressive 
increase from just under 6 billion ATKs in 1969 to 86 billion 
ATKs in 1993, and an anticipated 91 billion ATKs in 1994 (average 
6% increase p. a. ). Growth of world cargo capacity was averaged 
at 5.71 per annum. Compared with 1992 figures, 1993 shows more 
than a 16'6 increase in world air cargo capacity, while the 
freighter fleet share of world air cargo capacity showed a 
negative figure of 20-. less than 1992, as only 85 freighters were 
added to the world fleet in 1993. This simply means that the 
world passenger fleet was the main provider of the 16*-o increase 
in world air cargo capacities. 
Boeing's classification of world freighter aircraft and their 
percentage share of world freighter fleet capacity, by type of 
aircraft, is shown in Figure 1, below, while Table 6, on the 
followingpage, shows, inparticular, the percentage distribution 
of world passenger and freighter aircraft by category, and their 
percentage share of world total cargo capacity. 
Figure 1. Freighter share of world available cargo capacity 
(1993) 
Large size 
> 50 tonnes) 
59% 
Medium size 
30-50 tonnes 
26% 
Large size: B747, B767, DC10, IdDll 
medium size: B707, DC8, A3001310, L-1011, B757 
Small size: B727, B737, DC9 - MDBO, BAe-146 Caravelle. 
Figures in the coloured segments refer to all freighter aircraft of different 
sizes (derived from Table 6 on the following page). 
Small size 
9-30 tonnes) 
15% 
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Table 6. Distribution of available 
world air cargo capacity 
between freighter/passenger services 
( 1993 ) 
100% world aircraft's cargo 
I 
Freighter capacity Pax & Combi share 58% of world total 
capacities hare 42% of world capacity 
total 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 4+7 
Boeing Total Total No. % share V of Total share % of share 
Classification No. of of world of total Pax and of total of total 
of world World freighters freight world Combi freighter world world 
aircraft by Aircraft capacity aircraft aircraft capacity aircraft Aircraft 
cargo capacity 
Small 6,324 476 15t 7.5t 5,848 7.0%- 92.5 100%- 
B727 - 1300 
DC9 - 400 
MD80 - 1139 
B737 - 2540 
BAel46- 245 
Others- 700 
Medium 1,715 357 261; 21%- 1,358 18.0t 79t 100! k 
B707 - 145 
DC8 - 120 
A300 - 430 
A310 - 280 
L1011- 200 
B757 - 540 
Larcte 2,110 175 591; 8k 1,935 75%- 92%- 100%- 
B747 - 1040 
B767 - 590 
DC10 - 330 
MD11 - 150, 
Total 
1 
10,149 
1 
1,008 9,141 100% 100% 
source: Compiled from Boeing's July 1994 World Air Cargo Forecasts and ICAO 
Doc 9180119, Statistical Yearbook, 1993, issued Sept. 1994. 
Column 7 is compiled and computed by the researcher. 
The present tendencies governing the three groups of aircraft can 
be summarised as follows: 
1. Small size aircraft: 
The demand for small freighter aircraft in less developed 
countries, for mainly domestic use, in Africa, Australia, the 
sub-continent of India and some parts of the Middle East, will be 
met primarily by conversion to an all-cargo configuration of the 
passenger aircraft presently in use, such as the B727, B737 and 
DC9s. Some of the 'over 20 years old' B727-100 and DC9s will be 
scrapped or retired completely. 
Medium size aircraft : 
This category will continue to grow, especially in response to a 
growing demand by the integrators, courier operators, and medium 
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size freight operators. The old B707 and DC8s presently dominate 
the scene in this category. However, the world fleet is shifting 
towards a mix of DC8s and many new freighter versions of B757 and 
B767 aircraft. As for the future of the B707 and the DC8s, 
compliance with Stage 3 noise limitations will start the 
elimination process of most of the over 20 year old aircraft. 
Approximately 280 of them are at present in operation. It is 
expected that by the year 2000, as a result of strict enforcement 
of Stage 3 noise limits, the majority of these aircraft will be 
barred from use in North American, European and Pacific Basin 
countries. Many will be diverted for use in South America, 
Africa, the Indian sub-continent, Australia and the Middle East. 
Regardless of this diversion, the operators of these 20 year old 
aircraft must be able to balance their requirement for survival, 
such as: 
1. The relatively high cost of heavy-duty maintenance. 
2. High fuel consumption per block hour. 
3. The high cost of overhauling engines, and in most cases the 
complete replacement of engines, against the acquisition of 
new aircraft, though with much higher capital outlay, but 
rendering : a) low maintenance costs and b) high fuel 
efficiency, low fuel consumption per block hour, 
(approximately 221; less than older generation aircraft). 
The pressure to replace old aircraft will continue growing and 
pressing operators with Stage 3 noise compliance, and the 
consequential high cost of hush-kitting until such time as the 
old aircraft become a burden to its users, regardless of the 
development status of the country of use. 
3. Larqe size aircraft: 
The emergence of long range wide-bodied aircraft, such as the 
Airbus 340, B777, B747-400 and the MD-11, as replacements for the 
L-1011 and DC10s, and B747-100/200/300, is attributed largely to 
the passenger factor, or air travel demand. New Large Aircraft 
(NLA) are emerging in response to the pressing demand for 
a. lower fares. 
b. more non-stop long range flights. 
c. higher frequency of services. 
What concerns this research are the potential huge air cargo 
capacities that are bound to materialise as a result of 
conversion to an all-cargo configuration of a good portion of 
wide-bodied aircraft presently in use for mainly passenger 
traffic. This means that more air cargo capacities will become 
available for the sea-air and direct air freight modes. 
Therefore, a brief analysis of this trend becomes relevant to the 
research. Having defined the air travel quest, the second step is to def ine how the airline industry is responding; what are 
they demanding from the aircraft industry? 
24 
Despite the airline recession and the Arab Gulf War, British 
Airways formed a 'New Large Aircraft' (NLA) project group in 
1991, simply because it was convinced that the B747-400 is too 
small to satisfy its long term needs. Its requirements call for 
a 600 - 900 seat aircraft to be ready by the year 2002. British 
Airways expect this aircraft to weigh 500 tonnes, and have a tail 
as big as the 757 wing, and be able to fly London to Singapore 
non-stop with full passenger and luggage loads, plus 10 tonnes of 
cargo. British Airways wants this aircraft to match 6% average 
passenger growth per year and allow the airline to compete in key 
long range intercontinental markets such as the Pacific Rim 
countries. 
Operating and Manufacturing costs: are emphasised as a major 
concern to the group. Targets were defined to the aircraft 
manufacturers with a focus on : 
Maintenance costs should be minimal during the f irst ten 
years of aircraft use. Longer service times, at lower costs 
than at present applied, should be provided by the 
manufacturers. 
2. Fuel efficiency, i. e. lower fuel consumption per PAX mile. 
3. Usability at current airports and the possibility of 
reducing the present turnround time of the B747 of 105 
minutes to 90 minutes for the 'NLAI. 
4. Reduction of airframe noise to meet stricter requirements of 
Chapter 4 noise standards, over the present 3-4 dB noise 
standard. 
5. The possibility of deleting corrosion inspection during the 
entire life of the aircraft. 
G. Reduction of overall operating costs by 201i of its present 
level. 
7. Acquisition cost: initial capital outlay to the bare minimum 
acceptable to financing entities with prolonged payment 
schedules. 
In short, the group's emphasis focused on reduced maintenance 
costs, and a greater degree of reliability and durability, rather 
than innovations in the cockpit and aircraft systems. 
Boeing highlights the unprecedented advantage of route planning 
flexibility for the new generation aircraft. It places a heavy 
focus on the Pacific Rim destinations : 
1. New direct international flights to the West Coast of North 
America, from Europe and Asia. 
2. New direct domestic flights within Japan, China and the USA. 
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Boeing, Airbus and McDonnell Douglas Industries are still very 
cautious about the NLA. Airbus Managing Director, Mr. Jean 
Pierson, and Boeing President, Mr. Ron Woodward have both stated 
recently (Aviation Week, Nov 21,1994), that airline executives 
are still too focused on the recent recession to decide on the 
size of the forthcoming aircraft. Despite this caution, ICAO 
forecasts orders for the New Large Aircraft to surpass 800 by the 
year 2015. 
ICAO forecasts for the year 2015 are as follows : 
Table 7: World Passenger aircraft 
vis-a-vis seating capacity 
(forecast for the year 2015) 
Small size new 
aircraft 
No. of seats 
No. of 
aircraft 
Large size new 
aircraft 
No. of seats 
No. of 
aircraft 
81 150 7975 301 - 400 2301 
151 210 3450 401 - 600 443 
211 300 3238 601 & over 360 
Total 14,663 3,104 
Source : ComDiled from ICAO Doc. 91 BO119 
Having pinpointed the future trend of the world passenger and 
freighter fleets and anticipated their cargo capacities in 
general, an important aspect of the study remains to be 
determined, and that is the cargo capacities available on both 
passenger and all freighter scheduled international services, and 
their relative distribution by region on major routes, in order 
to trace the development and growth of sea-air intermodality. 
Table 6, page 22, shows the Boeing 1994 spread of the percentage 
shares of world cargo capacities over three categories of 
aircraft, classified according to their use as passengers, 
including combis and freighters. Boeing classification by cargo 
capacity of each category of aircraft can be adjusted to comply 
with the ICAO classification of two main categories, wide and 
narrow bodied aircraft, instead of Boeing's three (small, medium 
and large). 
The Boeing small category can all fit in the ICAO narrow-bodied 
category, while medium and large aircraft can fit in ICAO wide- 
bodied aircraft categories with the exception of three types, the 
B707, the DC8 and the B757; which as passenger aircraft are 
dropped from Boeing's classification and included in the ICAO 
narrow-bodied category, but once converted to all freighter 
configuration, and in terms of cargo capacity that they are able 
to provide, are upgraded to ICAO's wide-bodied category. 
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As per Boeing's Figure 1, page 21, large and medium size 
freighters assume 59% and 26% respectively, of world freighter 
fleet capacity, i. e. 85% for both, while the small (narrow- 
bodied) freighters assumed only 15% of the available world air 
cargo capacity. 
World freighter fleet capacity share is 42-. of the world total 
fleet capacity, including passengers and combis, whose share is 
the balance of 58*-. (Table 6, page 22). Considering that both 
medium and large-size aircraft fall under ICAO wide-bodied 
category, then the world freighter wide-bodied aircraft share is: 
85'-. x 42*1 = 35.7% of world air cargo capacity (Figure 2, below) - 
As for scheduled passenger services, including combis, ICAO wide- 
bodied passenger aircraft provide 93% (18%+75%, Table 6, page 22) 
of cargo capacities available on international passenger 
scheduled services. Therefore, wide-bodied aircraft provide: 93% 
x 58-. = 53.9% as total passenger wide-bodied aircraft share of 
international cargo capacity. Therefore, wide-bodied aircraft 
passenger and cargo flights, provide 53.9% + 35.7% = 89.6% of 
total international cargo capacities. 
Figure 2. Distribution of available world 
cargo capacities between freighter and passenger 
services, by ICAO category of aircraft 
Passenger 
service 
4.1% Freighter 
service 
3% 
Passenger 
service 
Freighter 
service 
35.7% 
Narrow-bodied 
53.9% 
Wide-bodied 
Source: Compiled from Boeing's July 1994 air cargo forecasts, and the ICAO 
9180119 statistical yearbook, 1993 & Sept. 1994 issue, and our work sheets. 
It should be noted here that the impact of wide-bodied aircraft 
was not only felt in the increased cargo capacities that became 
available, but also, and more so, in the increase of actual 
freight tonne performed. Before 19691, freight represented only 
19.0% of the total international weight traffic, while passengers 
by weight, luggage and mail accounted for 81%. The international 
freight weight share grew to 31.2% in 1974 and an estimated 36.6*-o 
in 1994 (Table 8, on the following page). 
In 1968, the total international traffic as per ICAO was 18.7 billion TKPs, while the freight share 
was 3.6 billion TKPs. 
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Table 8. Total international traffic 
and freight share 
(in billions of TKs performed) 
1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 iý9ýt 1994** 
Total intl. traffic 
(PAX+baggage+mail+freight) 
19.5 35.1 60.6 81.7 123.1 4. '*'. 164.8 
Freight 6.1 
. 
11.2 
. 
18.9 
. 
28.9 44.9 55.6 60.3 
k share 31.0%- 
1 
32. Ok 
1 
31.2%- 
1 
3 S. 4! k 36.5%r 
1 ! 3t-*ýý'd 
Source 
1. 
* 
** 
Compiled from ICAO Circulars 158-AT157,1980,222-AT190 1989,244- 
AT199,1993 and 250-AT1102,1994. 
Includes CIS countries 
1993 figures are indicative for deriving 1994 figures. 
1994 figures are forecasted. 
How did this development take place? Which regions of the world 
were relatively more active in generating this increase in 
international freight movement? To what degree, and why? What 
are the routes that showed dense activity in f reight movement, 
and why? To answer these questions, a review of the world fleet 
distribution by category of aircraft, and the regions acquiring 
and operating them, becomes relevant to this study. The 
objective is to trace the development of air cargo capacities on 
international major routes connecting the six main regions of the 
world. 
while accepting the fact that the increase in air cargo capacity 
came in response to growing demand, the supply of freight 
capacities came in much larger volumes than the ability of demand 
to cope. Table 5, page 18, shows that unutilised available 
capacity was 55.51k of total available freight capacity in 1969. 
This percentage declined to 42.411 in 1989 and rose to 45.701 in 
1993, with an expected 44.50-6 in 1994. It remains to be 
determined on what routes the over-supply of capacities was 
available, and how the principle of supply creates its own 
demand' provided the necessary fertile ground for the emergence 
of sea-air intermodality. 
3.3 Distribution of air cargo capacities by region: 
The most important development in the world commercial fleet that 
took place between 1969 and 1994, was the growth of wide-bodied 
aircraft which reflects almost 90t (Figure 2, page 26) of world 
cargo capacities available in 1994. Appendix A' and Figures 3 
and 4, on the next two pages, trace the development and growth of 
the jet fleets of the six main regions of the world, by category 
of aircraft, wide and narrow bodied, and the percentage variation 
of each region's fleet with the rest of the world over a period 
of 25 years, in 5 year growth intervals. 
1. Appendix 1 shows accurate figures of distribution by region of aircraft categories. 
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In 1969, the wide-bodied jets were the exclusive property of 
North American carriers, as they then owned 100% of the total in 
world service. By 1974, this share dropped to 62.7% while that 
of Europe shot up to 21.9%, with both regions assuming 84.6% of 
the world wide-bodied fleet, and, therefore, providing 75.816 
(computed by multiplying 84.6% world wide-bodied fleet by 89.6% 
world international cargo capacity provided by wide-bodied jets; 
of international air cargo capacity. 
Before 1974, international scheduled air cargo capacities were 
provided by mainly the world freighter fleet services, then in 
operation, which consisted largely of B707s, DC8s, B727s, DC10s, 
L-1011 and very few B747 freighters, and to a much smaller extent 
by the very few scheduled international combi flights operated by 
a handful of airlines such as KLM, Air France and Swiss Air, and 
finally by the lower deck cargo compartments of international 
scheduled passenger services. Therefore, a meaningful spread of 
air cargo capacity between wide and narrow-bodied aircraft should 
start with 1974, allowing a few years from the first year of 
entry into world service, for progressive absorption of the then 
new technology aircraft into the world fleet. The new technology 
aircraft were: 
B737 first entry in 1967 
B747 first entry in 1969 
DC10 first entry in 1971 
L-1011 first entry in 1972 
A300 first entry in 1974 
By the year 1979, the dominance of North America and Europe was 
challenged by the newly emerging giant of the Asia-Pacific 
region, whose wide-bodied fleet share of the world total, grew 
from zero in 1969 to 12.3% in 1974 and 20% in 1979, while that of 
Europe and North America declined to 25.4% and 45.5% 
respectively. As a result, three regions dominated 90.9% of the 
world wide-bodied fleet. The increase in the number of wide- 
bodied aircraft from 16 in 1969 to 503 in 1974 and 932 in 1979 
was mainly responsible for the huge air cargo capacities that 
became available on international services. 
Despite the fact that this decade (1969 - 1979) was depressed by 
two periods of fuel price increases, 1974 and 1979, and two world 
wide recessions, which led to a slump in economic activities, 
nevertheless, the growth in air cargo capacities continued 
unabated through the second decade under review (1979 - 1989), 
with a high rate of acquisition of wide-bodied aircraft, 
especially by the Asia Pacific region, which almost equalled 
Europe in 1984 by acquiring 320 wide-bodied aircraft against 350 
for Europe. By 1989, the Asia Pacific region was almost on a par 
with Europe, both assuming respectively, 23.5% and 24% of the 
world wide-bodied fleet. 
For the last 5 year interval under analysis (1989 - 1994), the Asia Pacific region continued its pace of wide-bodied aircraft 
acquisition, and by 1993 its share grew to 25.51ý against 22.6% 
for Europe and 40% for North America. Estimates for 1994 place. 
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Europe at 22.9ý;, North America at 39.6% and the Asia Pacific 
region at 25.9% (Figures 3 and 4, pages 28 and 29 and Appendix 
A) . These three regions of the world actually dominate the world 
wide-bodied fleet share with a total of 88.4% between them. 
Given that 89.6-06 of international cargo capacity is provided by 
the world wide-bodied fleet (Figure 2, page 26), therefore, as 
these three regions together assume 88.4% of world wide-bodied 
fleet, they provided 79.20-. (89.6 x 88.4) of total available 
international air cargo capacity in 1994. 
The percentage share of each region of international air cargo 
capacities (Figure 5, page 31 and Appendix B) was computed based 
on findings in Figure 2, page 26 and Appendix A. Each region's 
percentage share of the world total fleet of wide and narrow- 
bodied aircraft was multiplied by the relative percentage 
capacity that each type of aircraft provides. 
Example: In 1993, Europe's share of the world wide-bodied 
aircraft fleet was 22.6% (Appendix A). Wide-bodied aircraft 
provided 89.6% of world air cargo capacity (Figure 2, page 26), 
therefore Europe's wide-bodied aircraft cargo capacity was 22.6% 
x 89.6% = 20.2%. While its narrow-bodied cargo capacity is its 
share of world narrow bodied total fleet of 25.8% (Appendix A) 
multiplied by the cargo capacity of 10.4! k (Figure 2), which 
equals 2.7%. 
As the spread of wide-bodied aircraft among world regions 
materialised gradually and took form in the 1970s, therefore, a 
realistic spread of world capacities should start with 1974. A 
percentage share of available international cargo capacity for 
each region was computed as per the example above, and tabulated 
in Appendix B. 
3.4 Regional development of air cargo traffic: 
In 1969, Europe alone was the most dominant region in the 
carriage of freight traffic, as it controlled 48.011 of the total 
world international air cargo movement. The second region was 
North America, with control of 29.5% of the world total. Both 
regions carried 77.5% of the world international cargo (Figure 6 
on the following page and Appendix C). By 1979, Europe's share 
dropped to 42.1% and that of North America to 18.7%, giving way 
to the powerful emergence of the Asia Pacific region, claiming 
22-91-6 of the world total, as against a mere 10.3% in 1969. The 
Asia Pacific region airlines grew exceptionally well during the 
first decade of review. They were able to penetrate the international freight market rather rapidly, achieving an annual 
growth rate of 21.1%, much higher than the world average annual 
growth rate of 12.1% for that period. 
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'As a result, there has been a fundamental restructuring of the 
international air freight industry, with the centre of gravity 
shifting towards Asia and the Pacific. As a group, the Asian and 
Pacific carriers overtook North American airlines in the carriage 
of international freight by the end of the 1970s, and they are 
now in the process of rapidly overtaking their European 
counterparts as well'. ' 
The Asia Pacific region's annual growth rate of 13.816 between 
1979 and 1989 gave it a share of 31.4% of international air cargo 
traffic against only 18.5% for North American carriers, while 
Europe maintained a good share by capturing 37.015, with an annual 
growth rate of only 7.7k, well below the world average of 9.2t. 
By 1993, the Asia Pacific region overtook Europe and assumed 
36.226 of world international air cargo traffic, against 34.301 for 
Europe and 17.5% for North American carriers. The trend is 
expected to continue through 1994 with the Asia Pacific region 
assuming approximately 37.0% of the world international freight 
market, with about 34% for Europe and 17.6% for North America. 
Many developments took place in the airline industry, and 
specifically that of Europe and North America, between 1969 - 
1994, which helped the Asia Pacific carriers to penetrate deep 
into the international air cargo traffic market, developing a 
trend of increasing involvement which is expected to continue 
until the end of the century. ICAO forecasts the Asia Pacific 
region to be in control of approximately 42% of the international 
air cargo traffic by the year 2003 (ICAO Circular PIO 10-94). 
The phenomenal growth rate of airlines of the Asia Pacif ic region 
was supported indirectly by a relative decline in interest by the 
North American and European carriers on two major route groups; 
the North Atlantic and the intra-European. 
Table 9. Percentage of world international 
scheduled air cargo traffic on the 
North Atlantic & Intra-European route groups 
1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 19941 
North Atlantic 
Freight tonne-km 42.0916 38.0% 23.0% 25.3% 27.0% 25.6% 
_Annual 
growth rate 
- ---------- ----------- --- 
5 *_5 % -- ---------- --- 
7-. Olc 
- ----------- 
Intra European 
Freight tonne-km 7.0 9111; 4.0561 2.8% 
- 
Annual growth 
- 
rate_ - - 
__7. _5P6 
5.516 
Lvmpaaeu, compurea ana ranu. Latea rrom L(; Au L; 2rcu. Lar L-ýd - A11DI, -C", c AT190,237-AT196 and Doc 9280119, and World Air Transport statistics 
No. 38 Wats 6194. 
2994 figures are forecasted. 
Doganis, Rii-a-s(1991), IFFy-ing Off Course', pages 316 - 317, second edition reprinted in 1992 by Routledge, 11 New Fetter lane, London. 
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1. The North Atlantic route group suffered most as they lost 
190i of their share of total international air cargo traffic, 
dropping from 420ý to 2M;, between 1969 and 1979 (Table 9 on page 
34). However, a small part of this loss, that of 4%, was 
regained by 1989 to reach 27%. This share is expected to decline 
again to 25% by 1994. 
The sharp decline in interest on this route group was largely due 
to the highly de-regulated market of the North American region, 
a fact that accelerated the growth of unscheduled services, and 
at the same time opened the doors for the immediate entry of the 
Asia-Pacific region's carriers. 
In 1969, the non-scheduled share was 26.2% of total passengers 
and cargo carried, and grew to its highest ever of 29.301 in 1971 
and started dropping gradually to 24.601 in 1974, and to 
approximately 14.8-06 in 1979. The declining trend continued 
through the 1980s claiming 12.1% in 1984, and fluctuated between 
7% and 10% for the rest of the period, stabilising at 7.0% in 
1989. In 1993, the share of non-scheduled services on this route 
group grew to 10.5% and is expected not to exceed 11.00i in 1994. 
The decline in non-scheduled services came about as a result of 
a shift of focus to domestic services, which took place in 
response to pressing regional requirements to provide regular 
non-stop services to many North American city-pair markets, too 
small to be serviced by large wide-bodied passenger aircraft. 
This particular development was mainly responsible for the 
increased orders for smaller, narrow-bodied aircraft within the 
75 - 150 seats range. As such, belly-hold cargo capacities on 
these aircraft were of no significance to regional and 
international air cargo movement. 
However, this was followed by an increase in demand for narrow- 
bodied cargo aircraft, by the newly emerging 'parcel express 
airlines', firstly in North America and secondly in Europe. 
These new airlines grew fast, and by 1989 they operated a huge 
fleet of narrow-bodied cargo jets providing overnight deliveries 
within their region, and second day inter- continental deliveries 
via strategically located sorting hubs. 
North America's narrow-bodied aircraft fleet grew from 46.4% in 
1979 to 53.550ý in 1989, and an expected 50.201ý in 1994, while that 
of Europe grew by 12%, assuming 27.9% in 1979 and 23.8% in 1989, 
and is expected to assume a share of 25.7% in 1994 (Appendix A) - 
2. The intra-European route groups suffered as well. Their 
share of intra-European cargo traffic, considered international 
on the European level, dropped almost 43% from 7t in 1969 to 4t 
in 1979. The downward trend continued, to reach 2.8t in 1989. 
This development was mainly due to two major factors: 
a. The European non-scheduled services had a relatively larger 
slice of this market. Their share almost doubled by 1979 
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and assumed 40'16 of the total traffic carried, with a growing 
trend that claimed 42%; in 1984, and reached its peak of 
50.3SI; in 1989. The period between 1989 and 1992 was 
characterised by the Arab Gulf crisis and fuel price 
increases, whereby economic development, especially that of 
the airline industry, was stagnant, operating at almost the 
break-even point, or even making losses. As a result, there 
was a shift of emphasis of the scheduled European carriers 
to their own domestic market. From then onward, a 
declining trend started to take shape as the growth of 
unscheduled services was checked. The non-scheduled 
services' share of the market had a very sharp drop to less 
than 10-a of the total European domestic traffic, and in 1993 
assumed a humble share of only 3! k. By 1992, the domestic 
charter operators had almost disappeared from the European 
market. 
b. The growth and reliability of the European overland 
transport system witnessed great improvements in the 
motorways and railway networks. Therefore, starting in 
1974, there began a gradual shift to overland transport in 
the handling procedures of international air cargo traffic 
arriving or departing major European gateways. As distances 
between major European cities are relatively short, many 
European airlines started an overland freight interchange 
facility of their own, a trucking hub, for their regional 
distribution of international cargo imports to any point in 
Europe, and at the same time, serving their international 
cargo exports to any point in the world. 
The system operates as follows: Exports are handled through 
the pick up of any shipment f rom any point in Europe by 
truck to the interchange facility where the shipment is 
sorted, labelled, marked and numbered and built into a 
relevant container ready for onward carriage, regionally by 
truck to its destination, and internationally by truck, from 
the interchange facility to the international exit gateway 
airport for immediate uplift to its final destination on a 
pre-booked international flight. 
Cargo imports are handled through the pick-up, by truck, of 
shipments as they are off loaded from arriving international 
scheduled flights into Europe's major entry gateway 
airports, to the interchange facility or the trucking hub of 
the relevant airline, where further distribution by truck, 
to any point in Europe (as final destination), takes place 
on scheduled and numbered trips. British Airways operates 
a European trucking inter-change hub at Maastricht, KLM at 
Amsterdam and Ghotenburg, Lufthansa at Frankfurt. Many 
other freighter airlines use Ostend, Amsterdam and Brussels 
as their interchange point. 
The Asia-Pacific carriers either took advantage of the already 
established European trucking hubs, by using them in agreement 
with the European airlines operating them; such as China Airlines 
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using the trucking system of Cargolux at Luxembourg, or by 
establishing their own trucking hub; as did Singapore Airlines 
and Cathay Pacific, using their own fleet of trucks, the first 
from/to Amsterdam, Brussels, Frankfurt and Manchester, and the 
latter from/to Frankfurt, for further inland distribution and 
collection of their cargoes. Some Asia-Pacific airlines use 
both, i. e. the European trucking system and their own, such as 
Air Hong Kong, an entirely wide-bodied freighter airline, which 
maintains regular frequencies into Manchester and Brussels, uses 
its own trucking fleet from/to Manchester, and the Sabena 
trucking system from/to Brussels Airport. 
3. other factors which helped the growth of the Asia Pacific 
region were partly due to a change in demand patterns by the 
European and North American consumers. The demand 
increased, for manufactured goods produced in the Asia 
Pacific region, though they were supplied in the early 1970s 
at a lower degree of quality, as compared with similar 
commodities produced in Europe and North America, but at a 
much lower price in the market place. Gradually, Asia 
Pacific's improved quality products replaced a large part of 
the European and North American products in the market place 
of both. 
The implications of this analysis are clear. The European and 
North American carriers, greater involvement with their own 
domestic services, left much ground to be explored and invaded by 
other regions of the world, led by the Asia Pacific region. 
The productivity of each of the world's six regions must be 
analysed in relation to their share of available international 
cargo capacities vis-d-vis actual freight performance in terms of 
tonne-kilometres, in order to derive relevant freight load 
factors and identify regions and routes where unutilised cargo 
capacities become available, and therefore present the 
possibilities of sea-air intermodality to step in. 
As seen in Figures 7 and 8 on the next two pages, and as 
tabulated in Appendix D, the lowest freight load factor falls in 
the region of North America, providing the highest unutilised 
cargo capacity at an average of 75%ý, followed by the Middle East 
and Africa, with over 5011 unutilised cargo capacities each. The 
regions with the highest freight load factor, and therefore the 
lowest unutilised capacity are those of the Asia-PacifiC region, 
Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean. 
The question is, on what route groups is sea-air intermodality 
most likely to develop? Route groups between regions provide a 
scheduled network of international services, connecting at least 
two of the six regions of the world with each other, while route 
groups within a region provide connections among the countries of 
that region. Route groups between regions are serviced by large 
wide-bodied aircraft, while route groups within a region are 
mostly served by narrow-bodied ones. 
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High volume, high yield route groups are characterised by a high 
number of scheduled flight frequencies. High volumes of 
passenger and cargo traffic materialise between those regions of 
the world with relatively high rates of economic activity, 
availing their population with high per capita income and, 
therefore, strong purchasing power, that makes possible frequent 
passenger travel by air, for business or pleasure. 
As for cargo traffic, given the natural, economic and human 
resources of a region, economic development entails that 
countries should specialise in the production of goods that are 
best produced in their own region, in quantities enough to 
satisfy domestic demand, and at the same time, export the surplus 
to international markets. The part of international trade 
involving the exchange of quality, specialised products is air 
freighted between countries and regions, in both directions. 
Some countries tend to export more than they import, and, as 
such, a directional imbalance of air cargo traffic flow, in 
favour of the country with the higher exports, takes place. 
Countries with low air exports suffer most as they end up with a 
high rate of unutilised air cargo capacities on route groups 
connecting them internally with other countries of their own 
region, or externally with countries of different regions. 
Each region's percentage share of total available international 
scheduled air cargo capacity, in relation to actual cargo 
handled, is shown in Appendix D, together with the region's 
freight load factor and the degree of cargo capacity utilisation. 
Regions having a regularly high degree of unutilised cargo 
capacity are best suited for the introduction and development of 
sea-air cargo movement. 
To identify the route groups with the highest degree of 
unutilised cargo capacity, the years 1993 and 1994 are taken as 
examples, to show the changes in the degree of capacity 
utilisation. The region's route groups' capacity utilisation 
trend is then traced over a twenty' year period as shown in 
Appendix D. 
North American Route GrouiDs: 
The major route groups connecting North America with the rest of 
the world are in fact those of Western Europe and the Asia- 
Pacific, while the rest contribute less than one percentage point 
of total world international scheduled air cargo tonnage handled. 
Twenty year period starting in 1974, because 1969 -1974 represent a period of acquisition by worl3 airlines of the then new wide-bodied aircraft introduced in 1969. 
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Table 10. North American Route Groups % share of 
world total international scheduled cargo traffic 
Route groups 1993 1994 
North America Inbound outbound Total Inbound outbound Total 
1. Western Europe 5.0% 4.2% 9.2% 5. Vk 4.0%- 9. Vk 
2. Asia Pacific- 
a. N. E. Asia 4.5% 2.6% 7. Vk 4.81; 2.6% 7.4k 
b. S. W. Pacific 0.2% 0.2V 0.41; 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 
3. South America 0.3% 0.4V 0.7V 0.3%- 0.4% 0.7% 
4. Rest of the World 0.1%- 0. Vk 0.2%- 0.1%- 0.1* 0.2* 
Total 10. Vk 7.5% 17.6% 10.5k 7.3% 17.8% 
N. American TKPS share 
(millions) 9,800 10,600 
Total international 
scheduled TKPs (millions) 55,600 60,300 
Source: Derived and computed from IATA Industry Statistics 1-994, JATA 
Industry Automation and Finance Services International traffic 
forecasts, October 1994 and ICAO publications 158-ATItt, 222-AT190 
and Statistical Yearbook Doc 9180119 September 1994 and Appendix D. 
Notes: 
1. XATA Route group percentage share of inboundloutbound cargo traffic between 
regions, computed, adjusted and applied to ICAO actual regional performance 
in tonne-kilometres. 
2. This source and note I apply to the rest of the Tables in this section. 
Those two route groups' international scheduled air cargo 
activity with North America constituted 16.3k in 1993 and 16.5k 
in 1994 of its total share of 17.6k and 17.8k respectively. This 
means that 92.6k of total north American air cargo movements is 
carried out by these two major regions. 
The figures, as computed in Table 10, above, show that the 
imbalance of international trade was recurrent on two major North 
American route groups, in favour of air imports, with Europe 
having a balance of 0.8% and 1.1% in 1993 and 1994 respectively, 
in its favour, while this margin almost doubles in the case of 
North-East Asia, of 1.9k in 1993 and 2.2% in 1994. Though the 
directional imbalance is within a meagre 2%, it becomes a real 
problem when the phenomenal air cargo capacity of the North 
American region is related to actual tonnage handled. Freight 
load factors derived for the years 1993 and 1994 show a very low 
utilisation degree at 23.3k and 24.1%, respectively (Appendix D) . 
Reviewing Appendix D, the North American region suffers from the 
regularity of unutilised cargo capacities, beginning in 1974 at 
78.8%, with noticeable improvements in 1984 and 1989, but 
nevertheless, unutilised air cargo capacities remained at 75.9% 
in 1994. Most of these unutilised capacities materialise on the 
outbound routes from North America to Europe and North-E Asia. 
The unutilised capacities can be utilised through the introduction of sea-air intermodality on air routes connecting 
North America with Europe, with cargoes originating in the Asia- 
Pacific region, and ocean-shipped to a qualified North American 
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sea-air transfer port, for onward uplift to Europe, while the 
imbalance with North-east Asia can only be rectified through the 
conversion of a portion of high value ocean export traffic bound 
for North-East Asia, to the direct air freight mode. 
European Route Groups: 
Major route groups connect European countries with each other, on 
the one hand, and with the rest of the world, on the other. 
Large volumes of international cargo traf f ic flow between Europe, 
Asia-Pacific and North America. These volumes decrease 
drastically between the other three regions of the world and 
Europe, as shown in Table 11 below. 
Table 11. Western Europe Route Groups % share of 
of world total international scheduled cargo traffic 
Routs groups 
Western Europe 
1. Within Europe 
2. North America 
3. Asia-Pacific 
a. N. E. Asia 
b. S. E. Asia 
c. S. W. Pacific 
4. South America 
5. Middle East 
6. Africa 
Total 
W. European TKPS share 
(millions) 
Total international 
scheduled TKPs (millions) 
gource: Same as Table 
1993 
Inbound Outbound Total 
3. Sk 3. lik 6.6% 
4.2%, 5. Ot 9.2% 
3.9% 3.2%- 7.1%- 
2 . 4% 1.3 %r 3.7%r 0.2% 0.11; 0.3%- 
0.81; 0.7%- 1.5% 
1.61; 2.3%- 3.8% 
0.4% 1.5%. 1.9k 
17.0%- 17.2k 34.2% 
19,000 
55,600 
10 on page 41. 
1994 
Inbound Outbound Total 
3.5%- 2.8%- 6.3%- 
4.01; 5.196 9.1%* 
4.3%- 2.8%* 7. lt 
2. Olk 1.3%- 3.3%* 
0.21k 0. Vk 0.3%; 
1. ot 0.71; 1.7% 
1.7% 2.491 4. Ilk 
0.4% 1.5% 1.9%. 
17.1% 16 . 7% 33.8% 
20,400 
60,300 
Europe's share of international scheduled air cargo capacities 
was 22.9% in 1993 and 23.2k in 1994, and it handled almost double 
the North American tonnage, with slightly over half of the North 
American air cargo capacity (Appendix D). Europe's total 
international scheduled air cargo capacity is balanced, over the 
two year period of analysis, at 17.016 in both directions. 
However, Europe/Asia-Pacific route groups show an imbalance in 
favour of Asia in general; with North-East Asia at 0.7% and 1.5% 
in 1993 and 1994 respectively, and South-East Asia at 1.1% and 
0.7k for the same years. This imbalance can only be rectified 
through activating and motivating Asian demand for European air 
export products, and by converting high value ocean exports 
direct to the air freight mode. Sea-air intermodality has no 
grounds for development on these routes. 
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Other route groups connecting Europe with South America, are 
almost balanced, while route groups for Africa and the Middle 
East show an imbalance in favour of Europe, which means that 
unutilised air cargo capacities are available from those areas to 
Europe, and, as such, present the possibility of sea-air 
intermodality to be introduced via qualified African and Middle 
eastern sea-air ports. 
Asia-Pacific Route Groups: 
This region is in fact the fastest growing and most active in the 
world, assuming 36.316 and 37.016 of the total international 
scheduled cargo movements in 1993 and 1994 respectively. 
Appendix D shows the actual growth in tonne-kilometres performed, 
from 2.1 billion in 1974 to 22.3 in 1994, a growth rate of 10.6 
times over the whole period. 
Table 12. Asia-Pacific Route Groups % share of 
world total international scheduled cargo traffic 
Routs groups 1993 
Asia-Pacific Inbound Outbound Total 
a. North East Asia 
1. Within N. E. Asia 1.6% 1.9% 3.5%- 
2. S. E. Asia 2.0%- 1.74k 3.7% 
3. S. W. Pacific 0.4%- 0.5%- 0.9%- 
4. Western Europe 3.2%- 3.9% 7.1%- 
5. North America 2.6k 4.5% 7.1%- 
6. Middle East - 0.2% 0.2% 
Total 9.8% 12.7% 22.5% 
b. South East Asia 
1. Within S. E. Asia 0.8%- 0.9% 1.71; 
2. N. E. Asia 1.3% 2.4% 3.71; 
3. S. W. Pacific 0.5%; 0.5%. 1.0% 
4. Western Europe 1.31; 2.4% 3.7%- 
5. Middle East - 0.21; 0.21; 
Total 4.3% 6.0% 10.3% 
C. South West Pacific 
1. Within S. W. Pacific 0.5% 0.4% 0.9% 
2. N. E. Asia 0.5% 0.4%, 0.9%; 
3. S. E. Asia 0.5% 0.5% 1.0% 
4. North America 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 
5. Western Europe 0.11; 0.2%- 0.3%- 
Total 1.8% 1.7% 3.5% 
Asia-Pacific grand total 15.9% 20.4% 36.3% 
Asia-Pacific TKPS share 
(millions) 20,200 
Total international 
scheduled TKPs (millions) 55,600 
1994 
Inbound Outbound Total 
1. st- 1.8! k 3.6! k 
2.0% 1.8% 3.8% 
0.4! k 0.5%- 0.9% 
2.8%- 4.3% 7.1% 
2.6! k 4.8%r 7.4% 
- 0.2% 0.2% 
9.6% 13.4% 23.0% 
0.8% 1. ot 1.8%r 
1.8% 2. Ot 3.8% 
0.7% 0.5% 1.2% 
1.3% 2.0%* 3.3! k 
- 0.2%r 0.2% 
4.6% 5.7% 10.3% 
0.5! k 0.4% 0.9% 
0.5% 0.4% 0.9% 
0.5%. 0.7%- 1.2! k 
0.2% 0.2! k 0.4%- 
0.1% 0.2% 0.3! k 
1.8% 1.9% 3.7% 
16.0% 21.0% 37.0% 
22,300 
60,300 
Source: Same as Table 10, page 41. 
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Due to the relatively large geographic area, the long distances 
that must be flown to connect various countries of this region 
and the newly earned wealth of its dense population, three major 
route groups connect the Asia-Pacific region with each other and 
with the rest of the world. 
Within the region, North-East Asia route groups handle the 
largest volume of freight movement of 62.216 of the region's 
total, -while South-East Asia route groups handle 27.8! k and that 
of the South-West Pacific hover around the 10.01i mark. Its share 
of the world total is spread over route groups as follows: 
1993 1994 
1. within Asia-Pacific 17.3% 18.1% 
2. with Europe 11.1% 10.7% 
3. with North America 7.5% 7.8% 
4. with the Middle East 0.4% 0.4% 
36.3% 37.0% 
This means that approximately 50t of the Asia-Pacific share of 
36.301 and 37.0% occurs within the region itself, and the balance 
with mainly Europe, North America and to a much lesser extent, 
the Middle East. 
The Asia-Pacific region enjoys a net imbalance in its favour, 
with all three regions, of 4.2t and 4.9t of total international 
scheduled cargo traffic, for the two years under analysis: 
1993 1994 
1. N. E. Asia with Europe at 0.716 1.5! k 
2. N. E. Asia with N. America at 1.9! k 2.2! k 
3. S. E. Asia with Europe at 1.1! k 0.7! k 
4. S. W. Pacific with Europe at O. vk 0.196 
5. N. & S. E. Asia with the M. E. at 0.4%ý 0.4! k 
4.216 4.9! k 
The increase in the net imbalance of 0.7% during one year, 
between 1993 and 1994, shows that the trend of increased Asia air 
exports versus air imports is growing fast. Most of the net 
additional growth occurred with Europe and North America, while 
the net imbalance with the Middle East remained stable. 
This means that Europe and North America are increasing their air 
imports vis-d-vis air exports, from/to the Asia-Pacific region. 
Therefore, more unutilised air cargo capacities become available 
from North America, Europe and the Middle East to the Asia- 
Pacific region, and therefore present fertile ground for the introduction of sea-air as fill-in cargo. The conversion of a 
portion of high value ocean cargo traffic, bound for the Asia- 
Pacific region, to the sea-air mode, would help to partially 
rectify this imbalance. 
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Other Route Grouvs: 
The remaining three regions of the world, namely the Middle east, 
Africa and South America, assume altogether less than 12t of the 
total international scheduled cargo activity. 
The Middle East Route Group: 
As shown in Table 13 below, the Middle East region assumes over 
42! k of the remaining three region's total international cargo 
traffic, and has a much wider connection of route groups with 
Europe, North/South east Asia, Africa and the rest of the world, 
which includes North America and the South West Pacific. 
The Middle East region is largely an importing one, showing 
regular imbalance with North/South East Asia and Europe. The 
only imbalance in its favour is shown on route groups connecting 
it with Africa and the 'Rest of the World' . Because of its 
geographic location, 'midway' between the routes connecting the 
Asia-Pacific with Europe and Africa, most of the Middle-East's 
outbound cargo traffic is transit freight, originating in the 
Asia-Pacific region or Europe. As such, it presents a 
strategically ideal location for sea-air intermodality to develop 
and grow. 
The people of the Middle East region are traditionally classified 
as 'consuming, people, who import most of their needs from mainly 
Europe, North America and Asia-Pacific. The region's oil 
industry dominates its economic activity to a very large extent. 
Light industries in the 'wearing apparel, field, such as the 
readymade garments industry, extending to shoe factories, 
furniture industries, etc. mushroomed from the 1980s onwards, and 
the products are partly air-exported to North America, Europe and 
Africa, thus marginally helping to rectify the regularity of its 
imbalance with these regions, especially with Europe. 
Table 13. Middle East Route Groups % share of 
world total international scheduled cargo traffic 
Route groups 1993 1994 
Middle East Inbound Outbound Total Inbound Outbound Total 
1. Europe 2.3%- 1.6% 3.9% 2.4% 1.7% 4.1V 
2. N. E. Asia 0.2%- 0.0% 0.2%- 0.2k 0. Ok 0.2% 
3. S. E. Asia 0.2% 0.0% 0.2! k 0.2%- 0.01; 0.2% 
4. Africa 0. Vk 0.2% 0.3%- 0.1%, 0.1% 0.2% 
5. Rest of the World 0.1%; 0.3%- 0.4%- 0.1%- 0.1%. 0.2%; 
Total 2.9%- 2.1%- T0 %- 3.0% 1.9% 4.9% 
Middle East TKPS share 
(millions) 2,800 3,000 
Total international 
scheduled TKPs (millions) 55,600 60,300 
Source: Same as Table 10, page 41. 
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Africa Route Group : 
As seen in Table 14 below, almost all of Africa's international 
scheduled cargo movement falls under the domain of Europe, and 
suffers a chronic imbalance, greatly in favour of Europe. it 
presents very good grounds for the introduction and development 
of the sea-air mode via a qualified African sea-air transfer 
port, mainly for re-distribution by air to various landlocked 
African states. 
The imbalance on the international route groups, connecting 
Africa with Europe, are bound to remain in Europe's favour for a 
long time to come, as African industries are still very primitive 
and barely able to cope with domestic demand. 
Table 14. Africa Route Groups % share of 
world total international scheduled cargo traffic 
Route groups 1993 1994 
Africa Inbound Outbound Total Inbound Outbound Total 
1. Europe 1.5! k 0.4%- 1.9! k 1.5%, 0.4t 1.9! k 
2. Middle East 0.2? k 0.1t 0.3%o 0. Vk 0. Vk 0.2! k 
Total 1.7! k 0.5% 2.2V 1.6% 0.5t 2. Vk 
Africa' TKPS share 
(millions) 1,200 1,300 
Total international 
scheduled TKPs (millions) 55,600 60,300 
Source: Same as Table 10, page 41. 
South America Route Groulo : 
The South American region has, however, demonstrated a remarkable 
activity of balancing cargo movements on its route groups, to one 
tenth of a percentage point. This is mainly due to the high air 
exports of perishables such as general foodstuffs, meat, fresh 
fruits, vegetables, flowers, plants and the like, to North 
America and Europe, who dominate the international scheduled 
cargo traffic with South America. 
It should be noted that over 5016 of South American international 
scheduled cargo traffic occurs within the region itself (Table 15 
on page 4 7) . The introduction and development of sea-air intermodality in this market depends largely on the North 
American demand for Latin American products. A large number of 
Latin Americans are permanently residing in North America, and 
hold strong ties to their Latin American roots, resulting in a 
continuous and growing demand for their original home products. 
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For example, hundreds of cargo flights depart Miami Airport every 
day to points in South America to bring back highly demanded 
foodstuffs and perishables. The possibilities for sea-air cargo 
exists as optional fill-in, cargo on the first leg of the 
journey from North America to south America. 
Table 15. South America Route Groups % share of 
world total international scheduled cargo traffic 
Route groups 1993 1994 
South America Inbound outbound Total Inbound outbound Total 
1. Within S. America 1.3%- 1.2%, 2.5;; 1.0%* 1.0%- 2. O! k 
2. N. America 0.4! k 0.3;; 0.7! k 0.4! k 0.3! k 0.7%- 
5. Europe 0.7%- 0.8%. 1.5%- 0.7%- 1. O! k 1.7%- 
Total 2.41; 2.3t 4.7t 2. Vk 2.3! k 4.4! k 
South America TKPs share 
(millions) 2,600 2,800 
Total international 
scheduled TKPs (millions) 55,600 60,300 
Source: Same as Table 10, page 41. 
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Below is a summary of major world cargo traffic flows 
between regions, as a percentage of ICAO total 
scheduled international cargo traffic performed in 
TKs, 1994. 
Figure 9: 
Notes: 
1 Traffic flows between regions less than 0.1t are not shown (totalling 0.4t 
recorded under'Rest of the World' in Tables 10 and 13 on pages 41 and 45 
respectively). 
2. Traffic within regions shown in boxes. 
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Major potential sea-air routes 
Figure 10 : 
ep, 
1. North American sea-air routes via North America: 
Cargo arrives at North American ports by ocean from Asia, 
and departs by air to Europe and South America. 
2. European sea-air routes via Africa: 
Cargo arrives at African or Middle Eastern ports by ocean, 
and departs by air to various states within Africa. 
3. European sea-air routes via the Middle East: 
Cargo arrives from Europe to Middle Eastern ports by ocean, 
and departs by air to the Asia-Pacific region. 
4. The Asian sea-air routes via the Middle East: 
Cargo arrives at Middle Eastern ports by ocean from Asia, 
and departs by air to Europe and Africa. 
5. The Asian sea-air routes via Africa: 
Cargo arrives at African ports by ocean from Asia, and 
departs by air to various states within Africa. 
Part II: Analysis of sea-air routes. 
0 LO 
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Chapter 4 
Sea-air intermodality - history and 
development, the early routes. 
After the Second World war, several combined sea-air services 
were attempted in the international transport system. These 
attempts, on different routes, were pioneered by freight 
forwarders and NVOCCs, in co-operation with air carriers, and to 
a lesser extent with shipping lines'. 
4.1 The sea-air route from Europe to South America 
In 1955, the freight forwarding agency IKuhne and Nagel' 
established a sea-air service to South America via New York as a 
transfer port. They named the service I Sea-air Express I. The 
sea-air route started from factories in West Germany to the 
gateway port of Hamburg. Cargo moved on the first leg of the 
journey, from Hamburg to New York by ocean, and from New York, by 
air, to various destinations in south America. The whole journey 
from origin to destination consumed a transit time of 13 to 16 
days. The basic element that was considered at that time was to 
decrease the cost of transportation, as compared with direct air 
freight cost. 
The extension of transport time was a disadvantage in relation to 
direct air freight - 13 to 16 days for sea-air, as compared with 
3 to 4 days for direct air freight. But the sea-air transit time 
still had a clear advantage over all ocean transport time of 35 
to 40 days. However, it must be stressed that most of the 
freight that moved via the sea-air mode, during the period 1955 
to 1970, was cargo that would have moved by direct air freight, 
where air cargo capacities were available, rather than by direct 
ocean. But aircraft serving flights between Germany and South 
America were still mainly narrow-bodied and were unable to cope 
with cargo demand at that time. It was the first time a combined 
transport project was initiated by a freight forwarder. 
1 Tsuneo Tanasa, (1988) 'Sea-Air - The New Opportunities', a research presented at the 'Pacific Transport Freight Seminar,, Raffles City, Singapore, 20 - 23 June, 1988. 
2. 'Sea-air Cargo - an Introduction' (1988), Vereingte Motor-Verlage GmbH & Company, Stuttgart, 
Germany. 
52 
4.2 The Europe - Africa route 
From 1955 onward, and until the late 1960s, many sea-air services 
were initiated between Europe and Africa. Sabena, the Belgian 
airline, in co-operation with a number of freight forwarders, was 
the launching airline for this type of transportation between 
Europe and the Congo (now Zaire). Sea-air service from Belgium 
to the Congo (Zaire) was offered for several years starting from 
1955 until 1965. Cargo moved by ocean from Antwerp to the port 
of Matadi, then onward by air to various inland points. This 
service was limited to the availability of cargo space on flights 
from Matadi to various Belgian-controlled areas in Africa. 
The French airline UTA followed the Belgians, and in co-operation 
with 'Companie Maritime des Charges Reunis', offered a similar 
sea-air service from the port of Marseilles, as a gateway port, 
to points in French controlled central Africa. This service, 
like Sabena, had many disadvantages, the major one being the very 
limited air cargo space that was available from the transfer port 
to points inland. 
It should be noted that not all these attempts at intermodality 
were directed at decreasing the cost of transportation. Many 
destinations in Africa were very difficult to serve by 
conventional means of transport, such as direct ocean shipping 
and direct air freight. Shipping lines were serving the main 
gateway ports of Africa as a whole. From the gateway ports to 
points inland, overland services (whether by truck or by rail) 
were either non-existent or very poor. The same was true for air 
carriers who served main or capital cities of Africa with narrow 
bodied aircraft, which had very limited cargo space that was 
sold, in most cases, to the passengers in the form of 
unaccompanied cargo. 
Such was the air-sea service offered by Air France from London to 
Algeria, via Marseilles, as a transfer port. This service was 
started in the late 1950s and continued until 1965. The 
frequency of flights from London to Algeria was low, two to three 
flights per week, with very narrow bodied aircraft and hardly any 
cargo capacities. Further, cargo space was heavily overbooked by 
the passengers themselves. 
During the period between 1958 to 1965, the air-sea service by 
Air France came about as a direct response to market demand. On 
the first leg of the journey, cargo was carried by air from 
London to Marseilles, while cargo on the second segment of the 
journey, from Marseilles to Algeria, was carried by sea. The 
combined transport service resulted in a higher cost than direct 
air freight, but amazingly the objective of introducing this 
particular air-sea service was to reduce the duration of direct 
air freight transit time, rather than direct ocean shipping 
transit time. Direct air freight from London to Algeria was 
restricted to a very few flights, and so plagued with overbooking 
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that shipments had to wait at London Airport' for 14 to 21 days, 
and during the summer season, up to 25 days. The air-sea service 
by Air France reduced the transit time to an average of 9 days 
via Marseille. 
All these intermodal services from Europe to Africa faded away 
during the late 1960s, and early 1970s. The introduction of 
wide-bodied aircraft, namely the B 747, together with the large 
and fast container ships, had an impact on the gradual 
disappearance of these services. 
Pure cargo flights, using wide-bodied aircraft (B 747s) , were 
introduced by the Belgian airline Sabena from Brussels to Central 
Africa, namely Zaire and other cities. UTA followed suit in the 
early 1970s, introducing similar flights to Brazaville and many 
other French controlled points in Africa. 
Portuguese airlines also started direct wide-bodied flights to 
points under their influence in Africa. Shipping lines using 
large and fast container ships started calling at African ports 
and delivering cargoes in containers further inland, either on 
their own trucking fleets, or on hired ones with much less 
dependence on the then available services of the largely 
antiquated African railway systems. Infrastructure developments 
in Africa, in terms of advanced airports and ports, cargo 
handling facilities, construction of modern motorways and 
railways did contribute to the changes that occurred, slowly and 
gradually from the early 1970s to the present day in 1994. 
1. From an interview with the Regional Director, Air France in U. K., August 1988. 
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Chapter 5 
The Western routes via North America 
Far East to Europe 
Introduction 
The emergence and development of the sea-air cargo flow, via the 
North American west coast', was prompted by the introduction of 
wide bodied aircraft in the late 1960s, first in N. America, and 
gradually to the rest of the world, resulting in the availability 
of huge air cargo capacities from points on the west coast to 
points on the east coast and Europe. Low cargo rates were 
offered in the market to fill in the unutilised air capacities 
that became suddenly available on all airline flight services 
using wide-bodied jets. 
The availability of huge air cargo capacities, from the west 
coast, was mainly due to the fact that the majority of heavy 
industries are located on the east coast of America, Europe and 
the Far East, and therefore the flow of goods by air from those 
areas to the rest of the world was by far greater than on the 
return leg. This was what caused the imbalance in the two way 
air cargo traffic. 
Sea-air cargo was developed from the Far East mainly from Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan, as an option to direct air freight which 
was very CoStly2. Sea-air was also developed as an option to the 
long transit time of ocean freight of 7 to 8 weeks. Cargo moved 
by ocean to the west coast main gateways, then transferred on to 
railways or truck trailers to points in the American continent. 
Cargo bound for Europe was either air freighted directly from the 
west coast airports or from the east coast airports after a long 
journey overland. This field research on sea-air transfer ports 
of North America covers Vancouver, Seattle, Los Angeles, San 
Francisco on the west coast, and Miami on the east coast. it 
should be noted that from the San Francisco Bay area, freight 
volume is very small in relation to other transfer ports, due 
mainly to limited shipping line services, and the lack of 
interest in sea-air cargo by the American carriers. 
A note on methodology 
In the section that follows, a detailed analysis of each of the 
current world active sea-air transfer hubs is made. Much of the 
data required for the analysis was either lacking or totally 
inaccurate, from the sources approached, especially some Port 
1. uray, T. (1986) ýwhy the Sea-Air Concept is Taking off'. Lloyd's List, November 14,1986. 
2. Direct air freight from points in the Far East to points on the west coast, was very costly due to 
its one way payload revenues. The return leg back to the Far East produced hardly any revenue 
because of the scarcity of cargo. In order to make up for the loss of revenue on this sector, 
airlines applied very high rates on the first leg (Far East to North American west coast). 
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Authorities, airlines and shipping lines, who considered the data 
required as classified. Intensive field research played a very 
important role in this exercise : 
1. Collection and assessment of data available from Port 
Authorities, local government entities, wherever relevant, 
was made. 
2. Collection and analysis of data and other relevant 
information, including interviews with Freight Forwarders, 
airlines, shipping lines and port officials, was made. 
3. The sea-air market and factors related to its growth and/or 
decline, were subjected to intensive analysis. 
4. Tabulation of statistical f igures was made in the most 
accurate technique, and specifically figures of available 
air cargo capacities on scheduled international services of 
the carriers operating from/to each of the sea-air transfer 
hubs under review. An account of the technique adopted is 
detailed in Appendix E. 
5.1 The sea-air route via Vancouver 
A sea-air route via Vancouver was started in the early 1960s' by 
Air Canada (then called Trans Canada Airlines). The idea was to 
speed up delivery of high value Japanese consumer goods to 
various destinations deep within America. Cargo was shipped from 
Yokohama to Vancouver by ocean, then hauled overland to Vancouver 
International Airport for onward carriage by air to inland points 
within America and the East Coast. The sea-air journey from 
origin to final destination took an average of 18 days. KLM, the 
Royal Dutch Airline, took the initiative of introducing the 
service beyond the continent of America, and started the sea-air 
services via Vancouver to various points in Europe. It took 21 
days to carry the freight from Japan to Europe by sea-air via 
Vancouver, whereas all ocean transport took 7 to 8 weeks to reach 
inland destinations in Europe. 
In the middle of the 1960s numerous accidents occurred during 
bulk transhipments, which almost brought about the cessation of 
the service. But as container ships and jumbo jet freighters 
were introduced in the 1970s, the routes and services were 
upgraded and further developed. 
Firstly to North America, by the transfer of containers from 
onboard ships at Vancouver Port to onboard heavy duty truck 
trailers bound either to inland destinations in America, or to 
Vancouver airport for destuffing and eventual air carriage to 
final destinations. 
1. From interviews with Air Canada management in Vancouver and Toronto, July 1992, by the writer. 
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Secondly to Europe, by the transfer of containers from onboard 
ships to the railways bound for the Toronto container terminal 
where cargo is de-stuffed and trucked to airline (mainly Air 
Canada and KLM) cargo receiving bays, for palletising and 
consequential air lift, to various destinations in Europe. 
Sea-air movement continued steadily through the 1970s' until the 
early 1980s, with air carriers playing the major role'. There 
were a few attempts by a handful of freight forwarders, led by 
'Concorde Express' 3, aimed at expanding their control over the 
sea-air cargo flow. Those attempts were promptly met by fierce 
resistance from Air Canada and the Canadian Customs Authorities. 
Sufferance warehousing rules were introduced in 1982 which 
stipulated that freight forwarders could only move their cargo 
through airline warehouses within the airport, otherwise they had 
to go off the airport premises. 
Further, the airport did not provide any special facility or 
incentive to sea-air operators such as priority handling'. On 
the other hand, the port of Vancouver has been traditionally a 
gateway for all kinds of freight. It was, and still is, an 
export oriented port, mainly for bulk cargo (containerisation 
degree was 37.511 of general cargo in 1994). Up to 1990, the 
container terminal capacity of half a million containers, 
including empties, was never fully utilised, and the utilisation 
rate of the terminal usable area varied between 56% to 65% per 
year (Table 16, below). Despite this fact, a second new 
container terminal, more than double the size of the present one, 
is planned to start operating by the end of 1995. 
Table 16: Vancouver Port 
Analysis of container traffic 
Tonnage: in thousands. Containers: in thousands 
Port 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993" 1994 2 
Vancouver Port 
Total no. of'containers 280 306 306 323 384 441 430 425 
handled. 
Total container tonnage 2,409 2,732 2,645 2,708 3,290 3,624 3,570 3,450 
Containerisation degree 
M of general cargo) 27.5% 28.3% 28.5% 29.0% 33.3% 36.6 37.1% 37.5% 
Av. tonnage/container 1 8.6 1 8.9 1 8.6 1 8.4 1 8.6 1 8.2 8.3 8.1 
Source ISL Shipping Statistics Yearbook, Institute of Shipping and 
Logistics (ISL), Bremen, October 1993. 
Notes Figures 1987 to 1992 were derived from ISL Yearbook 2993. 
1. &2 Figures for 1993 and 1994 were derived from related periodicals and 
tested against ISL figures, and average percentage changes per year 
over six years (1987 - 1992) - periodicals such as the ICKCA Annual Review, World of cargo handling, London, March 1995. 
1. On the progress of intermodal transportation, see: Marwick, Peat and partners (1980), -Intermodal transportation for containers and trailers (Ottawa : Canadian Transport Commission) 2. Mahoney, J. H. (1985), 'Intermodal Freight Transportation', Westport: ENO Foundation for 
Transportation Inc. 
3. Concorde Express a multi-national Freight Forwarder and Sea-Air Operator. 4. Priority Handling The provision of special parking lots for trucks off-loading sea-air cargo, 
special attendance by skilled airport labour, availability of cargo receiving bays, and 
palletisation outside office hours. 
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The low rate of Vancouver Port Terminal utilisation, and their 
plan for a controversial new second terminal, together with the 
sluggish demand by international shipping lines to use Vancouver 
Port, did not fully convince Port Authorities to offer special 
facilities for import cargo, especially sea-air cargo, and 
remained rigid in its built-in export oriented image. Further 
hindrance to the possible introduction of sea-air facilities came 
about in the form of labour union periodic strikes that paralysed 
the Port activities from time to time. 
A large number of shipping lines from Japan and South Korea re- 
scheduled their first port of call from Vancouver to Seattle, 
while the rest rescheduled to Los Angeles and San Francisco. 
Seattle became the biggest sea-air hub on the US west coast. 
Freight forwarders who were denied entry into the sea-air market 
in Vancouver, found a warm welcome by Seattle Port Authorities 
who immediately responded with priority handling to the sea-air 
containers. 
The reaction from Vancouver Authorities was gradual and spread 
over a decade. The first measure by Vancouver Airport was the 
creation of a committee of freight forwarders in 19841, without 
any airline participation, with the aim of improving the sea-air 
service. 
The second measure which followed in 1986, was to ease the 
sufferance warehousing rules. Freight forwarders were allowed to 
use their own warehouses at the airport and receive cargoes 
directly from the port. For the first time, freight forwarders 
started destuffing containers themselves and building pallets for 
air carriage to final destinations, without airline handling 
interference. 
The third measure came about on the 1st of July 1992. Vancouver 
airport was placed under the management of a local board of 
directors aiming at drastic changes in policy; the main target of 
the board was to market Vancouver Airport as an international 
gateway and a transit hub, by attracting new carriers and cargoes 
from the West Coast of the USA, especially from Seattle Port, via 
a trucking programme linking Seattle and Tacoma with 3 hours 
trucking time. 
The fourth measure came in 1992 from the port of Vancouver who 
offered shipping lines lower charges for container handling. 
Well aware of the 30%; average unutilised capacity of the present 
terminal, and with a second terminal of almost double capacity 
being built for opening by the end of 1995, Vancouver port 
realised the importance of attracting the shipping lines again to 
reschedule their first port of call to Vancouver. 
The sea-air markets of Vancouver Port and Airport were subjected 
to questionnaires and direct interviews by the researcher in 
1992, who came out with the following first hand findings : 
Interviews with Vancouver Airport officials, and the Department of Transport Canada, Vancouver in July 1992, by the writer. 
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1A decline in sea-air tonnage flow through Vancouver Airport 
was confirmed by Air Canada, KLM and Vancouver Airport based 
sea-air operators and freight forwarders. 
2. An increase of sea-air cargo traf f ic was reported by the 
majority of international shipping lines using either 
Seattle or Vancouver Port as the first port of call. The 
shipping lines contacted were APL (American President Line) , 
Hyundai, K Line, Mitsui OSK, Sealand and Maersk. A drastic 
increase was reported to have occurred during the third 
quarter of 1990, continuing in force till the second quarter 
of 1991, and reached a staggering figure of almost 20,000 
tonnes shared between the ports of Seattle, Los Angeles and 
Vancouver. Most of the shipping lines confirmed a share of 
approximately 25% of this increase to have been off-loaded 
at the Port of Vancouver. This increase was not shown or 
reported by Vancouver Airport, but was reported' to have 
been railed to Toronto Airport for further uplift to points 
in Europe. 
All shipping lines confirmed that this windfall increase was 
a direct result of the Arab Gulf crisis, and the immediate 
shift to North American sea-air transfer hubs of 
approximately two-thirds of the total sea-air cargo that was 
otherwise routed via the U. A. E. ports and one-third to the 
sea-air transfer hub of Singapore (an average of 30,000 
tonnes per annum2, of sea-air cargo was moving via the sea- 
air transfer hubs of the United Arab 8mirates in 1990 and 
1991). The windfall improvement of Vancouver Container 
Terminal utilisation rate, of 77% in 1991 and 8801 in 1992 
gradually fell back to 86k in 1993 and 8556 in 1994. With 
the return to normalcy of the U. A. E. ports, the declining 
trend is expected to continue in 1995 and 1996 and stabilise 
at an annual growth rate of 501 over the pre Arab Gulf War 
rate of 650k.. 
3. Data on the decline or growth of sea-air cargo, via both 
Vancouver Port and Airport, was not available from official 
sources. The Marketing Department of Transport Canada, in 
Vancouver stated that statistics on sea-air cargo are non- 
existent. Further, data on airline activities was 
considered classified information. However, the researcher 
managed to compile in Table 17, on page 60, the 'best 
estimates' figures from a memo, dated August 1992, by Mr. 
Hans Erkens, Director of Market Development at Vancouver 
Airport, which was later verified and updated in September 
1994 through direct contact and interviews with shipping 
lines, airlines and sea-air operators, all based in 
Vancouver and Seattle. 
Source : Port Rashid (Dubai) . Dubai Airport Civil Aviation and Sharjah Airport Authorities monthly- and annual official releases of sea-air cargo volume statistics. 
2. Source : Kintetsu World Express, Adanac International Forwarders & HECNY Transport - all based in Vancouver. 
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Table 17: Port of Vancouver sea-air cargo to Europe 
(in tonnes) 
origin 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Japan 2,350 4,700 6,050 6,250 6,100 6,150 6,200 6,300 
Korea 250 Boo 550 600 650 650 700 700 
Taiwan 750 1,400 
. 
1,500 5,500 4,500 
. 
2,100 
. 
2,000 
. 
1,800 
Others 600 1,300 1,100 2,500 3,500 
1 
1,500 1,200 1,300 
Total 3,950 7,900 9,200 14,850 14,750 10,400 
1 
10,100 10,100 
. '>UUL L; W. czirecr- az2E: erviews w2r-n sn2pping 12ries, a2r. L2neS, Sea- 
air operators and memos of the Market Development Board- Vancouver. 
Airlines and freight forwarders in the market did not share the 
optimism of Mr. Hans Erkens, figures, which were on average 300-S 
higher than all f igures in Table 17, above. Their reasons being: 
(a) Vancouver Port receives a relatively small quantity of sea- 
air cargo, as most shipping lines call first at Tacoma or 
Seattle. Then, sea-air cargo which is in excess of 
available air capacities at Seattle airport, is trucked or 
railed, or a combination of both, in containers to airports 
where air capacities were available, such as Vancouver, 
Toronto, Montreal, Atlanta and Miami. The air cargo 
capacities available from Toronto and Montreal, can be seen 
in Appendices E-2 and E-3. 
(b) Air cargo capacity, of Vancouver Airport, was limited to a 
once weekly DC8 Air Canada freighter, starting from 
Vancouver via Toronto to Amsterdam and to passenger flights 
starting from Seattle via Vancouver to Amsterdam, Frankfurt, 
Paris and London (Appendix E-1). All passenger flights' 
underdeck capacities were loaded with sea-air cargo first in 
Seattle, and whatever remaining unutilised capacities were 
filled in Vancouver. 
The f if th development that came about was that Air Canada stopped 
selling sea-air cargo on a direct shipper basis in Japan as of 
Ist January 1989, something they had done since the conception of 
the sea-air idea in the 1960s. In particular, the Air Canada 
once weekly DC8 freighter capacity was mainly used by one freight 
forwarder - Kintetsu World Express. 
As from 1992, Air Canada offered their air cargo capacity to the 
forwarding industry as a whole. As indicated by Air Canada 
management, they carried about 80 tonnes a week on flights from 
Vancouver to Europe via Toronto during 1990 and 1991. Sea-air 
cargo would make about 80V of this figure, i. e. about 65 tonnes 
Interviews with Air Canada management in Vancouver and Toronto, in July 1992 revealed sea-air figures as prepared by Air Canada and Toronto and Vancouver airports, to range between 8,500 - 9,000 tonnes per annum, for the years 1991 and 1992. Air Canada carried an average of 65 tonnes per week 
as per their records, which meant 65 x 52, i. e. 3,380 tonnes per annum, or just under 40* of the total sea-air tonnage per year via both Vancouver and Toronto. KLM combi flights from Toronto to Amsterdam during the same period, 1991 and 1992, carried approximately 3,500 tonnes/year, which 
meant 40% of sea-air cargo was carried by KLM. The above figures were derived from direct interviews with Air Canada and KLM managements in Vancouver and Toronto. 
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(including the freighter service), which means Air Canada's share 
was just under 40? c of the sea-air market, while KLM combi flights 
assumed another 40 t of the sea-air market. The remaining 20t 
was shared by Canadian airlines International , Lufthansa and British Airways. 
Vancouver Airport sea-air cargo traffic figures, based on 
interviews with freight forwarders, sea-air operators, Air Canada 
and Lufthansa are as follows: 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Tonnes 8,600 8,700 9,000 9,150 9,250 
The numbers are significantly smaller than those indicated by 
Transport Canada in Vancouver. During interviews with the 
freight forwarding community in Vancouver, the above figures were 
reconfirmed by the majority, as they were in line with total 
available air capacities. Rounded estimates of the 1991 sea-air 
volume via Vancouver Airport range between 8,000 and 9,000 tonnes 
per year. 
one reason that could account for the discrepancy between these 
research findings, and those indicated by Transport Canada, is 
that consolidated sea-air cargo arriving by ocean transits 
Vancouver bef ore being railed onward f or uplif tf rom Toronto. The 
transit consolidated cargo is f irst registered as Vancouver 
traffic, then is broken and railed to Toronto as individual 
shipments, where it is registered again as Toronto traffic. 
The implications of sea-air cargo growth 
The implications of sea-air growth to the Airport Authorities, 
Port Authorities, airlines, shipping lines, sea-air operators and 
freight forwarders are found in Tables 18 and 19 that follow: 
From Vancouver Airport, as a percentage of total 
international air cargo exports to the rest of the world. 
2. To Vancouver Port, as a percentage of total import container 
traffic and tonnage 
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Table 18. From Vancouver Airport 
(in 1000 tons, rounded to the nearest 100) 
1 1990 1 1991 1 1992 1 1993 1994 
Total cargo handled 121 124 131 151 181 
Total domestic cargo 74 72 70 91 115 
Total international cargo' 47 52 61 60 66 
Total air export S2 20 27 24 22 24 
(including sea-air) 
Total sea-air volume 9 9 9 9 9 
Sea-air t of total 45.0% 33.3% 37.5% 40.9% 37.5% 
Source Airports Council international - Airport Traffic Statistic, 29 March 
1995 and Airport Traffic ICAO Digest of Statistic No. 403 - 1992 and 
No. 410, ICAO 1994 - 11194 QIP111600. Notes: 
2. Air imports and air exports. 
2. Total air exports world wide. 
Table 19. To Vancouver Port 
(in 1000 tons & containers, rounded to the nearest: 100) 
1 1990 1 1991 1 1992 1 1993 1994 
Total container traffic' 323 384 441 430 425 
Import container traffic 161 182 221 215 212 
Sea-air containers 4 4 4 4 4 
Sea-air % of tota 12 2.5% 2.2% 1.8% 1.9% 1.9% 
Total container tonnage 2,708 3,290 3,624 3,570 3,450 
Import container tonnage 1,354 1,645 1,812 1,785 1,725 
Sea-air container tonnage' 23 23 19 19 20 
Sea-air % of total4 
Source ISL Shipping Statistics Yearbook of 1993 and relevant Port 
Authorities, direct releases March 1995. 
Notes 
1. Total container traffic = total off-loaded and loaded. Containers 
offloaded at any port are the property of shipping lines and must be re- 
exported, whether empty or loaded with cargo. Therefore 50t of the total 
containers handled by any port represent import cargo, and the balance is 
re-exported to origin. Thus, a container is handled twice at any port. 
2. Sea-air container percentage of total is reached by applying number of sea- 
air containers to the number of import containers. example; in 1990,2.5t is reached by dividing (4 + 161) x 100 = 2.5t. 3. Sea-air container tonnage : Sea-air cargo is largely low dense volume and high value cargo, and occupies larger container space with lower weights. Freight Forwarders, Sea-air operators and Port Authorities in Taipei, Hong Kong and Singapore confirm that the average sea-air load per 20' container (TEU) ranges between 4.5 and 5 tonnes. Sea-air container tonnage includes 
sea-air cargo diverted to other than Vancouver Airport, from the Port of 
Vancouver. 
4. Sea-air container tonnage percentage of the total is reached by dividing import container tonnage by sea-air container tonnage x 100. The same 
computation is applied throughout this chapter. 
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In summary; 
The Port of Vancouver is able to handle a greater number of 
containers and container tonnage. In 1994, it handled 
425,000 containers and 3.5 million tonnes of containerised 
cargo which represents 8501 of its present container terminal 
capacity. With the scheduled opening of its new container 
terminal in late 1995, the container terminal facilities 
will double the present capacity of 500 thousand containers 
to one million. 
2. The Airport of Vancouver, with a current airline cargo 
capacity of 29,500 tonnes per annum (Appendix E-1), is 
approximately 30t utilised by sea-air cargo originating in 
the Port of Vancouver in 1990; this rate of utilisation 
remained unchanged through 1994, while domestic air exports 
grew from 11,000 tonnes in 1990 to 15,000 tonnes in 1994, 
thus utilising slightly over 50t of available cargo capacity 
per year (Table 18, page 62). This means that approximately 
80t of total available air cargo capacities was utilised in 
1994. Only 2016 or 4,500 tonnes of air export cargo 
capacities remain unutilised -a case that does not pressure 
Vancouver Authorities to offer additional facilities to the 
parties involved. However, this unutilised cargo capacity 
is further enhanced by the air cargo capacities from mainly 
Toronto Airport and to a lesser extent, from Montreal 
Airport. 
Toronto is connected by an efficient and reliable railway 
system from the Port of Vancouver, that has been 
successfully used for sea-air cargo. Total air exports, 
including sea-air cargo averaged 43,000 tonnes' per year 
(1990 - 1994), against available cargo capacity of 71,100 
tonnes (Appendix E-2), a utilisation rate of 60%. 40% or 
28,000 tonnes remain unutilised, a figure almost equal to 
all available air export capacity from Vancouver Airport. 
From Montreal, air exports averaged 59211, over the same 
period, against an available air export capacity of 50,600 
tonnes (Appendix E-3). 40t or 20,700 tonnes remain 
unutilised from Montreal Airport. 
This presents a compelling reason for the Vancouver Port 
Authorities to ease their rigidity by offering additional 
facilities and incentives to shipping lines, freight forwarders, 
NVOCCs and sea-air operators. 
Source Airports Council International - Airport Traffic Statistic, 29 March 1995 ana Airport Traffic ICAO Digest of Statistic No. 403 - 1992 and No. 410, ICAO 1994 - 
11/94 Q/Pl/1600. 
64 
5.2 The sea-air route via Seattle 
During the 1980s, Seattle and Tacoma emerged as one of the 
leading sea-air transfer hubs of the world. Specifically, the 
period between 1985 and 1992 witnessed the introduction of new 
freighter services to Europe. In addition, several major freight 
forwarders established operational bases in the Seattle area. As 
a result, Far East sea-air operators started recommending the 
route via Seattle as a reliable option, to their clients. Short 
total transit time, low cost and reliability attracted major 
forwarders in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan to use the Seattle 
route on a regular basis. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, air 
cargo space was limited from SEA-TAC airport to Europe. it 
consisted mostly of belly space on passenger flights and the 
indirect service by Flying Tiger via their hub to Europe. 
The scene was dif f erent on the ocean segment. Most shipping 
lines calling at Vancouver were calling first at Seattle or 
Tacoma. The frequencies of shipping services were numerous. 
Further, the shorter sailing time (one day less than Vancouver) , 
together with the efficiency derived from priority handling of 
sea-air containers by Seattle port, resulted in a very fast 
transit time from port to airport. This is what made 
Seattle Port ready to assume its future role as one of the 
leading sea-air transfer ports of the world. 
Table 20: Seattle Port 
Analysis of container traffic 
Tonnage: in thousands. Containers: in thousands 
Port 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 19931 
_1994 
2 
Seattle Port 
Total no. of containers 964 951 964 1,063 1,049 1,053 1,059 1,311 
handled. 
Total container tonnage 7,135 7,290 7,262 7,773 7,999 7,794 8,019 9,866 
Containerisation degree 
M of general cargo) 95.4% 95.6% 94.9% 94.4% 92.1% 94.1 93.5% 93.3% 
Av. tonnage/container 1 
17.4 
1 7.7 1 7.5 1 7.3 1 7.6 1 7.4 1 7.6 1 7.5 
Source Port of Seattle Container and Tonnage Reporting Statistics system. 
Faxed by Seattle Port Authority to the researcher in May 1995. 
Table 21: Tacoma Port 
Analysis of container traffic 
Tonnage: in thousands. Containers: in thousands 
Port 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993" 19942 
Tacoma Port 
Total no. of containers 697 782 925 938 1,021 1,054 1,075 1,028 
handled. 
Total container tonnage 4,353 5t170 5,98 6 5,98 6 6,44 0 6t712 6,712 6,440 
Containerisation degree 
(% of general cargo) 47.0% 37.0% 38.0% 41.0% 50.0% 56.0% 59.0% 62.0% 
Av. tonnage/container 1 6.2 1 6.6 1 5.6 1 6.4 1 6.3 1 6.4 6.2 1 6.3 
Source Port of Tacoma Container and Tonnage Reporting Statistics system- 
Faxed by Tacoma Port Authority to the researcher in May 1995. 
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The Port of Tacoma is cited in Table 21, page 64, as an 
alternative to Seattle Port, in cases of congestion. Because of 
its high sensitivity to transit time, all sea-air cargo is 
handled by Seattle Port on a priority basis. Intermodal 
transport, in general, is delayed by half to a full working day, 
at Tacoma Port, because all container traffic (save the part 
destined to Portland, which is directly railed), is hauled deep 
inland to Spokane Terminal for segregation or assembly, and then 
re-distributed to final destination, either by rail or trucks. 
The growth of air cargo capacities from Seattle airport had to 
wait until late 1983, when Cargolux airline introduced a B747 
once weekly freighter service to Seattle from Luxembourg'. it 
continued to add more capacity to this market with two flights 
per week in 1985, which was increased to three flights per week 
in 1988, culminating in five flights per week in 1990. This 
frequency was stabilised at four regular flights per week, 
between 1992 and 1993, and later reduced to three flights per 
week in 1994 and is forecasted to be upgraded to four flights per 
week, as from 1996 onward. 
The development did not go unnoticed by other airlines, and a DC 
10' weekly freighter service was soon established by Martinair of 
Holland in 1985, and a few years later a weekly B 747 freighter 
service was introduced by UTA of France. These three freighter 
operators were the main providers of freighter capacity for sea- 
air cargo from Seattle to Europe, till 1991 and early 1992, when 
UTA decided to suspend its services, thus limiting freighter 
cargo capacities to that provided by only the two remaining 
freighter airlines for the rest of the period under analysis, 
until the end of 1994. 
This development induced a strong growth in direct and indirect 
support services from passenger airlines, such as British 
Airways, SAS, Finnair, United and Pan AM3, who participated in 
carrying sea-air cargo in their bellies. Support service also 
came from freight forwarders and the trucking industry. The 
cargo flown from Seattle to Europe was not all sea-air. There 
were strong exporting industries in the Pacific North West area, 
such as the Seattle based Boeing aircraft industry and many other 
computer based industries. Seattle Airport made its own 
estimates as to how big a portion of the exports were of local 
origin vs the uplift of sea-air cargo. These estimates are 
tabulated in Table 22, page 66. 
1 Cargolux operates a trucking service from Luxembourg to almost all international airports of 
Northern Europe, with daily frequencies. Therefore, Luxembourg gradually became a re-distribution 
overland hub for all sea-air cargo carried from Seattle to various destinations in Northern Europe 
via Luxembourg (Source: Interviews with Cargolux Regional Managers, Sept. 1992 and Nov 1994). 
2. Martinair upgrades its once weekly service to B747 during certain times of the year when the season 
is high for cargo, i. e. from September to December 10, and from March to end July each year. 
3. Pan Am filed Chapter 11 (Bankruptcy procedures) in 1990. 
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Table 22: Sea-air cargo from SEA-TAC Airport vs local exports 
(in 1000 metric tonnes) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994* 
Local Exports 4.9 5.2 7.2 7.8 8.2 8.0 8.1 
Sea-air exports 15.8 17.4 19.6 16.8 15.3 15.3 13.0 
Sea-air share 
of the total 
76.3% 
I 
77.026- 
II 
76.3-ck 
1 
68.316 
I 
65.101 65.716 
II 
61.6 116 
Source: Seattle Airport Authority. 1994 figures are estimated. 
Interviews with the airlines using Seattle Airport revealed the 
following figures of air cargo movement from Seattle airport to 
Europe. The figures were rounded to the nearest 100 tonnes 
(fractions over 50 tonnes were rounded to 100, and those below 50 
tonnes were ignored). 
Table 23 Total air cargo, Seattle to Europe 
(in metric tonnes) 
Airline 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994* 
Cargolux 13,300 15,500 14,100 13,900 13,700 10,000 
Martinair 2,600 3,200 3,000 2,800 2,800 2,700 
SAS 2,800 2,900 3,000 3,000 3,000 2,200 
British Airways 1,100 1,400 2,400 2,200 2,100 2,700 
UTA/Air France 300 900 1,300 - - - 
Others 2,500 2,000 800 1,600 1,700 1,600 
Total 22,600 26,800 24,600 23,500 23,300 21,100 
Source: Seattle Airport Authority. 1994 figures are estimated. 
Note: The figures in this Table show the bulk of sea-air cargo was transported 
by only a handful of air carriers, actually shifting to specialised sea-air 
carriers rather than spreading among many airlines. This is evident as the 
figures under 'Others, (other air carriers), share shrunk from 2,500 tonnes 
in 1989 to a meagre 800 tonnes in 1991 and picked up again in 1992,1993 
and 1994, to stabilise at 1,600 tonnes. The carriers grouped under 
'Others, were Pan Am, United, Northwest and Finnair. Most US carriers 
considered sea-air cargo as undesirable simply because of its low returns. 
They therefore did not show keen interest in this particular traffic. 
Total air freight export traffic figures to Europe (Table 23, 
above) show that the year 1990 witnessed an increase of 13.710k 
over 1989, while 1991 figures show a decrease of 4.31k from 1990, 
with a declining trend developing through 1992 and 1993, 
culminating in the lowest figure ever of an estimated 21,100 
tonnes in 1994. Further, it becomes very clear from Table 24, 
page 67, that the bulk of sea-air cargo was handled by a few 
airlines. 
67 
The decrease in sea-air cargo volume handled by Seattle Airport 
was mainly attributed to the decreasing air cargo capacities made 
available by the air carriers due to the directional imbalance of 
air cargo traffic, between Europe and Seattle. Many carriers 
calling on Seattle Airport were forced to reduce their freight 
frequencies, or even suspend them, such was the case of UTA of 
France in early 1992. 
The percentage market shares of the most dominant carriers were 
as follows: 
Table 24 Air cargo, Seattle to Europe 
(percentage share) 
Airline 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994* 
Cargolux 58.81r 60.3k 57.31; 5 9. lk 58.8%- 47.4%; 
Martinair 11.5! k 12.5k 12.2%- 11.9%. 12. Ok 12.8%- 
SAS 12.4! k 11.3%- 12.2%- 12.8%- 12.9% 10.4% 
British Airways 5. Olk 5.0%- 9.8% 9.4% 9. Ok 12.81; 
___ 
UTA of France 1.8k 3.5%, 5.3% - 
Others 10.5%, 7.4%- 3.2% 6.8%- 7.3t 7.6%- 
Total 100.0%- 100.0% 100.0k 100.0v 100.0k 100.0%- 
Source: Derived from Table 23 - Seattle Airport Authority. 
1994 figures are estimated. 
The Port of Seattle applied priority handling for sea-air cargo 
arriving in containers during the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Container vessels from the Far East increased their frequencies 
and scheduled their arrival dates into Seattle Port. Sea-air 
cargo from the Far East (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan) was 
booked on container vessels with scheduled arrivals into Seattle 
Port on certain days of the week, to meet scheduled air freighter 
services from Seattle airport to various destinations in Europe. 
APL has for some time played a leading role in carrying sea-air 
cargo to the Pacific Northwest. Their arrival time in Seattle 
was on Friday, giving just enough time to make the transit to the 
majority of cargo flights, which depart Seattle during the 
Saturday - Monday period ( Martinair has their once weekly flight 
on Sundays, while the four Cargolux flights depart Saturday, 
Sunday, Monday and Wednesday). 
With a shift in the ship arrival from Friday to Saturday, making 
the Saturday flight connection no longer possible, a Sunday 
flight departure becomes very tight, as most cargoes which missed 
the Saturday freighter were rebooked on Sunday's flight. NYK and 
Hyundai scheduled their arrivals into Seattle Port on Wednesdays. 
As such, sea-air containers were transferred to the airport, 
destuffed and rebuilt into air pallets, ready for air carriage on 
the same day Wednesday or latest by Thursday. But airlift to 
Europe had to wait till Saturday's freighter service, which meant 
a precious 3 to 5 days loss of transit time from port to airport. 
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Table 25, below, shows the arrival day of ships at Seattle Port 
from the Far Eastern countries of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. 
Table 25: Container vessels serving SEA-TAC from the Far East 
Average trip duration in days taken from shipping lines 
schedules in 1990 - 1991 - 1992. 
Shipping line Day of arrival Journey duration in days 
Seattle or Tacoma from 
Japan S. Korea/Taiwan 
APL Sat 9 10 
Hyundai Wed 9 10 
K Line Mon 8 10 
Mitsui OSK Mon 9 10 
NYK Line Wed 9 10 
NOL Mon 9 10 
OOCL Mon 9 10 
Sea-Land Sun 8 10 
Maersk Line Sun 9 10 
Source: Seattle Ports Authority 
As this table shows, most of the vessels arrive in Seattle or 
Tacoma during the period Saturday - Monday, which happens to be 
the same time period when the majority of the freighter services 
depart SEA - TAC f or Europe. However, Wednesday arrivals of 
Hyundai and NYK shipping lines result in 3-5 days of port to 
airport transit time, a fact that prolonged the total transit 
time, and presented a clear disadvantage to the continuity and 
growth of sea-air cargo flow. To overcome this particular 
disadvantage, freight forwarders and other sea-air operators 
started an immediate search for other options that would reduce 
the 3-5 days stay time. 
Not all shipments were flown from Seattle Airport within the 
first 48 hours of having arrived at the port. Transit times via 
Seattle were affected by arrival day of the vessel vs day of 
flight departure. The connection possibilities determined the 
additional transit time. The importance of the connection 
possibilities between vessel arrival and flight departures is 
highlighted further in Table 26, page 69: 
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Table 26 Sea-air schedule connection and transit time 
1990 - 1991 - 1992 
Arr day Shipping First cargo Dep Dweell time 
of vessel line flight out day in Seattle 
Sunday Maersk Cargolux Mon 1 day 
Sea-Land 
Monday K-Line 
Mitsui OSK Cargolux Wed 2 days 
NOL 
OOCL 
Wednesday NYK Line Cargolux Sat 3 days 
Hyundai Martinair Sun 4 days 
UTA Sun 4 days 
Cargolux Sun 4 days 
Saturday APL Cargolux Sun 1 day 
Martinair Sun 1 day 
UTA Sun 1 day 
Cargolux Mon 2 days 
Source: Seattle Ports Authority 
Therefore, the number of connections offering one day transit are 
limited and very tight. A safe connection is a two day 
connection, which can be obtained by a Monday ship arrival and 
Wednesday flight departure, and a Saturday ship arrival, with 
Monday flight departure. 
The concentrated operation of cargo aircraft frequencies around 
the weekend was primarily due to the availability of cargo from 
Europe to the US at the end of the week. Traditionally the 
freight forwarders in Europe consolidate their air export freight 
for two large moves per week, one in the middle of the week, and 
another during the weekend. The objective with the weekend move 
was to fly out on Saturday or Sunday from Europe, a European 
week's production of goods, and make it available for customs 
clearance at the destination point on Monday morning. 
The outbound cargo flights offered in the Seattle market were in 
fact dictated by the demand from Europe. Seattle air exports to 
Europe exceeded its air imports, thus causing the well known 
directional imbalance in air cargo traffic flow (Table 27, page 
70). 
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Table 27 Directional imbalance : Seattle vs Europe 
(figures to the nearest 100 tonnes) 
Year Import Export Imports as % of Exports 
1989 09,8 22,6 43.3? c 
1990 10.6 25,7 4 1. Olk 
1991 09,1 24,6 37.0! k 
1992 09,1 23,5 38.3% 
1993 08,7 23,3 37.3% 
1994* 08,0 21,1 37.906 
A2r. L2ne reporus E; o zoeauu;. Le ecru. 
1994 figures are estimated. 
This situation has forced airlines to either combine a Seattle 
flight with another city on the inbound segment (adding to cost) , 
or to pass some of the cost of the light revenue inbound flight 
to the outbound. The findings of the period under analysis for 
the sea-air market between 1989 and 1994 do in fact set the scene 
for very limited growth in the sea-air volume via Seattle 
Airport. Available air cargo capacities depend largely on the 
North American demand, and specifically that of the Seattle area, 
for European products. Thus an increase in air freight demand 
for European products helps balance the directional imbalance of 
freight movement. 
Appendix E-4, compiled in September 1994, shows that the only 
carrier offering regular freighter flights from Seattle was 
Cargolux, while Martinair upgrades during the season, a once 
weekly freighter service, usually on weekends. The rest operate 
a mixed configuration of passengers and cargo. The available 
cargo capacities (Fedex discounted) was 27,300 tonnes in 1994. 
A declining trend of available air cargo capacity started in 1990 
and continued through the 5 year period that followed, resulting 
in a continuous yearly decrease of total air cargo tonnage 
carried. As compared with each year, 1994's figure of 21,100 
tonnes of total air cargo traffic carried to Europe represented: 
a decrease of 21.8 % from 25,700 tonnes in 1990 
11 16.6 % from 24,600 tonnes in 1991 
if 11.4 % from 23,500 tonnes in 1992 
it 10.4 % from 23,300 tonnes in 1993 
This implies that the trend of cargo capacities from Seattle 
Airport to Europe was not that of growth but that of a gradual 
decline over the five year period, ending in 1994. However, 
whatever air cargo capacity was made available on pure freighter 
flights, during any one year it was assumed to have been fully 
utilised, and excess cargoes diverted to other airports in North 
America. 
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Options of trucking the containers to Canadian airports deep 
inland, such as Toronto and Montreal Airports, entailed 3 and 5 
days overland journeys, while in the case of Vancouver Airport, 
only 3 trucking hours were required. Further, motives of lower 
air freight rates helped the move to haul cargo overland to other 
airports, not only in Canada, but also within America, where air 
cargo capacities to Europe were available at lower rates (refer 
Appendices E-2 and E-3, on available cargo capacities from 
Toronto and Montreal, and Appendices E-5, E-6, E-7, E-8, E-9 and 
E-10, on available air cargo capacities from American Airports 
such as Atlanta, Boston, Miami and New York. ). 
4m. 
TON 
NEW YORK 
SAN FRANCISCO 
WASHINGTON 
LOS ANGELES 
gump, - 
Figure 13 : Route Diversion (trucking from Seattle) 
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A report was prepared by Seattle Port Authorities late in 1992, 
in an attempt to quantify the sea-air market. 15 major freight 
forwarders and sea-air operators in the Seattle area, were 
interviewed, and figures on sea-air cargo diversion by overland 
transport (truck/rail) to other airports, were derived for the 
years 1990,1991 and the first half of 1992. For the second half 
of 1992,1993 and the first half of 1994, approximate figures 
were derived by the researcher through direct contact with 6 
major Seattle based, sea-air operators. Table 28, below, shows 
the best estimates of sea-air traffic via the Port of Seattle. 
Table 28 Routing diversion of sea-air cargo 
arriving at the Port of Seattle and Tacoma 
(all figures in tonnes) 
Air Carriage via 
Years Seattle Miami Canada Other US Airports Total 
1990 19,600 7,000 25,500 7,700 59,800 
of total 32.81 11.7%- 42.6%- 12.9! k 100.0! k 
1991 16,800 6,500 21,500 15,100 59,900 
of total 28.0%- 10.9%- 35.9%- 25.2t 100.0! k 
1992 15,300 9,000 26,300 4,100 54,700 
k of total 28.0! k 16.5! k 48.1! k 7.5%- 100.0! k 
1993 15,300 10,300 25,800 4,900 56,300 
k of total 27.2! k 18.3%- 45.8%- 8. Tk 100.0! k 
1994* 13,000 10,900 27,300 5,800 57,000 
V of total 22.8! k 19.1%- 47.9%- 10.2k T 100. ot Source: Seattle Airport Authorityl Researcher4_s7direct contact-with-Sea7ttle based Sea-Air Operators, Oct. 1994. 
Notes 1994 figures are estimated. 1990 and 1991 totals are relatively high 
due to the diversion of U. A. E. sea-air traffic to North American 
transfer hubs as a result of the Arab Gulf crisis. 
Canada: Vancouver, Toronto, Montreal. Other US airports: NewYork, Atlanta, Boston. 
As seen in this Table, an average of 44% (of a five-year period 
1990 - 1994) of total cargo flow into Seattle Port, was trucked 
to Canadian airports, for further air lift to Europe. The above 
numbers include an adjustment factor of 5% on the total, and are 
rounded up to the nearest one hundred tonnes. The adjustment is 
made in order to allow for the tonnage that moved via 
Seattle/Tacoma by smaller forwarders, which may have been missed. 
In summary, available air cargo capacities from Seattle Airport 
are gradually declining because many European air carriers are 
facing difficulties in balancing the directional imbalance in 
traf f ic f low, as North American demand f or European made products 
is dwindling and being replaced by products of the Asia-Pacific 
region, forcing carriers such as UTA and Air Canada to suspend 
their freighter services in early 1992 from Seattle and Vancouver 
Airports, respectively. 
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The windfall increases of 1990-1991 due to the Gulf War and the 
subsequent shift of 40,000 tonnes of sea-air traffic from the 
U. A. E route to the North American route, did in fact inflate the 
growth rate via Seattle, Los Angeles, and Miami, periodically. 
As Seattle assumed a share of approximately 25! k, or 10,000 
tonnes, of this windfall, a proper account of the normal growth 
could only be considered starting from 1992, or else, the 1990- 
1991 figures must be adjusted to show the sea-air volumes less 
the 10,000 tonnes windfall for each year. In both cases, Table 
8, page 72, shows a steady increase of sea-air cargo via Seattle- 
Tacoma port as of 1992, and this is mainly attributed to: 
a) the full awareness of Seattle Port Authorities of the 
importance of attracting as much cargoes as possible, 
including sea-air cargo, to their port, by offering a wide 
variety of facilities such as computerised state of the art 
information and communication systems, and many other 
attractions as detailed in the next chapter. 
b) the growing trend of the support services offered by other 
airports in North America, such as Toronto, Atlanta, Boston, 
Miami and New York, was developed by European air carriers 
in their attempts to rationalise their international 
services by consolidating flights to major high volume cargo 
routes in North America. Such was the case of Lufthansa 
which consolidated its international flight services from 
points in Germany to New York, Atlanta, Los Angeles, Boston, 
Miami etc, thus cutting the costs of operating its multi- 
international services and using the few major high volume 
points as a re-distribution centre to various smaller 
regional points in North America, either by overland 
transport, or via the regular and dense domestic air 
services. This practice was immediately followed by many 
major European airlines such as British Airways, KLM and 
many others. This practice was reversed by the North 
American carriers who, contrary to any rationale, adopted a 
policy of multiple flight frequencies to almost all the 
gateway airports of Europe. Their argument is that their 
marketing efforts are focused on passenger traffic and they 
would want to offer their passengers a direct service to the 
nearest airport to their residence in Europe. 
Appendices E-5 to E-10, show the average annual air cargo 
capacities made available from Atlanta, Boston, Miami and New 
York to main gateway airports in Europe. The stress on European 
carriers is made because of their interest in developing sea-air 
traffic, as fill-in cargo, despite its average low return. On 
the other hand, direct interviews with North American carriersil 
on the Regional Manager level, conducted in 1992,1993 and mid- 
1994 were discouraging, in so far as sea-air traffic was 
concerned. They did not show any real interest in carrying this 
particular traffic, due to its marginal revenues, and preferred 
to concentrate their efforts on high value, high yield goods 
produced by their region's industry and marketed partly for distribution by air to various points within North America, and 
partly air exported to Europe and the rest of the world. 
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The emergence of cargo hubs gave rise to the phenomenal 
development of overland diversion to and from the selected air 
cargo re-distribution centres. This fact boosted the efforts of 
Seattle Port Authorities to attract more sea-air cargo to their 
port and which was promptly diverted overland to these newly 
established hub airports. This practice of overland diversion 
was mainly due to the relatively high air freight rates to 
Europe, and the limited air cargo capacities offered from Seattle 
Airport, which at present handles less than 2516 of total sea-air 
traffic passing through the Port of Seattle (Table 28 page 72). 
An appreciable part of Seattle Port's sea-air cargo is not air 
freighted from Seattle Airport due to the relatively high air 
freight rates applicable to Europe. For example, Seattle market 
air cargo rates have recently' ranged between US$ 1.60 and US$ 
1.80 per kilogram. On the other hand, from Atlanta, rates were 
available on a prime time Lufthansa freighter service to 
Frankfurt, at around US$ 1.25 to US$ 1.30/kilogram. The saving 
of 35 to 55 cents per kilogram was more than enough to absorb the 
3 to 5 days of overland diversion time and cost. In view of the 
much lower rates offered from these airports to various European 
destinations, freight forwarders and sea-air operators were able 
to offer shippers and consignees the option of a lower total 
transport cost at a marginally longer total transit time. 
The implications of sea-air cargo growth to the Airport and Port 
Authorities, airlines, shipping lines, sea-air operators and 
freight forwarders are found in Tables 29 and 30, that follow: 
1 From Seattle Airport, as a percentage of total international 
air cargo exports to the rest of the world. 
2. To Seattle Port, as a percentage of total import container 
traffic and tonnage. 
Table 29. From Seattle Airport 
(in 1000 tons, rounded to the nearest 100) 
1 1990 1 1991 1 1992 1 1993 1994 
Total cargo handled' 245 193 282 381 415 
Total domestic cargo 
Total international cargo 
Total air exports 
(including sea-air)' 
Total sea-air volume 
Sea-air t of total 
200 149 239 322 355 
45 44 43 54 60 
27 25 24 23 21 
20 17 15 15 13 
74.0% 68.0% 62.5% 65.2% 61.9% 
Source Airports Council international - Airport Traffic Statistic, 29 March 1995 and Airport Traffic ICAO Digest of Statistic No. 403 - 1992. Notes 1. Total cargo handled = loaded and offloaded between Seattle Airport and the rest of the world. 
2. XCAO Digest of statistics No. 410, ICAO 1994 - 11194 QIP111600. Total air exports worldwide. 
Figures in this paragraph were derived from interviews with Seattle based airline managers, sea-air 
operators, freight forwarders and quotes by airlines operating from Atlanta between Mar - Aug 1994. 
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Table 30. To Seattle Port 
(in 1000 tons & containers, rounded to the nearest 100) 
1 1990 1 1991 1 1992 1 1993 1994 
Total container traffic' 1,063 1,049 1,053 1,059 1,311 
Import container traffic 532 525 527 530 656 
Sea-air containers 13 13 12 13 13 
Sea-air % of tota12 2.4% 2.5% 2.3% 2.4% 2.0% 
Total container tonnage 7,773 7,999 7,794 8,019 9,866 
Import container tonnage 3,887 4,000 3,897 4,010 4,933 
Sea-air container tonnage' 60 60 55 56 57 
Sea-air % of total4 1.5% 1.5% 1.4% 1.4% 1.2% 
Source 11SL Shipping Statistics Yearbook of 1993 and relevant Port 
Authorities, direct releases March 1995. 
Notes: 1,2,3 and 4 same computation as in Table s 18 and 19 under Vancouver 
section 5.1. 
In summary, the Port of Seattle's current handling of 1.3 million 
boxes and 9.9 million tonnes of container tonnage, can be 
expanded greatly. As seen in Table 20, page 64, from 1987 to 
1989, the total number of containers handled, and its tonnage, 
remained stagnant at slightly less than a million boxes, at 7.3 
million tonnes per year; while during 1990 - 1994, the number of 
boxes handled, rose by over 200,000, on average, per year, and 
its tonnage to almost 10 million tonnes, i. e. a growth of 20%ý in 
container traffic and 30% in container tonnage. 
The potential of the Port of Seattle is to grow substantially 
during the next five year period and this is bound to affect sea- 
air cargo flow positively through Seattle Airport and the other 
North American supporting airports such as the main airports of 
Canada and the US; namely Miami, Atlanta, Boston and New York 
who, in fact, represent huge supporting air cargo capacities. 
US Airports Available air cargo (Appendices E-5 to E-10) 
capacities p. a. to Europe 
----------- -------------------------- 
Seattle 27,300 tonnes 
Atlanta 55,100 tonnes 
Boston 57,200 tonnes 
Miami 86,600 tonnes 
New York 391,800 tonnes 
618,000 tonnes 
In addition, much use was made of major Canadian airports (Table 
28, page 72) to move volumes of sea-air cargo. The Port of 
Seattle currently handles an average of 57,000 tonnes of sea-air 
cargo per annum, 16,000 of which is handled by Seattle Airport, 
while an average of 41,000 tonnes are handled by other supporting 
airports of North America. 
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The important conclusion is: Despite the limited availability of 
air cargo capacity from both Vancouver and Seattle Airports, sea- 
air intermodality continued its healthy growth through overland 
diversions to other airports within North America, where air 
cargo capacity was available at lesser or similar to Seattle 
airline rates. The healthy growth is demonstrated through the 
ability of sea-air intermodality to absorb the additional 
monetary costs and longer transit time resulting from overland 
diversions. 
5.3 The sea-air route via Los Ancreles 
An introduction to the ports of Los Angeles 
The ports of Los Angeles (Worldport LA) 
Beach were f irst developed in 1542 on a 
Today the two ports have facilities tc 
vessels at the same time. General 
approximately 50 million tonnes annually, 
the busiest in the United States. 
and the Port of Long 
natural harbour site. 
cater to nearly 200 
cargo tonnage totals 
making these two ports 
In 1994, Worldport LA led all U. S. West Coast ports in foreign 
cargo volume and value; handling in excess of 25 million tons of 
goods worth more than US$ 50 billion. The port surpassed its 
nearest regional competitor in cargo traffic by one-half million 
tons and cargo value by nearly US$ 6 billion. 
Figure 14 
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Source: WorldPort LA and Long Beach Port Authorities' Statistics 1994 
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The success of Worldport L. A. and Long Beach Ports is attributed 
to many factors, the most important are: 
Strategic location 
Positioned on the western edge of the West Coast of the United 
States, it forms an attractive option for flows of high volume 
traffic from the Pacific region, namely countries such as Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan. Focus for these ports extends beyond the 
traditional Pacific region area, to Europe, South America and 
Africa. 
Transioort Network 
The important aspect of any port's competitive position is its 
ability to serve through an efficient overland transport network. 
By road, Worldport and Long Beach are served by two motorways, 
'the Harbour motorway, and 'the Terminal Island motorway', which 
connect three major Interstate routes. Interstate 5 runs from 
the Canadian border near Vancouver down the US West Coast through 
Washington, Oregon and California, and crosses the Mexican border 
south of San Diego. Interstate 10 is the main east/west link 
running from Los Angeles through Arizona, New Mexico and Texas, 
to Florida. 
Interstate 15, taking a north-easterly route from Los Angeles, 
accesses Nevada, Utah, Idaho, Montana and Canada. The 
Interstates provide the ports the possibility to serve all areas, 
specified above, by road alone. Road transport, however, does 
not provide the most efficient mode of transport. 
Rail transport offers the most fuel efficient and environmental 
friendly form of transport. The two ports are serviced by three 
major trans-continental railroads (Southern Pacific 
Transportation Co. and Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co) . 
Each of the trans -continental railroads interchange directly with 
other US, Mexican and Canadian railroads, thus providing cargo 
moving through the two Los Angeles ports access to over 250,000 
miles (402,325 km. ) of main rail trackage. 
As for air freight, three major airports service Worldport and 
Long Beach: 
Los Angeles Airport (LAX) - one of the largest and most important 
airports in the US, offering 1,800 flights daily and is serviced by 85 airlines (including fourteen all cargo airlines). Volumes 
of air cargo movement in excess of 1.5 million tonnes is handled (loaded/offloaded) annually. 
Ontario Airport - although smaller than LAX, is important, handling 5 million passengers and 300,000 tonnes of cargo per 
year. This airport specialises in passenger and cargo traffic 
within the USA and is basically termed as a domestic airport. 
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Van Nuiys Airport - the busiest general aviation airport in the 
US, with approximately 500,000 aircraft movements yearly. This 
airport specialises in charters and smaller passenger aircraft 
movements from Los Angeles to any point in the U. S. A. 
Handlinq facilities 
To compete for traffic flows, any major port's handling 
facilities should be able to ensure the shortest possible transit 
time to intermodal cargo flow. Therefore, in order to obtain a 
competitive edge, facilities at both Worldport and Long Beach are 
constantly being upgraded, expanded and new facilities 
constructed. 
Table 31: Worldport LA and Long Beach 
Analysis of container traffic 
Tonnage: in thousands. Containers: in thousands 
Port 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 19931 1994 2 
Los Ancreles 
Total no. of containers 1,585 1,652 2,108 2,116 2,038 2,090 2,100 2,123 
Total container tonnage 28,530 29,901 3 8,3 65 4 0,2 04 38,722 3 6,875 3 7,8 00 38,214 
Containerisation degree 
(% of general cargo) 71.0% 71.4% 84.4% 80.0% 77.5% 71.5% 74.5% 77.1% 
Av. tonnage/container 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.2 19.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 
Loncr Beach 
Total no of containers 1,460 1,485 1,545 1,637 1,617 1,838 1,940 1,987 
Total container tonnage 26,280 26,670 27,877 29,865 30,674 34,703 3 7,18 1 3 9,3 88 
Containerisation degree 
(% of general cargo) 88.0% 88.6% 89.0% 90.1% 89.9% 90.9% 91.2% 91.4% 
Av. tonnage/container 18.0 1 18.0 1 18.0 1 18.2 1 18.9 1 18.9 1 19.2 1 19.8 
Source : ISL Shipping Statistics Yearbook, institute of Shipping and 
Logistics (ISL), Bremen, October 1993 and direct contact with the 
relevant Port Authorities. 
Notes Figures 1987 to 1992 were derived from ISL Yearbook 1993. 
1. &2: Figures for 1993 and 1994 were derived from related periodicals and 
tested against ISL figures, and average percentage changes per year 
over six years (1987 - 1992) - periodicals such as the ICHCA Annual 
Review, World of cargo handling, London, March 1995. 
The importance of expanding and improving Port facilities is 
further highlighted in a general 1994 report on sea-borne trade 
by UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), 
which forecasts a 5016 increase in world sea-borne trade, to 5 
billion tonnes per year. Various factors are involved in this 
forecast. 
1. Increased consumer demand for imported goods from Korea, 
Japan, Taiwan and China. The trade between these countries 
and the US is expected to continue its dramatic increase, as 
it has already done over the last decade. 
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2. Expected changes in the world political map, such as the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of East 
European countries, will inevitably bring profound changes 
to the pattern of world trade. 
3. The North American Free Trade Agreement, embracing the US, 
Canada and Mexico, is expected to offer unrivalled 
development opportunities leading to a surge in North-South 
trade along the North American West Coast. 
4. The economies of Central and South America are forecast to 
grow substantially in the next two decades. 
To cope with the anticipated growth, Worldport LA launched the 
largest development project since its founding in 1907. The 
120201 project when completed will constitute the largest 
integrated marine - highway - rail transportation system, 
introducing new high efficiency terminals and facilities 
comprising more than 100 acres of new land created by extensive 
outer dredging. 
Construction of the 150,000 lifts-a-year Terminal Island 
Container Transfer Facility (TICTF) is expected to be operational 
in 1995, and the container handling installations planned will 
also feature a Container Transfer Facility at each site. Another 
element of project 120201 named the Alameda corridor should 
greatly enhance the transfer of truck traffic to rail. It will 
cover a 25 mile route connecting the port with major rail 
facilities in downtown Los Angeles. 
Parallel developments are taking place at the airports of Los 
Angeles. The 98 acre cargo complex has recently been upgraded to 
provide for speedy round-the-clock handling of air cargo. 
In addition, the city's Department of Airports is investing US$ 
50 million (1994) in a new 57 acre Imperial Complex which will 
offer state-of-the-art air cargo facilities. Further, several 
private air carriers and freight forwarders have started their 
own newly built air cargo facilities. A new airport covering 
17,500 acres is under construction to cope with increasing 
demand, and will be named Palmdale Regional Airport. 
The sea-air cargo market of Los Angeles 
Sea-air cargo via Los Angeles was initiated by the airlines 
(Flying Tiger and United Airlines) in the late 1950s and early 
1960s for practically the same reasons that applied to other sea- 
air transfer ports of the US west coast. The main purpose was to 
'fill in, unutilised air cargo capacities that were available to 
points in Central America and the East Coast of America, to 
Europe and South America. A large portion of high value goods 
was attracted to this mode from the then, all ocean, long 
journeys of 35 to 45 days. 
Despite the introduction of new technology and fast container 
ships, the ocean journey from Japan, South Korea and Taiwan to 
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Central and Northern Europe is still consuming an average of 30 
to 35 days, because of the many ports of call en route. Ocean 
services to South America are slow and unreliable', especially to 
the many large landlocked markets in that part of the world. 
Ocean journeys from the Far East to South America, including 
transfer of containers to South American shipping lines at Los 
Angeles or Miami, take an average of 45 days even until the 
present day in 1994. 
Results of field research, interviews and questionnaires in Los 
Angeles, with the ports and airport authorities, were similar to 
those of Seattle, Vancouver and San Francisco. No of f icial 
statistical support on sea-air cargo movements was available. 
However, interviews with shipping lines, airlines and freight 
forwarders were more productive in terms of data required. 
In 1989, as a result of the growing awareness of the potential of 
the sea-air cargo market, Worldport Los Angeles and Los Angeles 
Airport Authorities started a committee that met regularly to 
discuss how that particular market is developing. The increased 
attention to this issue, as from 1989 onward, may be almost 
entirely credited to the Los Angeles Port and Airport 
Authorities' awareness of the strength of sea-air traffic via 
Seattle-Tacoma. 
Based on a market survey conducted and co-ordinated by Mr. Rick 
Wells, Assistant Chief of Planning, Los Angeles Airport, informal 
figures on the size of the market were published in an in-house 
memorandum circulated among the managers 9f Los Angeles Airport 
in November 1989. The survey was done strictly with the airlines 
serving Los Angeles Airport. 43 questionnaires were sent out to 
43 airlines, of which 24 responded positively. 
Airport officials estimated total sea-air tonnage flow from Los 
Angeles Airport in 1988 to have been 7,200 tonnes, broken up as 
follows: 
5,200 tonnes to Europe, 
1,000 tonnes to US domestic destinations and 
1,000 tonnes to South America. 
The memo goes on to state that sea-air cargo is considered by 
U. S. airlines to be 'not desirable cargo due to its low return'. 
It states further, that the Los Angeles area, contrary to 
Seattle, is a huge origin- dest inat ion market for direct air 
freight, and therefore the capacity for sea-air cargo to 
influence Los Angeles traffic volumes is minimal, and that there 
was no need to embark on extensive marketing of the sea-air 
product. 
Field research and intensive analysis of official figures 
released to the researcher (in response to a written request) by 
Los Angeles Airport Authorities, as tabulated by the U. S. 
1A detailed anaTy-sis of unreliability is presented under Miami as a major transfer port to South America ( section s. 5 in this chapter). 
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Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, IN145 and EM545, 
dated March 1995, show accurate and official data of air imports 
and domestic air exports to/from Los Angeles airport, for a 
period of five years, starting from 1990 to 1994, covering the 
following regions: 
1. West Europe 
2. East Europe 
3. South America 
In addition, official data was released by Los Angeles Airport 
Authorities, showing cargo handled by all airlines, using Los 
Angeles Airport, between 1990 and 1994. Los Angeles Airport, 
similar to other relevant sources such as ICAO and IATA, records 
only a single statistical figure of cargo handled, i. e covering 
two operations of cargo tonnage weights loaded and off-loaded, 
and do not record separate figures for each of the two 
operations. The analysis that follows, based on certain 
practical assumptions, is a serious attempt by the researcher to 
determine the present status of Los Angeles Ports and Airports, 
air and ocean carriers, in relation to intermodal transport, and 
specifically sea-air cargo movement. The attempt goes further to 
substantiate the current sea-air cargo volume, as a whole and per 
airline, in figures that were denied, or said to be classified, 
or were reported as 'unavailable' by the shipping lines, 
airlines, port and airport authorities. 
The sea-air traffic between Los Angeles Airport and Europe: 
As total domestic made air exports and air imports tonnage by 
country has been released by the Department of Commerce 
(tabulated in Appendix F-2), and since total tonnage handled 
(loaded and offloaded) by air carriers at Los Angeles Airport was 
also released by the Los Angeles Airport Authority (tabulated in 
Appendix F-1), then, subtracting total imports from total cargo 
handled yields gives the total tonnage of air exports from Los 
Angeles Airport. 
Since all transit cargo, originating in the Ports of Los Angeles, 
and air exported through its airports, is not recorded by the 
Department of Commerce, the air export total tonnage figure, from 
Los Angeles Airport, was much greater than that reported by the 
Department of Commerce. The excess must be considered as transit 
sea-air cargo. 
Total cargo handled at Los Angeles Airport between Los Angeles 
and Europe was 183,000 tonnes in 1994. Subtracting air imports 
of 52,300 tonnes results in 131,000 tonnes of total air exports. 
Domestic air exports to Western Europe were 78,300 tonnes and to 
eastern Europe, 2500 tonnes, a total of 80,800 tonnes. Therefore 
sea-air tonnage was 131,000 less 80,. 800= 50,200 tonnes. 
The US carriers, confirmed lack of interest in carrying sea-air 
cargo means that they only carried domestic air exports. It is 
further assumed that the US carriers share 50k with participating 
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European carriers on this route, as they are unable to have a 
larger share due to their limited air cargo capacity of 50,500 
tonnes per annum (Appendix F-3) to Europe. 50t of 80,800 tonnes 
is 40,400 tonnes, resulting in a freight load factor of 80t 
[(40,400 -- 50,500) x 100]. 
The European carriers were left with 50,200 tonnes of sea-air 
cargo volume and 40,400 tonnes of domestic air exports, totalling 
90,600 tonnes, to be spread among their combined available 
capacity of 135,800 tonnes, including El Al airline (Appendix F- 
3). The tonnage share per airline was computed according to an 
axiom that the tonnage share performed is directly proportional 
to its percentage share of total available capacity to Europe. 
Example: British Airways availed an annual average cargo 
capacity of 17,600 tonnes versus a total available of 135,800 
tonnes. Therefore, British Airways percentage share of tonnage 
performed is 13% of 90,600 tonnes of total available tonnage = 
11,800 tonnes. The percentage share and tonnage performed by 12 
major airlines in 1994, is computed below: 
Table 32. Scheduled European airlines' 
s hare distribution, 
from Los Angeles Airport to Europe 
total air exports and sea-air volumes in tonn es 
(1994) 
Airline V share otal air exports d r Sea-air 
-T 
Available 
tonnage performe tonnage capacity 
British Airways 13.0k 11,800 6,200 17,600 
Lufthansa 11.5%- 10,500 7,800 15,700 
Air France 13.89k 12,500 8,200 18,700 
Alitalia 13.8! k 12,500 2,100 18,700 
Cargolux 11.4! k 10,400 10,200 15,600 
KLM 6.0%- 5,500 4,600 8,200 
Virgin Atlantic 5.9%_ 5,300 3,100 8,000 
El Al 10.8%- 9,800 4,000 14,700 
Lauda 4.3! k 3,900 --- 5,900 
Swissair 3.31; 3,000 2,000 4,500 
Martinair 1.8%, 1,700 1,700 2,500 
Iberian 2.8%- 2,300 --- 3,500 
Others 1.6% 1,500 300 2,200 
Total 100! k 90,600 50,200 135,800 
Source: Column 2, total air export tonnage performed, including sea-air. 
Column 3, sea-ai r tonnage; is a %best es timate' figure drawn by the 
researcher from direct interviews with the airlines and freight 
forwarders in Los Angeles area. 
Column 4, available capacity as tabulated in Appendix F-3. 
The development of sea-air cargo volumes and their percentage 
share of total air exports to Europe, over the five year period 
under review, is shown in Table 33, page 83. 
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Table 33. Sea-air cargo share to Europe 
from Los Angeles Airport 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Local air exports 
to Western Europe' 77,200 81,300 95,600 83,300 78,300 
Local air exports 
to Eastern Europe 2 900 900 1,700 2,700 2,500 
Total local air 
exports to Europe 78,100 82,200 97,300 86,000 80,800 
Sea-air 57,600 49,500 31,200 31,500 50,200 
Total air 
cargo to Europe 135,700 131,700 128,500 117,500 131,000 
Sea-air % share 42.4% 37.6% 24.3% 26.8% 38.3% 
Source Los Angeles Airport Authority official release of cargo tonnage 
handled per airline operating scheduled services from Los Angeles 
Airport and Department of Commerce official release of domestic made 
exports and imports from and into Los Angeles Airport. 
Almost all air freight export movement from Los Angeles Airport 
to Europe is carried at present by twenty four major carriers. 
Field research, interviews and the analysis made earlier show 
that only 10 European carriers were interested in carrying sea- 
air cargo, while the other 14 did not show any interest, due 
mainly to its low returns. Sea-air cargo was important to many 
European carriers such as British Airways, Air France, KLM, 
Lufthansa, Virgin Atlantic, Swissair, Alitalia, Cargolux, 
Martinair and El Al, as sea-air cargo has been a major revenue 
factor and represented 38.316 of their respective total cargo 
uplift in 1994. 
As seen in Table 33, above, sea-air cargo generated 42.41k of the 
total air cargo exports in 1990. From then onward, in 1992 and 
1993, it dropped sharply to 24.31k and 26.8k respectively. The 
reason for the 1990 higher-than-average share was mainly due to 
the Gulf crisis, and the consequential transfer of all U. A. E. 
bound sea-air cargo, to the West Coast hubs of North America and 
to Singapore. 
Los Angeles sea-air market to South America 
The flow of sea-air cargo for South America via Los Angeles 
Airport has grown strongly with indications for much further and 
stronger growth to occur during the last decade of the 20th 
century. 
The research finding confirms that sea-air cargo to South and 
Central America grew from 19,000 tonnes in 1990 to 25,000 tonnes 
in 1991 and more than double that figure in 1994 at 51,100 
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tonnes, despite the fact that most of the cargo destined for 
Mexico is usually trucked over from the Port of Los Angeles or 
Long Beach. But due to the difficulties of truck clearance 
congestion at the borders next door to San Diego (Tijuana), a 
good portion of this cargo is at present air-carried to Mexico. 
To trace the development of sea-air cargo volumes to South and 
Central America, including the air portion carried to Mexico f rom 
Los Angeles Airport, the same method of analysis used for Europe 
is used again here, covering a five year period starting 1990 to 
1994. Before 1990, sea-air cargo to South and Central America 
was negligible and within the 1000 tonnes bracket. 
1. Appendix F-4, shows total air cargo capacities made 
available by all scheduled international carriers operating 
between Los Angeles Airport and South, Central America and 
Mexico. 
2. Appendix F-5, shows total air cargo handled 
(loaded/of f loaded) by all airlines operating between Los 
Angeles Airport and South, Central America and Mexico. 
3. Appendix F-6, shows total Los Angeles air exports (domestic 
made exports) as released by the US Dept, of Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census, of March 1995, to major countries in 
South America. 
4. Appendix F-7, shows total exports and imports, and the ratio 
of exports of total trade between Los Angeles and major 
South American countries. 
The first step is to determine the total air exports, including 
sea-air cargo carried, by subtracting the total air imports from 
total air cargo handled (loaded and offloaded). The second step 
is to determine the total sea-air volume by simple deductions of 
Los Angeles' domestic air exports from the total air exports 
(Table 34 below). 
Table 34. Sea-air cargo share 
to South and Central America (incl. Mexico) 
from Los Angeles Airport 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Total local 
air exports 8,100 8,900 11,200 11,500 13,300 
Total Sea-air 19,100 25,100 38,500 43,200 50,100 
Total air cargo to 
S. & C. America 27,200 34,000 49,700 54,700 63,400 
Sea-air % share 70.2% 73.8% 77.5% 80.0% 79.0% 
Source Los Angeles Airport Authority official release of cargo tonnage 
handled per airline operating scheduled services from Los Angeles 
Airport and Department of Commerce official release of domestic made 
exports and imports from and into Los Angeles Airport. 
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The figures in 
rate in sea-air 
Table 34, page 
cargo volumes 
" 31.4t in 1991 
" 53.4t in 1992 
" 12.2t in 1993 
" 16. Ot in 1994 
84, show a dramatic annual growth 
of : 
The interesting fact here is that sea-air cargo is a very 
important revenue factor for almost all the airlines operating 
from Los Angeles Airport to South and Central America, as it 
constitutes an average of 751; of all air cargo traffic. 
Overland Truck Feeder Services : 
Overland truck f eeder services f rom Los Angeles Airport are 
provided by the airlines operating from/to the airport, under 
official City of Los Angeles licences. The airlines that operate 
feeder trucking services are : 
1. Scandinavian Airways. 
2. Swissair 
3. Federal Express 
4. Link America 
5. Airmax 
The first three operate their own trucking services, with Federal 
Express concentrating on their very own special high revenue 
traffic of express parcel deliveries, with no contribution to 
sea-air cargo movements, while Link America and Airmax are 
commissioned by other airlines interested in moving sea-air cargo 
to other US Airports for further on-carriage, by air, to 
destinations they serve. This is largely due to the saturated 
cargo capacities of these airlines from Los Angeles Airport. 
Link America : is a small airline based in Chicago and licensed 
to operate feeder trucking services, like any other airline 
from/to the airports, and cannot, by law, offload or load cargo 
from any other place as the cargo is moving linbond' onboard 
their trucks. 
Airmax : is also a small airline, based in St. Louis, Missouri 
and Chicago and licensed to operate feeder trucking services, 
like Link America. 
The nature of sea-air cargo is that it moves I in bond' from ports 
to airport and is not registered as revenue cargo to the US 
Customs and Excise Departments, and therefore it must not be off- 
loaded anywhere enroute except at the airport to which it was 
first consigned, as per Bill of Lading of the shipping line. 
Airlines at the airports receive sea-air cargo through the 
assistance of Freight Forwarders and shipping lines who deliver, 
direct to the airport, full container loads or de-consolidated 
container loads, in smaller independent shipments, each with a 
different destination. 
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The handling of containers by the Ports of Los Angeles and Long 
Beach shows that the average load per container is approximately 
18 tonnes (Table 31, page 78) . This may be due to the 
large 
consumer area of Los Angeles which caters to 14 million 
consumers. As such, orders are usually huge and occupy a large 
number of bigger capacity containers. This means that most 
containers handled by these two ports are 40 foot containers, 
which in the case of sea-air, are delivered to Los Angeles 
Airport in bond, and are registered by the Los Angeles and Long 
Beach Port Authorities, and not the Airport Authorities, to avoid 
duplication. As this cargo is delivered to the airline at the 
airport, part or all of it may find its way onto international 
flights, and, therefore, is registered by Los Angeles Airport as 
cargo handled by the airline concerned. Part of this cargo may 
be diverted through truck feeder services, or through 
commissioned airlines who operate such a service, and, therefore, 
is not registered by Los Angeles Airport. 
Feeder truck services are provided and publicised with certain 
set and authorised frequencies per week to certain destination 
airports within the U. S. The frequencies can be upgraded or 
downgraded depending on demand by the principal airline. 
Research and interviews with the airlines operating these 
services revealed that no downgrading takes place, all 
frequencies are executed as published and publicised, even at 
lower than average payload. They may be delayed, but not 
cancelled. Upgrading takes place, usually during the high season 
starting June 15th, up to mid October, when a return to original 
standard frequency schedules takes place. 
The average payload per truck is approximately the same as the 
container loads handled by both ports of Los Angeles and Long 
Beach, i. e. 18 tons per 40 foot container. In cases of full 
container loads, the same ocean container cargo is offloaded, 
segregated per destination and reloaded onboard feeder truck 
trailer services, either air- palletised or as is in bulk. 
Communications between the airline, the truck feeder service, the 
airport of delivery, airline office, Airport Authorities and the 
US Customs and Excise Dept. in tracking shipments and computer 
tallying of entry and exit shipments moving in bond', is 
adequate and efficient. Cargo moving on truck feeder services 
between airports in the US is fully insured against total or 
partial loss and/or damage, and the liability of the airline 
operating such a service is an extended liability of its 
international air freight flight services covering the invoice 
value of the consignment with a ceiling on compensation to 
shipper or consignee, not to exceed US$ 20.00 per kilogram. In 
cases where the declared value of the consignment exceeds the set 
limit of US$ 20 per kilogram, and the shipper wishes to insure 
the declared value, then an additional premium covering value in 
excess of the set limit is levied from the shipper as valuation 
charge', and is clearly inserted on the relevant box of the CTD 
(Combined Transport Document), and/or the airline's Airway Bill, 
whichever is applicable, at the very origin of the shipment, i. e. 
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Japan, Korea, Taiwan and the Far East in general. 
Feeder trucking services are operated mainly by those airlines 
who are interested in carrying fill in, cargo as it contributes 
to their revenue. From Los Angeles Airport to airports within 
the US, the following truck feeder services operated by various 
airlines are listed, with an estimated cargo tonnage made 
available at the re-routed (diverted to) airports for on-carriage 
to final destination by air. 
1. Los Angeles/Atlanta 
a. Swissair operates seven truck frequencies per week, all 
carrying air palletised cargo, with an average of 18 tonnes 
per truck load, which means approximately 6,500 tonnes of 
sea-air cargo to Atlanta, for further on-carriage to Zurich 
on their four weekly combi flights, B74D LPQ and two 743 LPJ 
and one M11 LPJ (Appendix F-3) 
b. Airmax operates two feeder trucking services per week, 
carrying an average of 150 tonnes of air palletised sea-air 
cargo per truck trip. This service is upgraded to an 
additional frequency as of June 15th each year till Oct 15th 
or 20th, i. e. 20 additional frequencies per year, which 
means a total of approximately 2,000 tonnes per year (124 
frequencies x 15 tonnes). 
C. Link America operates seven feeder trucking services per 
week all carrying de-palletised or bulk cargo at an average 
of 17.5 tonnes per truck trip, yielding a total load of 
6,400 tonnes per year. 
2. Los Angeles/Boston 
a. Airmax operates two regular frequencies per week and 
upgrades during the season with an additional 20 frequencies 
spread over five months. All frequencies carry air 
palletised cargo which averages at about 2,000 tonnes per 
year (124 frequencies x 15 tonnes). 
b. Link America operates seven regular trucking frequencies per 
week, carrying de-palletised cargo, or breakbulk, at an 
average of 17.5 tonnes per truck trip. Total tonnage 
averages 6,400 per year. 
3. Los Angeles/San Francisco 
a. Scandinavian Airlines operates seven air-palletised cargo 
trucking services to San Francisco for further on-carriage 
by air to Scandinavia, mainly Helsinki. Total average 
tonnage = 6,500 tonnes per year. b. Airmax and Link America both operate regular weekly seven 
air-palletised cargo services and seven bulk cargo services 
with both, together, averaging 11,800 tonnes per year. This 
cargo is largely import cargo from Europe with San Francisco 
as its final destination. European airlines who are 
restricting their frequencies to high volume routes and do 
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not operate multiple frequencies to nearby airports (San 
Francisco is only 500 miles from Los Angeles Airport), in 
their attempt to reduce operating costs, resort to truck 
feeder delivery services, of consignments, to their nearby 
airport of final destination. 
4. Los Angeles/Miami 
a. Airmax operates 2 regular air-palletised cargo truck 
frequencies per week, and upgrades during the 5 month high 
season with 3 additional frequencies, at a total tonnage of 
3,700 tonnes per year (164 frequencies x 15 tonnes). 
b. Link America operates five regular bulk cargo trucking 
frequencies per week, and upgrades to seven frequencies 
during the high season. The approximate total tonnage 
carried to Miami by Link America is 5,200 tonnes per annum 
(300 frequencies x 17.5 tonnes). 
The total sea-air volume that was moved in 1994 through feeder 
trucking services was as per the following Table. 
Table 35. Sea-air cargo route diversion 
to feeder truck service 
from Los Angeles Airport (in tonnes) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Atlanta 3,600 5,200 11,000 12,500 14,900 
Boston 2,000 2,900 6,200 7,100 8,400 
San Francisco 1,600 2,300 4,800 5,500 6,500 
Miami 1,600 2,300 4,800 5,500 8,900 
Total 8,800 12,700 26,800 30,600 38,700 
Source Derived from interviews with freight forwarders, airlines and 
airlines operating trucking services from Los Angeles Airport. 
The figures for the years 1990 to 1993 were computed according to 
the percentage growth of sea-air cargo per year, over the 
preceding year and tested against the feeder services, capacities 
and frequencies that were available each year, starting in 1990. 
These figures were checked again during interviews with the major 
Los Angeles based freight forwarders who confirmed that the above 
figures were accurate and reflect actual sea-air movements within 
a margin of ± 7! k variation. 
In summary, the sea-air market via Los Angeles Airport during the 
period of five years under review, between 1990 and 1994 can be 
described as follows: 
1. To Europe : 
Growth is limited to the air cargo capacities made available by 
those airlines interested in sea-air cargo. The present 
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imbalance of trade between Los Angeles air exports in relation to 
air imports to and from Europe makes it difficult for airlines to 
operate additional freighter services. Table 36, below, shows a 
wide imbalance of air imports in relation to air exports. 
Table 36. Los Angeles /Europe 
Air exports vs, air imports 
and imports as at of exports 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Exports 77,200 81,300 95,600 83,300 78,300 
Imports 38,600 39,100 42,000 45,600 52,300 
Imports as a 
t of exports 50.0! k 48.11; 43.996 54.101; 66.80; 
Source : US Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 
Starting as low as 50% in 1990 and worsening even more during the 
next two years that followed, to 48.1t and 43.9t respectively, 
air imports started to improve in 1993 to reach 54.10i of air 
exports, and reached its highest ratio in 1994 of 66.8t. 
Increased freighter capacities cannot be economically justified 
through the dense carriage of air cargo on only one sector and 
especially when that cargo is largely sea-air and produces much 
less revenue to the airline concerned. 
The only possibility for air cargo capacities to increase between 
Europe and Los Angeles lies in balancing the present directional 
imbalance of trade, i. e. by increased air imports into Los 
Angeles Airport, a case which is not likely to happen in the near 
future. 
Air exports to Europe are almost stable at an average of 80,000 
tonnes a year, while air imports have steadily risen from 38,600 
tonnes in 1990 to 52,300 tonnes in 1994 making an average of 
43,400 tonnes per year, which is slightly higher than 50! k of the 
air exports. 
Sea-air cargo to Europe does not represent any attraction to the 
US carriers, whose share is concentrated on the domestic air 
exports, higher returns; therefore the possibilities of growth in 
sea-air cargo bound for Europe lies basically in the overland 
feeder services to alternative airports in the US, where air 
cargo capacities are available in abundance. 
The growth of sea-air to Europe via alternative airports is seen 
in Table 37, page 90. 
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Table 37. The growth of sea-air cargo to Europe 
via Los Angeles Airport direct air 
and through feeders via alternative US Airports 
and the percentage share of each 
Year LAX Atlanta Boston SFO Total 
Airport feeder feeder feeder 
Direct service service service 
1990 57,600 3,600 2,000 1,600 64,800 
t of total 88.91% 5.6-9. 3. I-. 1- 2.5-9., 100-4.1 
1991 49,500 5,200 2,900 2,300 59,900 
t of total 82.6-9. - 8.7-9. 4.8-19. 3.8* 100-9.1 
1992 31,200 11,000 6,200 4,800 53,200 
-9t of total 58.6-0. - 20.7-0*,, 11.7-1, 9.0-90, 100-1.1. 
1993 31,500 12,500 7,100 5,500 56,600 
t of total 55.7-01- 22.11.1, 12.5-9. 9.7 -0. -* 
100-9.1 
1994 50,200 14,900 8,400 6,500 80,000 
t of total 62.8-1.1, 18.6-9. - 10.5-1.1. - 8.1 100-1.11 
5 yr total 220,000 47,200 26,600 20,700 314,500 
Average per year 44,000 9,440 5,320 4,140 1 
62,900 
Source Compiled, computed and tabulated from Tables 34 and 35 on pages 84 
and 88 respectively. 
2. To South and Central America : 
On this route the situation is reversed. Air imports exceed air 
exports by a much bigger margin. 
Table 38. Los Angeles / South & Central America 
Air exports vs, air imports 
and imports as at of exports 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Exports 2,500 2,800 4,900 4,700 6,100 
Imports 4,400 5,200 6,600 8,000 9,400 
Imports as a 
% of exports 176.0% 185.7! k 134.60i 170.206 154.0%; 
Source : US Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 
This means that sea-air cargo has ample room to grow 
substantially to South and Central America as fill in' cargo to 
the current unutilised air cargo capacities made available 
through the directional imbalance of trade in favour of air 
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imports. The increase will continue until it reaches the point 
where all available unutilised capacities are fully utilised and 
saturated. 
Sea-air cargo may witness further growth through the added 
facility of Miami Airport (through truck feeder services) where 
unlimited and unutilised air cargo capacities are made available 
increasingly through the hundreds of flights that land daily at 
Miami Airport fully loaded with fresh produce from South and 
Central America, to cater to the dramatic growth of Miami's and 
Florida's consumer market, which is largely made up of people of 
Latin American origin, who maintain close ties with their 
original home countries (Table 39, below). 
Table 39. The growth of sea-air cargo 
to South and Central America 
via Los Angeles Airport direct air 
and through feeders via Miami Airport 
and the percentage share of each 
Year via LAX 
Airport direct 
ia 
Miami 
Total 
1990 19,100 1,600 20,700 
t of total 92.3-9. 7.7-1. 10 0 -q.. 
1991 25,100 2,300 27,400 
t of total 91.6*1 8.4 -111, 
100-9.1 
1992 38,500 4,800 43,300 
t of total 88.9-1.1- 11.1-4. 100-90, 
1993 43,200 5,500 48,700 
t of total 88.7-91 11.3-0. 100-9. 
1994 50,100 8,900 59,000 
t of total 84.9-9. 15.1-90 100-40 
5 yr total 176,000 
Average per year 35,200 
Source : iled, computed a 
88 respectively. 
23,100 199,100 
4,620 
1 
39,820 
ated from Tables 34 and on pages 84 
The implications of sea-air cargo growth to the Airport 
Authorities, Port Authorities, airlines, shipping lines, sea-air 
operators and freight forwarders are found in Tables 40 and 41 
that follow: 
1. From Los Angeles Airport, as a percentage of total 
international air cargo carried to the rest of the world. 
2. To Los Angeles Port, as a percentage of total container 
traffic and tonnage. 
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Table 40. From Los Angeles Airport 
(in 1000 tons, rounded to the nearest 100) 
1990 1 1991 1 1992 1 1993 1994 
Total cargo handled 1,165 1,141 1,230 1,326 1,545 
Total domestic cargo 752 718 750 843 1,048 
Total international cargo 413 423 480 493 497 
Total air exports 192 201 222 221 224 
(including sea-air) 
Total sea-air volume 77 75 70 75 100 
Sea-air ?G of total 40.1% 37.3% 31.5% 33.9% 44.6% 
Source Airports Council International - Airport Traffic Statistic, 29 March 
1995 and Airport Traffic ICAO Digest of Statistic No. 403 - 1992. 
Table 41. To Los Angeles Port 
(in 1000 tons & containers, rounded to the nearest 100) 
1 1990 1 1991 1 1992 1 1993 1994 
Total container traffic 2,116 2,038 2,090 2,100 2,123 
Import container traffic 
Sea-air containers 
Sea-air % of total 
Total container tonnage 
Import container tonnage 
Sea-air container tonnage 
1,058 1,019 1,045 
19 19 22 
1.8% 1.9% 2.1% 
40,204 38,722 36,875 37,800 38,214 
20,102 19,361 18,438 18,900 19,107 
86 87 97 105 139 
1,050 1,061 
23 31 
2.2% 2.9% 
Sea-air k of total 0.04% 0.04% 0.05% 0.06% 0.07% 
Source ISL Shipping Statistics Yearbook of 1993 and relevant Port 
Authorities, direct releases March 1995. 
A closing remark on Los Angeles Ports and Airports: 
The wide range of facilities offered by the Los Angeles Ports and 
Airports, shipping lines, airlines, freight forwarders and sea- 
air operators, make Los Angeles a convenient alternative to 
Seattle and Vancouver. 
Sea-air cargo uplifted from Los Angeles airport arrives at two 
ports in the metropolitan area, similar to the Seattle-Tacoma 
situation. Nearly all shipping lines serving Seattle-Tacoma from 
the Asia Pacific region also'serve the Los Angeles market, but 
most of them on clearly differentiated routing networks. Many of 
them operate newer technology, faster ships to Los Angeles, than 
they do to the Pacific Northwest, and can offer a sailing time from the Far East to Los Angeles that exceeds the sailing time to 
Seattle and Tacoma by only one day (or a total of 10 days VS 9 days to Seattle-Tacoma). 
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An added advantage is that ship arrivals are not as concentrated 
around the weekend, as in the case of the Pacif ic Northwest. The 
spread of shipping lines, arrivals to the ports of Los Angeles 
(Worldport) and Long Beach, over all the days of the week, make 
it possible for sea-air cargo to connect all airline weekly 
frequencies, regardless of whether they fall at the weekend or 
not, a fact that improves on the daily flight payload increasing 
the utilisation of unutilised capacities, which otherwise remain 
(in other sea-air transfer hubs) unutilised during mid week 
flights, thus improving airline freight load factors and thereby 
improving revenues. 
Based on these findings, Los Angeles Airport officials were not 
quite correct in concluding that the sea-air market is not of as 
great a significance to Los Angeles Airport as it is to Seattle. 
The analysis, contrary to Los Angeles Airport Authorities' 
convictions, confirms the importance of sea-air cargo to this 
airport. 
5.4 The sea-air route via San Francisco 
Sea-air cargo traf f ic via San Francisco was started by Flying 
Tiger in the early 1960s. At the time, and until the mid 1970s 
Flying Tiger was moving sea-air cargo by air mainly to the US 
East coast and Central America. The timely introduction of the 
double-stacked container trains had a devastating effect on this 
particular sea-air movement, by attracting almost all the sea-air 
volume to the railways who offered scheduled timely departures 
and arrivals, at comparatively very low rates, due to the double 
stacking of containers. 
The sea-air market to Europe and South America, as from the mid 
1970s onward, showed a slow but steady increase; the slowness of 
sea-air cargo growth was mainly attributed to the limited air 
cargo capacities that were made available by the limited airlines 
operating international scheduled services between San Francisco 
Airport and the main gateway airports of Europe. However, 
starting from the early 1980s onward, airlines operating this 
sector increased their flight frequencies with extensive use of 
wide-bodied aircraft, which resulted in a substantial increase of 
available air cargo capacities to Europe, while international 
scheduled airlines' services to South and Central America had a 
very limited growth, and consequently, air cargo capacities were 
limited to the very few airlines who operated wide-bodied 
aircraft on this sector. 
Before 1990, sea-air cargo volume to Europe and South America was 
limited to approximately 3,500 tonnes per year. ' The figures 
released by the US Bureau of the Census, Water Borne and Commerce 
Department, show that sea-air volume was: 
3,426 tonnes in 1988 
1,168 tonnes in 1989 
and approximately 5,000 tonnes in 1990. 
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Therefore any serious attempt to analyse and quantify the sea-air 
market via San Francisco Airport must take into consideration the 
following data, over a specific period of time : 
1. Air cargo capacities made available from the Airport through 
airline frequencies and type of aircraft designated use. 
2. Port container handling activity and shipping lines' 
frequencies. 
3. Total air cargo volumes carried to Europe and South America. 
4. Total local San Francisco air exports. 
To start with, the period to be reviewed is taken from 1990 to 
1994. A five year period analysis should be able to present, 
quite fairly, the position of San Francisco Port and Airport in 
relation to sea-air cargo movements, its development trends and 
the future prospects of growth. 
Air cargo capacities : San Francisco/Europe 
European air carriers operate 52 f requencies per week to very few 
European gateway airports. Thus, general flight services are 
concentrated at f ive airports, which by themselves generate high 
volumes of cargo movement on the route, as opposed to the US 
carriers multiple flight frequencies to ten gateway airports, 
which naturally results in the spreading of the load, and 
therefore lower cargo volumes per flight. European and US 
carriers, frequencies from San Francisco Airport to main gateway 
airports in Europe is detailed in Appendix F-8. 
The general trend of the US carriers has been stated before, and 
is repeated here again to spotlight it as one of the main factors 
responsible for the continuous and persistent, low freight load 
factors of the North American carriers. The US carriers 
operating from San Francisco, or any major US airport, except Los 
Angeles and Miami, unlike the Europeans, adopt a policy of 
multiple flights to multiple gateway airports in Europe. us 
carriers operating from Los Angeles and Miami are geared to apply 
this policy to. South and Central America, and consolidate their 
frequencies to Europe to only seven major gateways, in the case 
of Los Angeles and four in the case of Miami, as against 15 and 
9 respectively by the Europeans (Appendices F-3 and G-1). 
From San Francisco, the US carriers, argument is: since they have 
the least interest in moving low return sea-air cargo, and since 
their concentrated marketing efforts are mostly focused on 
passenger traffic, and the high return domestic air exports of 
San Francisco and part of the strong air export market of Seattle 
(computers and the Boeing aircraft aviation industry spare parts, 
etc. ), they would want, therefore, to offer a direct air service 
to their passengers, shippers and consignees located in the areas 
around the airport of destination; unlike the European airlines 
who resort to domestic airline services and overland feeder truck 
services to re-distribute their passengers and cargo from their 
major gateway hubs to various destinations in Europe. 
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One may not be surprised to see so many major American carriers 
filing Chapter 11 (bankruptcy procedures) during the last decade. 
Such was the case of Pan Am and TWA (Trans World Airlines) , while Flying Tiger, America's and the world's No. 1 freighter airline, 
was facing survival difficulties, and was sold to Federal 
Express, a freight forwarder. 
The lack of interest of the US carriers in sea-air cargo is 
compensated by the keen interest of the European carriers, who 
enjoyed, for quite some time, the privilege of monopolising the 
carriage of this type of traffic, until early 1990, when they 
started facing competition by an outsider, a carrier that is 
neither European nor American, namely El Al, who with three B 747 
freighter frequencies per week to Amsterdam applied a policy of 
priority loading to cargo bound for their home country; whatever 
balance air cargo capacity that becomes available is sold to sea- 
air operators through a 'spot rating, procedure - which 
eventually ends up with El Al carrying sea-air cargo to Amsterdam 
for further distribution to points in Europe at marginally lower 
rates than those applied by the European carriers. 
The Port of Oakland and the shipping lines : 
The same shipping lines calling at Seattle - Tacoma ports call at 
the Port of Oakland, with very few port calls to the Port of 
Portland, on their way to San Francisco Bay. The average transit 
time is only one day in excess of that of Seattle and Tacoma. 
Oakland is only half an hour by road to San Francisco Airport, 
and sea-air traffic to the airport, as well as rail traffic to 
the East Coast, is handled promptly and efficiently, with 
adequate handling equipment, similar in quality and productivity 
to those available in Long Beach Ports, Seattle - Tacoma and all West Coast ports of North America. 
Table 42, below, shows the total number of containers handled by 
the Port of Oakland, the percentage of container tonnage in 
relation to general cargo tonnage and average load per container. 
Table 42: Oakland Port 
Analysis of container traffic 
Tonnaqe: in thousands. Containers: in thousands 
Port 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 19931 1994 2 
Oakland 
Total no. of containers 954 1,032 1,091 1,124 1,195 1,291 1,360 1,525 
Total container tonnage 12,360 12,673 12,807 13,387 14,495 18,100 19,500 20,800 
Containerisation degree 93.1% 94.3% 95.2% 96.5% 97.3% 98.0% 98.0% 98.0% 
(% of general cargo) 
Av. tonnage/container 
1 
13.0 
1 
12.3 
1 
11.7 11.9 
1 
11.2 
1 
14.0 
1 
14.3 
1 
13.6 
0 LýCt L. L 4i LA Uki x UCLL'UUun, Lj a Er uLL. UL oflappaliq allu 
Logistics (ISL), Bremen, October 1993 and direct contact with the 
relevant Port Authorities. 
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The relevance of Table 42 to our analysis lies in the degree of 
containerisation and the number of containers handled per year, 
which means that the more air cargo capacities made available 
from San Francisco Airport, the more sea-air growth and the less 
diversion to other alternative airports. 
Total air cargo carried to Europe : 
Total air cargo handled (loaded/of f loaded) at San Francisco 
Airport during the period under review, between 1990 and 1994, 
showing international cargo movement, is as per Table 43, below. 
Table 43. Total cargo handled (loaded/offloaded) 
at San Francisco Airport 
for all international destinations 
(in 1000 tons, rounded to the nearest hundred tonnes) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
International 217 213 191 210 224 
cargo handled 
loaded/offloaded 
Source Airports Council International - Airport Traffic Statistic, 29 March 
1995 and Airport Traffic ICAO Digest of Statistic No. 403 - 1992. 
The international cargo movements show a very slow rate of growth 
from 217,000 tonnes in 1990 to 224,000 tonnes in 1994, which 
means less than a 5k increase over the 1990 figure. 
Total domestic San Francisco exports, including the part trucked 
from Seattle and Boeing headquarters, showed also a very slow 
average growth of 1.19116 per year, as per the Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of Census released figures of 1990 to 1994. 
Total air exports to Europe and the rest of the world fluctuated 
between 93,000 and 96,000 tonnes during the five year period 
under review. 
The US carriers' share was estimated to reach 6016 of the total 
local air exports due to the policy followed of operating 
international scheduled frequencies to a multiple of gateway 
airports in Europe, and hence the shippers preference of direct 
air delivery, as opposed to overland truck service, from a few 
gateway hubs in Europe. The shares are split, as shown in Table 
44, on the following page. 
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Table 44. General Cargo movement analysis 
and sea-air cargo volumes 
(in 1000 tons, rounded to the nearest 100) 
1990 1 1991 1 1992 1 1993 1994 
Total local air exports' 92,900 93,400 95,800 94,100 93,200 
a. US carriers' share 55,700 56,000 57,500 56,500 56,000 
b. European carriers' share 37,200 37,400 38,300 37,600 37,200 
SFO sea-air volume 6,400 11,000 20,100 27,500 27,000 
Sea-air cargo diverted from LAX 1,600 2,300 4,800 5,500 6,500 
Total sea-air cargo carried by 6,400 11,000 15,900 22,700 21,900 
European carriers 
El Al NA2 NA 4,200 4,800 5,100 
Total air cargo exports 99,300 104,400 115,900 121,600 120,200 
Source: US Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census and computed and derived 
from Tables in this section. 
1. Total local air exports to Europe and the rest of the world. 
2. NA - Not available. 
South and Central America : 
Table 45. Freighters and mixed flights 
from San Francisco 
to major gateway hubs in South America 
(Available average cargo capacities rounded to the nearest 100 tonnes) 
Airline A/C type Days of the week Cargo capacity Destination 
flights operate per annum 
American Airlines 767 LPJ Daily 3,500 Asuncion 
United Airlines 763 LPJ Daily 2,800 Rio de Janeiro 
American Airlines 767 LPJ Daily 3,500 Sao Paulo 
Total available cargo capacity per annum, 
San Francisco to major S. American gateways 9,800 
Source : Air Cargo timetable, Number 440, September 1994. 
Sea-air cargo to South and Central America is negligible and is 
mainly handled by Los Angeles and Miami Airports. Table 45, 
above, shows that the US airlines are the only air carriers 
providing air cargo capacity to South and Central America and is 
quite limited to the B767 and B763 passenger flights, 
accommodating largely the San Francisco local air exports. 
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In 1994, total air cargo that was registered as handled air 
exports from San Francisco Airport to destination airports in 
South and Central America was as follows : 
Mexico City 
Rio de Janeiro 
Guadalajara 
Guatemala City 
Puerto Vallarta 
San Jose Cabo 
Others 
900 tonnes 
300 tonnes 
400 tonnes 
40 tonnes 
20 tonnes 
20 tonnes 
50 tonnes 
1,730 tonnes 
Most of the cargo was trucked to Los Angeles Airport for further 
uplift to the above destinations. The above figures were 
reported by American Airlines and United who operate from San 
Francisco Airport and TACA, Mexicana, Air France, VARIG and VASP 
who operate from Los Angeles Airport, but received cargo at San 
Francisco Airport, and were compared with figures published by 
ICAO Statistics No. 410 and were found to vary only slightly with 
1992 figures, and therefore were accepted as reliable. 
The implications of sea-air cargo growth to the Airport 
Authorities, Port Authorities, airlines, shipping lines, sea-air 
operators and freight forwarders are found in Tables 46 and 47. 
From SFO Airport, as a percentage of total international air 
cargo carried to the rest of the world. 
2. To Oakland Port, as a percentage of total container traf f ic 
and tonnage 
Table 46. From San Francisco Airport 
(in 1000 tons, rounded to the nearest 100) 
1 1990 1 1991 1 1992 1 1993 1994 
Total cargo handled' 516 607 603 616 687 
Total domestic cargo 299 394 412 406 463 
Total international cargo 217 213 191 210 224 
Total air exports 98 102 107 ill 109 
(including sea-air)' 
Total sea-air volume 6 11 20 27 27 
Sea-air V of total 6.1% 10.8% 18.7% 24.35 24.8% 
Source Airports Council International - Airport Traffic Statistic, 29 March 1995 and Aizport Traffic ICAO Digest of Statistic No. 403 - 1992. 
Notes I. Total cargo handled - loaded and offloaded between SFO Airport 
and the rest of the world. 
2. ICAO Digest of statistics No. 410, ICAO 1994 - 11194 QIP111600. 
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Table 47. To Oakland Port 
(in 1000 tons & containers, rounded to the nearest 100) 
1 1990 1 1991 1 1992 1 1993 1994 
Total container traffic 1,124 1,195 1,291 1,360 1,525 
Import container traffic 562 598 646 680 762 
Sea-air containers 2 3 5 6 6 
Sea-air % of total 0.04% 0.05% 0.08% 0.09% 0.08% 
Total container tonnage 13,387 14,495 18,100 19,500 20,800 
Import container tonnage 6,694 7,248 9,050 9,750 10,400 
Sea-air container tonnage 6 11 20 27 27 
Sea-air k of total 0.01% 0.02% 0.02% 0.03% 0.03% 
Source ISL Shipping Statistics Yearbook of 1993 and relevant Port 
Authorities, d irect releases March 1995. 
5.5 The sea-air route via Miami 
Cargo operations at Miami Airport date back to the 1930s when 
aviation pioneer Eddie Rickenbacher, s Florida Airways air carried 
mail, freight and heavy packages to various points in the United 
States. In 1937, the first year during which cargo information 
was tabulated, approximately 181 tonnes of cargo was handled at 
the airport, in comparison with over 1.3 million tonnes in 1994. 
Approximately 4001 of all cargo travels in the bellies of 
passenger aircraft serving Miami Airport. The remaining 60% is 
transported by 63 carriers providing dedicated cargo service. 
Since 1937, more than 15 million tonnes of cargo were handled at 
Miami Airport. International traffic accounts for 800-k of total 
freight handled at the airport (figures source: DCAD 1995). 
Miami's potential to become the biggest sea-air hub in the world 
is supported by two main factors. Firstly, the availability of 
substantial cargo space to almost all major gateways of South 
America and Europe, and secondly, the presence of so many air 
carriers operating to and from Miami airport, provide the 
necessary dense flight frequencies and a competitive rate 
structure to attract sea-air cargo flow. In addition, the 
current airport facilities are adequate to handle greater volumes 
of cargo. 
During June 1992, the aviation department began the first phase 
of a US $ 500 million cargo facilities development programme, 
which will continue through the end of the decade. The programme 
will bring on line 11 state-of-the-art buildings, featuring 
increased aircraft ramp areas on the airside and redesigned 
roadways on the landside. These new features will permit the 
swift transfer of cargo from aircraft to warehouse, to waiting 
100 
trucks, which play an instrumental role in the multimodal 
movement of cargo. Cargo warehouse space will increase from the 
existing 1.4 million square feet to nearly 4 million square feet. 
Cargo aircraft parking positions will double to accommodate 80 
wide-bodied aircraft. 
The airport's phenomenal air cargo growth is a result of several 
significant factors : The strength of Miami Airport, its 
unparalleled air services, and the stabilisation of many Latin 
American economies, have all combined to enable this airport to 
continuously experience gains in air cargo movement. It is 
geared toward route and fare liberalisation, and is at present 
served by 91 scheduled air carriers and 52 non scheduled 
airlines. 
1.13 American scheduled all cargo carriers. 
2.18 international scheduled all cargo carriers. 
3.45 international scheduled mixed carriers. 
4.15 American scheduled mixed carriers. 
5.52 charter carriers. 
The operations of these airlines make available unrivalled air 
cargo capacities, especially to South and Central America, and 
reasonable air cargo capacities to Europe. Appendices G-1 and G- 
2, show air cargo capacities made available by each airline 
operating from Miami Airport, as per the gateway they operate to 
South and Central America, and Europe. 
Table 48. Miami Airport air cargo 
(in 1000 tons, rounded to the nearest 100) 
1 1990 1 1991 1 1992 1 1993 1 1994 
Total domestic cargo (within US) 220 184 204 219 240 
Total air exportsl(int'l) 341 376 430 509 590 
Total air imports (int'l) 347 343 403 494 502 
Total international cargo'(trade) 688 719 833 1,003 1,092 
Total cargo handled 3 908 903 1,038 1,222 1,332 
Source Airports Council International - Airport Traffic Statistic, 29 March 
1995 and Airport Traffic XCAO Digest of Statis tic No. 403 - 1992, 
No. 410, ICAO 1994 - 11194 QIP111600. 
Notes 1. Total international exports. 
2. Total international imports and exports. 
3. Total cargo handled = loaded and offloaded at Miami Airport. 
The sea-air option to South and Central America is growing 
rapidly and becoming the transport mode of choice. Direct ocean 
services from Europe and the Far East are comparatively very slow 
and unreliable, especially to the large landlocked markets of 
South America. In addition, port handling services at almost all 
South American ports are slow, old fashioned and inefficient. 
Further, excessive red tape, bureaucracy and pilferage add to the 
pile up of problems at these ports. 
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For example, so far only very few foreign shipping lines, 
airlines and freight forwarders have attempted to establish large 
distribution facilities in Brazil, the South American country 
with the highest growth rate, representing an attraction to many 
international transport enterprises. Because of regulations 
requiring government ownership of at least 50 percent of any 
foreign operation, and the precious time-consuming bureaucratic 
procedures and red tape, a foreign firm, having established 
itself in Brazil or any South American country, has to employ 
specialists in each country, capable of sorting out the myriad of 
different regulations. Some countries require commercial 
invoices while others require non-commercial ones, or certain 
documentation required in one will not be required in another. 
It is also necessary to understand how goods move in a particular 
country. In some cases, they must go through a bonded warehouse, 
which is owned by the government. In Brazil, one must become 
almost a government entity. These complications are the reason 
why Latin American shipments are likely to stay in the country's 
port for a week or two before release for delivery, through 
overland trucking or railway services, to the final consignee. 
On the other hand, direct air cargo capacity on regular flights 
from Europe and the Far East to Central and South America are 
very limited and very costly. The sea-air mode of transport is 
becoming largely the primary choice to Latin America and is 
practised via Miami and Los Angeles. 
Given the 'just in time, market value of goods to consignee, the 
bureaucratic delays in the final stages of delivery give more 
reason to the consignee to order the consignments from the 
shippers at origin, either by direct costly air freight, or via 
the sea-air mode. The sea-air cargo markets of supply are 
mainly: Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, South Korea and, to a 
much lesser extent, Europe. The supply routes are: 
1. The route via the Panama Canal 
Shipping lines calling at Miami from the Asia-Pacif ic region 
ports, via the Panama Canal, have not increased their 
frequencies during the period between 1990 and 1994, though 
almost all cargo bound for South and Central America is 
ocean-shipped to the Port of Miami on this route, with an 
average transit time that ranges between 27 to 30 days. The 
prospects for a future increase in shipping line frequencies 
is highly doubtful, and many observers tend to accept a 
reduction rather than an increase in the long run, as many 
shipping lines are increasingly using the ports of the West 
Coast of North America, namely Vancouver, Seattle, Tacoma, 
Oakland and Los Angeles, rather than the Panama Canal. 
2. The route via the-West Coast of North America 
A very small part of the Asia-Pacific region's sea-air cargo 
bound for South and Central America is at present routed via 
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the North American West Coast ports, to connect with 
departing freighter flights to South and Central America, 
from adjacent-to-port airports. Cargoes in excess of 
available capacities from these airports are connected with 
Miami Airport by overland rail and truck feeder services. 
In both cases, a saving of 7- 10 days on transit time is 
made vis a vis the Panama Canal route to the Port of Miami, 
yielding an average of 20 days total transit time, from 
origin to destination. In view of this short transit time, 
an increase of shipping line frequencies and sea-air flow is 
more likely to develop on this route. 
The route from European iDorts to Miami 
The very first sea-air service was initiated by the German 
freight forwarder IKuhne and Nagel' from Europe to South 
America, via the Port of New York. In the early 1980s, and 
until the present time in 1995, many European shipping lines 
started direct services from major European ports to Miami, 
such as the ports of Algeciras, Rotterdam, Antwerp and 
Hamburg. European freight forwarders and sea-air operators 
followed suit and started sea-air cargo movements of 
European products to the Port of Miami for further on- 
forwarding by air to South and Central America. Again, the 
average total transit time was further cut to 15 days on 
this route. Despite the savings in total transit time, the 
sea-air cargo movement from Europe to South America is 
likely to remain stable or grow at a very slow rate due 
largely to the fact that the South American demand for 
European made products is fading away, and is gradually 
being replaced by a strong demand for similar Far Eastern 
products at much lesser costs. 
Table 49: Miami Port 
Analysis of container traffic 
Tonnage: in thousands. Containers: in thousands 
Port 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 19931 1994 2 
Total no. of containers 224 273 338 374 408 449 458 465 
Total container tonnage 1,948 2,128 2,674 2,967 3,242 3,896 3,710 3,673 
Containerisation degree 88.5% 90.1% 92.0% 91.0% 92.0% 93.4% 92.5% 93.1% 
M of general cargo) 
Av. tonnage/cont .6 7.8 7.9 7.9 
1 
7.9 8.7 
1 
8.1 
1 
7.9 
bource : ISL Shipping Statistics Yearbook, Institute of Shipping and 
Logistics (ISL), Bremen, October 1993 and direct contact with the 
relevant Port Authorities. 
Notes Figures 1987 to 2992 were derived from ISL Yearbook 1993. 
2. &2: Figures fox'1993 and 1994 were derived from related periodicals and 
tested against ISL figures, and average percentage changes per year 
over six years (1987 - 1992) - periodicals such as the ICHCA Annual Review, World of cargo handling, London, March 1995. 
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To quantify the sea-air cargo market via Miami Airport is not a 
simple task. The US Customs at Miami registers only the locally 
produced air exports of the state of Florida and the United 
States. All 'in bond' shipments declared at any port of first 
entry into the US, and flown, trucked, railed or ocean-shipped to 
Miami Airport 'in bond', for onward forwarding by air, to a 
destination outside the US, are not registered by the US Customs 
at Miami, but are registered by the Airport Authorities as 
general export air cargo handled by the airlines. An average of 
50k to 55k of total air exports by Miami Airport is registered by 
the US Customs each year as domestic air exports. 
Therefore, by a simple operation of deducting the US Customs 
total air exports figures from the total air exports of Miami 
Airport, the resultant figure represents a volume of cargo that 
moved 'in bond, through Miami Airport. The question is, what 
portion of this in-bond traffic is sea-air cargo? 
Miami international air trade: 
Analysis of Miami international air trade by region shows that it 
is confined to two main regions of Latin America (South and 
Central America) and Europe. There is a complete absence of 
direct airline international scheduled services with other 
regions of the world. The major Asia-Pacific gateway airports' 
sole connection is made available through American Airlines who 
operate a daily passenger flight service to Tokyo, with an 
intermediate stopover point at Seattle Airport, and an aircraft 
change from Boeing 763 to MD11, thus rendering no contribution to 
the air cargo trade. 
The same applies to the regions of Africa and the Middle East, as 
the very rare flights to these regions are subject to a stopover 
enroute, and a change of aircraft. 
Table 50. Miami Airport international air cargo trade 
and percentage share distribution 
in (000) tons, rounded to the nearest 100 
1 1990 1 1991 1 1992 1 1993 1994 
Total international freight' 688 719 833 1,003 1,092 
South/Central American 
%- of total 
Europe & rest of the world 
498 544 614 689 789 
72.3k 75.6%; 73.7% 68.7%; 72.2%; 
190 175 219 314 303 
% share of the total 27.7% 24.4V 26.31; 31.3% 27.8% 
Source Computed and Tag-ulated from International Air Services, DCAD figures 
released March 1995. 
2. Total int. trade is total trade less domestic trade (Table 48, page 100) 
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1. South and Central America 
Miami Airport is fully orientated to service the South American 
market. Though daily direct freighter services are available to 
the main gateway cities of Europe, freighter services to points 
in Latin America are by far much greater than those to Europe. 
There are approximately 100 passenger flights and 40 - 50 
freighter flights per day, in each direction, from Miami to 
various destinations in South America. Miami Airport offers more 
non-stop cargo services to Latin America and the Caribbean than 
New York, Houston, New Orleans, Atlanta, Tampa and Orlando 
airports combined. 
Air freight trade with South America is effectively two 
directional but definitely not balanced. Tables 51 and 52, that 
follow, show volumes and values of air exports/air imports, and 
their growth from 1989 to 1994.1989 is taken as a base year to 
show percentage change per year over the preceding year for the 
period under review. 
Table 51: Air freight trade with South America 
(to the nearest 100 tonnes) 
Exports: Domestic Florida made exports 
Year Export weight Import weight Total weight 
(with percentage increase/decrease) 
1989 98,400 (base year) 180,900 279,300 
1990 107,300 (+9t) 191,400 (+6! k) 298,800 (+7t) 
1991 126,700 (+18! k) 202,500 (+6t) 329,200 (+lot) 
1992 156,700 (+24t) 218,100 (+8t) 374,800 (+14! k) 
1993 157,900 (+it) 241,400 (+Il! k) 399,313 (+6! k) 
1994 169,300 (+7t) 264,700 (+lot) 434,000 (+9t) 
Source: US Customs, Miami - March 1995. 
As per US Customs, Miami air imports were almost double the 
Florida or US air exports in 1989, as shown in the above Table. 
The imbalance of freight trade movements, i. e. exports being much 
lower than imports, in terms of weight tonnes, is compensated in 
terms of dollar values of each. The imbalance of trade is simply 
reversed in favour of Miami, as seen in Table 52. 
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Table 52: Air freight trade with South America 
(value figures x US$ I million) 
Year Export value Import value Total value 
(with percentage increase/decrease) 
1989 $ 2,755 $ 1,036 $ 3,791 
1990 $ 3,124 (+130-i) $ 1,116 (+8%) $ 4,240 (+12%) 
1991 $ 3,541 (+131c) $ 1,228 (+10%) $ 4,769 (+12%) 
1992 $ 4,330 (+22%) $ 1,412 (+15%) $ 5,742 (+20-10 
1993 $ 5,036 (+16! k) $ 1,640 (+1601) $ 6,678 (+18*0 
1994 $ 5,410 (+7%) $ 1,980 (+21k) $ 7,390 (+10216) 
Source: US Customs, Miami - March 1995. 
This means that the higher tonnage imports f rom South and Central 
America are worth much less than the lower export tonnage of 
Miami to South and Central America. Imports into Miami Airport 
are mostly perishables consisting of fresh produce, flowers and 
fruits and vegetables, the volume and tonnage of which is big in 
relation to its value. For example, in 1993, Miami imported 
241,400 tonnes worth, US$ 1,640 million, or US$ 6,793.70 per 
tonne (1000 kgs), or US$ 6.79 per kg of freight trade, while 
Miami exported, during the same year, 157,900 tonnes worth US$ 
5,036 million, or US$ 31,893.6 per tonne (1000 kgs), which means 
US$ 31.89 per kg of freight trade. 
Therefore, Miami air-exports high value (computers and 
electronics, etc. ), low weight goods and air imports low value, 
high weight goods (perishables) in return. Airlines concerned 
with the movement of such freight apply a relatively high rate 
per kilogram of air transport on high value (low weight) air 
exports, while on the return sector, a relatively lower rate of 
air transport per kilogram is applied to low value (high weight) 
goods, producing the required result in terms of airline 
revenues, and, therefore, the application of different rates on 
each sector is justifiable. 
The purpose of this section is to examine how sea-air cargo 
helped balance, in terms of cargo tonnage, the weight imbalance 
between Miami and Latin America. The balancing of value trade 
deficits and surpluses is outside the scope of this research. 
However, commodity values are definitely relevant to the sea-air 
cargo analysis in that, almost all sea-air cargo consists of high 
value, high volume (low density) and low weight cargo. 
The main categories of goods transported by the sea-air mode are: 
1. Aircraft engines and parts. 
2. Business and office machinery parts, accessories, computers, 
word processors and integrated circuits. 
3. Electric and electronic appliances and parts. 
4. Electrical tools and spares. 
5. Precision instruments and supplies. 
6. Musical, optical, photographic, scientific and laboratory 
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instruments and spares. 
7. Imitation jewellery. 
8. Toys, shoes, umbrellas, sports accessories and supplies. 
9. Leather products, handbags, souvenirs and household items. 
10. Textiles and readymade garments. 
The relevance of these classes of commodities is manifested 
further in the ocean segment of transporting sea-air cargoes. It 
is mostly low density, high volume cargo and occupies the full 
space of a TEU with an average of 4 to 4.5 weight tonnes per TEU, 
whose inner usable space is 27 cubic metres, while the same TEU 
is able to accommodate 20 - 22 weight tonnes. 
High value goods tend to absorb a relatively higher cost of 
transport, whether by air or by ocean. Air transport of high 
value goods, such as those air exported from Miami Airport, are 
economically able to absorb an airline air freight rate in the 
range of 311 to 5%ý of the value of the goods at origin. Thus, the 
average value of Miami air-exported goods is US$ 31.89/kg. 4t of 
that means approximately US$ 1.25/kg for air freight transport to 
destination. 
For example : An airline DC8 freighter service, such as Tampa 
Airlines, operating between Bogota - Colombia and Miami Airport; 
On the first sector - Bogota/Miami, 40 volumetric' tonnes of 
fruits, vegetables and flowers are flown at US$ 0.60 per 
kilogram, yielding a revenue of US$ 24,000. 
On the return sector - Miami/Bogota, 20 tonnes of high value 
Florida or US made air exports are flown at US $ 1.25 per 
kilogram, yielding a revenue of US$ 25,000. 
The round trip total revenue is US$ 49,000, a figure which is 
economically acceptable when considering the average cost of a 
DC8 freighter flying hour ranges between US$ 3,000 and US$ 3,500 
to the airline, depending on the base country's general cost of 
operations. The round trip between Bogota/Miami, consumes 
between 9- 10 flying hours. The important point here is that 
Tampa Airlines have achieved their target of revenues and flown 
back from Miami with 20 tonnes of high value Florida made goods, 
with an unutilised capacity equivalent to another 20 tonnes, on 
the return leg. 
By the same token, ocean transport rates of sea-air cargo, just 
like any other cargo, are set by the shipping lines in terms of 
a fixed rate applicable on a certain sector per box of 201 or 
401, etc. However, most shipping lines levy an extra premium' 
for carrying sea-air cargo as it is carried on a priority basis. 
It is loaded last at the port of origin, to be off-loaded first 
at the port of destination. As sea-air cargo occupies more space 
with lesser weight and is highly volumetric by nature, then the 
average weight cost per kilogram is higher than other high 
density ocean cargo moving in containers. 
1 Volumetric : vegetables, fruits and flowers are low dense cargo, occupying larger space and 7h-erefore are charged according to the applicable volume to weight ratio of 6 cubic metres to equal 
one chargeable weight tonne. 
2. Extra Premiu : Sea-air premium charge by the shipping line is tabulated and detailed in Chapter 
7, 'Characteristics of the Sea-Air hub', under shipping lines section. 
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For example :a 201 ocean container is able to accommodate up to 
22 weight tonnes of high density cargo, with an inner usable 
volume of 27 cubic metres. Shipping lines quote their rates per 
box size (201,401,501, etc. ) subject to the sector of ocean 
transport and the nature of the goods. For example, APL's rate 
per TEU for general cargo from Hong Kong to Dubai is US$ 1,400, 
port to port. In case the cargo weight was 10 tonnes, or 10,000 
kgs, then the rate per kilogram is US$ 1,400 -- 10,000 kgs = US$ 
0.14 per kg. 
In the case of sea-air cargo, which is high value and low density 
(volumetric), and occupies the full usable TEU space of 27 cubic 
metres, with an average weight of 4,500 kgs, then the rate per 
kilogram is US$ 1,400 -- 4,500 kgs = US$ 0.31 per kg. This 
demonstrates how sea-air cargo is able to absorb higher costs of 
transport. It is therefore quite realistic to assume that a good 
part of container cargo imports into Miami Port moves 'in bond' 
to Miami Airport for further on carriage by air, to South and 
Central America. 
Table 53: Miami's air trade 
importslexports between 
Miami and S. & Central America 
in (000) tons, rounded to the nearest 100 tonnes) 
1990 1 1991 1 1992 1 1993 1994 
Total international trade 488 544 614 689 789 
Imports 259 272 318 354 373 
Re-exports ex Europe' 47 43 54 62 74 
Domestic made exports 52 76 89 78 87 
Total sea-air 130 153 153 195 255 
Total air exports 229 272 296 335 . 416 
Source: Air international Services DCAD and US Customs, Miami - March 1995. 
Note: 1. See Table 54, page 108. 
2. Europe and the Rest of the World 
Having defined the domestic Florida air exports to South and 
Central America from Miami Airport, as per the US Customs, Table 
53, above, it remains to define: 
1. The part of Miami's air imports from Europe and the rest of 
the world that passes in-bond, and is re-exported by air to 
South and Central America 
2. Air exports to Europe and the rest of the world. 
Air imports f rom Europe and the rest of the world are mainly high 
value, low weight goods, consisting of readymade garments, 
imitation jewellery, toys, footwear, souvenirs, video games and 
high-tech products. With respect to international air services, 
DCAD estimates total air imports into Miami from Europe and the 
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rest of the world to be 70t of the total air cargo trade movement 
with Europe and the rest of the world, of which the US Customs 
clears an average of 65t a year for local consumption, and the 
balance of 35t moves in-bond to South and Central America. While 
air exports to Europe and the rest of the world are recorded as 
reported by Miami Port Authorities, in Table 54 below. 
Table 54: Air imports/air exports 
between Miami and Europelrest of the world 
and the in-bond re-exports share to South & Central America 
in (000) tons, rounded to the nearest 100 tonnes) 
1990 1991 1992 1 1993 1994 
Total air imports 190 175 219 314 303 
a. Air imports to Miami 
(average 70t - DCAD) 133 123 153 220 212 
b. Air imports, re-exported 
in-bond to S. & Cent America 47 43 54 62 74 
(35W - as per US Customs) 
Air exports to Europe' 35 32 41 65 63 
Air exports to rest of the world 22 20 25 29 28 
Total domestic made exports 57 52 66 74 91 
Total exports Uncl. re-exports) 104 95 120 136 165 
Source: Air International Services DCAD and US Customs, Miami - March 1995. 
1. Air exports to Europe do not include any sea-air volume. 
Miami sea-air cargo volume: 
The sea-air volume ex North America's West Coast transfer hubs 
diverted through overland f eeder services and the volumes, ex the 
port of Miami, trucked to Miami Airport, for onward air carriage 
to South America, is tabulated below. 
Table 55. Miami sea-air cargo volumes 
Sea-air 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
cargo from (in tonnes) 
Seattle-Tacoma 7,000 6,500 9,000 10,300 10,900 
Los Angeles 1,600 2,300 4,800 5,500 8,900 
Miami Port 122,500 145,100 139,200 179,200 236,000 
Total 130,100 153,900 153,000 195,000 255,800 
The implications of sea-air cargo growth to the Airport 
Authorities, Port Authorities, airlines, shipping lines, sea-air 
operators and freight forwarders are found in Tables 56 and 57, 
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that follow: 
1. From Miami Airport, as a percentage of total international 
air cargo exports. 
2. To Miami Port, as a percentage of total container import 
traffic and tonnage 
Table 56. From Miami Airport 
(in 1000 tons, rounded to the nearest 100) 
1990 1 1991 1 1992 1 1993 1994 
Total cargo handled' 908 903 1,038 1,222 1,332 
Total domestic cargo 220 184 204 219 240 
Total international cargo 688 719 833 1,003 1,092 
(imports & exports) 
Total air exports 341 376 430 509 590 
(including sea-air)' 
Total sea-air volume 130 154 153 195 256 
Sea-air k of total 20.3% 41.0% 35.6% 38.3% 43.4% 
Source Airports Council International - Airport Traffic Statistic, 29 March 
1995 and Airport Traffic ICAO Digest of Statistic No. 403 - 1992 and 
International Air Services, DCAD. 
Notes 1. Total cargo handled = loaded and offloaded between Miami Airport 
and the rest of the world. 
2. ICAO Digest of statistics No. 410, ICAO 1994 - 11194 QIP111600. 
Total air exports worldwide. 
Table 57. To Miami Port 
(in 1000 tons & containers, rounded to the nearest 100) 
1990 1 1991 1 1992 1 1993 1994 
Total container traffic 374 408 449 458 465 
Import container traffic 187 204 225 230 233 
Sea-air containers 34 38 41 53 63 
Sea-air % of total import 18.2% 18.6% 18.2% 23.0% 27.0% 
Total container tonnage 2,967 3,242 3,896 3,710 3,673 
Import container tonnage 1,484 1,621 1,948 1,855 1,837 
Sea-air container tonnage 122 145 139 179 236 
Sea-air !k of total 8.2% 8.9% 7.1% 9.6% 12.8% 
Source ISL Shipping Statistics Yearbook of 1993 and relevant Port 
Authorities, direct releases March 1995. 
The relevance and importance of sea-air cargo as shown in Table 
57, confirms the important role of sea-air cargo in filling the huge unutilised cargo capacities available for air export from 
Miami to South and Central America, thus balancing the weight imbalance of trade. 
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Chapter 6 
The Eastern routes - Far East to Europe 
6.1 The sea-air route via Vladivostok 
Analysis of the sea-air transfer ports of the west coast of 
America and Canada, showed all the following facts, in varying 
degrees of influence on the future growth of their traffic to 
Europe. 
High air cargo rates by North American air carriers, and limited 
air cargo capacities on pro sea-air European carriers, from the 
airports adjacent to the sea-air transfer ports, forced sea-air 
operators to divert sea-air cargo flow by overland means of 
transport (rail/truck), to other airports deep inland or to the 
east coast airports, where air cargo capacities were available at 
lower costs, but at a longer transit time of 3 to 5 days. 
These facts have forced freight forwarders/sea-air operators to 
search for alternative transfer ports. In June 1991, the sea-air 
route via Vladivostok, Russia got a boost when two major 
operators, Concorde Freight Services and Nippon Express started 
using this route. In April 1991, Concorde introduced an 
exclusive freighter service from Vladivostok to Luxembourg and 
Maastricht, using an Aeroflot IL76, Russian-made aircraft for 
this flight, with one technical stop at Moscow airport. Sea-air 
traffic was attracted from only two sources, South Korea and 
Japan. 
Cargo was shipped across the Sea of Japan to the Russian port of 
Vostochny which is 200 kms away from Vladivostok airport. Cargo 
was handled, custom cleared and trucked in bond to Vladivostok 
airport, to ride on the only charter flight arranged by Concorde, 
and later Nippon, to either Luxembourg or Maastricht, for further 
distribution overland to various points in Europe. 
In theory, the sea-air route via Vladivostok has the advantage of 
a shorter transit time from origin to destination, when compared 
with the trans-pacific west coast route. The overall transit 
time from South Korea to various points in Europe was 7 to 8 
days, while from Japan it ranged between 8 to 9 days, a saving of 
at least 5 days from the trans-pacific sea-air route. 
In actual fact, the ocean segment of the journey from South 
Korean and Japanese ports posed huge problems to over-all transit 
time. The port of Vostochny was served only by a joint Japanese 
and Korean service of one shipping line Fesco, (Far Eastern 
shipping Line) from Japan. It operated four voyages a month from 
the ports of Yokohama, Nagoya and Kobe, starting in the south of 
Japan, and twice a month from Mugata, Toyama and Moji, calling at 
Vostochny, on its way to the South Korean port of Pusan. This in 
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fact meant a once weekly service from Yokohama, Nagoya and Kobe 
and a fortnightly service from Mugata, Toyama and Moji. 
Concorde executives claimed that they were operating 6 to 8 
charter flights per week. This meant that ocean service from 
Japan and South Korea should bring in, on their once weekly 
voyage, enough cargo to fill 6 to 8 flights of IL76 aircraft. In 
other words, the transit time should be lengthened by a further 
5 to 6 days from day one of arrival of one week's cargo or 6 
flights cargo in one lot to Vladivostok airport. 
The IL76 freighter chartered by Concorde and Nippon Express, from 
Aeroflot, is a fuel hungry aircraft. It consumes between 9.5 to 
11 tonnes of fuel per flying hour depending on weather 
conditions, cruising speed and actual load on board. With one 
halt en route at Moscow airport for refuelling, the aircraft had 
to uplift 100 tonnes of fuel on the first sector of the journey 
at the cost of loading less cargo than its payload capacity. An 
average of 30 tonnes of freight was loaded on each flight with 
175 cubic metres volume capacity. The empty leg back to Moscow, 
from Luxembourg or Maastricht was sometimes filled by Aeroflot 
with cargo needed in Moscow. Most of the time the empty leg to 
Moscow and Vladivostok produced no revenue, and the only reason 
that the flight was kept operating was the cheap, subsidised, 
Russian aviation fuel available only to Aeroflot and other 
Russian airlines. 
Despite all the optimism expressed by many major sea-air 
operators at the onset of this route (such as the statement by 
the Panalpina group that the transfer via Vladivostok is becoming 
more and more attractive in terms of both transit time and lower 
rates, and that this route would continue to assume a market 
share of the North American route to Europe) , the volume of 
traffic that was attracted to this route was only confirmed 
directly by Nippon Express, during the researcher's visit to 
Japan in January 1993. They carried 500 tonnes of sea-air cargo 
from April 1992 to August 1992, i. e spread over 5 months, or 100 
tonnes per month, and thereafter the service was suspended. 
Concorde followed suit and suspended their service on this route. 
Interviews with Concorde officials did not produce any figures, 
neither did Aeroflot and the Russian authorities at Moscow 
airport. The researcher resorted to estimation, as follows: 
Aeroflot records show 64 flights from June 1991 to August 1992, 
the time sea-air operations were suspended. Assuming that all 64 
IL76 flights carried 30 tonnes each, the total uplift by 
Concorde was 1,920 tonnes. The question arises; what percentage 
share was this volume uplift from the total sea-air market of 
both South Korea and Japan in 1991 - 1992 ? 
Official statistics on sea-air volumes are available in Japan 
from the Ministry of Transport, and are tabulated on the 
following page: 
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Table 58: Sea-air tonnages from Japan to Europe 
(rounded to the nearest 100 tonnes) 
Year Japan/Europe South Korea 
1988 50,000 39,000 
1989 46,600 31,300 
1990 55,700 42,600 
1991 56,100 45,100 
1992 55,300 48,500 
Source: Ministry of Transport - Tokyo 
Note: South Korean figures are estimate figures by the shipping lines 
serving Pusan port. 
Nippon carried 500 tonnes over 5 months of operations i. e 100 
tonnes per month, while Concorde carried 1,920 tonnes over 15 
months of operations, i. e. an average of 128 tonnes per month. 
Both attracted a total of 228 tonnes per month against an average 
volume 8,500 tonnes per month from both Japan and South Korea, 
i. e. volume attracted was 2.71-6, a negligible figure. However, 
the potential of Vladivostok must be considered in view of the 
shortcomings that were mainly responsible for its suspension in 
August 1992: 
1 Fuel prices doubled in Russia during the second half of 
1992. Operating a fuel hungry aircraft such as the IL76 
became prohibitively expensive. 
2. Lack of interest by Vladivostok local authorities to develop 
efficient handling facilities for the transiting of sea-air 
cargo. 
3. Infrastructure was, and still is, inadequate for the 
development and growth of sea-air cargo movements. 
4. Airport and Port Authorities were geared and oriented only 
to their local needs and those of the authorities. 
5. Complete absence of freight forwarders. 
6. The airport is served by very few regular but highly 
unreliable flights to points in Russia. 
7. The port of Vostochny is served by one shipping line from 
Japan and South Korea, with very few frequencies. 
The potential of short transit time of 7 to 9 days from origin in 
South Korea and Japan to various points in Europe, together with 
a possibility of rates equal or lower than those offered via the 
west coast, remain doubtful for future developments, due to 
periodic and continuous increases in aviation fuel, and the 
Russian government's target to match international fuel price 
levels in 1996 - 1997. 
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6.2 The sea-air route via Sincrapore 
Singapore, an island nation, with an area of 239.5 square miles 
(less than that of New York City) and inhabited by 3.5 million 
active, industrious and diligent people of largely Chinese 
origin, is a global city that stands at the centre of major 
trading routes. Singapore is located at the peninsula of 
Malaysia at the mouth of the Strait of Malacca, the inter-ocean 
waterway providing the shortest connection between the Indian 
Ocean and the South China Sea of the Pacific Ocean. It is 
conveniently located close to Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong and 
Australia. Almost all the region's major exporters to the U. S. A. 
and Europe use Singapore ports and airports for their export 
transhipments. As such, Singapore is considered a major 
international transport (ocean/air) transfer hub, and a major 
gateway to the Asia-Pacific. 
Realising Singapore's potential as a commercial centre for import 
and export trade, Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles of the British East 
India Company, leased the island from the Sultan of nearby Gingga 
in 1819, and founded a British settlement under direct British 
rule. By 1867, Singapore was operating a free trade policy, and 
unrestricted immigration, until 1930, when it started its own 
self government. Due to rapid population growth and increased 
competition from neighbouring countries, it realised that the 
commercial section alone would not be able to support the 
island's economic growth. It became necessary, therefore, to 
action an aggressive marketing plan to encourage industry and 
foreign investment to the island. With its central location, 
excellent service infrastructure and the availability of skilled 
manpower, it encouraged numerous industries such as petroleum 
refining, ship building, textiles and electronics, to locate in 
Singapore. 
Singapore's central location seems to have developed a 
behaviourial pattern of general acceptance of medium solutions to 
all trade issues. The result is a stable economic environment, 
and one where enterprise is able to flourish. Singapore has 
flourished from its humble beginnings, in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, to become one of the leading commercial centres in 
the world in just 24 years. It is located in the fastest growing 
economic zone in the world, in the midst of its Asian 
counterparts of Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan and South Korea. 
Singapore's general success is attributed to many factors, The 
most significant are : 
1. Singapore Port's position and the facilities available make 
Singapore the busiest seaport in the world. 
2. Singapore Airport's passenger and cargo handling facilities 
make it one of the most efficient airports in the world. 
3. Infrastructure development and telecommunication facilities. 
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1. Singapore sea port 
Between 1993 and 1995, some 195 ship-to-shore container cranes 
are expected to be delivered, of which 105 cranes (54U will have 
an outreach of more than 40 metres and 68 cranes (30U will have 
an outreach of 45 metres'. The biggest cranes in use today with 
an outreach of 48 metres are built by Samsung of Japan and Noell 
of Germany; these two types of high productivity long reach 
cranes are used by only af ew world ports: Singapore Port 
Authority uses 4 Samsung and 6 Noell cranes in the Brani 
container terminal. 
Table 59, below, highlights and emphasises the position of 
Singapore Port as the busiest in the world. The 'Institute of 
Shipping Logistics' - Bremen ranked it as world Number 1 in 1993. 
Table 59: Singapore Port 
Analysis of container traffic 
Tonnage: in thousands. Containers: in thousands 
Port 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 19931 19942 
Sinqapore 
Total no. of containers 2,634 3,375 4,364 5,223 6,354 7,560 8,864 10,2 00 
Total container tonnage 38,400 51,300 65,200 76,600 90,900 109,000 128,600 141,100 
Containerisation degree 
(% of general cargo) 74.1% 76.6% 78.1% 81.2% 83.8% 86.7% 87.1% 90.0% 
Av. tonnage/container 14.6 15.2 14.9 14.7 14.3 14.4 14.5 
. 
13.8 
source ISL Shipping Statistics Yearbook, Institute of Shipping and 
Logistics (ISL), Bremen, October 1993 and direct contact with the 
relevant Port Authorities. 
Notes Figures 1987 to 1992 were derived from ISL Yearbook 1993. 
1. &2 Figures for 1993 and 1994 were derived from related periodicals and 
tested against ISL figures, and average percentage changes per year 
over six years (2987 - 2992) - periodicals such as the ICHCA Annual Review, 'World of Cargo Handling', London, March 1995, and from 
statistical figures released by the Port Authorities. 
In the longer term, the key to cost-effective, high productivity, 
ship-to-shore container handling may be automation. As yet, the 
complexity of automating ship-to-shore crane operations has 
presented insurmountable barriers, but technology is moving ahead 
all the time and a breakthrough could be made in the next few 
years. The most likely pioneer in this context is the P. S. A. (Port of Singapore Authority), which is currently building a new 
high-tech container terminal at Pasir Panjang. Pasir Panjang 
Port is controlled by the Port of Singapore. Aware that the 
expected growth forecasted would far exceed the Port's handling facilities, the P. S. A. claims that Pasir Pajang will have the handling capacity to cope with 36 million TEUs annually. This, it is envisaged, will feature a Remote Crane operations System 
which will control and operate all cranes on the terminal, including ship-to-shore units, from a single control room. 
1. Woodbridghe, Clive, 'The World of Cargo Handling', London, March 1995, pages 24 - 27. 
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2. Singapore Airport 
Singapore Airport is served by 64 international airlines with 
2,700 scheduled flights every week to and from 119 cities in 53 
countries (as at May 1994). They come through Singapore Changi 
Airport. Passenger handling capacity is more than 30 million a 
year, the highest in the Asia-Pacific, while cargo throughput was 
838,420 tonnes in 1993 and 1,026,703 in 19941. Cargo, in 
Singapore's Free Trade Zone requires no customs declaration and 
goods stored are not subject to any duties. 
From the moment the aircraft arrives to the moment a shipment is 
broken down and re -consolidated, it never has to leave the 
purpose-built Changi Air-freight Centre. All the essential 
facilities are well integrated within the Centre to provide 
maximum convenience and clockwork precision in the movement of 
cargo shipments. Within the 51-hectare air freight centre are 
three buildings for cargo agents with 45,000 square metres of 
office space. Over 150 cargo agents are operating at the airport 
and have their own offices and handling space in these buildings. 
The centre also houses 5 cargo terminals, 6 parking bays for 
freighter aircraft, Customs and trade permit offices, an airmail 
transit centre and a plant and animal quarantine unit. 
The Changi Airfreight Centre is a Free Trade Zone. That means 
freight forwarders and cargo agents can breakbulk and consolidate 
their shipments with no customs formalities. Sea-air 
transhipment cargo can be hauled from the port to the airport, 
trucked across to the freight forwarder's warehouse, sorted, 
segregated, labelled, re-consolidated and air-palletised, then 
trucked again across to the aircraft, for loading and eventual 
flight take off to destination. The whole transhipment process 
is executed within a few hours. 
Red tape, in Singapore Airport handling procedures, is reduced to 
the minimum. Freight forwarders and cargo agents can make their 
declarations and apply for their import and export permits 
electronically through the new TradeNet system -a computer 
system which links the business communities in the sea and air 
cargo industries to all controlling bodies. 
Customs or trade permits can be obtained even before the plane 
lands. The information pertaining to the shipments can be 
transmitted to Singapore Airport and entered into the computer 
system while the plane is still in the air. Upon arrival, goods 
can be cleared through Customs and whisked away immediately. 
This allows much savings on time and labour resulting in a 
tremendous increase in efficiency. Singapore Customs operates 
around the clock, throughout the year. 
Sea-air cargo via Singapore Airport 
The total air trade movement between Singapore Airport and the 
rest of the world, over a five year period (1990 - 1994) is shown in Table 60, on the following page. 
Figures in this paragraph were collected from Civil Aviation Authority, Singapore and Airports Council Internat iona 1- March 199S. 
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Table 60: Air freight movements 
through Changi Airport 
(to the nearest 100 tonnes) 
Year Export weight import weight Total weight 
(with percentage increase/decrease) 
1990 298,700 (base year) 322,300 (base year) 621,000 
1991 301,300 (+0.9*1) 340,700 (+S. 7%) 642,000(+3.40-. ) 
1992 325,700 (+8.0%) 394,300 (+15.7%) 720,000(+12.11) 
1993 368,200 (+13.0%) 470,200 (+19.2%) 838,400 (+16.40-. ) 
1994 458,600 (+24.6%) 564,100 (+2001) 1, 026,700(+22.5*-o) 
Source: Singapore Trade Development Board. 
Singapore specialises in high-tech, high value air exports, 
consisting mainly of computer related products, integrated 
circuits, disk drives, printers, micro computers, computer parts 
and peripherals, CTVs and CTV picture tubes, VCRs and parts, as 
well as organo- inorganic compounds. Air imports are largely 
composed of semi-f inished products which undergo final processing 
stages at Singapore's high-tech production plants such as 
integrated circuits, disk drives, blank computer tapes and 
diskettes, VCRs, CTV and radio parts, electronic components, 
chemical products and preparation, as well as cigarettes and a 
few motorised vehicles. 
A relatively large part of Singapore imports is re-exported after 
passing the final stages of production. Singapore's total 
external trade (imports and exports) figures as released by the 
Singapore Trade Development Board, at 1985 prices, show the trend 
and ratio, as depicted in the figures that follow. Imports were 
over US$12.5 billion in 1994, while exports were US$11.5 billion. 
The export trade consists of domestic made exports and re-exports 
of a part of the imported production as explained earlier. 
Figure 16 : 
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Singapore's total external trade, valued at 13.5 billion 
Singapore dollars, in 1988, was almost doubled in 1994 at 24 
billion Singapore dollars. However, it should be noted that 
total exports were always lower in value than total imports, as 
can be seen in the chart below : 
Figure 17 
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Figure 18 below, shows total exports, domestic and re-export 
values at 1985 prices. 
Figure 18 
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In 1994, total exports reached approximately 11.5 billion 
Singapore dollars, of which approximately 2.3 billion were oil 
exports and 6.2 billion were domestic made exports and 3 billion 
were re-exports. The ratio of re-exports in relation to total 
non-oil exports averaged 48! k over a seven year period, 1988-1994. 
Applying the same ratio of 48.00-. on total air exports tonnage 
figures, as released by the Singapore Trade and Development 
Board, Table 61, below was derived, computed and tested against 
the Board's estimations and forecasts of re-exports tonnage 
figures. Sea-air cargo tonnage was quoted in the table as per 
figures released by the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore. 
Table 61: Sea-Air cargo/total and re-exports 
between Singapore/rest of the world 
sea-air as a percentage of air exports 
in tons, rounded to the nearest 100 tonnes 
1 1990 1 1991 1 1992 1 1993 1 1994 
Total air exports 298,700 301,300 325,700 368,200 458,600 
Domestic made exports 155,300 156,700 169,400 191,500 238,500 
Re-exports (incl. sea-air) 143,400 144,600 156,300 176,700 220,100 
Sea-air share of total air 10,800 7,100 4,000 12,100 9,700 
exports 
Sea-air as at of domestic 7. O! k 4.5! k 2.4%- 6.3%- 2.1%- 
exports 
Source: Derived, computed and tabulated by the researcher from figures 
provided by the Singapore Trade and Development Board. 
Domestic made exports and sea-air : 
The major markets for Singapore domestic made exports, in rank 
and degree of their percentage share of total are: U. S. A., 
Europe, Malaysia, Japan and Australia. 
Table 62: Singapore's domestic made exports dollar value and percentage share of the importing region 
(in millions of Singapore dollars - 1994) 
Country Dollar value Percentage share of the total 
U. S. A. 2,100 33.8%ý 
Europe 1,700 27.4%ý 
Malaysia 500 8.19,16 
Japan 400 6.5111; 
Australia 200 3.2k 
Others 1,300 21.096 
Total 6,200 _ 100.01-116 
Source : Singapore Trade Development Board - March 1985. 
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Air exports of Singapore, in terms of weight tonnage, occupy a 
much higher percentage than the percentages of their dollar 
value, due mainly to the fact that : 
1. Exports to adjoining Malaysia are made via a railroad 
causeway across the Jahore Straits which connects Singapore 
with the Malaysian mainland in a few hours. 
2. Exports to Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Thailand and Hong Kong are 
made largely via the intensive ocean feeder frequencies at 
low cost and of very short transit time of 5-7 days. 
All high value products that are able to absorb air freight costs 
are not in fact air freighted, but ocean shipped or railed, as in 
the case of Malaysia. Therefore, most of the available air cargo 
capacities from Singapore Airport, is utilised for: 
air exports to U. S. A 48.006 
air exports to Europe 32.0101 
air exports to Australia/N. Z. 8. Ok 
air exports to the rest of the world 12.0? 6 
100.0% 
Source - Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore - March 1995. 
Sea-air cargo volume was only 5,000 tonnes in 1987 and grew to 
6,700 tonnes in 1988, and 7,500 tonnes in 1989 (Table 64, page 
123). The big increase was in 1990 due to the Arab Gulf Crisis 
when nearly 25% of the sea-air cargo bound for U. A. E. Ports was 
diverted to Singapore and the balance to North American West 
Coast sea-air transfer hubs. It then resumed its pre-Gulf Crisis 
level in 1991 an 1992, as shown in Table 61, on page 119. 
Sea-air cargo movement via Singapore did not develop a continuous 
upward trend until the beginning of 1993, when volumes started to 
break the 10,000 tonnes level, to reach 19,700 tonnes in 1994, 
and an expected 25,000 tonnes in 1995. Sea-air cargo movements 
via Singapore did not develop as a selected sea-air mode per se, 
that is for its specific lower than direct air transport cost and 
shorter than all ocean transit time. It developed as a necessity 
and as a forced alternative to the air cargo capacities and 
flight frequen 
, cy problems 
that became chronic in the neighbouring 
highly industria 
, 
lised countries, mainly South Korea and Japan, 
who, like all other Pacific Rim countries, air exports to the 
markets of North America occupy over 50V of all their available 
air cargo capacities, despite the high frequencies. Direct air 
cargo from Taiwan, Thailand, South Korea and Japan to the U. S. 
had to wait 5-7 days at the airports of origin, during the high 
season, for their turn to be uplifted. 
The same situation was true for the underdeveloped countries of 
the Asia-Pacific. Such was the case of Sri-Lanka, Bangladesh and 
the southern parts of India, where the vast majority of the 
garment industries were geared to orders from the U. S. These 
orders were subject to quotas and specific delivery dates, with 
each country having a different quota status set by the U. S. 
government. Those quota orders were subjected to delivery in the 
1. source - Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore and 'Singapore Air Cargo, a publication of the CAAS. 
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U. S. to fall within a specified period of time. Substantial 
garment exporting countries such as India declare a free sky 
policy, from time to time, allowing international airlines to 
freely clear the backlog of mountains of garment volumes piling 
up at their main gateway airports for air exports to the U. S. 
Shippers in all these countries, whether highly developed or 
under- developed, resorted to whatever means available to air- 
export their orders 'in time'. The phenomenon of air-to-air 
transport emerged. This means that where cargo capacities were 
scarce or unavailable, shipments were air freighted to an 
intermediary point from where air cargo capacities were available 
to the required destination. For example from Dacca Airport, in 
Bangladesh, a shipper would air f reight his cargo to Singapore or 
Bangkok or Dubai, where cargo capacity is available, and request 
his forwarder to arrange re-forwarding from this intermediary 
airport to final destination in the U. S., 'in time', even at much 
higher combined air freight costs, than the current applicable 
air freight cost from the airport of origin, direct to the 
destination airport. 
As the regional sector flights, capacities become fully utilised, 
i. e. DACCA/Bangkok, DACCA/Singapore or DACCA/Dubai, and in cases 
of the Pacific Rim when regional sectors flights, capacities 
become fully utilised between the main gateway airports of South 
Korea - Japan and that of Singapore, then and only then was the 
sea-air mode used via an intermediary point where air cargo 
capacities were available, be it Singapore or Dubai. 
As the use of the sea-air mode gained reliability and continuity, 
it was found by shippers, freight forwarders and sea-air 
operators in South Korea and Japan, that some savings could be 
made, without adversely affecting the total transit time that 
would have resulted if direct air was used. 
For example: direct air freight costs from Tokyo and Seoul to 
London, average US$ 5.00 per kilogramme, while the same direct 
air freight cost from Singapore to London, averages US$ 3.50 per 
kilogramme. Therefore, connecting the Tokyo and Seoul cargo, by 
ocean, with Singapore Airport, results in marginal savings 
equivalent to an ocean cost average of 0.35 per kilogramme plus 
Singapore direct air freight costs of US$ 3.50 = US$ 3.85, less direct air freight costs from Seoul or Tokyo of US$ 5.00 per 
kilogramme, i. e. a saving of US$ 1.15 per kilogramme. 
Transit time : 
Almost all shipping lines' scheduled journeys from Taiwan, South 
Korea, Hong Kong and Japan, to Australian and New Zealand ports 
have their first port of call at Singapore Port. Nearly the same 
schedule of ocean journeys apply from those origin ports, to 
Europe's main ports of Rotterdam, Antwerp, Felixstowe and others. 
Most shipping lines, calling at the Port of Singapore, schedule 
5 to 6 regular voyages per week, in addition to dense and regular 
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ocean feeder frequencies operated by smaller sized ships and 
shipping lines, from the industrial centres of the Far East, 
mentioned earlier. The duration of the ocean voyages from 
closing time' at the ports of origin to the port of Singapore 
ranges from 5-7 days. However transiting Singapore Port to the 
airport can be done in a few hours at any time during the day or 
night. Ship arrivals, in terms of weekdays, became immaterial 
due to the dense daily ocean frequencies. However, arrival times 
were considered in terms of weekends and certain hours of the day 
which varied with ocean weather conditions such as storms during 
the monsoon season etc. 12 - 24 hours is accepted by all 
concerned in the sea-air industry, as the time required to 
transport sea-air cargo from the port to the airport. Transit 
time averaged 1 to 2 days from actual discharge time of cargo at 
the port, to the time of relevant flight take-off to destination. 
Table 63: Sea-air cargo transit time in days 
via Singapore 
Port of Origin Europe Australia/N. Z. South Africa 
Japan 9 10 12 
South Korea 89 11 
Hong Kong 78 10 
Taiwan 89 10 
Source : Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore 
Though air capacities increased drastically in 1994, air cargo 
space still is not easily available at Singapore Airport. KLM 
operates two pure freighter flights, in addition to five combi' 
B747s, to Amsterdam. Lufthansa operates four weekly combis to 
Frankfurt, and Air France operates three weekly combis to Paris. 
Lately, Air China started operating one pure freighter B 747 to 
Luxembourg, in March 1994,. Appendices H-1 and H-2 show air 
cargo capacities made available from Singapore Airport. Air 
China was not included due to their late start of operation, and 
the unreliability of their frequencies. 
The bulk of sea-air cargo is carried by Singapore Airlines on its 
regular scheduled 6 freighter services per week to Europe, and 
numerous wide-bodied passenger flights. 
1 closing time : is the time required by shipping lines and freight forwarders for final preparation 
of shipments to ready for carriage, such as: labelling, marking, final staking into containers with final custom seal and loading of containers onboard ship and final preparation of documents, invoices, B/L, voyage manifest and bay plan/cargo plan. 
2. Combi -a mixed passenger and cargo flight, where cargo is loaded on the main deck along with 
passengers, with a partition separating both. The B747 combi has an average available air cargo 
capacity of 30 tonnes. 
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It should be noted that the Singapore average of 385 daily 
international flights fell short of providing reliable direct air 
connections to various major cities in Africa. Less than 20 
African destinations are served with 1 to 3 flights per week, 
almost all flights with transfer connections at intermediate 
points to other airlines, a fact that makes Singapore a very poor 
transit point for sea-air cargo destined to Africa in general. 
The only country in Africa served from Singapore, with some 
degree of efficiency, is South Africa'. 
In conclusion, the sea-air cargo flow, via Singapore, is very 
small in relation to the major sea-air transfer hubs of the 
U. A. E., Seattle, Los Angeles and Miami. 
Sea air carcro via Singapore : implications and future trends 
Table 64: Development of sea-air tonnages 
via Singapore 
(all fiqures in tonnes) 
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Total 3,732 4,976 6,721 7,566 10,817 7,165 3,926 12,100 19,700 
Av annual 
Growth 
, 
base 
year . 
33.3%- 35.1%- 12.5t 43.0%- 
II 
-33.8%- -45.2! k 208.0%- 62.81; 
, >Uu. rce : UIVII Av2acion AUC12orlCy or ýungapore 
The growth of sea-air cargo volumes, starting from 1986 onward, 
showed a steady yearly increase until the end of 1990, the year 
of the Gulf War Crisis, where an increase of 4326 over the 
previous year was recorded due to the diversion of some of the 
U. A. E. bound traffic to Singapore. However, the figure of sea- 
air tonnage recorded in 1991 was not only a return to pre-Gulf 
War levels, but also a return to almost the same level of 1989, 
with no appreciable growth over 1989 sea-air volumes. 
Sea air tonnage 
1989 1991 
7,566 7,165 
In 1992, a much lower volume was recorded, of approximately 4,000 
tonnes. This simply means that sea-air cargo developments did 
not follow a specific trend of growth or decline during the 
period between 1986 and 1994. There were sporadic ups and downs 
as seen in Table 64, above. 
These fluctuations are explained as follows : The drastic drop of sea-air cargo volume in 1991 an 1992 was 
South Africa : Johannesburg, South Africa, is served by three jumbo mixed flights per week from Singapore. All three flights are via Mauritius and Bombay, and involve a transfer to other 
airlines, a fact that increases transit time by I to 2 days. 
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mainly due to the introduction of (a) two weekly B747 cargo 
flights by Air China from Taipei to Luxembourg in 1991, in co- 
operation with the Cargolux trucking system which took care of 
carrying cargo further to final destinations in Europe overland. 
(b) two weekly B747 cargo flights by Air Hong Kong from. Hong Kong 
to Manchester and Brussels in 1992, and later increased to 4 B747 
cargo flights per week. Both airlines launched their flights at 
slightly lower air freight rates, thus attracting most of the 
sea-air cargo that was routed via the Singapore route to the air- 
to-air mode. This meant that volumes of cargo that were bound 
for Singapore by ocean, for onward carriage by air, were diverted 
to the regional air sector connecting Japan and South Korea with 
an intermediate point where air cargo capacities were available 
to the required final destination. 
The basic implications are 
The diversion to Singapore Airport means that sea-air cargo 
via Singapore is largely dependent on the availability of 
air cargo space from origin (before diversion) to 
destination, and that the savings derived from the use of 
the sea-air mode via Singapore does not represent an 
important factor to shippers and consignees. on the other 
hans, the shortest possible transit time of direct air, or 
direct air via an intermediary airport, was most important 
in selecting the mode of transport to be used. 
2. The Asia Pacif ic region is a very strong generator of 
origin/destination air cargo, and each of its country's 
available air cargo capacities are almost fully utilised all 
year round. Any air capacities that become available in any 
country of the Pacif ic region, in excess of its own domestic 
air exports, are immediately utilised by the adjacent 
country, through the air-to-air transhipment mode. Thus, 
the available air cargo capacities, specially those of the 
national carriers, serve the domestic air exports on a 
priority basis; any excess air capacity is then offered to 
serve air-to-air transhipments from surrounding countries, 
and is offered lastly to sea-air shipments. 
3. Sea-air cargo via Singapore Airport is air-carried to its 
destination at the same cost as all other air cargoes. In 
the fast developing countries of the Asia Pacific regions, 
the growth of origin/destination cargo is so fast, that 
demand on air cargo capacities from their airports becomes 
much greater than supply. Many freight forwarders 
interviewed in Jakarta - Indonesia and Bangkok - Thailand, during February 1995, confirmed that a premium, ranging 
between 7- 10%, over and above the airline published rate, 
is levied by the airline on confirmation of space to air 
freight shipments, especially those bound for U. S. 
destinations on a certain day with a confirmed date of 
delivery. 
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Field research and interviews with relevant entities confirm 
statements made earlier in this chapter, that sea-air cargo 
thrives on the availability of unutilised capacities and its role 
as 'fill in, cargo marginally supporting airline revenues on the 
sector used and is welcomed by the airline industry in general. 
Such a basic characteristic of sea-air cargo does not hold true 
in the case of Singapore Airport or any Pacific Rim airport, for 
that matter. 
Therefore, the researcher is of the view that sea-air cargo, via 
Singapore Airport, is to be looked upon as almost direct air 
cargo,, because, as discussed and analysed in this section, sea- 
air cargo via Singapore in particular, was not diverted from 
ocean transport, but was originally air cargo, 'searching, for 
air cargo space for eventual uplift to its destination. 
in conclusion, the future of sea-air cargo via Singapore is 
dictated by largely one factor, namely the availability of 
unutilised cargo capacities. As more and more capacities are 
made available by the airlines, in excess of demand generated by 
the domestic air exports, it will present an opportunity for sea- 
air cargo to develop and grow. 
6.3 The sea-air route via the United Arab Emirates 
The U. A. E. was formed in 1971, replacing the old association of 
the Trucial States with Britain. Located at the southerly end of 
the Arabian Gulf, the U. A. E. comprises 7 Emirates, where oil 
discoveries have brought about colossal development in the last 
25 years, resulting in the modern, prosperous country it is 
today. 
There are- many factors which have made the U. A. E. the leading 
transportation hub in the middle East region today. Most important is its strategic location, midway between the 
manufacturers of the Far East and consumers of the West, its well developed infrastructure, extensive distribution network, a low 
cost vibrant economy and an aggressive 'Free Trade' atmosphere. 
The sheer number of entry and exit points in the U. A. E. - six modern international airports, and seven major sea ports, provide 
a variety of choice to the operators, and also generate a healthy 
competition among themselves, thus leading to lower port handling 
charges. These gateway ports and airports are close to each 
other, and connected by a fast motorway network that makes distance between any port and the other, or between any port and 
airport, within 2-3 hours trucking time. 
Cargo entry to any of the U. A. E. ports is free of government 
restrictions. Feeder vessels are able to off load cargo at any of 
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the gateway ports and truck them inbond to the re-export gateway 
hub of their choice. Thus, the possibilities of time loss due to 
congestion is ruled out with an additional bonus of very low 
trucking rates available between the various ports of the U. A. E. 
All major U. A. E. ports are equipped with the latest container and 
bulk cargo handling equipment. Large container terminals are 
located around the ports. Fast and 'free of restrictions' 
motorways and a round the clock trucking system is available. 
All the above services are offered at relatively lower costs than 
other similar hubs of the region. As a result, a large number of 
shipping lines are calling on the ports of the U. A. E. with 
regular frequencies. The U. A. E. ports have become a major re- 
distribution centre, mainly to the Arabian Gulf states, the 
Middle East and Europe. The Far East centres of production are 
increasingly using U. A. E. ports for its low cost facilities and 
short transit time. The re-distribution of cargo from the U. A. E. 
ports includes sea-air cargo volumes that originate mainly from 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Bangkok and the Indian 
subcontinent. 
The arrival schedule of the shipping lines and total sailing time 
are of vital importance to the entire sea-air product, as is 
speed and efficiency in making the containers, carrying sea-air 
cargo, available for transit from port to airport. 
The sea ports of the United Arab Emirates : 
1. Mina Zaved 
Located in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, Mina Zayed has increased its 
traffic flow over its docks by some 21% in 1993 to a total of 1.4 
million tonnes in container and general cargo. Vessels calling 
at the port in 1993 increased to 1,520. During the f irst 6 
months of 1994,698,137 tons of cargo and 42,800 TEUs were 
handled at Mina Zayed. 
Fulairah 
On the East Coast of the U. A. E, Fujairah is a 'Free Zone' Port 
offering shipping lines and related businesses the benefit of 
comparatively very low storage fees on their imports and exports, 
and no duties, as long as goods remain within the Free Zone Area. 
Fujairah handled 649,373 TEUs in 1993, with a total of 730 ships 
calling at the port. This represents a 2301 increase on 1992's 
figures. The first 6 months of 1994 showed an increase of 21! k to 
347,514 TEUs, which is in line with the increase in 1993. 
Sharlah Ports Authority - Port Khalid and Khorfakkan 
Sharjah is the 3rd largest of the Emirates, and is the only one 
which can boast to offer the facility of ports, on both the 
Arabian Gulf and the Indian ocean. The two ports are linked by 
a fast motorway known as the 'Sharjah Mini Bridge'. 
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Port Khalid 
Port Khalid is located on the West Coast of the Emirate of 
Sharjah and was the first port within the U. A. E. to operate a 
'Free Zone' which was established in 1978. It is also world 
famous for pioneering the Middle East's first container terminal 
and also is renowned for developing the region's first in-port 
alongside cold store, which is able to hold 9,000 tons of cargo. 
Other facilities at Port Khalid include a container terminal 
covering 150,000 square metres and offering storage for 8,000 
TEUs, 9,300 square metres of transit sheds and storage areas. 
The 3 berth terminal offers handling equipment such as two 35 
tonne Lieber T115 gantry cranes, having an outreach of 35.06 m 
and a span of 30.49 m. and 2.30 ton capacity SWL (sway less) 
transtainers which are supported by other vehicles with 12 metre 
flat beds or chassis trailers. Other handling equipment, which 
are available upon request, include mobile cranes with a 40 ton 
capacity, and handling devices for side, top or end lifting. 
4. Port Khorfakkan 
Located on the East Coast, Khorfakkan has been built on a natural 
harbour site and was constructed to complement Port Khalid, 
following the demand for a second port in the Emirate of Sharjah. 
Khorfakkan flourished during the Gulf War crisis, when many 
shipping lines used the port in preference to entering the waters 
of the Gulf. Due to the excellent facilities and service 
offered, many of these shipping lines still utilise Khorfakkan as 
their preferred port. They, therefore, do not need to commit 
their vessels through the sensitive Straits of Hormuz, and have 
benefited from gaining faster voyage times, and much less 
insurance premiums. Thus the Port of Khorfakkan handled in 
excess of 1,000 vessels in 1993, of which approximately 5001 are 
feeder services. 
The port handled a total of 446,475 TEUs in 1993, an increase of 
2401 on 1992. As 80% of the TEUs handled in 1993 were trans- 
shipment cargoes, Khorfakkan has established itself as a major 
trans-shipment point. 
In 1986, Gulftainer, on behalf of Sharjah Ports Authority, was 
given the contract to market Khorfakkan which has, in turn, led 
to an upsurge in traffic through the port. In line with this 
increase, Khorfakkan commissioned two further 40 tonne capacity 
ship-to-shore container cranes at the end of 199o, increasing the 
total to four. Two additional gantry cranes were commissioned in 
1993, bringing the total to six. 
5. Port of Mina Saar 
Located at Ras Al Khaimah on the East Coast, Mina Saqr is seeking 
to increase its output and is now developing a reputation for 
efficiency and the handling of a wide range of feeder services. 
In 1993, Mina Saqr handled approximately 4.5 million tons of 
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cargo. In the first quarter of 1994, general bulk cargo 
increased by 41*-., with the largest increase being trans-shipments 
which rose to 356,733 tonnes. With Mina Saqrls location offering 
vast time savings, and its excellent feeder services, traffic is 
steadily increasing due to many shipping lines considering the 
port's benefits. 
6. & 7. Dubai Ports Authoritv (D. P. A) - Jebel Ali Port 
and Mina Rashid 
Located in the Emirate of Dubai, Jebel Ali Port and Mina Rashid 
are controlled by the D. P. A. Since its formation in 1991, the 
twin ports now rank 15th in the world in terms of the container 
handling business. In 1993, the D. P. A. witnessed a 12t increase 
in port activity with total tonnage increasing to 24.15 million, 
containers handled rising to 1.7 million and the amount of ships 
calling increasing by 10t to 9,694. Today, the two ports service 
over 100 shipping lines, with container tonnage representing 61% 
of D. P. Als throughput in 1993 and 63.5% in 1994. 
The latest figures released by D. P. A. show a strong growth 
between January and July of 1994, with freight totalling nearly 
26 million tons (of which 19.5 million tons was carried in just 
over 1 million TEUs). D. P. A. predicts that figures for TEUs in 
1994, could well exceed 2 million. 
Facilities at Mina Rashid and Jebel Ali Port are of the highest 
standards, offering 102 deep water berths, dedicated transit 
sheds and purpose-built facilities for freight forwarders, sea- 
air operators and shipping lines, handling and sales agents. 
Equipment available includes PANAMAX cranes and other specialised 
container handling equipment of the highest standards. 
Table 65: Dubai Ports (Rashid & Jebel Ali) 
Analysis of container traffic 
Tonnage: in thousands. Containers: in thousands 
Port 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 19931 1994 2 
Dubai Port Rashid & 
Jebel Ali 
Total no. of containers 596 657 869 966 1,265 1,390 1,693 2,055 
Total container tonnage 7,14 5 7,3 78 9,34 9 13,340 15,180 16,400 24,150 28,360 
Containerisation degree 
(% of general cargo) 56.2% 55.5% 58.4% 59.0% 62.1% 60.1% 61.0% 63.5% 
Av. tonnage/container 1 12.0 1 11.2 1 10.8 1 13.8 12.0 11.8 14.3 13.8 
bource : 18L Shipping Statistics Yearbook, Institute of shipping ana 
Logistics (ISL), Bremen, October 2993 and direct contact with the 
relevant Port Authorities. 
Notes Figures 1987 to 1992 were derived from ISL Yearbook 1993. 
2. &2: Figures for 1993 and 1994 were derived from related periodicals and 
tested against XSL figures, and average percentage changes per year 
over six years (1987 - 2992) - periodicals such as the ICHCA Annual Review, 'World of Cargo Handling', London, March z995, and from 
statistical figures released by the Dubai Port Authorities. 
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Figure 19 : 
KHORFAKKAN 
FUJAIRAH 
U. A. E. - The sea-air cargo hub 
The U. A. E. , located midway between the Far East and Europe, 
provides excellent grounds for sea-air growth. Since crude oil 
was its main export, many aircraft were leaving the U. A. E. with 
vast volumes of unutilised air cargo capacities. Pioneers of the 
sea-air business were aware that if they could find cargo to fill 
in these capacities, airlines would offer attractive rates on the 
return leg to Europe. It was necessary, therefore, to convince 
the Far East shippers to utilise U. A. E. ports as a hub for 
European bound cargo. 
30 freight forwarders, specialising in sea-air, have located 
offices in theU. A. E., handlingbetween them approximately 35,000 
tons of sea-air cargo and offering a total transit time of 
approximately 15 to 16 days from the Far East to Europe. 
Dubai International Airport 
In 1991, Dubai International Airport opened the cargo village, 
where major cargo airlines such as British Airways, Emirates 
Airlines, Air France, Singapore Airlines, Cathay Pacific, 
Cargolux, China Airlines, KLM, Alitalia, Air Hong Kong, Air 
India, Olympic, Kuwait Airways, Egypt Air, Royal Jordanian, 
Turkish Airlines, Middle East Airlines, Gulf Air and many others 
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have all opened offices. The cargo village has 300,000 square 
metres of space with the capacity to deal with 250,000 tons of 
cargo annually. Dubai Cargo Village handled a record 218,264 
tons in 1993, an increase of 14.730-6 over the previous year and 
243,100 tonnes in 1994 (Table 66, page 131). 
As a direct result of the 'Open Sky Policy,, adopted by all of 
the U. A. E,. airports, some 240 flights depart daily from Dubai 
Airport, which are operated by scheduled and unscheduled 
carriers. Thus, any gaps in sea-air business lef t by the 
scheduled carriers are increasingly being filled by the 
unscheduled and charter services. 
Dubai Carao Villaae 
DCV (Dubai Cargo Village) currently consists of a central cargo 
building - housing the Administration offices, DNATA (Dubai 
Airport government Handling Agent of all airlines operating from 
Dubai Airport), airlines, Customs, Government offices and police 
and security staff - and a freight forwarders building. The main 
complex comprises 7,800 square metres of office space, an 8,300 
square metre handling area and space to store up to 5,000 tonnes 
of cargo. Its airside apron can accommodate up to four Boeing 
747s or a combination of two B747s and three narrow-bodied 
freighters simultaneously. 
DCV's proximity to Port Rashid and Jebel Ali - just. a 15 and 45 
minute drive away, respectively - has also helped establish Dubai 
as one of the world's leading sea-air cargo hubs, ahead of 
Seattle and Singapore. Dubai Cargo Village is to undergo 
expansion to its cargo capacity, which has reached its limits. 
Extension and modifications to the existing 25,000 sq metre 
central cargo building will raise DCVs warehouse capacity by a 
third to 350,000 tonnes a year. A new 10,000 sq metre custom- 
designed courier and mail complex as well as a second cargo 
freight forwarders building is under construction and scheduled 
to start operating by the end of 1996, early 1997. 
Dubai International Airport's facilities for handling 
consignments, brought in from Dubai's two sea ports and the Port 
of Khorfakkan and Fujairah, 160 kms away, and its ability to take 
delivery of shipments at seven fully equipped sea-air truck 
docks, means that freight carried on bonded vehicles can be 
loaded into a departing flight, within as short a period of time 
as six hours (see footnote on page 138), depending on the exact 
time of flight take-off. with over 60 international airlines, 
attracted by the government's 'open sky policy,, operating to 
over 100 destinations from Dubai, the choice of carriers 
available to the U. A. E. 's cargo community is vast. 
Table 66, on the following page, shows total cargo handled, air imports and air exports, including sea-air volumes tabulated over 
a period of five years. 
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Table 66. Dubai International Airport's 
Air imports vs Air Exports 
(in tonnes) 
1 1990 1 1991 1 1992 1 1993 1994 
Total air cargo handled 144,300 140,300 186,400 217,700 243,100 
Air imports 
Total air exports 
(including sea-air) 
Sea-air tonnage 
91,200 89,200 113,000 130,100 136,900 
53,1001 51,1002 73,400 87,600 106,200 
14,6003 11,50 04 12,500 9,200 6,000 
Sea-air k 
exports 
share of total 27.5% 22.5% 17.0% 10.5% 5.6% 
Source : Department of ý77711 Aviation, Dubai, & DNATA releases of March 1995. 
Notes: 
I&2. : Air exports and sea-air tonnage dropped drastically during 1990 and 
3&4 2991 because of the Arab Gulf Crisis. 1990 figures represent 10 
months of normal activity before the Gulf waters were declared a 
%war zone' and 1991 figures represent 9 months of normal activity 
after the easing of 'war zone' restrictions. 
As seen in Table 66, above, total air imports were always in 
excess of total air exports inclusive of sea-air volume via Dubai 
Airport. Theoretically, this means that aircraft arriving into 
Dubai Airport are discharging volumes of cargo much greater than 
the volume uplifted (air exports) on their return leg. This is 
based on the assumption that all flights arriving into Dubai 
Airport are terminators, and must return to their point of 
origin. This also means that unutilised capacities become 
available due to this directional imbalance. 
Table 67. Unutilised air cargo capacities 
due to directional imbalance - Dubai Airport's 
(in tonnes) 
1990 1 1991 1 1992 1 1993 1994 
Unutilised capacity due to 38,100 38,100 39,600 42,500 30,700 
directional imbalance of 
imports vs exports 
Source Dubai Airport Authority and DNATA releases of March-1995 a3d' 
computed and tabulated by the researcher - see Table 128. 
This unutilised air cargo capacity was computed by simply deducting total air exports, including sea-air cargo, from total 
air imports. But total air import figures do not necessarily 
mean that aircraft and airlines bringing in this air import cargo have already utilised all their available air cargo capacity on 
their first leg. Assuming a flight load factor of 70k on the first leg, the balance of 300-. must be added to the unutilised 
capacity already in existence, on the return leg, due to the directional imbalance of trade. 
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Table 68. Total unutilised air cargo capacities 
due to directional imbalance - Dubai Airport's 
(in tonnes) 
1 1990 1 1991 1 1992 1 1993 1994 
Unutilised capacity due to 38,100 38,100 39,600 42,500 30,700 
directional imbalance of 
imports vs exports 
30t first leg assumed 38,800 38,200 48,400 55,800 58,700 
unutilised & must be added to 
the second leg 
Total unutilised air cargo 76,900 76,300 88,000 97,300 89,400 
capacity on the return leg 
Source Table 67, and computation based on the assumption of a 70t freight 
load factor on the incoming first leg. 
This available unutilised air cargo capacity is valid in theory 
only. In order to give this analysis a meaningful conclusion, a 
short study of the actual flight routing of those airlines who 
are the providers of air cargo capacity for sea-air cargo, 
between Dubai Airport and European airports, was made in order to 
determine more accurately the available air cargo capacities on 
their return leg flights to Europe. 
Dubai Airport : unutilised air cargo capacities and sea-air cargo: 
The analysis that follows will try to determine the air cargo 
capacities made available from Dubai Airport, for sea-air cargo 
use, the percentage utilisation and trends of growth or decline. 
In 1994, air cargo capacities made available from Dubai Airport 
to Europe by scheduled international terminator flights, averaged 
36,100 tonnes per annum, while capacities by transiting scheduled 
international flights averaged 34,700 tonnes per annum, for a 
total of 80,800 tonnes per annum (see Appendices 1-1,1-2 and I- 
3). This air cargo capacity is not only made available for cargo 
destined to Europe, but also for cargo destined to the U. S. and 
Canada, via an intermediate stopover point in Europe, which may 
entail a change of aircraft and flight number. 
It should be noted that airline transit flights, cargo capacities 
available on the return leg from Dubai to Europe, make available 
another air cargo capacity on their initial first leg from Europe 
via Dubai, to the sub-continent of India and the Far East, 
equivalent at least to the volume of cargo discharged at Dubai 
Airport, as imports. These capacities are partially filled with 
cargo originating in Dubai. As per Dubai Airport Authority 
statistics - Department of Civil Aviation, 136,900 tonnes were discharged as air imports. This same capacity becomes available 
for total air exports from Dubai Airport. Therefore, as 80,800 
tonnes are available for air exports to Europe, then at least the 
balance of 56,100 tonnes (136,900 less 80,800) of capacity (see 
Tables 67 and 68 on unutilised capacities on page 132) becomes 
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available on eastward routes to the sub-continent of India, and 
the Far East. 
As per the source quoted above, the total air export volume from 
Dubai was 106,200 tonnes in 1994. The concern of this study is 
to determine, what part of this volume of air exports was 
destined to Europe and North America. Therefore, its share of 
available air cargo capacities on this sector, will determine the 
balance share remaining for sea-air cargo. 
Statistical support on domestic air exports and the portion of 
air imports re-exported from government departments, the Chamber 
of Commerce and Airport Authorities was not available. The 
researcher had to conduct interviews with ten major airlines and 
eight major, Dubai based freight forwarders, in March 1995. 
The findings are; the U. A. E. accommodates over one and a half 
million expatriates from all over the world. The largest is the 
Indian community, with close to 700,000 people working in the 
U. A. E., followed by Pakistanis, Filipinos, Sri Lankans, 
Egyptians, Middle East nationalities and Europeans. 
These people find the U. A. E. a tax haven. Until August 1994, all 
imports, with the exception of liquor and cigarettes, were 
subject to a 19,16 import duty. In August 1994, this duty was 
raised to 421ý. Expatriates look at the U. A. E. as a shopping 
paradise. They shop for lots of electronic goods, home 
appliances, carpets, souvenirs, wearing apparel and, in general, 
goods that are available in the U. A. E. at low prices, but which 
are very expensive in their home countries. Most of these goods 
are ocean-shipped to their home countries, but also an 
appreciable portion is exported by air. 
Estimates by the freight forwarders interviewed showed that air 
exports on the eastern route, i. e. from Dubai to the sub- 
continent of India and the Far East, and the neighbouring Arab 
countries, averaged the following in 1994: 
1. Air exports to the Indian sub-continent and the Philippines 
each averaged 15,000 tonnes and to Egypt 6,000 tonnes p. a. 
2. Transit cargo - air to air transhipment, the part of air imports, re-exported in transit to its relevant destinations 
on connecting flights, averaged 5,000 tonnes p. a. 
3. All others, including the surge of air exports to CIS 
countries, which started in 1992 and took momentum in 1993 
and 1994, in addition to air exports to destinations in the 
Arab Gulf States and the Middle East countries, averaged 
approximately 5,000 tonnes per year. 
The total of 46,000 tonnes, when related to 106,200 tonnes, as 
the grand total of air exports, gives a ratio of 43.35k to the 
Eastern route. Therefore, applying the balance of this ratio, air 
exports to Europe and North America (the western route) are 
approximately 106,200 x 56.7% = 60,200 tonnes, of which 29,200 
tonnes transit air-to-air as re-exports. 
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The major domestic air exports of the U. A. E., comprise one major 
commodity besides sea-air cargo, and this is the "readymade 
garments' product. The garment industry started in the late 
1980s and took full swing in 1993 and 1994, when it reached the 
25,000 tonnes level, with most of it bound to the U. S. and 
Canada. Before the introduction of the garment industry in 1989, 
most of the air cargo capacities available were utilised by the 
sea-air cargo flow; at present, the available capacities for sea- 
air from Dubai Airport are around 26,600 tonnes (Table 69, 
below), of which only 6,000 tonnes was utilised in 1994, 
resulting in fierce competition by the airlines operating from 
Dubai Airport, bringing down the airfreight costs to Europe by an 
average of 15t. 
Table 69. Airline Air cargo capacities 
by type of utilisation - 1994 
DubailEurope-N. America 
Type Air cargo capacity(tonnes p. a) 
Total available air cargo capacities 80,800 
Total domestic air exports 54,200 
Of which garments tonnage 25,000 
Transhipment re-exports in transit 29,200 
Available capacities 26,600 
Sea-air cargo tonnage 6,000 
Sea-air % utilisation of balance 
available capacity 22.5% 
Source Computed, derived and tabulated by the researcher from data in 
earlier parts of this section. 
Sharlah International Airnort : 
Sharjah International Airport rises from the desert like an 
oasis, its traditional Islamic design makes it a strong contender 
for the world's most beautiful airport. However, underneath that 
striking exterior lies an airport with state-of-the-art 
facilities which have resulted in a steady growth in traffic. 
Situated just 10 kilometres from the City of Sharjah, 15 kms from 
Dubai's Port Rashid and 45 kms from Jebel Ali Port, the airport 
is linked by a four-lane highway with Port Khalid and Port 
Khorfakkan, as well as the rest of the U. A. E. ports. Sharjah has 
over 60 years of experience in aviation which began back in 1932 
when British Imperial Airways built an airfield there as a stop- 
over point for its India and Australia services. 
Today, the airport which is managed with the support of Frankfurt 
Airport Authority, is able to handle 2.5 million passengers per 
year. Cargo handling facilities include two warehouses with 
15,000 square metres of floor space, a cargo apron which can 
accommodate up to six narrow-bodied aircraft or four 747s (all 
pure freighters) , 24-hour customs, a free-zone facility and 
efficient documentation procedures. 
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Equipped to deal with any type of cargo, the airport has special 
facilities for handling and storing valuables, mail and dangerous 
goods. The size of this facility was doubled in 1992 to meet 
growing demand. A custom-built ramp and shaded pens provide for 
the prompt transfer of livestock, a business in which Sharjah 
specialises, handling everything from camels and horses, to goats 
and sheep. Livestock and refrigerated goods represent the 
airport's main imports, with sea-air forming the bulk of the 
export traffic. Additional growth areas include Eastern Europe 
and Africa where the lifting of import restrictions there has 
attracted many CIS and African air carriers. 
Airlines are given the opportunity to provide their own cargo 
warehouse handling. A major airline, Lufthansa, took immediate 
advantage and started its cargo hub at Sharjah Airport in May 
1993, and by the third quarter of 1995, was operating 
approximately 45 weekly flights to and from Sharjah Airport. The 
bonded warehouse offers customers security for their shipments 
and can be used as a distribution centre for the Arab Gulf 
States. Sharjah operates an 'open sky policy' where any carrier 
can start an operation, with no restrictions on any 'Freedom of 
the air,. Permission is usually granted to all commercial 
flights within 24 hours. Sharjah Airport is considered, as per 
the latest release of ACI (Airports Council International - April 
1995) as one of the region's fastest growing airports, in terms 
of cargo handled (Table 70, below). 
Table 70. Sharjah International Airport's 
Air imports vs Air Exports 
(in tonnes) 
1990 1 1991 1 1992 1 1993 1994 
Total air cargo handled 28,800 28,100 25,000 77,000 103,600 
Air imports 9,700 8,800 7,800 18,300 19,200 
Total air exports 19,100,19,3 002 17,200 58,700 84,400 
(including sea-air) 
Sea-air tonnage 11,3 003 12,2004 9,300 10,700 16,100 
Sea-air % share of total 59.2% 63.2% 54.0% 18.2% 19.1% 
exports 
Source Sharjah Airport Authority - March 1995. 
Notes: l to 4: Air exports and sea-air tonnage dropped drastically during 
1990 and 1991 because of the Arab Gulf Crisis. 1990 figures 
represent 10 months of normal activity before the Gulf War, 
and 1992 figures represent 9 months of normal activity after 
the easing of %war zone' restrictions. 
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Table 71. Sea-air volume and cargo capacities 
percentage utilisation - 1994 
SharjahlEurope-N. America 
Type Air cargo capacity (tonnes p. a) 
Total available air export cargo capacities 66,800 
Total domestic air exports 39,300 
Of which garments tonnage 17,400 
Transhipment re-exports in transit 21,900 
Available capacities for sea-air 27,500 
Sea-air cargo tonnage 16,100 
Sea-air % utilisation of balance 
available capacity 58.5% 
Source Computed, derived and tabulated by the researcher from data in 
earlier parts of this section. 
Abu Dhabi International Airnort 
Abu Dhabi International Airport (new ADIA) has seen significant 
growth in its first 12 years of operation. From 1982 to 1993, a 
total of 31 million passengers were handled, representing an 
increase of 15811 on the 12 million passengers handled between 
1970 - 1981, by the old airport. Presently Abu Dhabi Airport is 
serviced by 50 international scheduled carriers, operating an 
average of 400 flight frequencies per week. 
Located 25 kms away from Abu Dhabi City, and 100 km from Dubai's 
Jebel Ali Port and 160 km from Dubai's Port Rashid, new ADIA has 
an advanced overland double carriage fast motorway transport 
network linking it with the rest of the Emirates' cities. 
Described as the most modern in the Middle East, its freight 
apron is able to handle 10 Boeing 747s simultaneously. Re- 
fuelling is carried out through underground fuelling systems, and 
the old mobile units supplying electric power to the aircraft 
have been replaced by ground fixed outlets. The cargo complex 
covers 24,000 sq metres and is able to handle 85,000 tonnes of 
cargo annually, and is used by carriers operating 26 B747s and 21 
DC10 freighters weekly, to 12 destinations. 
Various handling equipment are available, such as elevating 
transport vehicles' (ETVs) with over 70 storage beds fitted with 
electronic weighing scales. With cargo figures of air exports 
showing an increase of 21.6% over 1992 and imports an increase of 
38.111 for the same period, it was necessary to improve 
facilities, to cope with the anticipated growth and compete with 
other neighbouring airports for a larger share of the market. 
The Department of Civil Aviation, therefore, enlisted the help of 
British consultants Halcrow, to upgrade and improve the airport 
facilities. The 'Master Plan, will enable new ADIA to cater to 
10 million passengers per year, by the year 2020. The planned 
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improvements include; re-modelling of the existing terminal to 
reduce congestion in the short term and to be supplemented by 
either an extension to the original terminal or the construction 
of a new one by the year 2000. Six additional aircraft stands 
and additions to the taxi-way are to be provided. The taxi-way 
is to be improved, as well as service facilities such as the new 
extension to the aircraft maintenance facilities. 
Table 72. Abu Dhabi International Airport's 
Air imports vs Air Exports 
(in tonnes) 
1 1990 1 1991 1 1992 1 1993 1994 
Total air cargo handled 34,100 32,700 35,300 50,200 56,500 
Air imports 
Total air exports 
(including sea-air) 
Sea-air tonnage 
22,300 20,200 22,400 31,400 34,300 
11,800" 12,5002 12,900 18,800 22,200 
2,3 003 4,0004 500 1,600 3,800 
Sea-air % share of total 19.5% 32.0% 3.8% 11.8% 17.1% 
exports 
Source : Department of Civil Aviation, Abu Dhabi - March 1995. 
Notes: 
I&2. : Air exports and sea-air tonnage dropped drastically during 1990 and 
3&4 1992 because of the Arab Gulf Crisis. 1990 figures represent 10 
months of normal activity before the Gulf waters were declared a 
%war zone' and 1991 figures represent 9 months of normal activity 
after the easing of 'war zone' restrictions. 
Abu Dhabi Airport's total air exports follow almost the same 
ratio as Dubai; approximately 45*1 of the total of 22,200 tonnes 
rode the eastern route to the sub-continent of India, the 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, the Arab Gulf States and countries in the 
Middle East, while 55k were air carried on the western route to 
Europe and North America, which was approximately 12,200 tonnes. 
Table 73. Sea-air volume and cargo capacities 
percentage utilisation - 1994 
Abu DhabilEurope-N. America 
Type Air cargo capacity (tonnes p. a) 
Total available air export cargo capacities 26,000 
Total domestic air exports 18,400 
Of which garments tonnage 16t100 
Transhipment re-exports in transit 2,300 
Available capacities for sea-air 7,600 
Sea-air cargo tonnage 3,800 
Sea-air % utilisation of balance 
available capacity 50.0% 
Source Computed, derived and tabulated by the researcher from data in 
earlier parts of this section. 
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Abu Dhabi Airport's potential to develop sea-air cargo volume is 
impressive, as the possibilities are currently available for 
almost 80% growth. This could most likely occur if the airlines 
and the Airport Authorities, both, offer a certain flexibility in 
the airfreight costs presently applicable from Abu Dhabi Airport. 
This is required to absorb the costs of overland transport of 
sea-air cargo from the APL sea-air cargo hub at Fujairah Port, 
which is over 300 kms away from Abu Dhabi Airport. 
The sea-air scene in the U. A. E. 
U. A. E. Ports and Airport Authority organisations, in co-operation 
with U. A. E. based sea-air operators and freight forwarders, have 
set a record of 6 hours' to transit containers from ports to 
airports, including airline palletisation. This record depended 
largely on actual ship's arrival time during normal port working 
hours. According to pre-alerts, all formalities were prepared in 
advance and offloading from onboard ship to onboard trucks was 
done in few hours. However, the total average transit time in 
the U. A. E., ranges from 12 to 24 hours, based on the time 
schedules of shipping lines and the flight frequency of the 
airlines. 
The scheduled services of steamship lines to Dubai Port and 
Fujairah Port as their first port of entry to the United Arab 
Emirates is summarised in Table 74, below. 
Table 74: Container vessels serving 
DubailFujairah from the Far East 
SHIPPING PORT DAY OF DAYS FROM 
LINE ARRIVAL KOR HKG TWN SIN BKK BOM 
APL FJR FRI 18 14 12 8 20 
K-LINE DXB SAT/WED 19 14 13 10 17 
MOSK DXB SAT/WED 19 14 13 10 17 
NYK DXB SAT/WED 19 14 13 10 17 
NOL DXB NO SCHEDULE AVAILABLE 
OOCL DXB SAT 22 19 17 12 - 04 SEALAND DXB FRI 27 18 16 10 - 03 MAERSK DXB SUN 20 15 14 10 - 03 UASC DXB THU 19 15 13 09 - 03 
Source : Shipping lines, schedules 1992 - 1993. 
As this table shows, vessels arrive in Dubai or Fujairah during 
most days of the week, but the majority of sea-air cargo arrives 
on Friday with APL. The reason for this is that they offer a 
better transit time than the other shipping lines, from the Far 
East Ports. As an example of the impact of the ship schedules, 
Al Naboodah Cargo Centre (a freight forwarder based in Dubai) broke all records with a fastest 
handling time of 6 hours from ship arrival at Dubai Port to onboard scheduled EK flight 001 for 
London (Khaleej Times - 15 September 1987). 
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APL played a leading role in carrying sea-air cargo to the 
U. A. E., mainly via Fujairah Port. 
Their arrival time on Friday gave just enough time to make the 
transit to the majority of cargo flights which depart 
Dubai/Sharjah airports on Saturdays ( LH, AF, CV, LD, MP, SQ, CX 
using 747s, KU, RJ, TMA using 707s, SU IL76, EKI A310, and AZ2 and 
HK using B747 freighters - see Appendices I-1 to 1-4, on airline 
capacities. ). For ships arriving on Saturdays, the transit time 
allows sea-air cargo to make it on the cargo flights which depart 
Dubai/Sharjah airports on Sundays ( LH, AF, CV, SQ, CX, CI using 
747s, KU, RJ using 707s, EK A310, and HK using a B747 
freighter. ). For ships arriving on Sundays, transit time allows 
sea-air cargo- to make the transit for the Monday cargo flights 
which depart Dubai/Sharjah airports ( LH, AF, LD, CX using 747s, 
TMA using a 707, EK using a A310, and AZ using a MD11) . For 
ships arriving on Wednesdays, transit time allows sea-air cargo 
to make the flights on Thursday ( LH -2 flights, CX and SQ using 
747s, EK using a A310, and AZ -3 flights using MD11s). 
Arrivals from the Indian subcontinent are on Tuesdays and sea-air 
cargo connects with outgoing Wednesday flights. It must be 
emphasised that the majority of Indian sub-continent sea-air 
traffic arrives on Wednesdays and Fridays, and departs on 
Thursdays and Saturdays respectively. Even though there are a 
large number of cargo flights available from Dubai and Sharjah, 
there are also supporting flights from Abu Dhabi Airport on a 
regular and charter basis. Sharjah offers the largest number of 
charter cargo flights. It also needs to be emphasised that 
regular transiting cargo flights originating in the Far East, for 
European destinations have limited air cargo capacities, as 
priority is given to originating Far East cargo to Europe. 
The air cargo scene of the U. A. E. contributes positively to the 
development and growth of sea-air cargo. The presence of three 
major modern international airports, equipped with advanced cargo 
handling facilities and large cargo terminals, and the 
competition among these airports, have led to lower cargo 
handling and turnaround costs. This served as an added incentive 
to the "Open Sky policy, , adopted by the U. A. E. government as from the early 1970s up to the present time. 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s many international airlines 
started using U. A. E. airports on a regular basis, and often flew 
back with hardly any cargo load onboard. Air cargo capacities 
were available but unutilised. With increased frequencies of 
flights, the air cargo capacities available were also increased. 
Further increases in air cargo capacities were prompted by the 
rapid growth of Arab airlines who started operating wide-bodied 
aircraft, specifically the 747. In 1970 the combined fleet of 
Arab air carriers was 137 narrow bodied aircraft. By 1986, this 
figure had grown to 335, of which 120 were wide-bodied aircraft 
1. EK A310 daily passenger flights to Europe, with a capacity of 36 cubic metres, or 12,000 kgs per flight. 
2. AZ have three passenger flights per week to Rome, using MD11s with a cargo capacity of 22 cubic 
metres, or 7000 to 8000 kgs per flight. 
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and by the end of 1994, the fleet grew to 474, of which 190 were 
wide-bodied. With the growth of sea-air cargo in the early 
1980s, and up to the present time, large volumes became 
available, and available air cargo capacities were only partially 
utilised (see Appendix A). 
A remarkable development took place in the mid 1980s, and started 
growing rapidly. The "Free Zone' of Jebel Ali witnessed the 
birth of many garment factories. This phenomenon spread to the 
rest of the Emirates. In 1991,115 garment factories were 
producing readymade garments in full swing, in response to orders 
from the U. S. A., Canada and Europe. Exports of readymade 
garments were subjected to US quotas. The trend in the U. A. E. 
slowed down and garment factories mushroomed in the nearby Gulf 
states such as, Qatar, Kuwait and the Sultanate of Oman. 
These developments generated huge volumes of export freight which 
moved either by ocean or by air. The bulk of readymade garments 
were high fashion items and were required urgently at the 
consumer markets in mainly the U. S. A. and Canada. The bulk of 
this volume was air freighted and therefore helped fill in' a 
large part of the unutilised air cargo capacities of most 
airlines calling on U. A. E. airports. 
These developments induced airlines to introduce terminating 747 
freighter flights in 1991. Lufthansa became the pioneer of the 
jumbo freighter terminating flights, availing a weekly cargo 
capacity of 260 tonnes, followed by Cargolux availing a capacity 
of 140 tonnes per week to the U. A. E. market. other jumbo 
freighter flights transiting the U. A. E. offered, together, an 
average of 1,250 tonnes capacity per week. 
In summary: 
Almost all the sea-air cargo routed via the U. A. E. originates 
from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Bangkok, India, Colombo and 
Pakistan. Indonesia and Malaysia accounts for a marginal volume, 
but is steadily growing and assuming an increasing portion of the 
total market. Very little cargo originates out of South Korea 
because of longer transit time, when compared with the route via 
the west coast of N. America. The same applies to Japan. 
Table 75. Airline Air cargo capacities 
and sea-air utilisation - 1994 
DubailSharjahlA bu Dhabi Airports 
Type Dubai Sharjah Abu Dhabi Total 
Available air cargo 
capacities for sea-air 
26,6 00 27,5 00 7,600 61,700 
Sea-air cargo volume 6,00 0 16,10 0 3,800 25,900 
Sea-air % utilisation of 
available capacity 
22.5%- 1 58.5%, 21.6%- 42. Ot I 
Source : Comiouted. de_r_iýved and ta bulated bv the rese archer -I rom data in 
earlier parts of this section. 
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In conclusion, U. A. E. ports and airports serving as sea-air hubs 
have an immense potential to absorb much greater loads of sea-air 
cargo because : 
1. A high frequency of shipping lines call at U. A. E. ports from 
the production centres of the Far East. 
2. Cargo handling facilities and cargo terminals are available 
at lower costs than at other transfer hubs'. 
3. Congestion and loss of time in transfer, is ruled out due to 
the presence of many ports, and the proximity of the ports 
to the airports. 
4. Air cargo capacities, from various airports in the U. A. E. to 
Europe, are available, or can be made available, with short 
notice ' i. e charter freighter services are readily available from Sharjah Airport on an almost daily basis to Amsterdam, 
Brussels and Maastricht. Also, re-distribution to any point 
in Europe by European trucking systems is now a reliable 
procedure from not only Amsterdam, Brussels and Maastricht, 
but from all major entry gateway airports of Europe. 
The total sea-air cargo uplift from the three U. A. E. airports is 
shown in Table 75, page 140 -a figure much less than the average 
available air capacities. Room for growth and expansion is 
already available on regular scheduled flights. It must be 
stressed that air cargo capacities are further increased by the 
availability of empty legs of charter flights from this area. An 
exact figure could not be drawn due to the fact that none of the 
three U. A. E. airports keep any figures on this particular uplift. 
Port terminal charges at U. A. E. ports were found to be around US$ 0 03/kg, while those of Seattle 
and Los Angeles were in the range of US$ 0.05/kg. See footnote on pýge 151 for detailed analysis. 
Part III: 
Characteristics and trends oj'the 
sea-air chain and the transfer hubs. 
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Chapter 7 
Geography and regulations 
There are many characteristics that a sea-air transfer hub should 
have. However, no single factor can be used to characterise a 
sea-air hub. The emergence of a successful sea-air hub requires 
an optimal balance with each of the characteristics, such as, 
geographical location, government rules and regulations, quality 
of sea port facilities, nature of airport facilities, ocean 
carriers, air carriers and the freight forwarders. 
It is the objective of this research to analyse each of these 
characteristics in the context of the sea-air hub, and 
demonstrate how they must work jointly to build up its 
attractiveness and reliability. 
1 GeocrraDhic location 
The aim of sea-air intermodality is to transport goods from 
origin to destination in a continuous and controlled flow and in 
the most time/cost effective manner. The geographic location of 
a transfer point becomes important in relation to time and cost 
of transport. 
This means capitalising on relative advantages of various modes 
of transport at each transfer point of the whole journey. The 
geographic location of a transfer point is a prime factor in 
relation to speed and time values of cargo movement. The value 
of speed depends on the value of journey time to the shipper and 
consignee. If the time of transport by various carriers and the 
transit periods of load transfers are considered as a deferred 
satisfaction of consumer's demand, then the speed of transport is 
directly proportional to the cost of transport. The higher the 
speed, the higher are the rates (cost of transport). 
Speed may be considered as a factor of time and distance. The 
value of goods, in general, depend on their condition on reaching 
the consumer's market. This is a function of time, and many 
goods will require a certain period of transit time to reach a 
particular market in a condition acceptable to consignees and/or 
consumers. 
The geographic location of a transfer point becomes a function of 
transit time in relation to value of goods, inclusive of their 
transport cost on reaching their destination. The factors 
determining the service of a certain transfer point depend on 
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this relative value of time in relation to the product value at 
final destination. Given the nature of the product and markets 
of demand, the value of time becomes the sole consideration in 
the choice of a transfer point, provided that all available 
transfer points have equal facilities. 
A case study on sea-air cargo movement conducted by Hong Kong 
based FETA', and released to FETA members during their annual 
meeting held in March 1988 in Singapore, shows clearly the 
importance of transit time in relation to the sea-air cost of 
transport. The research finding still holds true in 1994 2. 
Shipping lines did not introduce faster ships, nor change their 
first ports of call en route, since that time. ocean and air 
freight costs, and therefore the combined sea-air costs are still 
applicable with an average currency adjustment factor on the US 
dollar of +5%, since its exchange rate versus other world 
currencies has depreciated much in the past six years. The 
research is updated as follows. 
Table 76: Transit time/cost of sea-air transport 
(Far East to Europe) 
on all sea-air routes 
Western route Eastern route 
via Seat/Vanc/LA via U. A. E. via HK/Sing 
Ports of Tr. time Cost/kg Tr. time Cost/kg Tr. time Cost 
origin (days) ($ (days) ($) (days) ($) 
Japan 14 1.75 20 1.60 7 2.50 
Korea 14 1.75 20 1.60 7 2.50 
Taiwan 18 1.65 18 1.50 7 2.50 
Hong Kong is 1.65 17 1.55 - - Singapore 18 1.65 17 1.55 - - Thailand 19 1.60 18 1.55 7 2.50 
Malaysia 18 1.65 18 1.55 7 2.50 
Source: FETA research released in March 1988 at their Singapore annual convention 
Tr. time : Transit time 
Costlkg, : US dollars per kilogram average cost to sea-air operators 
SeatlVanclLA : Seattle, Vancouver and Los Angeles 
HKISing : Hong Kong and Singapore 
Notes : 
Sea-air cargo moving from the Far East to Europe was defined 
as cargo having an ex factory value of more than US$ 
5.00/kg. 
1 Far East Transport Association, Hong Kong, whose members are major sea-air operators in the Far East 
(Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore), U. A. E. and Europe. 
2. Updating 1994 figures was done through direct fax contact with major Hong Kong, Taiwan. South Korean 
and Japanese sea-air operators. 
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2. The nature of the cargo consisted mainly of ready made 
garments, shoes, - scientific and precision equipment, 
artificial jewellery, toys, electronic goods, computers, 
TVs/videos, machinery and spare parts. 
3. Sea-air movements from the Far East to Europe used six 
transfer points. The western route via Seattle, Vancouver, 
Los Angeles, and the eastern route via Hong Kong, Singapore 
and the U. A. E. 
4. The airports of destination included the main gateway cities 
of Europe: London, Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam, Frankfurt, 
Rome, Madrid, Athens, Geneva, Copenhagen, Zurich, Basel, 
Hamburg and Dusseldorf. 
When geographic locations render equal transit time, the choice 
of one specific location vis-d-vis another depends on the 
decision of the sea-air operator. on the other hand, the 
consignee's decision to have goods at his disposal within a 
specified period of time, may be governed by factors other than 
the total cost of the journey in relation to time, such as the 
transport equipment itself, which serves, in addition to its role 
of transporting cargo, as a form of free-of-cost storage -a 
measurable convenience for shippers and consignees in relation to 
the required transit time of the whole journey. 
Therefore, geographic location takes on a further marginal 
dimension in its importance to consignees and shippers, not only 
in terms of longer or shorter transit times, but in terms of a 
free cost of storage. 
The "FETAI case study further highlighted the geographic location 
in relation to transit time by citing another sea-air transfer 
hub on the eastern route, namely that of Singapore, showing much 
shorter transit time than both Seattle and the U. A. E. ports, at 
much higher costs (Table 77 below). 
Table 77: Transit time and cost of sea-air transport 
Far East to Europe on the eastern route via Singapore 
Ports of Transit time Cost/kg 
origin (days) (US$) 
Japan 9 2.75 
Korea 8 2.75 
Taiwan 8 2.75 
Hong Kong 7 2.75 
Source: FETA research released in March 1988 at their Singapore annual convention 
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The high cost of the sea-air mode via Singapore is basically due 
to the much higher air f reight cost f rom Singapore to Europe, 
while the ocean sector costs f rom the ports of Japan, Korea, 
Taiwan and Hong Kong, to Singapore, are common rated. The 
importance of time, in as far as the geographic location is 
concerned, is clearly defined. The faster the speed of delivery, 
the higher is the cost of transport, and the shorter is the 
distance in terms of time. See Chapter 8, Section 8.1 on 
'Optimum Port Selection'. 
7.2 Government rules and reaulations 
In this section, government rules and regulations are analysed as 
a characterising feature of a sea-air transfer hub, in order to 
assess how the flexibility of government rules and regulations 
can contribute to the emergence of a successful sea-air hub. 
Government policy differs from country to country as regards to 
the transport system. Most governments are in control of sea 
ports, airports, ocean routes, air routes, motorways and 
communication systems. The primary concern of any government is 
the direct impact of its transport policy on the citizens, the 
objective being the welfare of the people. Government 
intervention is analysed on two major levels, the local level and 
the state level, covering national and international policies. 
7.2.1 The local level 
Local governments apply restrictions on the dimensions and size 
of road transport vehicles' for safety reasons. This became 
necessary in the 1960s with the introduction of long and extra 
long vehicles on the roads and motorways. The vehicles in 
question consisted of a tractive unit pulling a 40 ft or a 45 ft 
trailer, carrying standard-sized containers from the cargo 
terminals of the shipping lines, to the warehouses and storage 
areas located deep inside the country. 
Movement of long vehicles on the roads and the motorways became 
frequent and dense, with the increase in demand for door 
deliveries and ex-factory export handling. 
The increased demand led to increased pressure on the operators, 
for higher efficiency in terms of lower cost. To move goods in 
containers to and from container yards or ex-factory to the 
gateway port of export, or from ports of entry to end users, two 
40 ft flat bed chassis, switch-locked together, then loaded with 
two 40 ft containers and pulled by one tractive unit, were 
introduced to achieve economies of scale. This increased the 
hazards on motorways, which witnessed up to 90 ft long vehicles, 
moving fast to/from warehouses and factories within the country. 
1. In the U. K., legislation on the Heavy Commercial Vehicles (Controls and Regulations) Act of 1973 
gave local authorities greater powers to control and regulate truck movements. In 1980 the 'Armitage Report' recommended that restrictions on truck movement Should not be imposed without 
corresponding road improvements such as by-passes and widened carriageways. Refer: Lorries, People 
and the Environment (Armitage Report HMSO, (London) 1980. 
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The rate of road accidents and resultant injuries to people 
increased sharply, and led local governments to introduce 
restrictions on the dimensions of transport vehicles. Many 
countries restricted the length of their vehicles to a maximum of 
45ft, the width to 8ft, and the height to 16ft'. However, new, 
wide and fast motorways were constructed in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Narrow lanes were also introduced to allow an increasing number 
of vehicles, passenger cars and trucks to move simultaneously on 
these motorways. 
There were further restrictions on the payload of the transport 
vehicles. The carrying load capacity on a 40 ft container was 
limited to 22,000 kgs. The tractive unit and its empty 40 ft 
container chassis weighed between 22,000 to 23,000 kgs. 
Therefore, the maximum gross weight permissible on roads and 
motorways was set at 44,000 - 45,000 kgs. This meant that only 
22,000 kgs of goods could be transported in a 40 ft container. 
It was justified on the grounds that higher loads tend to spoil 
the roads, in particular the asphalt, and this in turn created 
ruts, which meant increased maintenance costs to governments, 
together with the roads themselves becoming a nuisance to 
motorists. 
Further restrictions were introduced because of environmental 
reasons. The green revolution in Europe and the emergence of 
environmental pressure groups led to governmental measures to 
preserve nature by introducing strict regulations in favour of 
reducing carbon di-oxide emissions of vehicles on the roads, 
rules to monitor filters of diesel engines, and in some 
countries, a complete ban on their use. 
Further, as tourism became more and more important to economic 
development and the well-being of the people, measures were 
adopted to attract more tourists. Spain, with a population of 55 
million, attracts 50 million tourists a year. 7 0%2 Of them tour 
Spain in motor vehicles and buses. 
Rules were introduced favouring tourism, at the cost of further 
restrictions on the movement of heavy transport vehicles to 
certain 
S3 
hours of the day and night. A complete curfew at 
weekend was even introduced to allow tourists to drive without 
any inconvenience of the long and heavy-duty transport vehicles. 
The impact of all these rules and regulations was reflected in 
the higher cost of moving cargo and a longer time of delivery. 
Government regulations at the local level, are related to the 
sea-air hub in the following manner: most ports are situated 
near the airports. In many cases, approximately 40 miles separate 
1. In the U. K. maximum weights and dimensions for the commercial vehicles are contained in the Motor Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations indicating the maximum vehicle length, width, weight, 
wheelbase, chassis and other equipment. The permitted maximum gross weight of goods vehicles (cargo 
carrying vehicles), depend on the wheelbase length, number of axles and the spread. Gross weight includes the weight of the vehicle and the load, together with the weight of the driver and the fuel 
tank. Refer: Motor Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations HKSO (London) 1978. 2. Spanish 'Ministry of Tourism' (1992 - 1993) statistical figures indicate that 15 million tourists, per year, land in Spain via the airports and ports, while 35 million tourists arrive by road using 
private vehicles, public buses etc. 
3. 'A Guide to Goods Vehicle Driving Hours' Department of Transport (London) 1990. 
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the airports from the sea ports. These 40 miles of motorway 
should be free of restrictions, such as curfews, which are 
mandatory in some parts of Europe at weekends, in order that the 
intermodal operators are able to deliver the goods quickly, at 
any time during the day, and on any day of the week. Therefore, 
other things being equal (in terms of port facilities, airport 
services and cargo handling), it is the motorways with the least 
transit time which contribute to a continuous flow of sea-air 
cargo, and thus, to the success and reliability of a sea-air 
transfer hub. 
Therefore, the awareness of local authorities and governments of 
the value of providing 'free of restrictions' road links between 
ports and airports converts a sizeable portion of truck traffic 
from the main roads, thus minimising the impact of noise, 
pollution and congestion on main road traffic. 
7.2.2 The state level (national and international): 
In laissez-faire economies, governments restrict intervention to 
national issues that have a direct impact on the well-being of 
its people. The free flow of foreign capital to various sectors 
of the economy is motivated by the degree of liberalisation in 
that economy. 
In the transport system, minimal government intervention in the 
rate structure, and the free interplay of supply and demand to 
determine the rates of various transport modes of the system, 
becomes a major consideration in the attraction of foreign 
capital flow. Foreign capital flow into the transport system 
helps generate multinational corporate activities. New 
investments motivate entrepreneurs and operators of a certain 
transport mode to introduce new technology that results in the 
reduction of the general costs of transport and in the 
improvement of 'in time, deliveries. 
Besides, governments may intervene positively to attract foreign 
capital inflow. For example, governments may allocate certain international routes to international carriers without adversely 
affecting the routes of the national carriers, or they may even 
open the doors of national carriers for foreign investments and 
therefore, embark on the globalisation of the whole system. The 
adoption of one vis-d-vis the other will have a direct effect on 
the level of demand for transportation services, and, therefore 
affect the organisational structure of transport operators. 
on the other hand, governments may intervene when operators of a 
certain mode of transport and the operators of various modes, decide to merge; mergers within a mode, and mergers among various 
modes result in the emergence of monopolies. monopolies in the 
transport system are said to render a generally poor service at 
a comparatively high cost. In this respect, government intervention to prevent the emergence of monopolies, is welcomed by the public and foreign investors, thus retaining the 
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competitiveness of the economy. 
By the same token, the application of preferential tariffs on the 
entry of certain goods may encourage the flow of those goods into 
the country and improve demand on the transport system, while 
imposition of higher tariffs may discourage the inflow of goods 
and depress demand. Although the transport system altogether has 
a marginal effect on the general trend of economic growth, any 
changes in the demand and supply of goods will have an immediate 
effect on the structure of the transport system and its various 
modes. 
The relation between government and transport systems takes on a 
two way dimension. on the one hand, the choice of certain 
options by the operators of various modes of transport (such as 
the emergence of monopolies) may invite government intervention, 
while on the other hand, the imposition of certain rules and 
regulations by the government, may invite the operators and the 
public either to accept these rules or oppose them by applying 
pressure through lobbying, strikes, demonstrations and the like. 
In relation to the reliability of a sea-air transfer hub, state 
level intervention at the national and international level should 
be minimal, allowing the free interplay of supply and demand to 
determine the rate structure of all three modes of transport, 
operating to and from that hub. 
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Chapter 8 
The transfer hubs 
8.1 Sea ports 
8.1.1 Sea port facilities 
The concerns of this study are the facilities required from a 
port, for the successful application of sea-air intermodality. 
A detailed description of sea-air cargo movements, from origin to 
destination, helps demonstrate the exact facilities required from 
a port assuming the role of an efficient and viable transfer 
point. 
Sea-air cargo moves between the Far East and Europe via two main 
routes, the western route and the eastern route. The U. A. E. 
ports are selected as a transfer point on the eastern route, 
while the North American Port of Seattle is chosen on the Western 
route. Sea-air cargo is monitored from origin to destination via 
these routes, with comparative analysis of both ports. 
Sea-air cargo is loaded ex factory in the Far East, either LCL1 
or FCL 2. LCL cargoes are consolidated, i. e. many shipments are 
put together to fill a 20 ft or 40 ft container, while FCL is one 
single shipment occupying the full space of a container. A B/L 3 
is issued for each shipment showing shipper/ consignee, nature of 
cargo, number of packages, origin and destination. An invoice 
and packing list accompany the shipment during its journey to the 
transfer point. 
Sea-air cargo, in containers, is loaded on ships last, at ports 
of embarkation, in order to be offloaded first on arrival at the 
port of transfer. This is required because other containers 
onboard ships are not subject to immediate and fast transfer to 
the other modes of transport. As the ship approaches the port of 
transfer, immediate berthing and immediate facilities to offload 
containers on to container quays are required. 
The mechanics of the sea-air operation is analysed as follows: 
A single 'Bill of Lading, is issued by the sea-air operator from 
the port of origin to port of transfer, and consigned to a 
multimodal operator. On loading containers at the port of 
origin, the sea-air operator pre-alerts the consignee 4 at the 
port of transfer with the details of the incoming shipment, such 
as the expected time of arrival plus other details as per the 
bill of lading. 
1. LCL Less than full container load 2 FCL Full container load 
3: B/L Bill of lading. 
4. Consignee Multimodal operator at the transfer point. 
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In the past, the telex was commonly used. In the last decade, 
facsimile and electronic mail use replaced telex communications. 
B/Ls, invoices and packing lists are now faxed, or electronically 
mailed to the consignees at the port of transfer long before the 
ship's arrival, allowing ample time to make prepa 
, 
rations f or 
immediate transfer of sea-air cargo from on board ships to on 
board truck trailers bound for the airport for air carriage to 
final destination. This operation is completed within 12 hours 
of the ship's arrival and applies only to FCLs (Full Container 
Loads) consigned to one consignee, while LCLs (Less than Full 
Container Loads), i. e. consolidations, must first move from the 
port to the de-consolidation centres of that port, where break- 
bulking' of the containers take place, and each shipment is 
segregated from the other, re-marked, re-labelled, re-numbered 
and each carried to the airport where an airline waybill is 
issued for each consignee and each destination. 
A pre-alert is sent to the consignees at destination, advising of 
the arrival time and date. The same information is communicated 
to the shipper at origin. The sea-air operator controls the flow 
of cargo from arrival at a transfer port to arrival at the 
consignee's airport. 
Port authorities require the invoice, packing list and ship's 
manifest for inbond customs clearance. In the U. A. E., port 
authorities require a bank guarantee of US$ 80,000 to be supplied 
by the sea-air operator. This ensures that sea-air cargo customs 
cleared inbond remains so for the rest of its journey, to the 
airport of final destination. The inbond customs entry form must 
tally with the airport customs exit form, and once tallied the 
transaction is closed. This whole operation is linked by 
custom's central computer. 
The differences and similarities in handling costs and procedures 
between Seattle/Tacoma port and the U. A. E. ports are: 
1. Both ports are equipped with the most modern handling 
equipment available today, including more than 25 gantry 
cranes, miles of container quays and vast areas of container 
terminals and container warehousing on chassis'. 
2. The availability of low cost labour in the U. A. E. (labour 
from the subcontinent of India, Pakistan and others), 
together with the availability of vast areas of inexpensive 
land around ports make warehousing, storage and container 
terminals less costly than Seattle/Tacoma, and certainly 
less costly than most sea-air ports of the world. For the 
end user, what matters is the cost per kg and a short 
transit time from origin to destination. The average cost 
of handling a kilogram of freight at the U. A. E. Ports is 
1. break-bulking Less than FCL are separated into individual shipments. Each shipment has a 
different consignee, and a different destination. while a FCL also undergoes the 
same process of relabelling, if addressed to one single consignee and one single 
destination, this results in saving transit time. 
2. chassis 40 ft and 20 ft mobile chassis exactly similar to 20 ft and 40 ft flatbeds but with 
no flat beds. Chassis are specifically used to load only standard containers, 
while flat beds can load containers and bulk cargo. 
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within $0.03/kg', while the average cost at the Port of 
Seattle is $0.05/kg2. 
3. The Port of Seattle assumes full responsibility for 
consolidation/de -consolidation and control of cargo flow up 
to delivery. The ports of the U. A. E. do not offer such a 
facility and are not yet involved in the logistics of 
container break-bulk or consolidation. They are presently 
constrained by their own rules of operation or by government 
restrictions. In the U. A. E., all consolidated cargo is 
either off loaded at the ports of Dubai or Sharjah, or hauled 
overland from any other U. A. E. port to either ports, de- 
consolidation centres, operated by the shipping-lines. LCL 
transit time is 1 to 2 days in the case of Seattle and 2 
full days in the case of U. A. E. 
4. In both ports, sea-air cargo arriving in full container 
loads and consigned to a single consignee (sea-air 
operator/ f re ight forwarder) is custom cleared and trucked in 
bond to the designated airport, with hardly any stoppage. 
5. In the U. A. E., APL ( American President Lines) uses Fujairah 
Port, 160 kms away from Dubai and Sharjah, as its hub. APL 
absorbs all the overland cost of transporting LCLs to the 
ports of Dubai and Sharjah, while direct deliveries of FCLs 
to the airports of the U. A. E. are charged only 25ý; of the 
standard trucking cost. It must be noted that LCL cargoes 
are trucked from the de-consolidation centres at the ports 
to the airports at an average cost equivalent to the FCL 25k 
charge for direct airport delivery. This brings LCL cargoes 
on a par with FCL as far as the cost of overland transport 
is concerned. 
The role of a port in the transport system is directly related to 
services performed for ships, cargoes and overland transport 
systems. Intermodal transport altered the role of ports from a 
break-bulk and terminal point to an expanded role as a 
fundamental link in the total distribution chain. The concept of 
intermodality has reduced the importance of some of the 
conventional services and created new functions for sea ports. 
1. & 2. average cost figures were derived from interviews with the U. A. E., Seattle, Los Angeles sea-air freight forwarders as follows: official charges as per port's tariffs at U. A. E ports are 
US $ 121.60 per 20 ft container including delivery order fee. 
US $ 173.50 per 40 ft container including delivery order fee. 
Average payload in kilograms of sea-air cargo in 20 ft containers is assessed on air freight volume 
ratio applicable from Dubai and Seattle of 6: 1 (see footnote on page 49) to average volume usable 
capacity of 28cbm or cubic metres, i. e 28 +6- 4667 kgs, and exactly double this figure for a 40 ft container. Therefore average cost per kg is : 20 ft container US $ 121.60 + 4667 kgs - US $ 0.026/kg. 40 ft container US $ 173.50 + 9334 kgs - US $ 0.019/kg. While LCL cargoes are charged differently, US $ 4.10 per cbm plus a delivery fee of $ 13.66 per 
consignment or bill of lading. The average LCL shipment -2 cbms, or 334 kgs. Applying the air freight ratio of 6: 1, each cbm - 167 kgs, therefore average cost per kg MCL basis), is $ 4.10 +$ 13.66 + 334 kgs -$0.053/kg. By application of research findings that sea-air cargo arrives to the ports: 
20% in 40 ft containers FCLs 
40% in 20 ft containers FCLs; 
401k in LCLs 
so 20% x 0.019 - 0.0004 
40% X 0.026 - 0.0104 
40% x O. OS3 - 0.0212 
0.0320 
This figure was rounded to US $ 0.03/kg as cost for U. A. E. ports. At Seattle/Los Angeles ports 
terminal handling charges are 65% more and a figure of US $ 0.05/kg was found to apply. 
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Many ports have started to offer extensive consolidation services 
to shippers and shipping lines. Since full container load 
shipments represent just part of the total container load, small 
consignments from various origins and bound for different 
destinations, and consigned to various consignees in different 
locations, but all via the same port, need to be consolidated 
into full containers in order to reduce costs of transport. 
The Port of Seattle's most significant contribution is in the 
field of consolidation as seen in advancing high volume, fast 
moving, longer range, intermodal journeys. The speedy handling 
of Full Container Loads at the port may not yield an advantageous 
large scale intermodal flow, while consolidation and de- 
consolidation centres at the port extends the activities of the 
port, to include the logistics of a freight forwarder. 
The de-consolidation centres provide just the service required by 
the sea-air operators at a transfer point. According to the 
findings of this research, approximately 40% of sea-air cargo 
arrives at a transfer port consolidated in less than full 
container loads (LCLs) . The need to de-consolidate and segregate each individual shipment, and the preparations that follow to 
make each shipment ready for air carriage, in the shortest 
possible 'break bulk' time becomes of crucial importance to the 
continuous flow of sea-air cargo to the final destination. 
In this respect, the 'Sea-Air Operator's Association' of the 
U. A. E. (SAOA) has already made proposals and recommendations to 
the 'Ports and Customs Authorities' of the U. A. E. to introduce 
de-consolidation centres at the airports, and allow direct 
deliveries of LCLs, so that 'break-bulking, occurs at the airport 
rather than at the port. Another related proposal by ISAOAI to 
the Port and Airport Authorities of the U. A. E. was to investigate 
the possibility of introducing a standard sea-air entry and exit 
form to apply to all ports and airports of the U. A. E. 
Port selection stratecries: 
The development of container vessels, together with the expansion 
and upgrading of many world ports, within certain geographic 
regions, lead the shipping lines to make strong selections of 
certain ports vis-d-vis others. The concentration of the 
container services to certain ports in a specific region was 
meant to achieve the greatest possible productivity of employed 
resources, i. e. the container vessels. 271,51 of all port calls 
are concentrated around ports in the Far East and one port in 
Europe. Also most of the world container traffic and container 
tonnage is concentrated around those same ports. 
Appendix J shows the degree of concentration of world container 
traffic and its tonnage, at 25 selected ports by rank of the 
As per ISL merchant fleet data bases and aggregates based on quarterly updates from Lloyd's Register 
of Shipping/LMIS, Lloyd's Voyage records and containership data from MDS Transmodal, 1992/1993. 
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world's 250 busiest ports' 
By the end of 1992, total container traffic of the 250 ports 
reviewed, was approximately 80.5 million containers, and the 
tonnage was approximately 840 million tonnes. 
101i, or 25 ports, of the 250 busiest world ports control 65.6*-. of 
world container traffic and 68.7t of its container tonnage. The 
Far Eastern region leads the rest of the world with 42.5t of 
total container traffic and 43.59k of its tonnage. On the other 
hand Europe and North America share among themselves slightly 
less than a quarter of the world container traffic and 25.21-6 of 
its tonnage. This trend is expected to continue strongly through 
the rest of this century. 
The consequences of such a regional concentration of services 
encourages the reduction of port calls, which further means that 
the possibilities of many shipping lines integrating their 
services into a common service from/to very few ports, may give 
rise to certain aspects of a sectorial monopoly and, therefore, 
serve as a strategic alternative to the formation of a 
consortium. 
The key to this possible consequence is the selection of certain 
ports to serve the combined regional services of shipping lines. 
Port selection strategies are subject to three main models: 
1. The single load centre stratecry, the 'hub' port: 
Such a port should be able to provide adequate intermodal 
handling facilities to connect all containerised cargo with 
overland transport to and from further points deep inland, 
including industrial consumers' centres in addition to major 
airports of the region. At the same time, this single port 
should be provided with numerous ocean feeder services 
covering the movement of containerised cargo from/to various 
ports of the region. 
2. Multi-port strateqv 
This strategy means that at least the main ports of the 
combined geographic region will be called on direct and not 
through feeder vessels. As such, the feeder services are 
reduced to a bare minimum. Further, under this strategy, 
overland intermodal services deep inland operated by the 
shipping lines, for either pick up or delivery of container 
cargo, are reduced practically to the location of the 
container terminal around the ports. In this case, a return 
to conventional shipping days, whereby each port was served directly, and assumed its own independent captive area of 
cargo movement. 
Based on ISL Shipping Statistic Yearbook of October, 1993 - Bremen Institute of Shipping and Logistics. The figures were derived from a total of 250 portal statistical data (1987 to 1992). 
as tabulated by ISL. 1992 figures were adopted for this analysis because 1993 and 1994 figures were 
derived from relatively less reliable sources and periodicals. 
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A combination of strategy 1& 
This model is considered by many observers as the most 
commonly used model today, as it seems to be an acceptable 
compromise to strategy 1 and 2. 
Port selection strategies are subject to many factors in addition 
to the general characteristic of the port itself. Ports may be 
characterised by their physical nautical limitations such as that 
of draught; others may be restricted by their own cargo and 
container handling facilities. Therefore, first a short list of 
world major ports with adequate nautical approaches and 
facilities can be drawn up, then, a further analysis of the 
logistic systems of these ports is apt to reduce further, and 
substantially, the first short list. As world port authorities 
are increasingly under pressure to provide logistic facilities 
for the shipping lines calling at their port, the evolution of 
the shipping line role from a 'port to port' carrier, to a 'door 
to door' carrier entails that ports called should have : 
1. Adequate transfer systems to transfer containers from 
onboard ship to onboard truck or rail for further carriage 
to points deep inland, or to nearby airports for further on- 
carriage by air to final destination; 
2. Adequate communications and data base systems enabling the 
shipping lines to practice control over the movement of 
their containers from/to the port, the container terminal 
and points deep inland; 
3. Moderate and reasonable port related charges; 
4. Adequate container and cargo handling facilities, together 
with the availability of skilled labour during working hours 
and outside working hours; 
5. Availability of numerous berths and large container 
terminals to accommodate all sizes of fully cellular 
container vessels and the ability to act as a redistribution 
centre for the whole region through sea borne feeder 
services and overland links; and, 
6. Availability of efficient motorway and/or rail system 
connecting the port with various densely populated consumer 
and industrial areas, as well as the main airports in the 
region. 
The present phenomenon of hubbing and the trend for a single load 
centre, a "hub,, having all the requirements as detailed in the 
six points above, is accepted by many world major carriers and is being tested constantly. Lately, APL invited the North American 
West Coast Ports of Los Angeles, Long Beach, Oakland, Seattle & 
Tacoma to work out together a proposal or a concept under which 
all five ports were asked to provide a single, load/offload 
centre for APL, covering all the West Coast. 
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In February 1993, the plan was cancelled due to many reasons. 
The main one was the difficulty of covering a distance of 1600 
kms of West Coast shore line, dotted with five ports equipped 
with almost equally adequate and efficient logistic systems. The 
difficulties were manifested by shippers and consignees' 
responses to the APL proposal within each port's range of its 
1600 kms radius, covering the West Coast as well as inland 
industrial and consumers' centres. The majority of shippers and 
consignees gave a negative response to the APL proposal of a 
single load centre. They were simply afraid of longer transit 
times for their cargo. 
The proposed APL plan shows that the selection of a certain port 
is so relevant to the shipping line productivity, and, at the 
same time, shows clearly how sceptical and indecisive the 
shipping lines are when considering a port selection strategy. 
However, the negative response that was demonstrated by the 
shippers and consignees was a response to only one single aspect 
of a complete chain of land-sea-land logistics, and that is the 
possibility of delays and longer transit times to their cargo. 
This factor could have been overcome by APL's commitment to 
shorter transit times and lower total shipping costs, which are 
bound to occur under a single load centre strategy. However, 
what deterred APL was largely the opposition from all five West 
Coast Port Authorities, and the US Government ruling, through 
their FMC, against the possible emergence of sectorial (anti 
competitive) , mega-size monopolies that could 
involve shipping as 
well as overland railway and trucking systems, and, therefore, 
endanger the competitiveness of all concerned parties. 
Port selection is only one aspect of a series of intermodal 
transport knots that starts at origin, ex-factory, to consignee's 
door, and which are not just subject to shipper or consignee's 
proximity to the port that is served direct by the shipping line. 
Slack' confirms that : "on the basis of the results of a 
comprehensive survey undertaken by 'World Cargo News' in the 
first quarter of 1984, in USA and Europe, the shippers select 
their logistic partners by evaluating the whole service and not 
by substantial consideration to a single component like a port 
which might be called direct or not" 
Further, Brooks' ascertained that based on an analysis of a 
survey conducted in Europe and the USA in 1989, the majority of 
shippers and consignees answers to questionnaires were grouped as 
per the importance of certain defined criteria in the selection 
of a carrier. Reliability came first with almost loot of the 
answers, while the great majority confirmed that the most 
important considerations, besides reliability were: 
1. The cost of service; 
2. The sailing frequency; and, 
3. The transit time. 
Slack B. - Containerisation, Inter-port competition and Port selection. Maritime policy and 
management Vol 12. No. 4 1985, pages 293 - 303. 2. Brooks M. R., Ocean Carrier Selection - criteria in a new environment. Logistic and Transportation 
Vol. 26,1990 No. 4, pages 339 - 355. 
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Therefore, factors determining the selection of a certain port, 
in relation to the three main port selection strategies, are: 
1. The demand side : 
As expressed by shippers and consignees, the basic demand for the 
reliability of any service is taken for granted because of its 
fundamental and crucial importance to the survival of that 
service, followed immediately by its cost, frequency and transit 
time. These three factors are inter-related and vary in the 
context of each of the three strategies. 
Under the single load centre strategy, the 'hub': 
a. Costs of shipping to shippers and consignees can be reduced 
by the shipping line with the use of larger container 
vessels which can accommodate larger volumes of containers, 
and, therefore, generate higher levels of revenue. 
b. Transit time can be reduced through higher frequencies of 
sailing, and becomes a factor of sailing frequencies. The 
more frequent the sailing, the shorter the transit time. 
Thus, the frequency of sailings becomes much more important 
than short transport time of direct shipping between any two 
ports, or between a multiple of ports, because less frequent 
sailings result in longer average waiting time, or stay time 
at port of origin', which in turn means longer transit time 
from origin to final destination. 
Under the multiple port strategy: 
It should be noted that the failure of APL's plan for a single 
load centre, of direct calls to/from one port meant the 
retainment of its multiple port strategy of multiple direct 
calls, to and from major ports of a certain geographic region, 
and also meant much less container handling and much less use of 
feeder services, both being the basic factors that accompany the 
single load centre strategy. 
Nevertheless, APL was able to maintain the same costs and transit 
time to shippers and consignees, as it did before the proposed 
single load centre. The savings derived from less container 
handling and less use of feeder services, due to the absence of 
massive container transhipments, did partially compensate APL's increased costs, resulting from the application of a multiple 
port strategy. 
However, under the multiple load strategy, APL was neither able 
to reduce shipping cost nor transit time to shippers and 
consignees. Therefore, demand is not really affected by a change 
of a component (such as a port) in the whole transport chain, 
provided that the cost of service and the transit time remain the 
same, or are improved from that which existed before the change. 
1 APL and Maersk Lines each maintain a single sailing frequency, every three and six days, 
respectively, from Hong Kong to Dubai. Shipping time port to port (water time) is 12 days for both 
of them. Shipments received by APL in Hong Kong will have an average delivery transit time of the 
three day frequency median, plus the port to port shipping time is (50% x 3) + 12 - 13.5 days. By 
the same token, average delivery transit time for Maersk is (50% x 6) + 12 - 15 days. 
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The supi: )lv side : 
The basic pre-requisite of the supply side is the fulfilment of 
the demand side requirements. Demand remains a constant factor, 
before and af ter the change of a component such as a port, in the 
sense that : 
a. Volume of cargo and the cost of service, both remain 
the same; and, 
b. Total transit time remains the same. 
The fulfilment of the demand side must be viewed in relation to 
the control of cargo flow and the maintenance of the shipping 
line's clientele as irrevocably essential, and, therefore, 
constitutes the most important factor in maintaining the stable 
growth of productivity and revenues. 
The question that becomes pressing is: Under the conditions 
established above, which port is to be selected by the shipping 
line? 
If shipping lines, revenues are assumed to remain the same due to 
no changes in the cost of service and the volume of cargo, then, 
the main criteria in this particular decision making becomes a 
function of costs and revenues. Shipping lines will try to 
reduce their cost of operations by looking at areas where costs 
are unnecessarily high, and by looking at the marginal 
contribution of the newly selected port in terms of lower costs 
of providing; 
a. efficient facilities to receive and load volumes of 
container cargo, in the shortest possible time, as an 
'origin port'. 
b. intermodal facilities that enable fast and in time door 
deliveries to final consignees, as a 'destination port. 
The assumption of stable revenues and costs are highly 
questionable under different port selection strategies: 
1. Under multi-port strategy: 
a. The dependence on the ocean feeder services and overland 
links becomes minimal, as shipping lines start calling at 
many regional ports with their extra-large container 
capacities resulting in much lower freight load factors and, 
therefore, lower revenues, thus adding relatively higher 
costs to their operations, which are proportionally higher 
than the ocean feeder replaced costs. 
b. The reduction of the shipping line overland links to/from 
the location of their container terminals around the many 
ports of call on their schedule does in fact reduce their 
cost, but not to the consignees nor to the shippers, whose 
concern is to have the goods reach the consignee's door in 
the fastest transit time at the most reasonable cost. 
158 
Overland pick-up services ex factory and door deliveries to 
consignee's door from/to the shipping lines, container 
terminals, become open to many enterprises other' than the 
shipping lines. The ability of outsiders to offer shippers 
and consignees a complete door to door service does in fact 
loosen the shipping line's grip and control over the flow of 
cargo which may result in the diversion of traffic to other 
competing lines, thus resulting in lower revenues and 
increased operating costs. 
Under a sincrle load strate 
Shipping lines are able to retain their control over the flow of 
cargo, and maintain most of their clientele through their ability 
to reduce costs and transit time. This is achieved through the 
use of extra-large container vessels, with larger container 
loads, thus reducing the average cost per slot and thereby saving 
on the general operating cost, may be reflected in offering part 
of the savings in the form of a marginal reduction in shipping 
cost to shippers and consignees. Transit time, however, may be 
shortened due to the increased sailing frequencies, between 
single ports load centres, as seen earlier. 
Such a strategy reduces the role of the freight forwarder to a 
mere Custom House Broker at ports of origin and destination, and 
may even nullify completely his role, since customs clearance is 
today a computerised operation that may be handled by an 
affiliate firm such as the shipping line's General Sales Agent, 
at origin and destination ports. 
The control over cargo flow in the port selection strategies aims 
at satisfying the door to door' demand of shippers and 
consignees of a certain geographic trading area. The 'door to 
door' demand entails the involvement in the intermodality of land 
- sea - land transport systems, from the time cargo is received 
at origin, to the time of delivery at final destination. 
Ex factory ---- > overland ---- > port of origin ---- > ocean ---- > 
port of destination ---- > overland ---- > consignee's door. 
shipping lines, freight forwarders, NVOCCs and Port Authorities 
are all competing for control over this type of cargo flow, 
within certain geographic areas. 
The other enterprises that are most likely to enter the 'door to door, market are: 
a. The Port Authorities, such as the Port of Seattle, getting involved in offering shippers 
and consignees a *package deal' of 'door to door' deliveries. 
b. The NVOCCS and the freight forwarders (see the section on 'Freight Forwarders', section 
9.3, Chapter 9). 
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8.2 Airports 
8.2.1 Airport facilities 
Airport cargo handling facilities contribute largely to the 
reduction of total transit time of intermodal transport. A short 
transit time is one of the major advantages of air transport. 
This advantage is derived mainly from the speed of the aircraft 
itself and from the speed of cargo handling at the airports. 
Airports are usually constructed around major cities and are on 
an average, 12 to 40 miles away from city centres and densely 
populated urban areas. Modern, double carriage, fast motorways, 
fast railways, and underground transport systems connect airports 
with city centres, industrial locations deep within the country, 
the market place and sea ports. 
Time saving factors of the combined sea-air journey are of 
primary importance for the success of the sea-air mode. 
Therefore, the airport's proximity to the sea port, availability 
of fast and low cost overland transport systems, connecting ports 
with airports, without restrictions, curfews and other 
hindrances, contribute to the continuous flow of cargo with the 
shortest possible transit time. 
Between 1980 and 1994, a large number of 'Airport Authorities", 
around the world were taken by surprise as a result of the 
unexpected increase in movements of passenger and cargo aircraft 
through their airports. Almost all the world's airports 
witnessed a surge in aircraft movements. 
Appendices K-1 to K-6 are derived from data reported by more than 
400 world airports and represents airports average annual 
increases in traffic over intervals of five year periods starting 
with 1980 to 1994, inclusive. Airports showing less than an 8.01W 
average annual increase in any of the main indicators, aircraft, 
cargo and passenger movements, were ignored. 
To cope with the sudden increases and realising that large 
airports cannot be built overnight, serious studies and long term 
planning of many development projects become pressing, such as: 
I Availability of a proper construction site for the 
proposed new airport; 
2. Planning; 
3. Financing; 
4. Construction; 
5. Equipment; and, 
6. Management and automation. 
Such projects need ample time to execute. An average period of five to ten years is required for the construction of a new large 
Most airports around the world are controlled by governments who appoint bodies, or delegate 
authority to operate and control their activities. These bodies are called 'Airport Authorities, . 
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and efficient airport. While the demand by air carriers was 
pressing and immediate, 'Airport Authorities' resorted to 
implementing quick measures to cope periodically with the 
increasing demand. Those measures came in the form of : 
1. Enlarging the present cargo terminals; 
2. Expanding runways; and, 
3. General re-equipment programmes. 
At the same time, many 'Airport Authorities, embarked on long 
term plans to construct new runways, new large cargo and 
passenger terminals, in addition to general automation of airport 
operations, computerisation and modern communication systems. 
The undertaking of such long term construction plans required 
sound financing and the availability of the necessary funds. 
Governments were fully involved in raising the necessary funds 
from various sources. One such source was the present airport 
and its new extended facilities. Airport Authorities were placed 
under pressure to raise part of the funds needed to modernise or 
even construct new adjacent facilities. Funds could not be 
raised by increasing the costs to the airlines using the airport 
because of competition by nearby airports who were facing more or 
less the same problems. 
On this particular subject, Mr. Gordon Hamilton, President of 
Sypher: Mueller International, addressed delegates at the fourth 
ACI (Airports Council International) World Assembly and 
Conference in Marrakech, Morocco, 6- 10 November 1994, on the 
topic 'Killing the Golden Goose' . Mr. Hamilton 
detailed some of 
the taxes which are often portrayed as airport-related charges, 
and explained that this treatment of aviation by governments 
could be due to the perception that; 
1. air travel is an elitist form of transport; 
2. that air travellers are mostly foreigners; and, 
3. that the charges are trivial, and that air travellers have 
no choice but to pay. 
Mr. Hamilton refuted this reasoning and gave the example of 
Vancouver where the introduction of a new passenger tax increased 
significantly the number of originating passengers driving to the 
US to start their air travel to the US and other world 
destinations. This resulted in a traffic loss equivalent to 3 
B737 loads per day of passengers, 394 jobs and some $65 million 
in economic activity. 
The moral, said Mr. Hamilton, was: 'Higher travel taxes mean 
reduced travel and reduced revenue to the airports, and an 
economic loss to the community,. 
The most likely acceptable option left was that related to 
economies of scale, and that is to attract as many world airlines 
as possible to use a particular airport at even lower costs, and 
offer as many facilities and incentives as possible, rather than 
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applying higher taxes to the limited number of airlines using 
that airport. The impact on cargo movement through the decrease 
or increase in passenger flights is reflected in the availability 
or non-availability of belly-hold cargo capacities. 
As efficient and new large or extended air cargo terminals 
became available at reasonable cost to airlines at many hub 
airports, authorities were further subjected to increasing 
pressure of a different nature, and that is to offer more 
incentives, in terms of less restrictions and control, to 
airlines using their airports. This pressure resulted in moves 
by numerous governments /authori ties towards: (a) less economic 
control of the airlines and (b) less interference in the 
services provided by the airlines. In other words, the 
I'liberalisation" of the airline industry. 
In the 1980s, with the start of liberalisation, an increasing 
number of domestic airlines started a move of operating 
international routes. This was further reinforced and encouraged 
by many governments who started applying 'Free Sky Policies', 
during certain periods of the year, to suit their needs, such as 
the government of India which declares, from time to time, a 
'Free Sky Policy, limited to cargo movement, allowing as many 
airlines as possible to clear their airport cargo congestion and 
the build up of backlog freight of their air export industry. 
On this particular subject, the following excerpt taken from the 
opening address of Mr. Jack Moffat, ACI Chairman, at the fourth 
ACI World Assembly and Conference in Marrakech, Morocco, 6- 10 
November 1994, demonstrates the point clearly. It The US 
experience showed that liberalisation stimulated travel and 
benefitted the consumer, but that the accompanying airline 
concentration may not be in the consumers' long-term interest. 
A more gradual and phased liberalisation is being tried in Europe 
in an effort to avoid or mitigate some of the more unpleasant 
social aspects that accompany de-regulation and competition". 
With the relationship between airports and airlines becoming more 
tenuous, many airports and their surrounding communities can no 
longer depend on steady air services, as airlines may close down 
or reduce air services from/to a certain airport, at relatively 
short notice. It is, therefore, up to the airport and the 
community it serves to attract airlines and their air services. 
The transition of air transport from a mode of transport for the 
elite, into a mass transport mode, may spell the end of special 
treatment of air transport by governments, and aviation could be 
increasingly subjected to regulations which do not always take 
account of its specific features. Mr. Moffat said that "airports 
will have to adapt to this new environment, and ACI will do its 
utmost to ensure that their interests are reflected in any 
international policies which may result from this trend. " 
"Dramatic changes are now taking place in the world of air 
transport and can no longer be accommodated by the existing 
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regulatory system". With this statement Dr. Phillipe Rochat, 
ICAO Secretary General began his keynote address on air transport 
liberalisation' and stressed that ICAO's proposed new regulatory 
arrangements could replace 'micro-managed' access to air 
transport markets, by macro-managed, markets as a whole. Any 
cities and their airports, in the territory of each party to the 
agreement, could be served with complete flexibility and airports 
would no longer be held back in the development of their air 
services by restrictions on most market access by airlines. 
Dr. Rochat said that to facilitate market access, the proposed 
regulatory arrangements would allow for substantial ownership and 
effective control of airlines to be located in any State or 
States party to the agreement and/or nationals of such States, or 
dispense with the ownership and control test altogether if the 
headquarters, central administration or principal place of 
business of the foreign air carrier is in the territory of the 
designating state. Dr. Rochat concluded by hoping that the ICAO 
Conference, to be held in November 1995, could set in place a new 
regulatory framework for those who want to use it. He also 
predicted a process in which some States would rapidly opt for 
multilateralism, while others would gradually liberalise their 
existing bilateral agreements. 
Some states went much further than Dr. Rochat's expectations and 
predictions, and much further than the US liberalisation and 
declared a permanent 'Free Sky Policy' with no restriction on any 
'Freedoms 2, to the airlines. Such was the case of the U. A. E. 
airports, namely that of Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Sharjah and Fujairah. 
Many other airports in the Arab Gulf region, such as Oman, 
Bahrain and Kuwait followed suit, but with varying degrees of 
liberalisation. 
1. Presentation made at the fourth ACI World Assembly and Conference in Marrakech, Morocco, 6- 10 
November 1994. 
2. Freedom : 
Market access in air transportation is not a free-for-all. It requires an operating license & traffic right. 
Both are granted by the airline's country of registration. The operating license is a permission to form 
an airline. Traffic rights are an authority to fly traffic routes domestically and/or internationally. 
Awards to fly traffic routes are granted for 'scheduled' flights or charter flights. The scheduled flights 
are entitled to carry passengers and/or cargo on common carriage basis. The charter flights are limited to 
the carriage of single-entity loads, (an affinity group of passengers, and a single load of cargo shipment) . Of late however, the stress on single load for cargo charters has been relaxed by governments, especially 
on routes involving 'Open-Sky' countries. 
To grant traffic rights to a foreign country, the government must have concluded earlier a 'Bilateral Air 
Agreement, ( 'Bilateral' ) with the foreign country concerned. The 'Bilateral, is, in capsule form, a 
political accord, - which has the force of a trade treaty - regulating capacity and conditioning ownership, 
nationality and operational safety requirements between the two countries. A national airline must have 
majority shareholding in the enterprise. 
Bilaterals are governed by the Chicago convention of 1944. This convention divides the latitudes to cross international borders into five freedoms of the air. 
The five freedoms of air are negotiated in bilateral air services agreements and defined as follows: First Freedom - the right to fly over another country without landing. Second Freedom - the right to make a landing for technical reasons (e. g. refuelling) in another 
country, without picking up/setting down revenue traffic. Third Freedom - the right to carry revenue traffic from country A to the country B, of treaty 
partn rs. 
Fourth Freedom - the r7ght to carry traffic from country B back to your own country A. Fifth Freedom - the right of an airline from country A to carry revenue traffic between country B 
and other countries such as C or D. This freedom cannot be used unless countries 
Supplementary rights 
C or D also agree. 
Sixth Freedom - the use by an airline of country A of two sets of third and fourth freedom rights to carry traffic between two countries but using its base at A as a transit point. For example, Royal Jordanian 
carries sixth freedom traffic between London and Middle East points via its base at Amman, even though it has not been granted fifth freedom rights between these points and London. Sixth freedom rights are not formally recognized in air services agreements, though several confidential memoranda of 'understanding' make implicit reference to them, especially when dealing with capacity issues. 
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Many airlines took advantage of the "Free Sky Policies' and 
started operating these routes on demand and at very competitive 
rates. Competition among airlines, especially cargo airlines, 
became fierce and deadly, eventually resulting in many cargo 
airlines' disappearing from the market place. 
The advantages of the 'Free Sky Policies, and the competition 
that emerged with it, were reflected in: 
1. an increased demand on air cargo capacities and on air 
carriers to provide the required cargo capacities. 
2. a continuous pressure by the users to decrease the cost 
of air cargo carriage, a factor that forced the airlines to 
rationalise their services or disappear from the market 
place. Rationalisation meant concentration of airline 
frequencies to certain high volume major routes, resulting 
in dense frequencies between certain airports and light 
frequencies between others. 
The immediate disadvantages were felt by airport authorities on 
major routes, as the increased demand led to congestion of cargo 
terminals, and inevitable delays, setting the scene for bitter 
complaints and growing pressure from carriers, freight forwarders 
and the users, to improve and expand the then available 
facilities, putting the blame on Airports and its Authorities. 
Airport Council International officials recognised the long term 
need of many airports for increasing capacities in order to 
accommodate the continuous air traffic growth. Temporary 
measures of upgrading which led to much more efficient use of 
existing facilities were not enough to ease congestion and 
delays. One prominent ACI official attributed the failure to 
political factors. ACI Director General, Oris W. Dunham Jr. in 
his presentation 'New Airports and the ability of present 
airports to cope with future traffic levels' (Air Traffic Control 
Conference held in Maastricht on 22 - 23 February 1995) highlighted the numerous new airport projects and improvements to 
airport infrastructures around the world. He also emphasised the 
physical, economic, regulatory and environmental barriers faced 
by the airport community and the entire aviation industry. 
Dunham said that despite all the efforts by the airport community 
to solve the capacity problems, the battle was very much in the 
air. "Only political will on the part of governments should lead 
to a viable solution to the chronic flight delays at many 
airports, delays which are often attributed to airports but which 
are in fact caused by factors well beyond their control, such as 
saturated ATc (Air Traffic Control) systems and industrial disputes of ATC and airline personnel,, said Dunham. He added 
that with new aircraft orders amounting to around US$ 800-900 billion over the next 10 to 15 years, infrastructure investment 
required funding of about US$ 450 billion. However, despite the 
difficulties, "airports are willing to take up the economic 
1. In the 1980s, the main growth in cargo capacities came from the introduction of wide-bodied pax 
aircraft rather than all cargo aircraft. In fact the share of total world air freight of all cargo 
carriers declined during this period, and many all cargo airlines went out of business, e. g. 
'Seaboard World Airlines'. More details follow under the section entitled 'Air carriers'. 
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challenge of providing facilities for traffic growth. Local 
authorities should be willing to give clear support to such 
investments, which create jobs and wealth" said Dunham. 
In fact, Airport Authorities and their governments have been 
continuously involved in expansion and construction plans that 
practically developed into a trend that started in the early 
1980s and is still growing up to our present time in March 1995: 
1. the construction of new, large and efficient airports; 
2. the expansion of old passenger and cargo terminals; 
3. the construction of cargo villages around airports and 
within their bonded areas; 
4. the expansion of runways; and, 
5. the renovation of old air traffic control systems, 
communications, data base and booking systems. 
World Airport development plans are announced and published from 
time to time. To cite a few examples covering all six world 
regions, airports development plans, as announced through various 
ACI publications in September 1994 and March 1995. 
Among other airport facilities that should be provided rather 
immediately, and updated constantly, is the provision of a 
central computer system, for all airlines to participate in, in 
order to offer cargo bookings on various flight schedules. This 
becomes a necessity when many. airlines use the same airport. The 
presence of many airlines at a certain airport gives rise to an 
immediate and simultaneous development, namely that of the 
General Sales Agent, the Sales Agent, the freight forwarder and 
eventually the sea-air operator, who in turn generate an 
additional demand for cargo bookings. 
The most significant facility that an airport should provide is 
the ability to handle massive movements of cargo in the shortest 
possible time. This calls for investment on the part of the 
authority looking after the airport, in areas of expanding cargo 
terminals, modernising runways or even building new airports with 
new cargo terminals and adequate runways to deal with increased 
traffic flow. Even with the airport services becoming efficient, 
the efficiency of the sea-air system will not be at its best, 
unless it is backed up by equally efficient facilities elsewhere. 
For example; assume a sea-air cargo movement during weekends (an 
assumption close to reality). It moves from the sea port to the 
airport on supposedly fast and reliable motorways with easy and 
clear access to the airport cargo terminals. This cargo is 
assumed to arrive in large volumes, at sea-air transfer ports on 
weekends or one day before a weekend starts, i. e. on 
Fridays/Saturdays (similar to Seattle and Vancouver port 
arrivals), for eventual air carriage on pre-planned freighter 
flights scheduled to depart during the same period. This kind of 
frequency is a planned frequency, and manifests co-operation 
between the two major modes of transport involved in the sea-air 
movement; the shipping lines and the airlines. Weekends are 
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considered dead time for the consignees, the end users. Its 
effect on the total transit time of the sea-air journey is 
irrelevant in the sense that if a ship is carrying sea-air cargo 
and arrives at a transit point on Thursday, or even a Friday, and 
assuming the sea-air cargo is moved immediately and within hours 
from the ship Is arrival to the airport, the cargo could be loaded 
on airline flights departing from the transfer point on the 
Friday itself. The mere arrival of goods by air, at an European 
airport of destination, on a Friday noon or afternoon, makes it 
very difficult to custom clear and deliver any consignment during 
" European weekend. Most consignments, if not all, arriving on 
" weekend, are custom cleared and delivered to end users during 
the early working hours of Mondays. 
The scheduled and planned arrivals of ships to sea-air transfer 
hubs, just one day before the start of an European weekend, 
entails a massive movement of sea-air cargo in containers from 
ports of entry to airports of exit, within the short period of 
the weekend. This means that a sea-air hub airport should be 
able to provide: 
1. Large areas and numerous bays for the offloading of 
containers, and large parking areas for trucks waiting 
their turn to offload. 
2. Large areas to facilitate container load segregation and 
hence immediate build-up of airline pallets. 
3. A 24 hour delivery and acceptance cargo service. 
Since the airline's main concern is a fast turnround at airports, 
and as many airlines will want to be loaded in a very short time 
span, the airport is pressured to provide further facilities, 
such as: 
1 The availability of trained cargo handling staff at the 
airport, equipped and ready to handle successive loads, 
during the weekend, makes it easier and faster, to re-label, 
re-number, re-weigh and palletise cargo, to be ready for 
carriage on the designated flight to the airport of 
destination; 
2. A sufficient number of electronic scales to weigh loaded 
pallets and cargo loaded in airline unit load devices; 
3. Proper and sufficient aircraft cargo handling equipment such 
as, automatic conveyors, high loaders, fork lifts and the 
like; and, 
4. Ability to move and handle goods inbond without undue paper 
work or delay. 
As many shipments are increasingly small individual shipments, 
and given that a small shipment cannot qualify for a full 
container load, then small individual shipments, termed as LCLs, (Less Than Container Loads) are grouped together to fill a 
container at origin. As this container arrives at the port of 
entry, at a sea-air transfer hub, it must be trucked overland to 
the airport of exit within the shortest possible time. A large 
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enough area should be made available for the de -consolidation of 
LCLs at the airport, to facilitate the break bulk of various 
consignments, and the preparations that follow. Preparation such 
as, re-labelling and re-numbering of each package in the 
consignment with its particulars, and then the palletisation of 
these individual consignments to 'ready for carriage state' . This facility is increasingly demanded by the sea-air operators. 
The major hindrances as far as reduction of sea-air transit time 
is concerned, are: (1) the emphasis on security as a result of 
terrorist activities, throughout the world, using aircraft and 
airlines for malafide intentions. As a result, airlines/airports 
apply a 24 hour cooling period after receipt of cargo. (2) an 
increase in sea-air cargo flow causes delays and congestion and 
(3) the adverse climatic conditions (such as high temperatures), 
cause airlines to restrict their payloads on take off, by last 
minute offloading of cargo. Further analysis of these points is 
made in section 9.3 under 'Freight Forwarders'. 
8.2.2 Airport selection stratecries: 
Sea-air cargo is considered an offshoot of high volume and 
highly concentrated sailing frequencies between a few ports 
in a certain geographic trading area. It is attracted to 
these routes because of their short transit time and low 
shipping costs, and, therefore, 'diverted' temporarily to an 
intermediary port, other than the port of destination of its 
original all ocean route. The highly concentrated ocean 
routes between the Pacific Rim ports of the Far East and the 
ports of the North American West Coast are meant for cargoes 
destined to the North American region. Sea-air cargoes 
diverted to ports on these high volume routes, transit North 
American ports and continue their journeys by air to their 
final destination in Europe. 
Therefore, sea-air cargo flows cater to demand other than 
that of the concentrated geographic trading area of shipping 
lines and their ports of call, which become an intermediary 
port, for sea-air cargo, on their way to final destination. 
The availability of air cargo capacity at the airports 
adjacent to the intermediary port is the main reason for the 
diversion of sea-air cargo. 
2. While all port strategy selections by the shipping lines are 
governed solely by the cargo flow within a trading area, 
airport selection by the sea-air operator is governed by the 
availability of air cargo capacities in airports close or 
adjacent to the high volume ports. What makes air cargo 
capacities available from/to a certain airport, is largely dependent on considerations other than cargo, and is 
governed by the policies and strategies of air carriers: 
a. Passenger air carriers: The passenger traffic movement, the 
population of the area and their per capita income, and 
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whether people have the purchasing power to travel by air 
more frequently, for business or for pleasure, constitute 
the main considerations for the start of an airline service 
to that airport. Other factors that are considered as well, 
are those of : refuelling, technical stops enroute, the 
ability to offload and re-load passengers (freedoms of the 
air), etc. All passenger airlines consider passenger 
traffic as their main source of revenue. Their belly-hold 
capacity is mainly made available for high revenue, 
unaccompanied baggage, mail and high value cargo. In the 
event that some of its capacity remains unutilised, then 
sea-air cargo is accommodated as If ill-in, cargo, at reduced 
cost. 
b. Combi air carriers: Airlines operating combi flights 
endeavour to enhance the low revenue derived f rom low 
passenger traffic, by accommodating high revenue cargo that 
rides on the main deck along with, but segregated from, the 
passengers. 
C. Pure cargo airlines: The pure cargo aircraft is by far the 
most important factor in the development and growth of the 
air freight industry. As per the 1994 Boeing Report, total 
world all cargo aircraft numbered only 1,008 of a total 
world aircraft of 10,149, i. e. 10t(see Table 7, page 26). 
Their share of world air cargo movement was 42t, while that 
of passenger aircraft Sit and that of combis (mixed 
passenger and cargo), 7t (page 24). 
The selection of an optimum airport by pure cargo airlines is 
largely governed by two main strategies: 
1. The Directional Balanced Revenue Strateqv: 
Considerations to operate an international scheduled, pure 
freighter service from a carrier's home base to a proposed 
airport in a foreign country, depends largely on the availability 
of viable revenue cargoes on both segments of the air journey 
between the base airport and the selected point. In cases of 
directional imbalance of cargo traffic, at least one sector's 
productivity should be sufficient in volume and revenue to absorb 
the costs of the return to the base sector and result in an 
acceptable profit margin to the airline in order to sustain the 
service. 
Under the single sector revenue strategy, the airline depends 
mainly on the revenues derived from the first leg of the return 
journey as a necessary condition to maintain its service. Air 
exports from the airline's home base to the country of the 
selected airport should produce sufficient revenue cargo 
regardless of its availability on the return leg. Alternatively, 
the airline may suspend or even cancel its service in cases of: 
a. low revenue on both legs of the journey. 
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b. low revenue on the first leg and volatile, 
unpredictable revenue on the return leg. 
C. a government directive, the imposition of high airport 
taxes, opposition from people residing in the locality 
of the airport, curfew hours, etc. 
2. The Sea-Air Carqo Revenue Strateq : 
The development of sea-air cargo as an offshoot of highly 
concentrated ocean routes provided the necessary condition for 
the pure cargo airline to start a regular service, and therefore: 
the viability and availability of high revenue cargo on at least 
one sector of the return journey. 
The first leg earns low revenue derived from the home base air 
exports to the sea-air hub. This is compensated by the 
availability of a continuous and reliable flow of sea-air cargo 
on the return leg, thus providing the necessary revenue to the 
airline to sustain its service. 
Sea-air cargo has developed from low revenue 'fill in' cargo to 
relatively high revenue demanded cargo. How did that happen? 
The volatility and fragility of available air cargo space, at 
airports adjacent to high volume hub ports, threw shades of doubt 
on the reliability of the sea-air concept as a whole. However, 
the persistence of sea-air operators and freight forwarders, 
together with the flexibility of shippers and consignees, 
overcame this hurdle through innovative means, such as overland 
diversions from the sea-air hub ports of Seattle, Vancouver and 
Los Angeles to airports deep inland within North America, where 
air cargo capacities were regularly available. The addition of 
a few more days of transit time was acceptable to shippers and 
consignees. Further, sea-air cargo took gradual and periodic 
tests as to its ability to absorb higher total transport costs: 
a. Air cargo capacities that were available for sea-air cargo 
also became available for other products as well. An 
example is the products of the newly established readymade 
garments industry of the U. A. E. (between 1985 and 1995 over 
82 readymade garment factories were established). Airline 
rates were raised from US$ 0.65/kg, applicable to sea-air 
cargo on the sector DXB - LON, in 1985, to US$ 1.10/kg, in 
1994, for the same sector. Sea-air cargo was able to absorb 
the higher costs of air transport, and survived this hurdle 
with relative ease, thus providing proof of its continuity 
and reliability. 
b. Sea-air cargo was subjected to further tests: Singapore was 
started as a sea-air hub in the mid 1980s. As its 
neighbouring countries of Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand 
became more industrialised and productive, this gave rise to 
quality air export products and as their own air cargo 
capacities became fully utilised, excess air export volumes 
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were at first I sea-aired, via Singapore at higher costs than 
that of direct air from their own airports. Then, due to 
the continuing pressure of demand, an intermediary air-to- 
air phenomenon of cargo movement took shape between regional 
airports of the exporting countries of Malaysia, Indonesia 
and Thailand to those having available air cargo space to 
final destinations of the importing regions of Australia, 
North America and Europe. 
Further, the rise of the readymade garment industry in low 
cost labour countries such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and 
India, has generated surplus cargo searching for air cargo 
space to final destination through the regional intermediary 
air-to-air cargo movements. Sea-air cargo had to compete 
with the 'air-to-air' operations. Because of the relatively 
high value nature of its commodities, sea-air was able to 
absorb the higher rate of direct air freight from an 
intermediary hub airport to its final destination, thus 
achieving appreciable savings in total transport cost vis-d 
vis the 'air-to-air' operations at slightly longer transit 
time. 
Example: 
Origin to Air to air Transit time 
transfer point (cost in us$) (days) 
to final destination 
JKT/BKK 1.00 / kg 2 
BKK/LON 3.25 / kg 2 
Total 4.25 / kg 
Sea-air Transit time 
(cost in US$) (days) 
0.25 kg 5 
3.25 kg 2 
3.50 kg 7 
The above example shows a sea-air saving of US$ 0.75 per kg at 
the cost of 3 days longer transit time. 
Therefore, in conclusion: Sea-air cargo flow was subjected to 
many tests in its path of development and reliability. The 
possibilities for growth are strongly forecast by the freight 
forwarder, at an average of over 12% per annum', and, therefore, is expected to play the role of an "integrator" at the sea-air 
transfer hub, by taking on the role of providing the means of air 
transport himself, i. e. the cargo aircraft, thus providing the 
air capacities required. 
With the advent of the new large aircraft, it is forecast that a 
good number of 15 - 20 year old wide-bodied passenger aircraft 
will be converted into pure freighters at a reasonable cost. The 
researcher's findings point out to the emergence, in the next decade, of a new type of 'integrators' - the sea-air integrators'. 
1 Questionnaires, interviews and direct quotes by Far East sea-air Freight Forwarders of their 
records, 1984 to 1994, show an average yearly growth of 12.3%. This rate of growth is further 
confirmed through the computation of world sea-air cargo volume made in this research. 
170 
Chapter 9 
The Carriers 
9.1 Ocean carriers 
Sea-air cargo moves almost entirely in containers, from ports of 
origin to the sea-air transfer hub. There is, still today, a 
very small percentage of sea-air volume that moves in bulk, from 
very few ports of the sub-continent of India. This practice is 
fading away gradually as it is used quite rarely by some shippers 
to the ports of Dubai and Sharjah due : 
1. to the close proximity of these ports to the sub -continent's 
major gateway ports (5 days sailing time). 
2. to dense frequencies of bulk feeder vessel voyages to the 
ports of the U. A. E. of more than a voyage a day, vs. container 
vessel feeder frequencies of 2 to 3 voyages per week. 
It is of relevance to review adequately, the emergence and 
development of the cellular container ships and the related 
problems that accompanied their introduction into the ocean 
transport industry. 
Table 78: Cargo ships and world merchant fleet 
jeJ,, aJwe igh TEU capa c4ý. y ýýare a: -: j ---w,!, rat (1989-. 1994 
Ships of 300qrt/qt and over 
Ship type 9-. share of world Average yearly growth 
merchant fle et, (dwt) rate %ý 198 9- 1994* 
1989 1993 1994 -------- --- ---- ------ 
No. of 
ships dwt TEU 
A. Cargo Ships 
Container ships ýcellular) 3.9 4.8 5.0 4,7 7. 4 8.7 
Non cellular ships 
General Cargo (single-deck) 3.9 3 .9 3.9 0.8 1. 
8 1S. 9 
General Cargo (m. ulti-deck) 8.4 6.9 6.7 -2.6 -3. 2 1.2 
Reefer ships 1.1 1.2 1.3 2.8 3. 6 13.7 
Total 17.3 16.8 16.9 
B. Others 
Oil Tankers 39.8 40.4 40.3 1.9 2. 2 NA 
Chemical Tankers 1.0 1.1 1.1 5.8 4. 8 0.0 
Liquid Gas Tankers 1.7 1.9 2.0 3.9 4. 8 0.0 
Bulk carriers 30.1 30.4 30.5 0.6 2. 1 NA 
OBO Carriers 6.2 5.4 
- 
5.4 -0.5 -1. 4 NA 
Total 78.8 T 92 79.3 
C. Others 
Special ships 2.1 2.2 2.1 4.5 3. '7 0.9 
RoRc, cargo ships 1.3 1.3 1.3 5. ý 1. 7 2.4 
Cargo/passenger ships C. 1 0.1 0.1 4. r, -5. 4 2.8 
RoRo/Passenger ships 0.3 C. 4 0.3 3.6 ý. 6 9.0 
Passenger ships 0.1 0.1 0.1 2.6 1. 2 0.0 
Total 13.9 4.1 3.9 1 1 1 
Total 100% Io0% 100ý- 1 1.2 1 .9 5.7 
111ý:, Ll LULe C) L onipping Logisiics-t5remen, brilpFilly OLaLl. 11- 
Yearbook-1993.1993 figures are ISL estimated figures. 
1994 figures are forecast, based on the preceding 5 year period 
average annual growth, 1989 - 1993. 
171 
After the Second World War, and up to the mid 1980's, the 
shipping industry witnessed revolutionary technological 
innovations. The introduction of cellular container ships 
dominated the shipping scene for almost half a century. The 
western world, comprising mostly Europe and the U. S. A., was the 
leader in the building of container vessels and in bringing about 
almost all the technological innovations and developments. 
The majority of the world cellular container merchant fleet was 
built in Europe up to the period ending in 1974. Between 1975 
and 1979, Europe's share of the number of container ships built 
dropped dramatically to approximately 40% of the world total. 
During the same period, Europe's lost share was almost entirely 
replaced by the Asian ship builders, specifically Japan and 
Korea, whose share in the number of ships built, slightly 
overtook Europe, but at almost 50% less TEU capacity. 
During the decade that followed, between 1980 and 1989, Europe's 
share showed some recovery and became slightly higher than the 
Asians in the number of container ships built, but at the expense 
of capacity which was much less than that of the Asians, by 
approximately 38% (see graph below). 
- 1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 l9a5_19sq 19go- 
UPbD 1994 
Figure 20: Existing World Container Fleet by Year And Area of Build 
MUS. A. 
] 
Asia- E Palcific ac 
[3 Europe 
Source: ISL Merchant Fleet data bases of 1993. 
This meant a trend reversal of large scale new buildings of all 
sizes and specially that of the large capacity vessels which 
became more or less the speciality of the Asian ship-builders. 
Structural changes in the ship-building industry started to take 
shape after the mid 1980s when an increasing number of large 
capacity container ships were built by the Asians and placed in 
commercial use on major high volume cargo routes. 
The largest container ships that entered the world shipping 
service, in 1993, were BUNGA PELANGI, HYUNDAI ADMIRAL and HYUNDAI 
- 1974 1975-1979 19WI984 lggS-1989 1990- 
upto 1994 
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BARON. All three vessels, built by Hyundai Heavy Industries, 
Ulsan (South Korea), have a capacity of 4,469 TEUs. A further 7 
ships of sizes over 4,200 TEUs entered the world service in late 
1993 and during 1994. 
Ship-building yards of Korea and Japan have continuously and 
persistently increased their share of this market; by 1993,43.5k 
of all world container ships' TEU capacity was built in Japan and 
Korea. The European's ship-building yards were forced to give 
way to the fierce competition of the Asians. 
This resulted in a massive market shift from the traditional 
(European) ship-builders to the Asians. New Asian ship-building 
yards dominated the scene from the mid 1980s onward and up to the 
present time in 1995, and they are forecast to continue their 
dramatic growth until the end of this century. Some of the 
European container ship-builders remained in top world ranks, 
such as HDW (Howaldts Werke - Dutch - Weft), Vulcan and Odense 
with the new-comers such as Samsung and Koyo. 
A five year period analysis (1987 - 1992) shows the change and 
shift of large capacity cellular container-ships building to the 
Asians, as per Table 79, which shows the distribution of shares 
by country and region at the start and the end of the five years 
under review, and the current percentage world share of each. 
Table 79: Percentage distribution of world cellular shipping 
container-ship fleet numbers and TEU capacity 
by region and country 
A five vear neriod analvsis I current distribution at the 
1987 - 1992 I beginning of 1993 
Shipbuilder Number !k share EUs (000s) It share p4umber %- share TEUs (000s) share 
Asia 
Japan 59 16.8t 169.5 25.0! k 217 16.2t 445.4 23.71; 
S. Korea 36 10.2%- 106.8 15.7! k 86 6.4t 237.6 12.7! k 
Taiwan 22 6.3! k 66.6 9.8t 57 4.3V 133.7 7.1%, 
Total - Asia 117 33.2% 342.9 50.5% 360 26.9% 816.7 43.5% 
Europe 
Denmark 18 5. li; 54.3 8.0* 29 2.2V 86.8 4.6%; 
France 17 1.3 lk 23.9 1.3! k 
Germany 48 13.6% 111.8 16.51; 167 2.5t 301.6 16.1% 
Total-Europe 66 18.8% 166.1 24.5% 213 15.9% 412.3 22.0% 
Others 169 48.8%, 169.7 25. Ot 766 57.2% 646.5 34.5%* 
Grand total 352 100.0% 
. 
678.8 100.0%. 133 9 100.0%- 1875.4 100.0% 
OUU. L L; W. L; ompuu: ea ana u; aDu. Lauea Dy une researcner zrom ibi, zn2ppang 
Statistics, 2993 Yearbook, relevant tables and statistical data. 
Others Include, U. S. A., and other minor ship-builders of the world. 
Container Fleet Development 
In 1993, the container carrying capacity (cellular and non- 
cellular) of the world fleet stood at 3.6 million TEU1. The 
1. ISL Merchant fleet data bases; aggregates based on quarterly updates from Llyod'a Register of 
Shipping/LMIS. 
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world container carrying fleet had a share of 16.811 measured in 
tonnage figures (dwt) , (see Table 78, page 170, row A. Cargo 
ships) . This share is expected to remain stable at 16.9% to 
17*-. 
in 1994. 
The total TEU capacity, of the cellular and non-cellular ships, 
grew on average by 5.711 per annum. With an average yearly 
expansion rate of 8.7%, the cellular fleet had a more dynamic 
growth than the non-cellular fleet, which had a yearly increase 
of only 2.80il. 
The growth of the cellular fleet capacity was marked by 
structural changes. The statistical results reflect the overall 
tendency towards larger vessels. The average TEU - capacity of 
cellular container ships increased from approximately 1,200 TEU 
in 1989 to 1,400 TEU in 1993. Fully cellular ships entering the 
container fleet since 1988 concentrated increasingly on TEU 
capacities of 3,500 TEU and above. A further trend towards 
larger ships is already in motion, and is likely to continue 
through the next century in full force. 
Looking at the age structure of the fully cellular fleet, it is 
evident that at least 18% of the older container ships 
representing 13% of the TEU capacity at the beginning of 1993 is 
bound to be replaced in the medium term. These ships were mainly 
built at the beginning of the 1970s; thus they have been trading 
for more than 20 years. The fully cellular container fleet as of 
January ist 1993 had an average age of 11.5 years. ISL broken-up 
figures for the period under review, show that container ships 
had been 21 years in service, on average, at the time of 
demolition. 
Trends in container shipping 
A remarkable development took place over a ten year period 
starting in 1985 and continued until the end of 1994, which 
showed a very strong concentration of container shipping services 
to a few shipping operators. As at the end of 1992, 
approximately 15 container operators were controlling 551i of the 
TEU capacity for ships ranging in size from a 1000 TEUs and over 
(ISL Merchant fleet data bases - Shipping Statistics Yearbook 
1993). Forecasts by ISL indicate that by the end of 1995, the 
same 15 container operators will control over 6016 of the world's 
TEU capacities of ships of 1000 TEUs and over. 
The leaders of this growing trend of TEU capacity concentration, 
with their relevant percentage share of world TEU capacity of 
ships size 1000 TEUs and over, at the end of 1992, are 
1. Maersk Lines - 7.216 
2. Evergreen - 7.216 
3. SeaLand - 6.716 
ISL Merchant fleet data bases; aggregates based on quarterly updates from Llyod's Register of 
Shipping/LMIS. 
174 
Table 80 shows how the fleet patterns differ from one operator to 
the other, in terms of ship sizes, TEU capacities and age. 
Table 80. Fifteen top ranking 
container shipping operators as of Jan ist 1993 
ships of 300grt/gt & over 
Operator 
No. 1000DWT 1000TEU 
AV 
Age 
AV 
1000DWT 
AV 
1000TEU 
European/US 
MAERSK 44 1917.7 114.4 7.7 43.6 2.6 
SEA-LAND 41 1436.3 107.3 11.64 35.0 2.6 
PL American President Line 21 848.9 58.4 11.76 40.4 2.8 
P& OCL P&0 Container Ltd. 22 944.3 58.1 14.73 42.9 2.6 
HAPAG-LLOYD 21 932.1 57.0 10.63 44.4 2.7 
OOCL Orient Overseas Container Line 20 768.5 51.2 11.5 38.4 2.6 
NEDLLOYD 23 842.5 50.9 10.03 36.6 2.2 
FAR EASTERN 
EVERGREEN 46 1837.7 114.1 9.35 39.9 2.5 
NYK Nippon Yusen Kaisah 35 1338.1 83.3 8.86 38.2 2.4 
MOL Mitsui OSK Lines 28 1073.2 62.8 9.14 38.3 2.2 
HANJIN 24 928.9 56.9 6.92 38.7 2.4 
YANGMING 21 777.1 56.8 8.14 37.0 2.7 
K- LINE Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha 21 799.0 48.8 6.73 38.0 2.3 
NOL Neptune Orient Lines 15 590.9 37.8 11.04 39.4 2.5 
Middle East 
ZIM Zim Israel Navigation Co. Ltd. 24 802.3 41.8. 12.84 33.4 1.7 
Total 1 406 15837.5 999.71 ' 39.0 - 2.51 
Source: ISL Merchant fleet data bases; aggregates based on quarterly updates from 
Lloyd's Register of ShiPPinglLMIS and Containership data from MDS Transmodal. 
This concentration of large size container ships to a few 
operators resulted in fierce competition among themselves, 
bringing freight rates to very low levels. The high costs of 
building new container vessels, together with the high cost of 
operating them, and the lower revenues derived from lower freight 
rates, have forced the shipping lines to search for new ideas in 
order not only to survive, but to operate at a profit without 
having to reduce their orders for new ship-building contracts. 
Despite the high cost of ship-building (see Table 82, page 176), 
the long term container market prospects continue to grow 
positively as the number of new ship-building contracts between 
1987 and 1992 grew by an average of 11.511 per annum, as per the 
quarterly updates from Lloyds Register of Shipping, March 1993. 
Further, ISL registered 127 ship-building contracts for container 
vessels, equal to 3.2 million dwt in, 1992 with slightly higher 
dwt contracts in 1993. 
The container shipping operators main objective was to reduce 
their costs of operations. The first step was to change their 
national flag registration to a flag of convenience, with lower 
taxes. Shipping lines of the western world were subjected to heavy taxes of registration and licensing of their ships, and 
were not permitted to employ foreign or imported cheap labour or 
crew. There were exceptions, such as with the British unions, 
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who allowed the use of Indian labour. Many western ship owners 
have used flags of convenience with no restrictions on labour. 
In 1980, the combined merchant fleet of Europe had a freight 
capacity of approximately 247 million deadweight tonnes. In 1987 
this fleet lost more than 370-,; of its European registered capacity 
to the countries with open Registry' (Flags of convenience) . Thus flags of convenience capacity registrations increased by 
almost the same capacities lost by Europe. Some of the most 
impressive registrations of container fleet capacities measured 
in percentage share of the world total, were as follows in 1988 
(ISL Shipping Statistics 1993). 
Panama 
Liberia 8.3'-, 'c 
Flags of convenience 
USA 10.2! k 
Germany 9.21i For comparison purposes 
Taiwan 8.5*-. 
However, developments over the five year period between 1989 and 
1993 show that the flags of convenience registrations increased 
considerably at the expense of the traditional flags of the OECD 2 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) and EEC3 
countries (European Economic Community). 
In 1993, OECD flag registration had a share of 42.2*-. of the 
total, as compared with 47.1t in 1989, while the open registry 
share of total TEU capacity rose from 21.4t in 1989 to 24.0-16 in 
1993. The average yearly growth rate of the Open Registry 
countries is shown in Table 81, at 8.8t and 11.81-6, as compared 
with OECD countries at 1.3t and 5.71--, for the number of ships and 
TEU capacity respectively. 
Table 81. Open Registry development 
(flags of convenience) 
in relation to world registry 
Ships of 300grt/gt & over 
Year OECD 
No. 
Registry 
1000TEU 
Open 
No. 
Registry Others 
100TEU No. 1000 TEU No. of 
Total 
ships 1000TEU 
1989 429 63T3 248 288.2 436 422.4 1113 1343.9 
1990 412 644.2 257 310.2 478 480.2 1147 1434.5 
1991 453 718.6 268 325.6 468 513.1 1189 1557.2 
1992 463 767.3 306 394.7 504 571.9 1273 1733.9 
1993 451 791 347 450.2 541 634.2 1339 1875.4 ff J 
verage annual growth rate 1989 to 1993 
.3 S. 7 8.8 11.8 5.5 10.7 4.7 8.7 
V1=ZL; j1aX. 1v_ L-LeeU aaE: a DaSeS; aggregates naseci on quarter. Ly upciaces rrom Lloyd's Register of ShippingILMIS. 
1.2: Countries permitting the registration of ships owned by non-residents. Open vq%: L2il. ýM vt ISL include open registry flags Bahamas, Bermuda, Cyprus, Liberia, Panama only. 2. OB Countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark (Danish International Ship Register) , N&C-ro-k (Ordinary Register) , Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway (Ordinary Register), Norway (Norway International Ship Register), Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK and US. 3. EEC Countries: Belgium, D nmark (Danish International Ship Register) , Denmark (Ordinary Register) , France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and UK. 
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The second measure by ship owners was to decrease the cost per 
slot (a purchase of a small portion of space on board a container 
ship) , offered to their customers. To decrease the cost per slot 
meant that a great many slots were needed to be made available on 
ships. This was achieved at a very high cost of investment in 
building large size vessels. ISL Shipping Statistics Yearbook 
1993 quotes average contracting prices for new buildings for the 
period between 1988 and 1992 as tabulated in Table 82, below. 
Table 82: Ship-building contracts costs 
(millions of US$) 
Ship size New building prices in millions of US$ 
Dwt/cbm 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
30,000 27.0 31.0 30.0 30.5 27.0 
80,000 38.0 43.0 44.0 44.5 40.0 
130,000 46.0 54.0 55.0 55.5 49.5 
250,000 73.0 82.0 86.0 90.0 85.0 
400,000 88.0 101.0 120.0 125.0 119.0 
Source Farnley's, review 1992, Oslo, January 1993. Prices based on 
Japanese and Korean shipyards. 
Up to 1985, container ships were built up to a maximum capacity 
of 3000 TEUs (Twenty Foot Equivalent Unit - Container) . In early 
1986, US lines produced the first jumbo container ship with a 
capacity of 4,470 TEU's. 
The trend of employing economies of scale through the building of 
larger container vessels took momentum. Many shipping lines 
started ordering super large cellular container ships. American 
President Lines' order, in 1986, of Panamax plus container ships, 
showed that the trend was to continue growing. In 1984 cellular 
container vessels which were 15.7ý6 of the total world container 
vessels grew to 21.516 in 1985, and by the end of 1989, the 
cellular ships share grew to 22.5%. By the end of 1993 it 
assumed approximately 28.6% of total container vessels and in 
1994, the share of fully cellular container vessels is forecasted 
to stabilise at 30% (see Table 78, page 170). 
In terms of capacities, orders for super large container vessels 
can best demonstrate this trend through a statistical review of 
world ship-building yards, productions by vessel size. The Koya 
ship-building yard of Japan had its total ship-building 
production concentrated on two major sizes. 50t on over 3500 
TEUs capacity ships and 50t on 1000 - 3499 TEUs capacity ships. 
Daewoo of South Korea, on the other hand, had 480-. Of its 
production on ships of over 3500 TEUs capacity and 5226 on 1000 - 
3499 TEUs capacity ships. 
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Table 83, below, shows almost 5t of total world ship-building was 
focused on over 3500 TEUs capacity ships, with 5106 of world 
cellular container ships produced with a capacity ranging from 
1000 - 3499 TEUs and nearly 44t of below 1000 TEUs. 
Table 83. World major ship-building yards 
percentage distribution of ship sizes 
built between 1986 and 1993 
Ship-builder size groups (in TEU) as t gest vessel built 
share of total no. of ships 
. 00ILar 
(TEUs) 
I- 
999 1000 - 3499 >=3 
Japan 
Ishikawajima 
Mitsubishi 
Mitsui 
Tsuneishi 
Kawasaki 
Onomichi Line 
Imabari 
Hitachi 
Koyo 
South Korea 
Hyundai 
Daewoo 
Samsung 
Germa 
Howaldt 
Vulkan 
Flender 
Warnow 
Blohm 
Taiwan 
China Sa 
Denmark 
Odense 
France 
Alsthom 
Others 
4.3 69.6 26.1 4038 
24.0 72.0 4.0 3568 
15.0 75.0 10.0 4000 
37.0 63.0 - 2875 
- 100.0 3456 
- 100.0 - 3428 
44.4 38.9 16.7 3502 
17.6 82.4 - 2832 
- 50.0 50.0 3800 
2.4 90.5 7.1 4469 
- 52.0 48.0 4258 
68.4 31.6 4422 
15.8 78.9 5.3 4340 
3.9 92.2 3.9 4340 
16.7 83.3 - 2594 
50.0 50.0 1254 
15.4 84.6 3010 
12.3 82.5 5.3 3604 
- 58.6 41.4 3922 
47.1 52.9 
65.5 34.2 
43.8 51.3 
ISL Merchant fleet data k 
from Lloyd's Register of 
-1 2536 
0.3 
4.9 
ses; aggregates 
ShippingILMIS. 
on quarterly updates 
The third measure may have taken some shipping lines by surprise, 
as it came from a government body and was forced upon the 
shipping line industry in a way that boosted competition, thus lowering the ocean transport costs offered to the public, and not 
necessarily reducing the cost of shipping line operations. This 
measure came through the historic development that took place in 
the U. S. A. on 18 January, 1984. A completely new shipping law 
was passed. The US Shipping Act of 1984 altered fundamentally 
all regulations and procedures that had prevailed since the 
shipping act of 1916. The Act of 1984 gave, among other things, 
shipping conferences', and all other shipping lines calling at US 
1. conferences A number of shipping lines joined in an agreement on a certain ocean route to 
apply a fixed freight rate for a variety of classified goods covering ocean 
transport from port to ports. 
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ports, the right to publish intermodal rates, i. e a single rate 
covering all sectors of transportation from origin to 
destination. These intermodal rates must be reviewed by the 
Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) within 45 days from the date of 
filing. In the case of a no objection by the FMC, the rates 
become effective. If the FMC considers the rates to be 
monopolistic and, therefore, anti-competitive, then it will get 
a court-ordered injunction to block these rates. 
This clearly meant a boost to the development of intermodal 
transport. The Act was one of de-regulation in favour of free 
competition, letting the market forces of supply and demand 
determine the level of services and costs. 
The new law allowed shipping lines to : 
1. Select whatever ports of call to the US, they wish to use. 
2. Select the gateway from which the shipping lines wish to 
assume inland transport of their containers. 
Free competition, free entry to the market and the uplifting of 
the world port's traditional restrictions blew wide open the 
doors for all shipping lines including international ones to join 
in the competition of door deliveries to consignees. 
The conference system traditionally offered a single fixed 
freight rate covering the ocean sector from port to port. 
Conferences were reluctant to allow their members to cover the 
inland sector of the intermodal movement of a shipment beyond the 
port of call. Many individual' shipping lines did, in fact, 
stretch their activities to cover the inland movement of cargo. 
Shipping lines, conferences became an immediate target for the 
new comers, the intermodal operators, who were prepared to 
undercut the freight rates agreed by the liner conferences. 
Competition became fierce on shipping routes of international 
trade, and conferences were subjected to increasing pressure by 
the outsiders. Many conferences were not able to hold a 
different rate level and had to give in to the market rates. 
Conferences found it increasingly difficult to survive as their 
share of the global market was dwindling quickly. The biggest 
challenge to conferences was, and still is, the continuing growth 
of intermodality. Arguments, at various government levels, 
became open as to whether the conference system would survive the 
changes in the transportation system, which offered the public a 
door to door service, single rate and one 'Combined Transport 
Document', with a defined liability. 
The US shipping lines had to face the challenge of 'door to door' 
competition that was knocking heavily at their doors, and breaking deep into the country's transport system. The US 
shipping lines responded immediately by co-operating with the 
already de-regulated railways. 
1. individual: independent operators outside conference lines. 
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American President Lines (APL) , Sealand and US 
lines' started to 
control their Far East traffic by designing special rail cars to 
accommodate double stacks, and by using special and dedicated 
unit trains (dedicated trains are for the exclusive use of one 
shipping line) . In brief, each shipping line established 
its own 
rail route from the ports of entry and gateways of Seattle, Los 
Angeles and San Francisco to Chicago, New York the mid west and 
the southern parts of U. S. A. 
The future potential of intermodality was foreseen by all the 
players in the transport system, although the shipping lines were 
the first to realise the future potential and were responsible 
for the innovations that came about in mainly the 'door to door, 
concept of the total distribution system. Such innovations 
centred partly on the possibilities of an acquiring a railway or 
a trucking system by the major shipping lines, and the formation 
of giant enterprises. 
Other modes of transport took the initiative in the opposite 
direction. Such was the attempt to take over Sealand in the late 
1980s by a US east coast railway giant. Sealand's early start was 
a trucking firm, it later moved into containerisation and became 
one of the largest container ship operators in the world. The 
mere attempt by a railway to acquire a container shipping line 
represents an unusual trend in the transport system, that may 
give rise to the formation of huge intermodal transport entities, 
which will be able to offer shippers and consignees a total 
distribution network operated by a single entity, a single rate 
and a combined transport document covering transport ex works to 
door, at a defined liability. 
The formation of giant intermodal enterprises constitutes a 
direct danger to competition and the smaller operators. To face 
the probable challenges of mergers and the consequential effects 
of a giant multimodal entity, smaller and individual shipping 
lines started a trend of co-operation among themselves. The 
question was: How to maintain their clientele in the face of such 
emerging giant intermodal entities that are able to offer lower 
rates among a variety of related services? 
To operate large container vessels with a capacity of over 2500 
TEUs on a high volume route is good in theory. In practice, the 
frequency of service to and from a certain port is the service 
that retains a customer. At the same time, to maintain a high 
load factor on large container vessels is vital for survival in 
covering high operational costs. Despite these difficulties, the 
trend took form, and a move by individual shipping lines to limit 
the number of ports at each side of the ocean was made in the mid 
1980s, and regular frequencies of large container ships were 
established to a limited number of ports. 
The move resulted in ; 
a) concentration of a huge number of containers at these ports 
1. US Lines disappeared in the late 1980s and declared bankruptcy. Application of chapter 11 didn't help. 
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for further distribution inland by overland transporters, 
and 
b) the emergence of intermodal sea-air transfer hubs. 
A high load factor on these large container ships was essential 
for the profitability of the system. To achieve a high load 
factor, shipping lines collaborated among themselves in various 
ways. Shipping lines entered into agreements with each other on 
slot chartering and many other aspects such as joint fleets, 
pools etc. Such were the agreements concluded on US trade routes 
between Japan Lines and Evergreen and between OOCL, NOL and K- 
Lines. The common objective of this collaboration between 
shipping lines, was in the first place to maintain a regular 
frequency to a limited number of ports on both sides of the 
ocean. The second was the satisfaction of their clientele, who 
provide high volume cargoes and, therefore, the required high 
load factor for survival, profitability and continuity. 
The third objective, and the most important, as far as this field 
of research is concerned, was the build-up of intermodal sea-air 
cargo on these routes, generating a relatively higher returns for 
the shipping lines who became increasingly involved in attracting 
this particular traffic. 
The question is : How does sea-air cargo generate a relatively 
higher return for the shipping lines? 
Sea-air cargo is largely cargo that was attracted from the all 
ocean mode in the first place. For example, the sea-air route 
via the U. A. E. has attracted ocean cargo that was bound for 
Europe on direct all ocean routes from the Asia-Pacific region 
ports to the main gateway ports of Europe. The part of all ocean 
cargo that was diverted to the sea-air mode, added volume and, 
therefore, support to the high volume, high frequency short 
routes from the same ports of the Asia-Pacific region to the 
intermediary hub ports of the U. A. E. 
This means added revenue to the shipping lines serving high 
frequency, short transit time routes, and at the same time, 
represents a marginal loss to shipping lines serving direct all- 
ocean, long transit time routes, unless these same lines serve 
the intermediary ports of the U. A. E., enroute to Europe. As 
such, no losses are incurred. 
In the first case, the sea-air cargo volumes gained by the 
shipping lines, operating the high volume, short routes, such as 
the Asia-Pacific/U. A. E., represent approximately 40,000 tonnes a 
year on average today (this figure was obtained from statistics 
and forecasts of sea-air volumes via the U. A. E., analysed in 
Chapter 6, section 6.3), with an average load of 4 to 4.5 tonnes 
per 20 ft container. This means that approximately 10,000 TEUS 
per year, at an average yield of US$ 1,325.00 per TEU, or a total 
of US$ 1,325.00 X 10,000 TEUs = US$ 13,250,000.00, in added 
revenue to the shipping lines serving this sea-air route. 
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In the second case, where no losses are incurred due to the 
assumption that the same shipping lines are serving both the sea- 
air transfer ports and the direct all ocean ports, the additional 
revenue materialises as the shipping lines charge additional fees 
to sea-air containers as they are handled on a priority basis, 
i. e loaded last at the port of origin, and off-loaded first at 
the sea-air transfer hub port, thus saving on transit time. The 
additional charges are shown in Table 84, below. 
Table 84: Shipping lines' sea-air rates 
as compared with standard cargo rates & transit time 
per 20 ft container in US $ 
From Asia-Pacific ports to Sea-air rate Transit time Other cargo rates 
U. A. E. ports* 
From Taipei 
Maersk 1,500.00 17 days 1,400.00 
APL 1,350.00 13 days 1,275.00 
Sea-Land/NYK 1,200.00 17 days 1,275.00 
Hanjin 1,050.00 24 days 1,000.00 
K Line 1,200.00 17 days 1,125.00 
From Honq Konq 
APL 1,375.00 12 days 1,200.00 
Maersk 1,400.00 17 days 1,300.00 
Senator 1,250.00 19 days 1,150.00 
From Jakarta 
NYK 1,350.00 19 days 1,275.00 
Maersk 1,400.00 19 days 1,350.00 
APL 1,350.00 16 days 1,275.00 
From Banqkok 
NYK 1,400.00 18 days 1,300.00 
Maersk 1,500.00 18 days 1,400.00 
APL 1.350.00 14 days 1,275.00 
Source: Faxed quotations from Far East based freight fox-warders and--sh-Ipping 
lines. 
Note: All transit times exceed 13 days which means that frequency to the U. A. E. 
is scheduled via an intermediary port enroute; most shipping lines have 
feeder services to Singapore, from where they operate direct to the U. A. E. 
ports. 
U-A-E. ports include Port Jebel Ali & Rashid in Dubai, and Fujairah Port. 
On average, the additional charge is approximately US$ 75.00 per 
TEU. This means an additional revenue of 10,000 TEUS X US$ 
75.00, which equals US$ 750,000.00 (three quarters of a million 
US Dollars in additional charges) . These additional revenues must be looked upon globally, as only few shipping lines are 
harvesting the benefits of sea-air cargo, such as APL, Maersk, 
OOCL, Mitsui and K Lines. 
Globally an average of 100,000 TEUs of sea-air cargo is handled 
by five major shipping lines, yielding additional revenues of US$ 
7.5 million, per year, for a practically cost-less service of loading last at origin and off-loading first at a sea-air hub. 
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Though the additional benefits of sea-air volume may not be 
substantial to the shipping line, they are certainly substantial 
for the airlines uplifting this cargo from a sea-air transfer 
hub. The findings of this research show approximately 400,000 
tonnes of all ocean freight are diverted globally to the sea-air 
mode every year. As air freight is charged on the basis of a 
kilogramme, the converted sea-air volume represents 400 million 
kilograms which is sold presently by the airlines at an average 
rate of US$ 1.25/kg (see Chapter 5, section 5.3 and Chapter 7, 
section 7.1), which means an additional revenue of half a billion 
US dollars (US$ 1.25 x 400 million kgs) to the airlines operating 
from the sea-air transfer hubs of the world. 
In a 'Sea-air Seminar' , held on Oct 25,1993, in Sharjah, U. A. E., APL involvement in intermodality was manifested in detail. 
The following are excerpts from the APL presentation. 
"American President Lines introduced containerised cargoes to the 
Middle East in the early 1970s and plans to augment services to 
the region, which it now serves via the Indian and Pacific 
oceans. 
Every Friday, an APL vessel carrying up to 2,400 containers from 
the U. S. A. and South East Asia, calls in at Fujairah on the 
U. A. E. east coast. Serving this same hub, four feeder services 
extend to and from 14 port locations in the Middle East and the 
subcontinent. These feeder services cover India, Pakistan, all 
the Arab Gulf states (Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and 
Oman), and the Red Sea port of Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) and Aqaba 
Port of Jordan. 
Such transportation involves movement by land and ocean under a 
single bill of lading issued by APL. As such APL operates as an 
intermodal transport company, controlling shipments on board 
vessel, truck and dedicated rail services. 
The APL transportation network also includes extensive port and 
warehousing facilities. In the U. A. E. for example, APL's 
container terminal in Fujairah holds up to 5,000 TEUs stacked in 
a computerised inventory linked to APL's worldwide on-line information network. Sea-air and other shipments, with a destination within the U. A. E., are either delivered by vessel to 
Dubai ports or transported through an exclusive trucker direct to 
the consignee, or trucked from Fujairah Port to APL's inland 
terminal in Dubai. 
For Less than Container Loads (LCL), APL, through its agents in 
Dubai, offers an extensive bonded warehouse inside Dubai Port. 
This facility is also linked to the APL network for smooth cargo 
tracking in anticipation of customers' requirements. This 
network is supported by more that 100,000 containers, the largest 
number held by any company in the region. ',, 
1. From a presentation by John D. Bowe, Managing Director of APL - Middle East Region at a conference 'Sea-air through partnership', held in Sharjah, 25 Oct 1993. 
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Further, "on the question of freight rates, APL studies the 
entire cost of transporting boxes from origin to destination. 
Involved will be movement by truck, train and ship and back to 
truck, until a final delivery is made at an inland terminal, 
consignee warehouse or air transit facility". 
One of the cost saving advantages which APL offers, is the 45 ft 
container, which holds 12t more cargo than the 40 ft container. 
Overland transportation costs for these boxes are the same as for 
the conventional ones. Thus the consignee obtains additional 
value at the same cost. 
APL, operating as an independent large size intermodal company, 
has achieved most of their objectives of maintaining their 
customers, and, therefore, have a high load factor for the ocean 
leg of the sea journey, in addition to overland door deliveries 
at decreased costs to their clients. 
The medium to small size shipping lines had to face the 
challenges of a giant intermodal entity such as APL, for their 
survival. They started by rationalising their service policy. 
They did so by first horizontal and later by vertical 
integration. Horizontal integration was manifested by the 
emergence of many joint agreements between small and medium size 
shipping lines who pooled their resources in order to provide the 
necessary capital needed to acquire new ships. 
Consortia and joint service agreements became common in Europe, 
especially in the mid 1980s, and, therefore, the ability of small 
and medium size shipping lines to compete with the giants was 
enhanced, thus depressing further, the level of freight rates. 
Lower freight rates meant lower profitability, which caused the 
shipping lines to again rationalise. A new vertical trend of co- 
operation was developed, that of feeder services to a giant's 
hubs. 
In other words, co-operation between the small shipping lines, 
not only among themselves, but also with a giant intermodal 
enterprise, took form in the feeder services, which mushroomed 
around sea-air hubs such as the U. A. E. ports of Fujairah and 
Dubai, Singapore and Hong Kong on the eastern route, and 
Vancouver, Seattle/Tacoma, Portland and the ports of Southern 
California such as San Francisco, Oakland, Long Beach and Los 
Angeles on the western route. 
similar developments took place in Europe. The growth of 
international trade between the Far East and Europe, and between 
Europe and the Americas, resulted in two directional traffic on 
both routes. Firstly the route between Europe and the east coast 
of the Americas, and secondly between the Pacific basin countries 
of the Far East and Europe. 
High volume-high return route groups emerged at the main ports of 
entry to Europe which were also opened to international shipping 
lines of the Far East and the Americas. The main ports of entry 
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were Rotterdam, Antwerp, London, Hamburg, the Bremen ports, 
Algeciras, Marseille, Piraeus and Genoa. 
These feeders, or complementary services, each had a relative 
advantage to its operator, by maintaining its customers and 
profitability. Maintaining customers was high on the agenda of 
all operators of various modes of transport. Customers, demands 
focused on the door to door, service, and not on selection of a 
certain carrier and a certain route. A package was offered to 
the shippers covering all modes of transport (except sea-air 
which was and still is the exclusive domain of the freight 
forwarders) and up to the consignee's door, at a single rate, in 
an effort to gain control of cargo movement. 
In conclusion : 
The emergence of sea-air hubs and the consequential growth of 
sea-air cargo movements can be termed as an offshoot result of 
the shipping lines, continuous drive to improve ocean-overland 
intermodal development, over a decade of hard work after the 
deregulation act of 1984. The trend increased the use of 
containerisation and the development of large container vessels 
of over 2500 TEUs that dominated the shipping scene since the mid 
1980s, and up to the present time. 
To maintain high load factors on these large container vessels 
was essential to the profitability of the system. A move to 
limit the number of ports at each side of the ocean of any two 
major industrial centres was made, and high volume routes were 
established with dense frequencies. 
Smaller shipping lines had no choice but to support high volume 
routes with feeder services. As a result, 'hubs, or re- 
distribution centres, employing various modes of transport, 
emerged. The sea-air operators and freight forwarders took full 
advantage of this development and successfully introduced the 
sea-air mode, while ocean-overland intermodality became out of 
their reach as it was developed heavily by the shipping lines and 
Airport Authorities at both ends of a high-volume, high-return 
route. Ocean overland cargo volumes are, by far, greater than 
those of sea-air, with the ocean lines practising a firm grip 
over this cargo flow in order to retain their clientele. 
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9.2 Air carriers 
A basic requirement for the emergence and development of a sea- 
air transfer hub, is that air carriers should be able to offer 
huge unutilised air cargo capacities, and should be willing to 
accommodate increasing volumes of sea-air cargo on their dense 
frequencies. The air-freight industry took a giant stride during 
the mid 1970s when cargo, in massive magnitudes, was uplifted 
from one point to another. The B 747 long range wide-bodied 
aircraft was largely responsible for this development. This 
meant increased aircraft productivity with the ability of large 
sized aircraft to carry larger loads of cargo at higher speeds 
providing lower cost per unit of cargo weight and volume. 
However, it must be stressed that in 1994, almost all 
international flight services by major airlines connecting the 
main gateway airports of the world's six regions are operated by 
wide-bodied aircraft, with very few exceptions. A good example 
is provided by the airports of today's active world sea-air hubs. 
All international scheduled flight services from/to the sea-air 
hub airports of Vancouver, Seattle, Los Angeles, San Francisco 
and Singapore use exclusively wide-bodied aircraft. 
However, from/to Miami International Airport, international 
scheduled flights and South and Central America are still using 
the B727, DC 8, B707 and B757 narrow bodied aircraft operated by 
pure freight carriers. 
Exactly the same types of narrow bodied freighters are employed 
between U. A. E. and Europe's airports, while narrow-bodied 
passenger aircraft are not scheduled from/to any of the sea-air 
hub airports mentioned above. 
Air cargo capacity available on these aircraft is as follows: 
1. Passenger wide-bodied aircraft have a volumetric underdeck 
cargo capacity of 60 cubic metres; depending on the density 
of the cargo consignments, loads from 10 to 34 tonnes 
(Boeing B747-400, March 1995 release) can be accommodated 
along with full passenger occupancy. 
The second type of aircraft, in terms of carrying capacity, 
is the DC10, all series, first introduced in 1971, followed 
by the L1011 Tristar in 1972. The DC10 is also a long range 
wide-bodied aircraft with the underdeck cargo compartments 
having a capacity of approximately 60 cbm. It is able to 
carry loads starting from 10 to 24 tonnes, depending on 
cargo density; while the Tristar L1011 has 35 cubic metres 
and the L1011-50 has 50 cubic metres cargo capacity in their 
respective belly-holds. 
The DC8 passenger aircraft has the largest underdeck 
capacity of 48 cbm, followed by the B737-300 and 400 series, 
with cargo space of 35 cbm, and lastly the B707 and B727 
with cargo space of 18 cbm each. It should be noted that 
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these aircraft were operated not only on medium and short 
ranges, but also on long ranges where fuel priorities took 
precedence to cargo loads on take-offs. Further, the B737 
all series was mostly used as an inter-city jet for commuter 
services, especially in Europe, and was hardly able to carry 
any cargo in its belly-hold due to the fast turnround, 
required by this type of service, at airports. 
The cargo capacities of the narrow-bodied passenger aircraft 
are on average equal to almost half that of the wide-bodied. 
In practice, passenger baggage occupied almost half the 
belly-hold space, leaving 9 to 12 cubic metres for cargo in 
the B707 and B727 aircraft, while the B737 was left with 20 
to 25 cubic metres for cargo, which in fact was rarely used 
because of its specialised short range - fast turnround 
commuter services. 
2. Pure cargo freighters : The real revolution in the air- 
freight industry started with the entry into the market of 
the B747 all-freighter services. This aircraft was able to 
accommodate 100 deadweight tonnes of freight, with a 
volumetric capacity of 600 cubic metres, while the narrow 
bodied freighters had the following capabilities 
B707 40 deadweight tonnes and 170 cbm 
B727 15 deadweight tonnes and 90 cbm 
DC 8 40 deadweight tonnes and 185 cbm 
B737-200 18 deadweight tonnes and 95 cbm 
B757 38 deadweight tonnes and 170 cbm 
The wide-bodied MD11 was able to carry 30 tonnes of freight 
at 185 cubic metres volumetric capacity and the DC10,60 
tonnes of freight with 360 cubic metres of space. The 
difference between the two types of aircraft was in the 
ability of the wide-bodied aircraft to accommodate large 
sizes of consignments ranging between 365 cbm (DC 10) - 600 (B747) cubic metres of volumetric cargo. 
3. Combis: A combination of passenger and cargo aircraft, 
whereby part of the main deck is segregated by way of a 
partition for cargo loading, in the form of pallets, 
containers or mounted on skids, thus availing a weight 
capacity of 15 tonnes for the MD11,20 tonnes for the DC10 
and 30 tonnes for the B747, and the same volumetric capacity 
of 60 cubic metres for all types in addition to their 
underdeck cargo compartments. 
Wide-bodied B747 combis are able to accommodate 5 times the 
narrow bodied B727 and B737 combis and 2% times the DC 8 
combi. The MD11 and DC10 combis are able to accommodate 
almost double the deadweight tonnage of the DC8 combi. 
The real advantage lies in the huge volumetric space that 
became available with the advent of the wide-bodied 
aircraft. This advantage is properly realised in the 
airline revenue derived from the carriage of air cargo; 
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chargeable volume weight set at 6 cubic metres to equal 1 
tonne or 1000 kilograms of deadweight, this means that low 
dense consignments (high volume -low weight) are charged 
according to the 6: 1 rule; 6 cubic metres =1 tonne, or 
1 cubic metre = 166.6 kilograms. If a consignment 
measurement length, width, height gives a cubic volume of 
one metre and weighs less that 166.6 kilograms, then 166.6 
is charged regardless of actual weight. If the consignment 
weight is 200 kgs, then cargo becomes high dense, and 200 
kgs is charged. The rule is to charge a ratio of 6: 1, 
whichever is greater. 
Table 85: Freight load factors 
of world sea-air transfer hubs 
total air export cargo capacity utilisation to Europe 
inclusive of sea-air traffic, 1994 
Sea-air Available - Air freight Freight Air freight Freight Load 
transfer hub usable air uplifted, Load uplifted, Factor 
cargo capacity, in tonnes Factor in tonnes (including 
in tonnes (for (excluding (excluding (including sea-air) 
exports) sea-air) sea-air) sea-air) 
Vancouver 29,500 14,800 50%; 24,000 8 Vk 
Seattle 27,300 8,100 30%; 21,100 77! k 
Los Angeles 186,300 80,800 43%- 131,000 70%- 
San Francisco 149,200 93,200 62% 120,200 81%. 
Miami 86,600 63,0001 73%- 63,000 73%; 
Singapore 178,400 141,8002 7 9! k 146,800 82k 
Dubai 80,800 54,200 67%- 60,200 75%- 
Sharjah 66,800 39,300 59%* 55,400 831; 
Abu Dhabi 26,000 18,400 71% 22,200 8 5! k 
U. A. E. Total 173,600 111,900 64! k 137,800. 79% 
. ZIUUZ UU: L; ompuE; ea ana r: aDu. Lauea zrom zagui-et; uuL-. Lvuu L. 1.1 LIJU bt: %; L. LUIlb VII 
air transfer hubs, Chapters 5 and 6. 
Having determined air cargo capacities available on the services 
of wide-bodied aircraft of all types, passengers, combis and pure 
freighters in addition to pure freighter narrow-bodied aircraft, 
freight load factors can be precisely figured therefore, to show 
the exact utilised cargo capacities on scheduled international 
flight services from a particular airport. If all the 
requirements of the sea-air mode were provided, an introduction 
of sea-air traffic is able to substantially decrease, the 
unutilised capacities available on the international airline 
scheduled services from that airport. 
Table 85, above and Table 86 on page 188, show the freight load 
factors at the world's most successful sea-air transfer hubs 
airports, before and after the application of the sea-air volume 
to the international air export traffic, thus showing the exact 
contribution of sea-air traffic in decreasing the volume of 
unutilised capacities that were available. 
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Table 86: Freight load factors 
of world sea-air transfer hubs 
total air export cargo capacity utilisation to 
SouthlCentral America, inclusive of sea-air traffic, 1994 
Sea-air Available - Air freight Freight Air freight Freight Load 
transfer hub usable air uplifted, Load uplifted, Factor 
cargo capacity, in tonnes Factor in tonnes (including 
in tonnes (for (excluding (excluding (including sea-air) 
exports) sea-air) sea-air) sea-air) 
Los Angeles 85,400 13,300 16%- 63,400, 741k 
San Francisco 9,800 1,700 1 17%; 1,7001 17! k 
Miami 588,400 243,000 1 41t 524,0001 89%; 
ýWJIVUýýU MIJU "lAJU. LC9L=U L. LVIII L. LVU. EUb UUL. LVCLI LIJ E-14= 0=L. L-Lw4J0 W44 
air transfer hubs, Chapters 5 and 6. 
Current load factors, as computed in Tables 85 and 86, from all 
active world sea-air transfer hubs to Europe and to Central and 
South America, all show a high percentage, with the exception of 
San Francisco, to South & Central America, where the load factor 
is 1711c due mainly to the fact that almost all international 
services to this region are operated by U. S. carriers who re- 
currently confirmed their lack of interest in carrying sea-air 
traffic. All other load factors ranged from 70*-. (Los Angeles) to 
89t (Miami) . This means that growth in sea-air volumes is limited to a few percentage points. 
1 Sea-air traffic arrivals into sea-air transfer hubs are 
largely concentrated on the weekends, and some mid-week 
scheduled international services are bound to miss this 
'fill in, cargo flow. 
2. General cargo traffic is accepted for carriage in various 
shapes and sizes, and, therefore, some space is bound to be 
lost in building this traffic in standardised unit load 
devices such as, air pallets and air cargo containers. 
For all practical purposes, 9001 freight load factor could be 
considered as the maximum attainable under actual market 
conditions. Therefore, prospects for a dramatic sea-air traffic 
growth is subject to many factors, such as: 
1. An increase in passenger scheduled international wide-bodied 
flight frequencies to major gateway airports of Europe, 
South & Central America. 
2. An increase in combi wide-bodied flight frequencies. 
3. An increase in pure freighter frequencies and the entry of 
newcomers, freighter operators (airlines) to the sea-air 
cargo industry at sea-air hubs. 
4. Overland diversion to airports where cargo capacities are 
available. 
The present weekly frequencies of wide-bodied international 
scheduled flights (Passengers/combis/f reighters) , in addition to narrow bodied freighter services, are shown in Table 87, on the following page. 
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Table 87. Weekly frequencies of wide-bodied aircraft 
(Passengerlcombislfreighters & narrow bodied freighters) 
between world active sea-air hubs 
and Europe's main gateway airports 
European Gateways Vancouver Seattle Los Angeles SFO Miami Singapore U. A. E. 
London 
Passengers P- 19 P - 12 P - 43 P - 44 P - 33 P- 23 P- 55 
Combis C- 4 C- 1 
Freighters F -1 F- 2 F- 6 
Amsterdam 
Passengers P- 3 P -3 P - 23 P - 11 P -4 P- 13 P- 23 
Combis C -4 C -3 C- 5 C- 1 
Freighters F -1 F -I F- 3 F- 7 
Brussels 
Passengers P -7 P- 2 
Combis C- 2 
Freighters F- 4 F- 16 
Paris 
Passengers P- 2 P- 27 P - 18 P - 19 P- 4 P- 12 
Combis C- 7 C -4 C- 3 C- I 
Freighters F- 1 F -2 F -I F- 12 
Frankfurt 
Passengers P- 18 P 5 P- 28 P - 28 P - 13 P- 17 P- 22 
Combis C- 1 C -2 C -7 C- 4 
Freighters F- 1 F -2 F -4 F- 1 F- 22 
Luxembourq 
Passengers 
Combis 
Freighters F 3 F- 5 F - 4. F- 3 F 10 
Source: Air Cargo Timetable, ABC Guide, September 1994. 
The concentration of weekly frequencies, especially that of pure 
freighter services, is limited to the few major European gateways 
of London, Amsterdam, Brussels, Paris, Frankfurt and Luxembourg 
Other European gateway airports are restricted in their number of 
freighter frequencies and the number of sea-air hub airports that 
operate them, such as: 
1. Manchester, with five wide-bodied weekly freighter (B747) 
frequencies from Dubai International Airport. This 
frequency originates in Hong Kong and passes through Dubai 
International Airport in transit to Manchester, but with 
fifth freedom rights at Dubai Airport, which permits the 
carrier, Air Hong Kong, to uplift sea-air and other cargoes 
from Dubai and U. A. E. 
Other European gateway airports with pure freighter frequencies: 
2. Milan, with 2 wide-bodied freighter frequencies from Los 
Angeles, operated by Alitalia. 
3. Rome, with three weekly DC8 narrow-bodied pure freighter 
services operated by Alitalia and 2 combis, wide-bodied B747 
frequencies operated by Malaysian Airlines, all from Dubai 
Airport, in addition to a once weekly B747 freighter 
frequency from Los Angeles, operated by Alitalia. 
4. Basle, served by 4 weekly narrow-bodied B707 freighter 
services operated by TMA from Sharjah International Airport, 
via Beirut. 
190 
5. Lyon, served with 2 B747 freighter services operated by Air 
France from Dubai International Airport. 
6. Copenhagen, served by two wide-bodied B747 freighter 
services, originating in Singapore and transiting Dubai, 
with fifth freedom rights. 
An increase in scheduled international wide-bodied frequencies to 
the main gateway hubs encourages concentration of flight 
operations, and, therefore, the creation of high volume routes, 
which entail supporting services of another mode of transport for 
distribution of cargo from the major gateway airports to further 
destinations inland. In the case of Europe, the support of the 
trucking services is clearly shown through the increase of 
trucking frequencies from major European gateway hubs nominated 
earlier (see trucking chart below). The trucking services are 
required because connecting flights from these major gateway 
airports are mainly operated by narrow-bodied small size commuter 
aircraft, who do not have the time, due to the very fast 
turnround of these flights, nor the capacity to accommodate 
massive volumes of cargo. In addition, pure freighter services 
from major gateway airports to regional airports within Europe, 
are very rare and mostly operated on a charter basis. 
Figure 21 : Development of Trucking Frequencies within Europe 
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These single links in a long logistic chain have prompted 
Luf thansa to tie up a punctual and regular truck service to their 
air cargo f requencies. The complementarity of the Luf thansa 
service is by their trucking network operating from Frankfurt to 
many airports in Northern Europe. The trucking system is 
operated on daily frequencies rendering a continuous flow of 
cargo from the time it is offloaded, from arriving aircraft to 
onboard truck, to final destination. 
Many airlines followed suit, such as KLM and Singapore Airlines 
who established re-distribution hubs at Amsterdam and Copenhagen 
airports respectively. In 1994, Gulf Air offered a similar 
service of 5 weekly, cargo flights to a hub airport - Brussels, 
for further re-distribution by the DHL trucking network system to 
most airports in Europe. 
From Sharjah and Dubai airports, many airlines offer combined 
air/truck services. Trans Mediterranean Airways and Kuwait 
Airways freighters use Amsterdam as their hub for overland re- 
distribution to the rest of Europe. Royal Jordanian freighters 
use Maastricht. Cargolux and China Airlines use Luxembourg. 
The availability of so many flight frequencies and air/truck 
services covering almost any city in Europe, gives the sea-air 
forwarder more power and control over cargo movement because of 
his ability to offer his customers, at origin, the best possible 
connecting flights at the transfer point, so that shipments reach 
final destination in the shortest possible transit time. 
Despite the airline involvement with overland transport at the 
airport of final destination, which is usually a major gateway 
airport from which regular and scheduled airline trucking 
services extend deliveries to the smaller regional airports 
nearest to the actual final consignee, airlines were denied 
accessibility to the actual final consignees because 
1. The freight forwarder at the sea-air transfer hub consignees 
the airline Air Waybill to his agent at the airport of 
destination, whereby airline truck deliveries are made to 
the nominated agent and not the actual consignee. 
2. The agent or freight forwarder at the airport of final 
destination is in a much stronger position, as he interfaces 
directly with the consignees and offers them an array of 
services such as, warehousing and distribution logistics 
that minimizes the end user's stockpiling and inventory 
costs. 
In general, the offers by the freight forwarder at destination 
airports, of storage and distribution services, attracts a large 
number of medium to small importers who benefit from the lower 
charges derived from the economics of scale. 
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9.3 Freictht forwarders 
The task of the forwarder, in the national economy, is to link 
the demand for transport with the offer of the transport 
operator. The forwarder manages and controls the movement of 
goods from one point to another in the safest, fastest and most 
economical way. Control is kept through a network of 
correspondents/associates or even through branches. Further, he 
acts as consultant by supplying exact information as to the cost 
of the various modes of transport, correct packing, 
documentation, banking procedures, customs clearance and consular 
requirements. 
The forwarder works for several operators, and is able to 
evaluate various possibilities available in the market, at any 
one moment in time. He, therefore, can offer the most efficient 
means of transport to the customers, with the primary function of 
combining the interests of both the customer and the operator. 
The forwarder's job is to force the operator to improve his 
offers, by various means, such as faster communication, better 
frequencies and reliable schedules. The forwarder accumulates 
immense know-how of most, if not all, available transport trends 
and offers in the market. It follows that the initiative to 
build up a reliable sea-air service is motivated by the freight 
forwarders. 
This section highlights the role of freight forwarders in the 
development of sea-air transfer hubs. The freight forwarders' 
traditional role lies between shippers and carriers in the range 
of services offered, such as: 
1. Pick up from shipper's factory, arranging documentation, 
legalisation of invoices, preparation of packing lists, 
insurance, and even packing the consignment itself at 
origin. 
2. Offering the shipper the widest possible choices of 
transport routes, rates and transit time. 
3. Customs clearance and door deliveries to consignees at, 
destination. 
Traditionally, the freight forwarder offering the above services 
is not burdened with heavy capital investment in acquiring 
transport equipment that other transport modes are burdened with, 
such as large container ships, aircraft, rail-cars and heavy duty 
trucks and tractors. 
The factor of relatively light investments by the freight 
forwarders helped in the emergence of specialisation. In the 
early 1980s, a trend to specialise in the provision of a certain 
service, or a group of related services, to shippers and- 
consignees, took form and many specialist freight forwarders 
surfaced in the world markets, a trend that appealed strongly to 
shippers and consignees, and helped the shift of freight control 
from the carriers to the specialised freight forwarder. 
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Custom House brokerage 
Those forwarders specialise in customs clearance pick up and 
overland deliveries to their clientele, the shippers and the 
consignees. 
Historically, the Custom House Broker was the first organisation 
to act as a middle-man between the shippers and the carriers. 
They offered the service of arranging' transportation of goods 
from one point to another, on behalf of their clients in their 
capacity as 'agent' to the means of transport, the carriers. 
In order to facilitate, enhance and administer the role and 
activities of the agent, carriers subjected the appointment of 
their representatives (agents) to strict rules and regulations, 
and defined compensation of their services in terms of a 
percentage commission applicable to the published carrier's rates 
of transport. Air carriers were the pioneers in this subject; 
they initiated rules and regulations through their I International 
Air Transport Association, (IATA) that produced a worldwide 
network of IATA appointed agencies. 
Before an agent receives appointment as an IATA cargo agent he 
should be able to : 
a. Demonstrate sound financial status. 
b. Employ qualified, certified staff able to handle all kinds 
of shipments, including dangerous cargo consignments. 
C. Own or lease adequate cargo handling facilities, open to the 
public. 
d. Maintain proper IATA approved accounting procedures, such as 
invoicing customers and collecting monies according to IATA 
rates and remitting the same to its principal, 'the 
airline,, within thirty days of the carrier's invoicing 
date, less his IATA commissions. 
Once appointed by IATA, the agent receives a stock of the 
airline's airway bills, serially numbered, which must be used 
serially, without interruption. Nowadays, as computerisation is 
widespread, a neutral airway bill stock is produced by the agent 
and the airline renumerates the agents with an agreed upon fee 
covering the cost of the document. 
The IATA appointed agent must strictly observe IATA approved 
conditions of carriage, and all rules regulating his conduct with 
the customers and general public. The agent's role is to print 
the Airline Airway Bill with all the relevant details of a 
shipment, on behalf of the carrier, and deliver it completed, to 
all concerned parties. The airline airway bill becomes the 
contract of carriage between the customer and the carrier, 
through its agent. The scope of the agent's activities are: 
Exports: shipments are picked up ex shipper's f actory with 
packing lists and shipper's invoices which may require legalisation and certification from the relevant sources such as 
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the Chamber of Commerce and the resident Consul of the country of 
destination. Insurance policies are issued, if required, and 
marking, labelling and numbering of each package is done, and an 
Air Waybill is issued on delivery to the airline at the exit 
airport. In brief, all steps are executed by the Custom House 
Broker to render the shipment 'ready for carriage,. 
Imports: shipments are custom cleared vide a letter of 
appointment by the consignee to his agent, authorising him to 
clear on his behalf; duty paid (later invoiced) and the shipment 
is delivered directly to consignee's door. 
In both cases, of imports and exports, the customs house broker 
is the middle-man who interfaces directly with the carriers and 
the customers. 
9.3.2. The Consolidator 
From the very f irst time that air carriers established the 
quantity rate structures, freight forwarders started their 
consolidation services which were made available to the general 
public, through publications, periodicals, pamphlets and 
advertisements, stating : 
a. Scheduled regular consolidation services. 
b. Published rates per kilogramme per total weight of shipment 
according to a scale of weight breaks that were much lower 
than the airline rates. 
Consolidation services took full advantage of the air carrier's 
rate structure which decreases progressively as shipment weight 
increases. They grouped a number of individual consignments into 
one large consignment, and air-freighted it at the air carrier's 
lower rates applicable to greater weight consignments. 
Freight forwarders specialising in this field usually concentrate 
their efforts in the market of small size, small weight, regular 
shipments. They may collect these shipments directly from 
shippers or from smaller freight forwarders or custom house 
brokers, and consolidate all into one large shipment, thus taking 
full advantage of carrier's quantity rates. The carriers 
themselves are basically responsible for the emergence of the 
consolidators. 
Carriers, i. e the airlines and shipping lines, have established 
a large array of rates with various structures that yield 
advantages and benefits to the shippers, on strict application. 
The most common group of carrier's rates are those of quantity. 
The larger the quantity, the lower the rate of carriage from one 
airport to another. For example; the published air rates 
applicable in September 1994 between London Airport and New York 
Airport were as follows: 
M Pounds Sterling 50.00 
N Pounds Sterling 3.93/kg 
Q 300 Pounds Sterling 2.05/kg 
Q 100 Pounds Sterling 1.24/kg 
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500 Pounds Sterling 1.14/kg 
M= means minimum per shipment. A minimum is set at Pounds 
Sterling 50.00 for shipment weight which, when charged at the N 
rate does not yield Pounds Sterling 50.00 and, therefore, is 
charged the minimum of Pounds Sterling 50.00. 
N= shipments weighing up to 45 
for shipments weights yielding 
Sterling 50.00, when the weight 
rate of Pounds Sterling 3.93/kg. 
kgs each. This rate is applied 
more than the minimum Pounds 
in kgs is multiplied by the N 
Q 100 = quantities of 100 kgs per shipment are charged at Pounds 
Sterling 2.05/kg rate. 
Q 300 = quantities of 300 kgs per shipment are charged at Pounds 
Sterling 1.24/kg rate. 
Q 500 = quantities of 500 kgs per shipment are charged at Pounds 
Sterling 1.14/kg rate. 
This shows the advantage of consolidated smaller shipments to the 
500 kgs weight break. The shipper (customer) is usually given 
part of the benefit, while most of it is retained and/or shared 
between the large consolidator and smaller broker, who co-loads 
his small shipments with the large consolidator. 
In addition to the consolidation high margin of profit, as seen 
above, the quantity rates are commissionable, i. e. subject to the 
mandatory 5% freight forwarder's commission. Further, airlines 
have established other incentives to the consolidators, such as 
special rates applicable to certain commodities. They are called 
specific commodity rates - grouped, numbered and classified 
according to IATA master item numbering and a group description 
list. 
Within the specific commodity rates structure, a quantity 
discount applies as well. For example; from London Airport to 
New York Airport, a specific commodity rate applies for ICI 
products under item No. 9960, for weights of 300 kgs and over, 
per shipment, on Continental Airlines, at Pounds Sterling 
0.92/kg. 
Many other classes of rate apply, in the airline and shipping 
line industry, with advantages given to higher weights or the 
bulk movement of cargo, such as the shipping line's container 
rates which gives contractual special discounted rates for 
shipments of 100,200,300 containers during a specified period 
of time.. Or the airline ULD (Unit Load Devices), special rates 
for cargoes loaded in these devices. 
The emergence of the 'consolidators' at airports of origin, i. e. 
where the freight is first generated, entails the presence of a 
'break-bulker, at the point of destination. Thus, the third 
speciality: the break-bulkerl. 
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9.3.3 The break-bulker 
Break-bulkers are mostly located at the main gateway airports of 
largely importing countries. The consolidators at origin prepare 
a consolidated shipment in the following manner : 
a. Each individual shipment is processed and made ready for 
carriage, as explained earlier, with only one difference, 
and that is a 'House Airway Bill' is issued instead of an 
Airline Airway Bill. A 'House Airway Bill' is an Airway 
Bill produced by the consolidator carrying his trade title 
and his conditions of carriage. The 'House Airway Bill' is 
similar in almost all respects to the Airline Airway Bill 
and may differ in the 'conditions of carriage,, which are 
printed on its back page. This document will be subject to 
detailed analysis later in this section. However, for the 
purposes of the consolidation process and break-bulk, the 
'House Airway Bill, is the only document that the shipper 
and consignee get, and consignees receive their consignments 
through this document, and shippers get their letter of 
credits processed through banks at origin, via this 
document. 
b. All "House Airway Bills' of a consolidated shipment are 
grouped and listed as per cargo manifest issued by the 
consolidator, showing : 
- The number of each 'House Way Bill'. 
- The weight in kgs and the chargeable weight (high density, 
low density etc. ). 
- The nature of the goods. 
- The number of packages in each consignment. 
- The shipper's and consignee's full names, addresses, 
telephone numbers, fax numbers, P. O. Box numbers, etc. 
All 'House Airway Bills, are attached to the cargo manifest, and 
a 'Master Airline Airway Bill', covering the whole consolidated 
shipment, is issued by the consolidator as shipper, and addressed 
to the break-bulker at the destination airport, as consignee. 
The actual shipper's and consignee's trade titles do not appear 
at all on the 'Master Airway Bill' 
As the break-bulker receives the consolidated shipment, he breaks 
it into individual shipments as per the 'House Airway Bills' and 
the consolidation manifest. At this point, the break-bulker 
consults with the consignee for his disposal instructions. This 
means that the break-bulker interfaces directly with the 
consignee who may entrust him with custom clearance and delivery 
of the shipment. In case the consignee is satisfied, then the 
break-bulker may be able to solicit future air consignments' 
carriage via the same system, by requesting the consignee to 
issue instructions to his shippers at the points of origin to 
entrust future shipments to the very same consolidator. As such, 
the control of cargo flow is diverted to the freight forwarding 
network of consolidators, break-bulkers and Custom House brokers. 
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9.3.4 The sea-air operators 
As the consolidators role grew rapidly, dealing directly with 
shippers and consignees, and offering door-to-door collection and 
delivery of freight, large consolidators started publishing their 
own through-rates, flight and ocean voyage schedules, using their 
own 'House Airway Bills, . The only factor that would 
have 
transformed them into carriers was the ownership of the means of 
transport; ships, aircraft, trucks and railways, which they did 
at a later stage, and became known as the "integrators". 
As 'Non Vessel Owning Common Carriers' (NVOCC), freight 
forwarders acting as carriers, without owning means of transport, 
assume the responsibility of the complete chain of transportation 
required by their customers; in fact, they offered a much wider 
service than the carriers, and that is the door-to-doorl 
services. They were able to set up their own route and quote 
their own freight rates, a single freight rate ex-factory to 
consignee's door at destination, and a combined transport 
document with a defined liability to total or partial loss or 
damage to the consignment. 
The consolidators, the freight forwarders, the NVOCCs and sea-air 
operators are different titles given to practically one entity 
that is able to offer shippers and consignees a 'door-to-door, 
collection and delivery of consignments through a 'House 
Waybill', which was developed into a Combined Transport Document 
(CTD) , basically because a "door-to-door, service involved a 
combination of various modes of transport. 
Originally, the "House Waybill' covered the carriage of the 
consignment airport to airport, and the 'House Bill of Lading' 
covered the carriage from port to port. shipments, however, were 
collected ex factory, which meant overland transport ex factory 
to the airport or the port at origin and overland transport from 
the airport or port of destination to consignee's door. As 
consolidators and freight forwarders gained larger control of the 
market, through the 'door-to-doorl services, insurance coverage 
of the overland sector was urged by shippers and consignees. 
This demand had a prompt response which came about with the 
introduction of the 'Combined Transport Document' replacing the 
'House Waybill', with a 'door-to-doorl defined liability, thus 
covering the risks of loss and/or damage that may occur during 
the overland carriage, whether at origin or destination. The 
liability is further analysed later in this section. 
The interfacing process between the freight forwarder on one 
hand, and the shippers and consignees on the other, became 
stronger and reliable, as detailed data and information about 
costs of transport of each mode were exchanged. With the 
widespread use of container ships and wide-bodied aircraft, in 
addition to the dramatic progress in information technology and 
innovations in the field of communications and computerised 
information data bases in the early 1980s, a revival of the sea- 
air mode, that was first initiated, in the 1950s, by the freight 
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forwarder IKuhne & Nagel', was thought to have much better 
prospects of success. So it was offered to shippers and 
consignees as a viable alternative to the high costs of direct 
air freight and the long transit time of ocean shipping. 
Technically, the 'consolidator' at origin was able to play the 
role of a sea-air operator through the appointment of a 'break- 
bulker, - freight forwarder located at the sea-air transfer hub, 
as his 'Combined Transport Document' (CTD) was already in use and 
needed only the ocean segment liability to be covered, vis-d-vis 
his customers. 
Operationally, how does a sea-air shipment operation differ from: 
1. Direct air-freight or ocean-freight single shipment 
operations? 
2. Direct air-freight or ocean-freight consolidated shipment 
operations? 
At origin :A freight forwarder - consolidator - collects a 
shipment from his customer, the shipper, ex factory and prepares 
it for carriage whether by air or ocean, to final destination. 
9.3.5 Direct air-freight single shipment 
once the shipment is ready for carriage, the freight forwarder 
issues an airline Airway Bill, as per shipper's instructions, 
showing all details such as the full name and address of the 
consignee, weight, number of packages, nature of goods etc., and 
books the consignment with the airline having the f irst available 
flight to the airport of destination. 
The freight forwarder, himself, delivers the shipment to the 
airline receiving bay, at the airport of origin, against a cargo 
receipt issued by the airline, confirming the number of packages 
received and actual gross chargeable weight of the consignment, 
as verified by the airline's electronic scale, located adjacent 
to their cargo receiving bay. Volume measurement of the 
consignment, and therefore volume chargeable weight is also re- 
confirmed by the airline staff receiving the shipment. In case 
the shipment is voluminous, i. e if its volume is more than the 6 
:1 ratio currently applicable by the majority of airlines, from 
all six world regions, then whichever produces the greater 
revenue to the airline is charged. 
This shipment may be received by the airline, already palletised 
or containerised in one of various airline ULDs (Unit Load 
Devices) and air-freighted to the airport of destination, under 
a single airline Airway Bill which may be consigned directly to 
the consignee, or to a freight forwarder located at the airport 
of destination. 
At the destination airport In the case where the shipment 
Airway Bill is consigned directly to the consignee, the airline 
immediately notifies the consignee by telephone, electronic mail 
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or facsimile transmissions of the arrival of his shipment. 
Consignees are usually pre-alerted by the freight forwarder 
and/or the shipper at origin with an ETA (expected time of 
arrival) message of his shipment, stating Air Waybill number and 
f light details. The consignee's Custom House Broker, at the 
airport of destination, carries out the customs clearance and 
door deliveries. 
In the case where the shipment is not consigned directly to a 
consignee, but to a freight forwarder break-bulker, at the 
airport of destination. The question is under what conditions 
is the freight forwarder at origin able to practice this kind of 
procedure, i. e to forward a single shipment consigned to another 
forwarder at destination, for later delivery to the actual 
consignee? 
Answer: In cases where the f reightage, insurance costs and other 
ancillary charges, from origin to destination, are collectable 
from the actual consignees. 
The freight forwarder is instructed by the shipper to issue the 
airline Airway Bill on 'charges collect' basis. The forwarder is 
forced, therefore, by IATA regulations to quote the IATA 
published rate on the airline Air Waybill. Cutting an airline 
Air Waybill as per IATA rates, on 'charges collect, basis, at the 
airport of origin and addressed directly to the consignee at 
destination, whether the consignee is a freight forwarder or the 
actual final consignee, requires that the airline collect the 
freightage exactly as computed on their Air Waybill, i. e. the 
IATA rate x total chargeable weight regardless of the contractual 
rates or bulk rates, agreed upon between the airline and the freight forwarder at origin. 
In order to avoid IATA rates and apply the contractual lower 
rates, freight forwarders simply issue two Air Waybills, the 
airline Air Waybill and their own - the House Air Waybill. The innovative use of two Air Waybills is referred to as 'back to back,. 
a. The House Air Waybill is issued by the freight forwarders as 
per the shipper's instructions, showing actual shipper's and final consignee's , full address along with standard shipment particulars. Further, all collections, such as the 
agreed upon cost of freightage with consignee, ancillary 
charges and CODs are also shown on the House Airway Bill. 
b. The airline Air Waybill is issued on prepaid basis, i. e. freightage costs from airport to airport are paid to the 
airline at origin, at agreed contractual or bulk rates. The 
shipper on the airline Air Waybill is the freight forwarder 
himself, and the consignee is his counterpart, another freight forwarder located at the airport of destination. 
The difference is : 
1. The airline Air Waybill is consigned to another freight 
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forwarder located at the airport of destination, and not to 
the actual final consignee. 
2. The airline liability', covering partial or total loss or 
damage of the shipment is shifted to the freight forwarder 
who becomes the only party who is able to file a damage/loss 
claim against the airline since the freight forwarder is the 
shipper and consignee on the airline Air Waybill. 
In cases of damage or loss, partial or total, the freight 
forwarder entitled for delivery must make a complaint to the 
air carrier in writing, claiming for compensation with 
respect to : 
(a) Visible damage to the goods, immediately after 
discovery of the damage and at the latest within 14 
days from receipt of the goods. 
(b) Other damage to the goods, within 14 days from the date 
of receipt of the goods. 
(c) Delay, within 21 days of the date when the goods are 
placed at his disposal, and 
(d) Non-delivery of the goods, within 120 days from the 
date of the issue of the Air Waybill. 
All rights to damages against a Carrier shall be 
extinguished unless an action is brought within two years 
from the date of arrival at the destination, or from the 
date on which the aircraft ought to have arrived, or from 
the date on which the transportation stopped. 
3. The actual and final consignee and/or the actual shipper are 
also able to f ile a damage/loss claim only against their 
freight forwarder and as per liability defined in the 
conditions of carriage printed on the back page of the 
forwarder's House Airway Bill. 
The exact wording of the airline liability limitations is quoted below, from the 'conditions of carriage' 
of a British Airways Airway Bill, currently in use, March 1995: Quote : 
"If the carriage involves an ultimate destination or stop in a country other than the country of departure, 
the Warsaw Convention may be applicable and the convention governs, and in most cases limits, the liability 
of the carrier in respect of loss, damage or delay to cargo, to 250 French gold francs per kilogramme, unless 
a higher value is declared in advance by the shipper and a supplementary charge is paid if required. The liability limit of 250 French gold francs per kilogramme is approximately US$ 20 per kilogramme, on the basis 
of US$ 42.22 per ounce of gold. " 
" If the sum entered on the face of the Air Waybill as 'Declared Value for Carriage' represents an amount in excess of the applicable limits of liability referred to in the above Notice and in these Conditions and if the shipper has paid any supplementary charge that may be required by the Carrier's tariffs, conditions 
of carriage or regulations, this shall constitute a special declaration of value and in this case Carrier's limit of liability shall be the sum so declared. Payment of claims shall be subject to proof of actual damages suffered. " 
"In cases of loss, damage or delay of part of the consignment, the weight to be taken into account in determining Carrier's limit of liability shall be only the weight of the package or packages concerned. " 
"Any exclusion or limitation of liability applicable to Carrier shall apply to and be for the benefit of Carrier's agents, servants and representatives and any person whose aircraft is used by Carrier for carriage and its agents, servants and representatives. For purposes of this provision Carrier acts herein as agent for all such persons- 
(a) Carrier undertakes to complete the carriage hereunder with reasonable despatch. Carrier may 
substitute alternate carriers or aircraft and may, without notice, and with due regard to the interest of the shipper, substitute other means of transportation. Carrier is authorised to select 
the routing or to change or deviate from the routing shown on the face hereof. 
This sub-paragraph is applicable tolfrom USA when domestic carriage within usA is exempted from its 
provisions. " 
Unquote. 
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Most freight forwarders issue their House Waybills almost 
identical to the airline Air Waybill, with the same 
liabilities and conditions. In cases where damages are 
proved to have resulted from the negligence of the airline 
staff or explicitly proved that the damages occurred as a 
result of mis-handling of the consignment by the airline 
cargo handling agent, the claim by the actual shipper or the 
actual consignee for compensation from the freight forwarder 
can be passed to the air carrier; that is if the air carrier 
is still solvent at the time the compensation falls due for 
payment. 
However, not all claims for compensation from the freight 
forwarder are easily 'passable, to the airline, as there is 
always a possibility that : 
(a) The freight forwarder has himself mis-handled the 
stuffing of an airline ULD. The airline ULD is 
received by the airline already filled with cargo, with 
no apparent physical damage to the ULD itself, and, 
therefore, declines any responsibility for damages 
discovered at destination while unstuffing the ULD. 
Such unstuffing may reveal shortages of packages left 
behind somewhere at the airport of origin and are 
difficult to trace, or unstuffing may reveal the 
presence of already damaged packages. 
(b) The same discrepancies in handling may occur to 
palletised cargo which may arrive at the destination 
airport with few pieces or packages left behind at an 
airport of origin. The forwarder must assume full 
responsibility and cannot pass this claim to the 
airline. 
(c) In case the shipper declares a higher value to his 
shipment, in excess of liability limits, and pays an 
additional charge, extending therefore, the liability 
of the freight forwarder up to the declared value, the 
freight forwarder must declare this value on his House 
Air Waybill, but is not able to declare it on the 
Master Airline Air Waybill covering a consolidation of 
a number of individual shipments. As such, the freight 
forwarder becomes fully liable to settle the claim as 
per the declared value of the consignment. 
As the 'back to back' single non- consolidated shipment arrives at 
the airport of final destination, a delivery order is issued by 
the carrier, or its representative, to the consignee, the freight forwarder (break-bulker) 
, located at the airport. The f inal actual consignee is pre-alerted with the ETA of his by the forwarder at origin through electronic mail or facsimile transmission directly or through his appointed agents at the 
airport of destination. Customs clearance and door deliveries takes place as per the final consignee's instructions. The agent 
at the airport of destination collects all charges as per the House Air Waybill, and remits all monies, less his commission, to 
the forwarders at origin. 
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9.3.6 Direct air consolidated shipments : 
Consolidation operations are exactly similar to 'back to back' 
single shipments, but the consolidation covers a 'group' of 
single shipments, consolidated together, with each having a House 
Air Waybill, and all are covered with one airline Air Waybill, 
referred to as the Master Air Waybill. The advantage to the 
consolidator is manifold: 
1. The grouping of single consignments under one airline Air 
Waybill generates higher total weights. 
2. The higher the weight of the consignment, the lower the rate 
offered by the airline, whether on a contractual basis or on 
a bulk case by case basis. 
3. The mixing of single consignments into a 'groupagel 
generates advantage through the averaging of high and low 
density cargoes. Volume chargeable weight is levied on the 
basis of the 6: 1 ratio. Single consignments are raýed on 
the HWBs as per their individual measurement, but the 
consolidator is charged as per the total measurement of the 
consolidated consignment, or as per the fixed agreed-upon 
lump sum per pallet or container, or any Unit Load Device 
charge acceptable and agreed upon by the airline and the 
consolidator. 
These advantages and benefits are so great that a share is 
allocated to all parties involved, starting with the consolidator 
and the shipper at origin and stretching to the break-bulker at 
the airport of destination, the sea-air operator at the transfer 
point - in the case of sea-air cargo movement - and finally the 
final consignee, who in fact pays all, in the form of a through 
selling rate as relayed to him by his shipper. 
9.3.7 Direct Ocean Single shipments : 
Since sea-air cargo moves almost entirely in containers and 
container ships, the analysis that follows is, therefore, limited 
to containerised cargo shipping. 
In cases where a shipment constitutes a full 20 foot or 40 foot 
container load, the shipper may require the services of af reight 
forwarder or may call directly on the shipping line with his 
instructions regarding loading date and time, nature of goods, 
method of packaging etc. The shipping line dispatches the 
required container for loading ex factory. The shipper prepares 
invoices, packing lists and the legalised - certified invoices himself or through his forwarder. The shipping line moves the 
fully loaded container to its container yard for eventual loading 
on the relevant ship's voyage to the port of destination. The 
shipping line issues a Bill of Lading stating the number of 
containers shipped, the trade title, the full address of the 
consignee and the rate per container charged, regardless of the 
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contents of the container, its weight (provided it does not 
exceed the maximum limit of 22 tonnes) and volume. In practice, 
the shipping lines do not certify the nature of goods, spelling 
out a phrase that exonerates them from any liability, with 
respect to the nature of the goods shipped. The phrase is 
printed on the Bill of Lading very clearly: 'the shipment is said 
to contain ...... I. "Is said to contain' means that the shipping line does not know for sure what this shipment consists of. 
Further, it does not state who said so ..... In addition 'said' 
gives the phrase a verbal connotation instead of a written 
confirmation. Such phrases belong to the nineteenth century and 
must be changed to comply with our day and age. 
Following is an excerpt from a paper presented by Mr. Peter 
Jones, at a Sea-Air Conference, held in Sharjah, U. A. E. in May 
1995, entitled 'Sea-Air: New Solutions to New Legal Problems'. 
Quote: "The chief international convention governing transport of 
goods by sea is known as the Hague Rules, now modified in most 
jurisdictions by the Visby Amendments ("the Rules"). The Rules 
reflect their origins in the laissez-faire environment of the 
nineteenth century. They only apply tackle to tackle,, i. e. 
when loading commences to completion of discharge. They antedate 
improvements in the safety of marine transport, and preserve 
exemptions in favour of a carrier for which any original 
justification has long since disappeared. They entitle a carrier 
to limit its liability to an amount that was fixed many decades 
before the container revolution. Despite increases effected by 
the Visby amendments, the level of these limits is significantly 
below the level applicable to air cargo. " Unquote. 
The liability of the shipping line is defined through its 
conditions of carriage as printed on the back page of the Bill of 
Lading, and is limited to a total compensation that shall in no 
circumstances whatsoever and howsoever arising exceed 2 SDRs per 
kilogramme of the gross weight of the goods lost or damaged. 
(SDR means Special Drawing Right as defined by the International 
Monetary Fund -2 SDRs are approximately equivalent to 2 US$). 
If the Hague rules are applicable by national law of the country 
where a claim is made, the liability of the Carrier shall in no 
event, exceed the limit provided in the applicable national law 
of that country. If the Hague rules are applicable through other 
than by national law means, in determining the liability of the 
Carrier, the liability of the Carrier shall in no event, exceed 
Pounds Sterling 100.00 per package or unit. 
In case a shipper claims higher compensation than that provided 
above, with respect to physical damages or losses to his 
consignment, such a claim will only be considered if the shipper has already declared the value of the goods prior to the 
commencement of the carriage and has stated such value on the 
Bill of Lading and approved by the carrier, an additional fee is 
levied to cover insurance of the declared value. In this case, 
the declared value substitutes the limits provided above. Any 
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partial loss or damage claims are adjusted pro rata on the basis 
of such a declared value. 
Compensation shall be calculated by reference to the value of 
goods at the place and time they are delivered to the consignee, 
or at the place and time they should have been delivered. For 
the purpose of determining the extent of the Carrier's liability 
for loss of or damage to the goods, the sound value of the goods 
is agreed to be the invoice value plus freight and insurance, if 
paid. 
In case a shipper or consignee claims for compensation with 
respect to losses due to delay in receiving his consignment : 
The carrier does not undertake that the goods shall arrive at the 
'Port of Discharge, or 'Place of Delivery' at any particular time 
or to meet any particular market or use, and the carrier shall in 
no circumstances whatsoever and howsoever arising, be liable for 
direct, indirect or consequential loss or damage caused by delay. 
9.3.8 Direct Ocean Consolidated shipments 
In the cases of smaller shipments that do not qualify for a full 
container load, and referred to as LCLs (Less than Full Container 
Loads), such LCL shipments are largely entrusted to a freight 
forwarder who collects them ex factory and prepares them to ready 
for carriage while temporarily stored in his warehouse. Once the 
shipment becomes ready for carriage, the freight forwarder 
contacts the relevant shipping line operating the required 
sailings to the port of destination, for loading the LCL 
shipments in containers compatible with the size of the LCL 
shipments in his possession. 
The most commonly used container is the 20 foot container. The 
usable inner capacity of this container is 27cbm, and is able to 
carry a maximum weight of 22,000 kgs. The current, March 1995, 
rate per 20 foot container from main gateway ports of the Asia- 
Pacific region to the U. A. E ports is US$ 1325.00. Therefore the 
rate per cbm is US$ 1325.00 -- 27 cbm = US$ 49.00 per cbm. A large consolidator offering regular timely consolidations does 
not expect a perfect load for each of his 20 foot containers. An 
average load is drawn from long experiences and is set at 18cbm 
per 20 foot container. Therefore, the rate per cbm becomes US$ 
1325.00 -- 18 cbm = US$ 73.60 per cbm. 
Large consolidators publish their own LCL rates and shipping 
schedules, and make their profit through loads in excess of 18 
cbm and up to a maximum of 27 cbm, which means that their 
prospects of making profits is still very high at 9 cbm (27 cbm - 18 cbm = 9cbm), which is 50-16 of the average chargeable load of 
18 cbm. 
Therefore, a direct ocean single shipment is executed as a part 
of a consolidated shipment. Whether the %consolidation 
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operation, is done by a shipping line or by a large freight 
forwarder, the charges per cbm are the same whether a house Bill 
of Lading or a shipping line Bill of Lading is issued. 
In the case where the shipping line is offering a consolidation 
service, a shipping line Bill of Lading is issued to each single 
shipment in the consolidation. The shipping line, or its 
representative at the port of destination does not require a 
break-bulk service, as all the shipments in the container are 
already broken and require only the issuance of a delivery order 
to each consignee, as per his individual Bill of Lading. In the 
case of a large forwarder offering consolidated services, a House 
Bill of Lading is issued for each single shipment in the 
consolidation, and all the House B/Ls are covered with a shipping 
line Master Bill of Lading, consigned to a forwarder, break- 
bulker located at the port of destination. A break-bulker is 
required and each single shipment is treated on its merits; some 
are on collect basis, some are to be custom cleared and further 
transported by rail or truck deep inland to consignee's door, 
etc. 
The expansion and the growing strength of the 
industry has widened much of its activities 
contractual carriage of ocean cargo, thus 
terminology to this activity. A forwarder who 
a principal to a contract of ocean carriage is 
Vessel Owning Common Carrier or NVOCC. 
Ereight forwarding 
to cover regular 
producing a new 
regularly acts as 
now called a Non- 
In the U. S., the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) regulates 
waterborne commerce to and from the United States in much similar 
ways than IATA regulates air traffic flow in Europe and the rest 
of the world. However, unlike IATA, the FMC generates its powers 
from the U. S. Shipping Act of January 1984, which requires 
'common carriers, of goods by water to file a tariff of their 
freight charges with the FMC, whose duty is to ensure that 
shipping lines and other entities acting as 'common carriers, do 
not engage in anti-competitive monopolistic activities. 
A common carrier must satisfy the conditions of the U. S. Shipping 
Act as a pre-requisite to its eligibility to practice common 
carriage. The U. S. Shipping Act defines a 'common carrier, as 
follows: 
"a common carrier is a person holding itself out to the general 
public to provide transportation by water between the United 
States and a foreign country for compensation that ....... 
a. assumes responsibility f rom 
point of destination, and 
b. utilises for all or part of 
the point of receipt to the 
that transportation a vessel-" 
The FMC distinguished NVOCCs from shipping lines, by the 
following definition of NVOCCS: 
"Non-vessel -operating common carrier means a common carrier that 
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does not operate the vessels by which the ocean transportation is 
provided and is a shipper in its relationship with an ocean 
common carrier". 
This term became popular in forwarding terminology outside the 
U. S. as a convenient phrase to describe the services of a 
transportation contractor. There is no equivalent term applying 
to air carriage of goods where freight forwarders are generally 
known as air consolidators. 
The key characteristics of a common carrier is that its services 
hold out, i. e. are open to the general public as a provider of 
transportation services for compensation. open to the public 
means that the services of a common carrier are available to any 
party, and are publicised through the media in the form of: 
1. Regular scheduled services from one point to another. 
2. A schedule of tariffs covering transport charges. 
3. A fixed place or places for receiving cargo. 
Under FMC regulations, a common carrier of goods by water is 
required to: 
1. File a tariff 
carrier, the NVOCC has to file tariffs. An ocean carrier or 
NVOCC that f ails to f ile a tarif f is subj ect to f ines of the 
maximum amount of US$ 1,000.00 per day. 
The principle behind this filing is that prices charged for 
ocean carriage must be available to all users without 
discrimination. By requiring equality of treatment between 
users, anti-competitive practices can be held in check. To 
achieve this, the FMC requires that these prices be 
incorporated in a tariff filed with the FMC and available 
for inspection by 'any interested party. Like the ocean 
The FMC requires that any changes in its charges by the 
NVOCC be incorporated in amendments to its tariff. In this 
respect, the NVOCC is in the same position as the ocean 
carrier. Failure to file amendments to its tariff is also 
an offence under the law, exposing the NVOCC to fines of the 
maximum amount of US$ 1,000.00 per day. 
A tariff rate may be reduced, but th 
charged until 24 hours after filiný 
tariff with the FMC. A tariff rate 
the higher rate be charged 30 days z 
cannot charge a lower rate intending by subsequently f iling an amendment. 
the date of the shipment is not the is in violation of the law. 
File a bond 
e lower rate cannot be 
I an amendment to the 
may be increased, and 
ifter filing. A NVOCC 
to validate its price 
If the rate charged on 
tariff rate, the NVOCC 
A NVOCC is required to file a bond issued by an acceptable 
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U. S. surety company, in the amount of US$ 50,000.00. The 
bond will be available to pay any judgment for damages 
against a NVOCC arising from its transportation related 
activities, a FMC order for reparations, or any penalty 
assessed against the NVOCC by the FMC. Once a complaint is 
filed, the FMC has a wide jurisdiction, and may also direct 
the party investigated to pay amounts in addition to the 
penalty prescribed by law. In the event of an unsatisfied 
claim, the FMC may collect the amount of the bond from the 
surety company and distribute it among the persons having 
claims against the defaulting NVOCC. 
or 
file a liability insurance that the FMC judges as adequate 
protection for U. S. claimants, and that also allows recovery 
of civil penalties imposed by the FMC under the Shipping Act 
of January 1984. 
In order to protect recovery of civil penalties imposed by 
the FMC on foreign NVOCCs, practising business to/from or 
through the U. S., the FMC requires that: a foreign NVOCC 
appoint a resident agent in the U. S. on whom legal 
proceedings can be served. These legal proceedings include 
any complaint alleging violation of the Shipping Act or the 
FMC regulations. It could also include any action by any 
cargo owner or its insurer claiming for breach of duty in 
the carriage of goods. 
3. Other requirements : 
The filing of the form of the bill of lading used in its 
service, and any agreement between it and another common 
carrier; the keeping of proper books and records, with 
specific reference to the itemisation of disbursements and 
other major operational expenses are mandatory requirements 
by International Associations in almost the same manner 
applicable by the FMC. 
However, the code of good conduct required by the FMC is 
enforced with relatively high penalties which are meant to 
curb the malpractice of giving any unreasonable preference 
or advantage to any one shipper, sharing of revenues with a 
third party or parties, and providing any free or reduced 
rates, below that already filed with the FMC, such as 
rebating. 
In Europe, the Asia-Pacific region and some parts of the world 
excluding the Americas, the freight forwarding industry's 
activities are regulated by largely two international 
associations, IATA and FIATA and very few regional organisations 
that have relatively minor impacts on the flow of cargo in 
between the three main regions of the world (Asia-Pacific, Europe 
and North America). 
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IATA, as discussed earlier, regulates the flow of the air-freight 
cargo movements, through rules and regulations. Freight 
forwarders abiding by IATA rules and regulations are appointed as 
IATA approved agents. 
FIATA (International Federation of Freight Forwarders 
Association) is an international freight forwarders association, 
with the main objective of regulating ocean traffic. Freight 
forwarder eligibility for FIATA membership is subjected to the 
FIATA initial requirement of an active national freight 
forwarding association in the country of the freight forwarder 
applying for membership. 
FIATA's main contribution to the freight forwarding industry was 
its success in introducing a FIATA Bill of Lading which covered 
multimodal transport of mainly two modes; ocean and overland. 
This FBL (FIATA Bill of Lading) is similar in all respects t9 a 
House Bill of Lading issued by a freight forwarder - 
consolidator, under which a forwarder undertakes to carry its 
customer's goods from the place of receipt to the place of 
delivery. For the part of the transport not carried by the 
freight forwarder's own equipment, mostly the ocean part, the 
freight forwarder employs the services of a carrier. The 
forwarder was fully responsible for the performance of the entire 
transport chain. 
A FIATA Bill of Lading is issued by freight forwarders and 
consolidators once they became FIATA members, by inserting the 
FIATA logo on their own House Bill of Lading. The FBL logo was 
believed to evoke confidence, trust and reliability in the 
freight forwarder vis-d-vis his customers. Customers were now 
given the same House B/L with a FIATA logo on it, which did not 
help much in Letter of Credit transactions of the importer's and 
the exporter's banks. Banks simply refused to accept these House 
Bills of Lading as a legal documentary evidence of shipping the 
goods, unless explicitly instructed by the party, who opened the 
letter of credit. 
In 1968, FIATA produced a standard FBL and applied for 
recognition of this FBL by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) based in Paris. The main function of the ICC is 
recommendational, with no effective enforcement on the Letter of 
Credit general practices. The FBL was recognized by the ICC as 
an acceptable transport document only in 1983, through the 
publication of the revision of Uniform Customs and Practice for 
Documentary Credits (UCP) no. 400. 
The FBL document was not the only document accepted in UCP 400. Other freight forwarders who were not FIATA members, but acted as 'carriers, or agents to a named carrier, were also accepted by the ICC. However, the latest revision of the ICC - UCP 500, dropped all references to the FBL, undermining FIATA documents as 
produced by an organisation, not worthy of ICC consideration. 
That was the end of it ... maybe ... FIATA is currently, March 1995, requesting its members to convince their clientele, the shippers 
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and the consignees of the advantages in the FBLI s use as an 
acceptable transport document in letter of credit transactions, 
offering solid commercial and legal protection. The researcher 
is of the opinion that FIATA documents are bound to f ade away 
from the market place and f inally disappear due mainly to the 
facts that : 
1. FIATA documents depend on the recognition of other 
international institutions for their acceptability by the 
general public and the banking institutions. They do not 
depend on themselves to gain acceptability and reliability. 
2. FIATA membership is restricted to the national freight 
forwarding associations of the country of the freight 
forwarder applying for membership, and the granting of 
membership is not subjected to any conditions or observance 
of any specific rules and regulations, other than the 
licence issued by the relevant authorities of that country. 
3. FIATA documents are wide open for malpractice, specially by 
the smaller forwarder, and with relatively low levels of 
enforcement, malpractice could become wide-spread. 
4. Many major world freight forwarders are currently in a much 
stronger position, than FIATA, to introduce their own 
document, offering their clientele a strong, successful and 
reliable document, showing their own trade titles and logos. 
In Europe and the Asia-Pacific region, freight forwarders still 
seek to be IATA approved agents, as they still believe that the 
mere print of the IATA logo on their documents generates 
customer's confidence and reliability to their activities. 
Freight forwarding in these regions is only subject to the 
provisions of the relevant government's rules and regulations 
covering the legal issuance of a freight forwarding licence. A 
freight forwarder, through his government licence, is able to 
practice various related activities such as, a carrier's agency, 
freight forwarding, consolidation, sea-air operations and NVOCCs. 
All are practised without any legal restrictions or 
jurisdictions. While in the U. S., IATA is viewed as a cartel 
applying non-competitive practices and is not allowed to enforce 
its rates. The FMC remains the only body regulating water borne 
transport, and provides no legislation prohibiting the same 
enterprise from offering its services as a forwarder and as a 
NVOCC. The only restriction is that a forwarder charging its 
customers a NVOCC tariff cannot, at the same time, apply for a 
brokerage commission from the ocean carrier. 
Having detailed the answers to the main questions of direct and 
consolidated airfreight on one hand and direct and consolidated 
ocean freight on the other, put forth earlier, it remains to be 
seen how sea-air operations differ. 
9.3.9 Sea-air shipments 
Sea-air operations do not dif f er technically f rom any of the f our 
operations analysed earlier. Sea-air is a combination of the 
multiple operations of two modes. Under the first segment of a 
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sea-air journey, direct ocean single shipments or direct ocean 
consolidated shipments are executed and consigned to a freight 
forwarder, at a sea-air transfer port. The forwarder receives 
these shipments and air freights them to the airport of final 
destination, either as direct single shipments or direct 
consolidated shipments. The only differences are: 
1 Under sea-air, the freight forwarder practices full control 
over cargo flow from origin to destination, denying any 
accessibility to carriers. A sea-air shipment moves from 
its origin through a forwarder to another forwarder at a 
transfer point and then on to a third forwarder at the 
airport of destination and, therefore, becomes the exclusive 
domain of the freight forwarding industry. 
2. The liability under a sea-air Combined Transport bocument 
(CTD) in cases of damage or loss, partial or total is 
different from that of the ocean and air carriers. 
The sea-air CTD is structured to protect the sea-air operator, 
the issuer of the document, as a contracting carrier, and protect 
also the actual carriers for their part of transport. Sea-air 
documents, now in use, incorporate clauses based on the Warsaw 
Convention and the Hague-Visby Protocol, to cover air carriage 
and ocean carriage segments, respectively, of the total journey. 
Where a sea-air document is employed to the carriage of cargoes, 
a theory of a network of liability applies to the modes of 
transport used, and therefore subject to different limitations. 
The 'locality, where the loss or damage occurred becomes crucial 
in the settlement of a claim. In the event the 'locality, is not 
established, a claimant will naturally wish the application of 
air transport liability limits (which are the highest at US$ 
20.00/kg). The air carriers are bound to resist payment due to 
the absence of proof as to the precise place where the damage or 
loss has occurred. The only solution to the resulting dispute is 
to make sure that procedures for inspection of goods at the time 
of transhipment, are thorough. However, in reality, this is 
seldom practised, as speed is vital for the commercial success of 
the sea-air service, and any interruption, for whatever purpose, 
becomes an obstructive factor in the attainment of the minimum 
transit time at the sea-air transfer hub. Besides, inspection 
procedures, if carried out, cannot be expected to eliminate such 
problems altogether. 
The Hague-Visby Rules do not refer to delay and many ocean Bills 
of Lading exempt an issuer from liability for delay. Not so with 
the air carriers, whose Air Waybill contain an undertaking to 
perform the transport with 'reasonable despatch', thus resulting in more frequent claims for delay, against the airline. Sea-air 
carriers generally accept liability for delay, subject to a 
contractual limitation amount of twice the freight, which invariably would be well below the Warsaw Convention limit of US$ 
20.00/kg. If the cause of the delay can be isolated exclusively 
to the air transport segment, the Warsaw limits will apply. If 
not, the limit of twice the freight applies. 
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In conclusion: 
1. All world air carriers do not offer any consolidation rates 
and services to the general public. Some air carriers may 
still be building their own cargo pallets and ULDs at many 
airports of the world, but for single shipments rated as per 
the air carrier's published rates. Therefore, all air 
consolidators are operated and managed by the freight 
forwarding industry. This means that most of the small to 
medium size shipments and shippers (clients) are controlled 
by the freight forwarder. 
2. The great majority of world shipping lines do not offer 
consolidation services. The very few who do, restrict it to 
certain high volume routes and, therefore, the majority of 
ocean consolidations are made by the freight forwarding 
industry. 
3. As for the single direct shipment, ocean and air carriers 
concentrate their efforts on the larger clientele who are 
able to produce high volume and frequent freight movement, 
and offer them directly, quantity and bulk contractual 
rates. The carriers refrain from offering the same to 
smaller and medium size clientele in order to maintain their 
good relations with the freight forwarding industry, as a 
strained relationship will do them more harm than the 
limited business generated from their approach to this 
portion of the market. 
4. Sea-air operations, covering all aspects of the series of 
transport links, include direct single as well as 
consolidated ocean and air shipments of various shapes and 
sizes, having low and high volume, and generated by a 
variety of clientele, remain exclusively under the control 
of the freight forwarding industry. 
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Chapter 10 
Convertibility of ocean freight 
The development and growth of freight load factors, over the last 
25 years shows that in 1969,44.51i of available cargo capacity on 
scheduled international airline operations was utilised. This 
utilisation rate grew to 46.31i in 1974,50.3k in 1979,56.8k in 
1984,57.6% in 1989 and dropped to 55.5% in 1994 (Table 5, page 
18). This meant that unutilised cargo capacity of over 40t was 
and still is the major concern of air carriers, and questions as 
to where to get the cargo, to fill in these capacities, became 
pressing. 
The main source, and probably the only source was to attract 
volumes of cargo from ocean transport. Hence the question, 'What 
kind of cargo could be diverted from ocean transport? ' To 
answer this question, "captive cargoes' of,,. -. 
be 
,P 
wh mode must 
segregated. Two groups of goods appear caý'ýive to maritime 
transport. 
1. Goods having large volume, low value per unit, low rate of 
perishability, occupying large space and which, therefore, 
can only be accommodated onboard ships. 
2. Goods having large physical dimensions, regardless of their 
value per unit, requiring large space which cannot be 
accommodated on the widest of the wide-bodied aircraft in 
use, and, therefore, must be transported onboard ships, such 
as turbines, asphalt plants, power stations etc. 
These two groups of goods are considered ocean 'captive, cargo 
and include a wide variety such as oil, ore, minerals, grain, 
chemicals, cement, steel, marble, granite etc. For such a group 
of commodities, the dominant mode of transport is ocean. 
Goods that are considered 'captive, air cargo are characterised by their: 
1. high value per unit, 
2. high rate of perishability. This group includes live 
plants, flowers, fresh fruits and vegetables, medical 
supplies, baby poultry and hatching eggs, works of art, 
antiques, high quality leather products, furs, high fashion 
goods, newspapers, magazines, periodicals, etc. 
The remaining group of commodities is the most dif f icult to 
def ine as it consists of a large variety of items that could 
utilise either of the two modes of transport. This group is 
neither ocean I captive I nor air I captive I. To characterise 
commodities within this group, the principal consideration is the 
total distribution cost factor with emphasis on the element of 
speed and the physical characteristics of the commodity under 
analysis. 
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Such a group of goods is considered divertible, and the choice of 
a certain mode of transport is governed by equally important 
factors which constitute an indivisible pattern, components of 
which must be considered altogether: 
1. Reliability of the mode of transport. 
2. Total freight costs and charges ex-factory, at origin, 
to the final consignee and the end user in the market 
place at destination. 
3. Total transit time from origin to end user. 
4. Value per unit of the commodity (per kg or per tonne) 
5. Consignee requirement of delivery within a specified 
period of time. 
6. Volume to weight ratio of the shipment (size/weight). 
In order to divert part of the divertible group of commodities to 
direct air freight, from ocean transport, strenuous efforts were 
made and campaigns were launched on two major fronts. 
The first campaign was aimed at the divertible ocean cargo group 
of commodities. Air carriers, aircraft manufacturers and related 
industries financed research studies , lectures and articles, in transport periodicals, all aimed at convincing shippers and 
consignees that air cargo transport was not as costly as it 
looked, when total distribution costs were considered. 
The second campaign came from within the airline industry itself. 
Air carriers started to rationalise their operating costs. The 
objective was to reduce the costs of operation, and thereby the 
cost of air cargo transport. The ability to offer lower air 
f reight rates in the market, to stimulate demand, and at the same 
time maintain profitability, became the target of most airlines. 
10.1. Air cargo total distribution cost concept 
To start, the reliability of a transport mode is of utmost 
importance in determining its success. Reliability is gained 
over a period of time through the regularity of a transport mode, 
services providing scheduled voyages or flights between any two 
points. In addition, the promptness of applying a certain number 
of frequencies per day, per week, per month, etc. and the 
consistent recurrence of handling procedures available to 
clientele cargoes at origin and destinations, evokes confidence 
and trust in that mode of transport, and, hence, reliability. 
To analyse the air freight cost in relation to total distribution 
cost, cargo movements must be traced from the very origin ex- 
factory at centres of supply, to the consignee's door at the 
markets of demand. During the process of monitoring air cargo, 
total distribution costs, the speed of air cargo as a competitive 
edge, must be highlighted as a supporting factor. 
Short transit time is obviously one of the main advantages of air 
cargo transport. Time savings, when compared with other modes of 
transport, becomes essential to the air carriage of certain 
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goods, especially with the added facility of frequency of air 
cargo f lights. The number of flights per day, or per week, 
available to shippers and consignees to use for their cargo 
movements, becomes vital to the transport of certain goods. 
1. High value goods, which are in demand at far away market 
places, thus reducing time between production and sale. 
2. Commodities which involve substantial capital, tied up in 
stockpiling, are air-freighted in order to save on capital'. 
(fresh produce and urgently required goods are dropped from 
this analysis as they are captive air freight shipments). 
The nature of air cargo is characterised by its perishability and 
high value. Air carriage of high value goods is done in order to 
reach the destination in a safe condition. Further, high value 
goods have the ability to absorb the high cost of air transport, 
at a fraction of its price at the consumer's market. 
The 1994 'World Air Cargo Forecast by Boeing Commercial Airplane 
Group' describes finding in the U. S. import/export market by air, 
a positive relationship between air freight potential and value 
per kg of goods. "Each U. S. export and import commodity was 
placed into a unit value range depending on average value per 
kilogram. When air tonnes were plotted against these values, a 
distinct co-relation is noted. Air penetration is generally 
higher by value groups for exports than imports". This 
difference was attributed to intensive marketing efforts to 
stimulate air exports, while the relatively strong dollar vis-d- 
vis other currencies, during the period under analysis, 
constituted the main factor responsible for lower value air 
imports. US air-borne import/export commodities in 1993 showed 
the following percentage of air penetration vis-&-vis commodity 
value. (Total air exports were 1,978,262 tonnes and total air 
imports was 1,985,850 tonnes in 1993). 
Table 88. Air penetration by value of commodities, 1993. 
Commodity value in US$Ikg t of total air 
imports 
t of total air 
exports 
Over $ 16.00 / kg 45.3 16 51.4 !k 
$ 14.00 - 16.00 /kg 9.8 '-i>6 9.5 0-. 
$ 12.00 - 14.00 /kg 6.2 '5115 6.5 1116 
$ 10.00 12.00 /kg 5.3 3.3 % 
$ 8.00 10.00 /kg 5.6 5.7 
$ 6.00 8.00 /kg 4.2 % 1.6 
$ 4.00 6.00 /kg 3.9 2.2 
$ 2.00 4.00 /kg 19.7 19.8 
100 %1 100 % 
'>UUX-ce ksoe2ng World Air Cargo Forecast 1994, Commercial Airplane Group 
1. Capital: Goods whose fast supply by air results in savings in stock levels to be maintained, and hence savings in capital. Example: spare parts. 
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Values of commodities ranging from US$ 14.00/kg and over, 
represented more than 6001 of total air imports and air exports. 
The top nine potential commodity groups reported by the Boeing 
World Air Cargo Forecast 1994 are : 
1. Personal Computers and equipment 
2. Sound recording equipment 
3. Footwear 
4. Photocopying equipment 
5. Apparel 
6. Engines/motors and non-electricals 
7. Measuring and technical instruments 
8. Telecommunications equipment 
9. , Auto spare parts and general spares 
One more aspect of commodity values is noteworthy. Because unit 
value is frequently used to identify potential markets, air 
freight might be assumed to be limited to high-value commodities. 
However, Table 88, on the preceding page, tells a different 
story. Although over 60% of all U. S. air trade in 1993 possessed 
values of US$ 14.00 to US$ 16.00 per kg, or more, a significant 
portion of tonnage had far lower values. Almost 20% of all air 
tonnes, in fact were valued below US$ 4.00 per kg. This table 
offers evidence that air tonnage is not confined to high-value 
commodities, and that many other commodity characteristics can be 
important in the choice of shipment mode, such as its demand at 
a certain market within a specified period of time, regardless of 
its value; example, general spare parts. As large portions of 
the top nine commodity groups, mentioned above, are still moving 
by ocean, tremendous market opportunities remain to be explored 
in favour of air freight. 
/Arguments favouring the airfreight mode pinpoint specific 
advanýages in relation to various characteristics of the 
commodity, such as: Air cargo is able to save on capital tied up 
from door to door. This means that the short transit time of 
goods to destination, and their immediate availability to the 
consignees, replenishes capital as fast as the goods are sold. 
This saving is further enhanced by the availability of many 
flight frequencies, and the ability of the producers at origin, 
to stock readymade goods and air freight them immediately, as 
ordered. This diminishes the need for stockpiling at destination 
and, hence, 
__a 
lower inventory cost in the market place. The 
market place is - characterised here by the high cost of land, 
warehousing and labour, while the cost of the same at the 
production line at origin, is usually much less. 1 
ýurther, 
seasonal goods must be sold at the mark ets of demand for 
as long as the season lasts, i. e. during a short period of time. ' 
The cost of air-freight becomes a convenience rather than a 
burden; to seize the opportunity of selling a seasonal product 
becomes an opportunity cost to the producer. Air-freight, as 
such, is an advantage regardless of its cost ( e. g., during 2- 
3 weeks in early July, it is possible to cover the cost of air 
freighting, first in season grapes from Crete to London, before 
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grapes are available, by truck, from Italy and France. ' 
By the same token, a commodity may become the subject of high 
demand at a certain period of time. In many cases demand can be 
forecasted, such as the Christmas season in the western world, 
and the Hajj season in the moslem world, and certain commodities 
can be produced in advance and air freighted in time. 
High volume, low density goods are cheaper to transport by air 
than by ocean (detailed in the section below). This refers to 
the density of a shipment, and depends on the ratio between 
actual weight and measurement volume of the consignment. The 
chargeable unit of freight depends on the ratio between the load 
itself and the total volumetric loadable capacity of the 
transport mode. 
10.2 The volume to weight ratio 
Almost all researches and studies over the past thirty years 
argued in favour of the air freight mode by spotlighting high 
value commodities and their ability to absorb air transport costs 
at a fraction of their value, short transit times, their ability 
to drastically reduce the cost of inventory and stockpiling, and, 
therefore, the replenishment of capital as fast as the goods are 
sold at destination. Although the importance of these points 
cannot be denied, very little was said, or researched on the 
volume/weight ratio of a shipment. The findings of this research 
point out clearly that the measurement volume to weight ratio of 
a shipment could be the most important factor determining its 
eligibility for conversion from the ocean freight to the air 
freight mode. 
In the absence of any adequate analysis of this ratio, a thorough 
analysis is deemed necessary for the full comprehension of the 
total cost distribution concept. The case studies presented in 
this section show, among other things, the importance of this 
volume to weight ratio in both the ocean and air freight modes in 
the computing of the transport cost of each. 
In the air transport mode, the design of the aircraft and the 
type of engines used, set the limits for its maximum take-off 
weight, including usable capacities for air cargo in terms of 
weight. The emphasis here is on actual total weight permissible 
for safe take-offs. Therefore, the volumetric usable capacity 
becomes a neutral factor once the maximum total take-off weight 
of an aircraft is reached. For example : the maximum total take- 
off weight of the specially designed B747-20OF freighter aircraft 
is 377.8 tonnes with a maximum net freight capacity of 123.4 
tonnes, and a maximum usable volumetric capacity of 682 cubic 
metres. The loadable capacity by weight and volume is calculated in Appendix L. 
Air cargo consignments are accepted as delivered in various 
1. Example cited by Professor Doganis, Rigas, Head of the Department of Air Transport, Cranfield 
University, U. K., August 1994. 
217 
shapes, weights and volumes and cannot possibly conform 1000-. to 
the aircraft structural floor load limitations. Cargo weights 
must-be spread out proportionally on the entire aircraft floor 
due to the maximum weight tolerance per square unit of 
measurement (sq. f t) , as set by the manufacturers. Thus trimming 
of the declared total net freight weight capacity becomes 
necessary. The same reasoning is applied to the declared usable 
volume capacity. Air cargo consignments are not packed to 
conform with the contoured shape of the aircraft. In an 
interview in August 1994, Mr. Asghar Shirazi the Lufthansa Cargo 
Manager, Dubai, quoted; "full volume usable capacity, as declared 
by the manufacturers, can be reached only if we use liquid to 
fill it up". 
The Lufthansa operations manual declares a usable total net 
payload (freight weight) of 102 tonnes for its B747-20OF 
freighter, inclusive of all cargo on the main deck compartment 
and two lower deck cargo compartments, while, the Singapore 
Airlines manual declares a usable total net payload for the same 
B747-200F, freighter of 104 tonnes. For the latest B747-40OF 
freighters, the usable net payload was announced by Singapore 
Airlines, on 5.7.1994, to accommodate 124 tonnes of cargo, which 
is about 20 tonnes and 34 cbm more than the B747-20OF freighter. 
The volume to weight ratio is not considered so long as the 
airlines derived their anticipated revenues from the maximum 102 
to 104 tonnes actual weight payload. The volumetric actual 
usable capacity of 600 to 625 cubic metres was considered only 
when one tonne or 1000 kgs of cargo exceeded, 6 cubic metres in 
volume. As such, volume weight was charged rather than actual 
weight in order to maintain and or increase airline revenues. 
For example, for a shipment with an actual weight of 1000 kgs, 
and dimensions of the packages, length x width x height equalling 
7 cubic metres, the chargeable volume weight would be 7x 1000 
kgs -- 6,. i. e. 1166.6 kgs instead of 1000 kgs. The volume to 
weight ratio of this aircraft is 625 cbm -. 104 tonnes =6: 1, a fact which did not disturb the (International Air Transport 
Association) IATA established ratio of 6: 1. 
IATA Resolution 502 covering low density cargo was adopted early 
in 1948. At that time, the conversion was based on 7000 cubic 
centimetres equalling 1 kg, i. e. 7: 1. The resolution was amended 
in October 19811 to reflect a conversion ratio of 6: 1. The 
rationale behind this resolution was to maximize airline freight 
revenue from low density shipments. Airlines calculated their 
revenues, in this case, based on the assumption that air cargo 
came in a variety of shapes, sizes and weights, and, therefore, 
not all cargo was low density cargo. The mixture of high and low 
density cargo onboard provided the required revenues by using 
maximum actual weight and maximum chargeable volumetric weight. 
Put simply, airlines equate 6M3 with 1 tonne of weight. 
1 IATA records point out that long before 1981, British Airways and then BEA (British European 
Airline) campaigned strongly to amend Resolution 502 to a ratio of 5: 1, but were always met by 
wide objections of member airlines of the relevant 1ATA sub committees. 
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Similarly, in the shipping mode, limits are set on a ships' 
loadable capacity in terms of measurement volume. The design of 
a certain ship determines its volumetric usable capacity. It is, 
in fact, the major constraint to its volume usable capacity. 
In 1969 'Tonnage Measurement of Ships Convention' adopted a new 
and unified system of measurement by which the tonnage of ships 
of all nations is determined. The Convention provides for gross 
and net tonnages, both of which are calculated independently. 
The gross tonnage is a realistic indication of the ship's size. 
It is based upon the moulded volume of the entire ship (hull plus 
erections and all enclosed spaces) with no deductions, exemptions 
or special allowance therefrom, while the net tonnage is a 
general indication of the ship's earning capacity. It is 
produced by a formula which is a function of the moulded volume 
of the cargo spaces, the number of passengers carried, the 
moulded depth of the ship and the summer draught. 
A cargo ship's usable capacity is a function of the stowage 
system applied to various commodity loading characteristics in 
relation to available usable space onboard. The stowage factor 
of any commodity determines the volumetric capacity in cubic 
metres that a shipment of that commodity will occupy, and not the 
actual cubic measurement of a tonne of cargo. Stowage factors 
provide 
2 
the proper space allowances for broken stowage' and 
dunnage . 
Such allowances of extra space are for 
1. Shipments of irregular shape and size; 
2. Palletised cargo; 
3. Refrigerated consignments and extra space for air circulation; 
4. Packing method and density to which the goods are pressed; 
5. Conditions of bags - fully rounded or slack; 6. Last minute, rushed-in goods for loading; and, 
7. Dead weight cargo such as, high dense, high gravity cargo in 
liquid form, barrels, drums and tanks etc. 
In brief, a space allowance for various classes of commodities is 
taken for broken stowage, and applied to the actual cubic 
measurement of a tonne or weight scale as the case may be. 
Therefore, an accurate estimate of the ship's volume usable 
capacity in relation to stowed measurement cargo can be made. 
Space, therefore, becomes the most important source of revenue to 
the ship. 
1 Broken Stowage : is caused by the presence of pillars, stanchions, brackets , web frames etc. This results in space unsuitable for cargo loading. This space must be packed firmly with suitable dunnage to prevent movement of cargo during the voyage, and to maintain stability. 
2. Dunnage in the form of collapsible timber, aluminium strips, battens, rattans, bundles of sticks, 
inflatable plastic bags, etc. may serve many purposes, depending on the nature of the cargo carried: 
a. Protection of cargo from damage and deterioration from contact with water, moisture, sweat 
and leakages from other cargo, bilges, ship sides, double bottom tanks, frames, bulkheads, 
brackets, etc. and provide ventilation and access of cool air to cargo requiring controlled 
temperature. 
b. Prevention of chafe and shock and maintaining stability by filling in broken Stowage, i. e. 
spaces which cannot be used for cargo. 
C. Maintain ship's balance by evenly spreading loads of deep Stowage. 
d. Provide working levels and gangways for labour to operate and serve. 
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The important f inding here is that generally, high density cargo 
becomes less costly to transport by ocean, while low density 
cargo enjoys a clear advantage of lower costs by air. In air 
freight, a chargeable unit is set at 1000 kgs to be equivalent to 
6 cubic metres. Volume does not become a chargeable factor in 
air freight until the 1000 kgs shipment volume exceeds 6 cubic 
metres'. In ocean transport, however, the chargeable unit is 
either 1000 kgs or I cbm, whichever is greater. For example, a 
consignment weighing 1 tonne and occupying 6 cubic metres of 
volume, with a chargeable tariff of US$ 100 per weight tonne or 
measurement tonne (cbm), will cost US $ 100 x 6cbm, i. e., US $ 
600.00. This means that the chargeable volume weight of 6 tonnes 
or 6,000 kgs results in a rate of US$ 0.10 per kg. in air 
transport, however, the same consignment can move by air at f ive 
times the ocean chargeable rate per kg (i. e US$ 0.50/kg) , and 
still remain cheaper than the ocean mode, because it will pay US$ 
0.50/kg x 1,000 kgs, which is only US$ 500. 
However, the increasing use of containers and container ships had 
its impact on the quotes per unit of volume basis. Container 
ships derived their revenues from quotes per full container size 
(container standard sizes varied from 20 ft to 40 ft to 45 ft to 
jumbo open top containers (Table 89 on the following page) 
regardless of actual cargo weights loaded inside the container. 
Maximum weight load limits were either imposed by the container 
manufacturer, taking into consideration maximum floor loads per 
square unit, or by the authorities in the countries through which 
the container moves'. 
If the shipping lines were to sell container capacities per cbm 
and not per box size, then the volume capacity computed according 
to the internal dimensions of the container is the maximum 
earning capacity. Such a capacity can be perfectly filled if 
liquid was to be used. It is, therefore, a notional volume 
capacity and the volume to weight ratio becomes also notional and 
does not ref lect the real day to day workable ratio. A much more 
reasonable volume usable capacity is reached by considering 
various shapes, sizes and weights of individual consignments and 
a stowage factor allowance of 15 - 20V be applied to the 
declared notional capacity to arrive at an adjusted and realistic 
volume to weight ratio. 
6: 1 ratio: In case 6 cbm actual weight is higher than 1,000 kgs, then the actual weight is charged. 
In some areas of the world, such as the sub-continent of India, Taiwan and Singapore, a ratio of 
7: 1 is applied in order to reduce the cost of air freighting low density, high value goods, since 
these goods are of importance to the economic development of a certain sector of their economy, 
and, hence, air export of these goods maintains employment of a large segment of the population in 
that sector. Example, readymade garments of India, orchids of Singapore and computers of Taiwan. 
2. The gross weight of a container and its contents must not exceed either the weight indicated on 
the container or the maximum weight limit imposed by the relevant authorities in the countries 
through which the container will move, whichever is less. Where any FCL exceeds these limits, the 
carrier reserves the right, at the merchant's sole risk and expense, without any responsibility 
whatsoever on behalf of the carrier, to repack the contents in one or more containers, or to make 
other arrangements as may be deemed appropriate by the carrier and to charge the additional cost 
involved. Wherever practical, repacking will take place in the presence of the merchant. Details 
of weight restrictions may be obtained from the carrier's offices. 
3.15 - 20 % Stowage factor allowance confirmed by shipping lines B/Ls, Freight Forwarders combined 
transport documents and FETA - Hong Kong Seminar on 'Sea-Air, March 1988. Appendix 1. 
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Table 89. Notional and adjusted containers 
Volume to weight ratios 
Dry Freight Container 
Designation 
Declared 
Notional 
Vol/wt. 
capacities 
m'/tonne 
Notional 
Vol/Wt 
ratio 
Adjusted 
stowage 
factor 
Vol/wt 
m'/tonne 
Adjusted 
Vol/Wt 
ratio 
1tonne 
cbm 
40 ft dry freight 67.3/27.4 2.45 55/25 2.20 
40 ft open top 64.0/26.0 2.46 58/25 2.32 
40 ft reefer 54.9/25.9 2.11 50/25 2.00 
40 ft dry high cube 75.8/27.2 2.78 68/25 2.72 
40 ft reefer high cube 65.8/25.6 2.57 58/25 2.32 
20 ft dry freight 33.0/22.1 1.49 27/20 1.35 
20 ft open top 31.5/21.8 1.44 27/20 1.35 
20 ft open top open 
side 
31.0/21.2 1.46 27/20 1.35 
26.2/17.1 1.56 1 22/15 1 1.46 
Source Compiled from ISL, and an application of 15 - 20 -t stowage factor 
allowance. 
It should be noted that the volumetric capacity of a standard 40 
ft dry freight container is slightly more than double that of a 
standard 20 ft container, while the dead-weight payload capacity 
of the 40 ft container is only 25 - 3001 higher than the 20 ft dead-weight payload, and hence a much higher volume to weight 
ratio for the 40 ft container. It follows that the 40 ft 
standard dry freight container is most suitable for low dense 
cargo as it is able to accommodate an average of 55 cbm with an 
average dead-weight of 25 tonnes, i. e. a chargeable volume ratio 
of 2.20 to the tonne. While the standard 20 ft dry cargo 
container is suitable for all kinds of cargo, low dense, high 
dense and deadweight cargo as it is able to accommodate an 
average of 27 cbm with a dead-weight of 20 tonnes, i. e. a 
chargeable weight to volume ratio of 1.35 cbm to the tonne. The 
20 ft container became much more popular and widely used by 
freight forwarders, consolidators, sea-air operators and shipping 
lines. 
At least in theory, the use of containers and container ships has 
changed the 'bulk' volume to weight ratio of 1 tonne =1 cbm to 
an increasing ratio starting from 1 tonne = 1.35 cbm in the case 
of the 20ft dry freight container, and upward to reach 1 tonne 
2.72 cbm in the case of the high cube 40 ft container (Table 89) 
This means that the cost to shippers and consignees should be 
based on the maximum usable volumetric and weight capacity of the 
container used. In the case of the 20' container, maximum usable 
volumetric and weight capacity is 27 cbm of volume and 20 tonnes 
of deadweight, i. e shipments should be costed at 1 tonne = (27 
cbm -- 20 tonnes) 1.35 cbm, whichever is greater. 
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In practice, this does not happen, as shippers are hardly able to 
fill 27 cbm in a 201 container due to the odd sizes and shapes of 
the shipments, and therefore are forced to dispatch most of the 
shipments with much less than full container loads, at the cost 
of a full container. Shipping lines base their quotes per 
container as a unit. Each quote depends on the size of the 
container in use. However, for less than container loads (LCL), 
they join the freight forwarders and the consolidators in 
offering published LCL rates to shippers and consignees 
(The 
ultimate goal of the shipping lines, consolidators and 
freight forwarders is to maintain their high standard of 
reliability rating with the shippers and consignees, and, 
therefore, are compelled to dispatch the shipments as per 
confirmed booking on the shipping lines, published voyage 
schedules. Consignments of various shapes and sizes are picked 
up from the shipper's factory or warehouse, by freight forwarders 
or consolidators, and delivered to the shipping lines' container 
terminal at port of origin, to ride the first available sailing 
from the port of origin to the port of destination. Shipments 
are loaded into containers and dispatched on time regardless of 
whether they occupy the full usable volumetric space or loadable 
freight weight of that containerj 
In order to avoid possible losses on LCLs, shipping lines 
resorted to an averaged volumetric or weight charge per shipment. 
A shipment of 15 cbm was found to be available at any time, while 
shipments of 15 weight tonnes were rare to find. LCL rates were 
constructed to produce the revenue required from a full 201 
container chargeable load, by charging a volumetric rate per cbm 
based on 15 cbm per 20, container instead of 27 cbm. This 
resulted in higher LCL rates per cbm. 
Consolidators of LCL, namely shipping lines and freight 
forwarders, concentrated their efforts on the 20 ft dry freight 
containers and started applying a much higher rate per cbm to 
small individual shipments to make up for the loss in usable 
volumetric capacity of the container. For example : Maersk 
Shipping Lines quoted in August 1994, for a full 20 ft container 
load, port to port, from Hong Kong to Dubai, US $ 1350.00, while 
consolidator's quotes ranged between US$ 60.00 to US $85.00 per 
cbm or tonne, for the same sector, depending on the size and 
measurement chargeable weight of the individual shipment; the 
higher the chargeable measurement weight of the shipment, the 
lesser the rate per cbm or tonne ( Table 89, page 220). 
If the full 20 ft container load rate of US$ 1350 were to apply 
to the 27 cbm, as a sum of individual cbm units, and if LCLs were 
readily available to produce, when grouped, 27 cbm per 201 
container, then the LCL rate would have normally been US$ 1350 + 
27 cbm = US$ 50.00 per cbm instead of US$ 85.00 to US$ 60.00 per 
cbm. The trick is in the application of higher rates per cbm and 
the old, well -established, well-known chargeable quote of 1 to4ne 
=1 cbm, whichever is greater, remains in effect. 
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In the case of low density LCL cargo; a consolidator fills a 201 
container with a number of individual shipments grouped together 
with a total measurement volume of 20 cbm and a deadweight of 4.5 
tonnes. The charge to the shippers is assessed according to the 
volumetric weight of each individual shipment, which are higher 
than its deadweight. As the highest rate of US$ 85.00 per cbm 
will be charged for small shipments (Table 93, below) , therefore, 20 cbm x US$ 85.00 = US$ 1700, will be charged, which is much 
higher than the US$ 1350.00 shipping line rate per 201 container 
as a unit. 
In the case of one single shipment with a volumetric chargeable 
weight of 20 cbm, and a deadweight of 4.5 tonnes, a much lower 
rate, anywhere between US$ 60.00 to US$ 85.00 per cbm, will be 
charged. Assuming a charge of US$ 70.00 per cbm x 20 cbm = US$ 
1400.00, the charge is still higher than the shipping line rate 
of US$ 1350.00 per 201 container as a unit (Table 90, below). 
In the case of high density LCL cargo; the consolidation of 
several individual high density shipments, such as metal spare 
parts, may result in a higher deadweight to volumetric ratio such 
as, 20 deadweight tonnes and 16 cbm. The charge that will apply 
is that of 1 cbm =1 tonne, whichever is greater. In this case 
the deadweight is higher than the cbm volume. Therefore, 20 
tonnes will be charged at US$ 85.00 per tonne x 20 tonnes = US$ 
1700.00, which is much higher than Maersk's full 20 ft container 
rate of US$ 1,350.00. 
Table 90: Shipping Lines'/Freight Forwarders' 
FCL and LCL rates (w/m), July 1994. 
Sector: HongKong/Dubai IFCL/20 ft LCLs + 20 cbm LCLs + Scbm 
Maersk Lines $1,350.00 $60.00/cbm $ 75.50/cbm 
APL $1,200.00 $60.00/cbm $ 85.00/cbm 
Senator Lines $1,150.00 $60.00/cbm $ 70.00/cbm 
Cosco $1,050.00 $60.00/cbm $ 70.00/cbm 
NYK $1,325.00 $60.00/cbm $ 75.50/cbm 
Freight Forwarders $1,250.00 $60.00/cbm $ 75.00/cbm 
Source: Shipping Lines and Freight Forwarders 1994 quotes. 
w1m: weight or measurement, whichever is greater. 
Notes: 
The first column shows rates applicable on FCLs by various shipping lines and freight fox-warders. 
The second column shows rates applicable on LCLs subject to consolidation with 
other shipments, in the same container. 
LCL + 20 cbm means individual shipments having a volumetric chargeable 
measurement of 20 cubic metres and over. 
The third column, LCL + 5cbm means individual shipments having a volumetric 
chargeable volume of 5 cubic metres and over. 
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Conclusions : 
Low density LCL cargo: The rate per cbm of a shipment 
varies with the volumetric capacity that a cbm of that 
shipment assumes in relation to the total usable volumetric 
capacity of a container. The higher the volume of usable 
capacity that a shipment cbm occupies, the lower is the rate 
per cbm. 
2. High density LCL cargo: The rate per deadweight of a 
shipment varies with the total deadweight capacity of a 
container. The higher the deadweight tonnage of a single 
shipment, the higher is the chargeable rate per deadweight 
tonne. 
Many shipping lines realised the higher earning from LCL (Less 
than full container load) shipments consolidation. In addition 
to their quest of maintaining their clientele, they started their 
own LCL consolidation services, similar in many respects to the 
already existing freight forwarders, services, though the rates 
applied per cbm were different. Examples are given in Table 90, 
on the preceding page: Rates in US $/20 ft FCLs and LCLs 
(consolidation rates/cbm) are quoted by various shipping lines 
and consolidators during 1994 with validity up to the end of Dec. 
1994. The sector quoted is Hong Kong - Dubai, port to port. 
Most high volume goods such as computers, monitors and related 
equipment, musical instruments, readymade garments, footwear, 
telecommunications equipment, vehicles, spare parts and the like, 
have a very low density and therefore produce an adverse weight 
to volume ratio in containerised ocean freight. Such commodities 
occupy the full average usable volumetric space of a 20 ft 
container, i. e. 27 cbm, when available in large quantities, with 
a deadweight ranging f rom 4-5 tonnes. In these cases, the unit 
charge per 201 container will apply. 
On the air freight side, a similar development took place and 
Unit Load Devices (ULDs) were introduced. Until the mid 1960s, 
all cargo (freight, mail, baggage) was carried loosely loaded in 
the cargo holds of passenger aircraft and in small all cargo 
aircraft. The introduction of the then large all cargo aircraft, 
the B707 and the DC8 in the mid 1960s (though both aircraft first 
entered world service in 1958 and 1959 respectively, cargo 
versions or conversions did not come about until the mid 1960s) . 
This meant long turn-around time at airports due to the lengthy 
unloading/loading time involved in bulk cargo. In order to speed 
the ground handling process, pallets, together with fast 
loading/unloading equipment and suitably designed aircraft floors 
were introduced. Pallets were either rectangular or contoured to 
prevent damage to the aircraft interior, and, at the same time, 
make full use of the contoured volumetric shape of the aircraft 
loadable space. 
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Cargo itself, on pallets, required protection from damage, 
pilferage and weather conditions, while on the apron. igloos, 
(non-structural shells or covers to the pallets) were introduced 
to provide the protection required. Pallets were met with 
immediate wide acceptance by the air carriers who were then 
dominantly passenger oriented carriers aiming for the shortest 
possible turnround time at airports. With the increasing use of 
pallets, it was found that the pallets were relatively unstable 
and vulnerable to shifting during the ground handling process. 
To overcome this possibility of shifting, restraint systems to 
aircraft floors were introduced, giving much greater support to 
the cargo during air carriage. The standardisation of ULDs in 
the form of standardised dimensions of pallets, igloos and 
containers made them compatible with various aircraft types. 
Thus each type of aircraft had a compatible set of ULDs that 
rendered maximum space utilisation. The only drawback is that 
the present use of ULDs, whether air ULDs or ocean ULDs, entails 
consolidation and break-bulk of cargo at both ends of each 
segment of the sea-air journey. To avoid break-bulking, an 
intermodal ULD would bridge the gap, but is yet to be seen, as it 
is still in the experimental stages. The problems that are 
delaying its introduction are : 
1. Air ULDs are relatively very light in weight and fragile for 
surface transport. 
2. Surface ULDs are relatively very heavy, and not suited for 
efficient aircraft use. 
3. Shapes of both vary greatly and a net loss sacrifice of 
space utilisation is envisaged in both air and surface modes 
before the successful introduction of standardised sizes of 
the would be intermodal ULDs can take place. 
10.3 Total Distribution Costs 
The following six case studies represent shipments of various 
commodities of values starting from US$ 4.00 to over US$ 20.00 
per kg, and characterised by their low and high density nature 
(measurement volume to weight ratio) that are regularly moving by 
all three modes of transport, namely air, all ocean and sea-air. 
The aim of these case studies is to assess the relative costs of 
the three different modes of transport in order to make a 
quantitative and qualitative assessment of the conditions under 
which shipments switch from sea to sea-air or air. 
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Model Case Studv No. 1- low density/medium value shipment 
Product: Readymade garments 
origin: Taiwan 
Destination: Frankfurt 
Monetary Unit: us Dollars 
Chargeable weight unit: Kilosltonneslcubic metres 
Volume and weight: 11.5 cbm11,306 kgs. 
FOB value (US$) 18,381kg (US$ 24,000 + 1,306 kgs) 
A. Inputs 
Mode of transport Sea Air Sea-air 
1. As per letter of credit: 90 30 45 
credit line (days) 
2. Average ex factory to consignee's 33 5 17 
door transit time (days) 
3. Maximum ex factory to consignee's 35 6 18 
door transit time (days) 
4. Minimum ex factory to consignee's 31 4 16 
door transit time (days) 
5. Net weight (kgs) 1,208 1,208 1,208 
6. Packaging weight 98 98 98 
7. Gross deadweight (kgs) 1,306 1,306 1,306 
8. Shipment volume (cbm) 11.5 11.5 11.5 
9. Gross chargeable volume weight (kgs) 11,500. 1,916 1,916 
10. Freight rate per kg (US$)' 0.18 2.70 1.70 
11. Packaging cost (US$)2 0.20 0.20 0.20 
12. Freight Forwarder's cost pick 
up ex factory to FOB (US$) 0.20 0.20 0.20 
(Free on Board ready for carriage) 
13. Insurance cost t 0.5 0.2 0.3 
14. Warehousing and stockpiling cost 0.16ý 0.04 0.04 
15. Average interest on credit line 12.0%ý 12.0 It 12.0%- 
and capital tied up k p. a. 
16. Duty type CIF & rate % 12.0%- 12. Olk 12.0% 
Total distribution cost (US$) Sea Air Sea-air 
1. Ex factory value including warehousing 24,000 24,000 24,000 
and insurance costs 
2. Packaging cost at origin 261 261 261 
3. Ex factory to ready for carriage cost 270 270 270 
4. FOB Value 24,531 24,531 24,531 
5. Freightage - export gateway to import 2,070 5,173 3,257 
gateway - port to port or airport 
6. Custom clearances, pick-ups & deliveries 1,091 436 655 
ex factory to consignee's door' 
7. Insurance, port of origin to consignee's 135 54 81 
door' 
8. Warehousing and stockpiling at 200 50 50 
destination 
9. Interest an capital tied up at an average 840 336 504 
12% p. a. 
10. CIF value (cost/insurance/freight) 28,867 30,580 29,078 
11. Duty rate of 121 on CIF values 3,464 3,669 3,489 
12. Total distribution cost (total product 
cost plus delivery, less factory value) 8,331 10,249 8,567 
13. Total product cost plus delivery to 32,331 34,249 32,567 
consignee's warehouse. 
14. !k increase/decrease over direct ocean. - + 5.9k + 0.7%- 
Freight rate per kg. Air freight rates are quoted airport to airport. Sea freight rates are quoted 
port to port, and sea-air rates are quoted to include break bulk and build up of pallets for air 
lift. Air freight rates from a transfer hub are quoted to apply for any air shipment, and no 
special consideration is given to a sea-air shipment. 
2. Packaging cost: It is the same under the three modes, since the same packing method is used for air 
or sea freight in containers. Bulk shipping packaging is excluded as it does not apply today. 
3. Under all ocean & pure air freight modes, figures include costs of 2 customs clearances & pick-ups 
& deliveries, once at origin and once at destination, while under the sea-air mode, a third is 
included, that of 'inbond' customs clearance and deliveries from ports to airport at a transfer hub. 
4. Insurance: Insurance companies calculate full risks coverage premiums by adding 10% to FOB value 
for freightage and delivery to consignee's door and apply their % rates on the total. 
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The important factors in this case study, and those that follow, 
are the variable factors, shown under 'Inputs', governing the 
total distribution cost. 
A. Input 
1. Freightage: the chargeable weight and rate under each 
mode. 
2. Warehousing and stockpiling at destination. 
3. Door to door insurance. 
4. Interest on capital tied up/credit line. 
B. Output 
1. Total delivered value of product in relation to total 
distribution cost of each mode. 
2. Convertibility from the ocean mode to the sea-air and 
air modes by considering total delivered costs of each 
as a percentage increase or decrease over or below that 
of the ocean mode. 
A. Inputs: 
Freightage is the most important factor in the build up of the 
total distribution cost. The charge in ocean transport is icbm 
=1 tonne (1,000 kgs), whichever is greater. The measurement 
weight in this case study is 11.5 cbm, which is higher than the 
dead weight of 1,306 kgs, or 1.3 tonnes. Therefore, 11.5 cbm are 
charged at US$ 180.00 per cbm, from Kaochung port in Taiwan to 
Frankfurt, via the port of Hamburg (inclusive of overland 
trucking to Frankfurt) , as quoted by Maersk Lines in August 1994, 
equals 11.5 x 180.00 = US$ 2,070.00. In order to have a 
meaningful comparison of the chargeable weights of the three 
modes of transport, the shipping lines' quote per tonne or cbm is 
converted to a quote per kilogramme by dividing the rate of US$ 
180.00 per tonne or cbm, by 1,000 kgs, yielding a rate of US$ 
0.18 per kg, which is applied throughout all the case studies. 
In air freight, 6 cbm = 1*, 000 kgs or 1 tonne, which means (11.5 
6) = 1,916 kgs x US$ 2.70/kg (quoted by Air China in 1994) 
US$ 5,173.00 for direct air freight. This rate is applied for 
all the case studies that follow. 
The charge under sea-air is a combination of the two modes' 
chargeable measurement of volume to weight ratios. A quote per 
kg is derived based on the air freight ratio for the second 
segment of the journey, as follows: 
1. The ocean transport charge of 11.5 cbms is charged for the 
first segment of the journey - Maersk Lines quoted in August 
1994 for the ocean sector Taipei/Dubai, US$ 80.00 per cbm. 
Therefore, 11.5 cbm x US$ 80.00 US$ 920.00. 
2. The air freight charge of (11.5 6) = 1,916 kgs for the 
second segment of the journey, i. e. the air freight rate (as 
quoted by Lufthansa in August 1994) of US$ 1.22/kg, for the 
sector Dubai /Frankfurt, was 1,916 kgs x US$ 1.22 = US$ 
2,337.00. It is worth mentioning here that rates quoted by 
Maersk and Lufthansa are commisionable to the forwarder. 
3. Combining both charges, US$ 2,337 + US$ 920.00 = the total 
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sea-air charge of US$ 3,257.00. To construct a single 
through sea-air rate, the total sea-air charges of US$ 3,257 
are divided by 1,916 kgs (the chargeable weight under the 
air freight ratio of 6: 1) yielding the sea-air rate of US$ 
1.70, as quoted by the consolidator in Taiwan. This sea-air 
rate is quoted throughout the case studies that follow. 
The innovative introduction of a single through sea-air rate, 
constructed as per the method shown above, was initiated by the 
freight forwarder (sea-air operator) in the early 1980s in an 
attempt to eliminate the possibility of confusing shippers and 
consignees with a multiplicity of rates covering each mode of 
transport used in the sea-air journey of a shipment to its final 
destination. It started as a convenience, and later developed 
into a fundamental characteristic of the sea-air operator, and 
that is; his ability to quote a single through rate and issue a 
'Combined Transport Document' (CTD) covering all modes of 
transport, used from port of origin to airport of destination, or 
ex works at origin to consignee's door. 
Stockpiling and warehousing, in the case of all-ocean, is costly 
because of the nature of container handling, and the fact that 
all incoming containers must first be moved from the entry port 
to the central container terminal for break-bulking and customs 
clearance before delivery to consignee's warehouse. This 
operation is time consuming and costly when compared to the 
arrival of shipments by air to the entry gateway airport, where 
customs clearance is done within the hour, or prior to arrival, 
and shipments are carried from the airport and distributed to 
consignee outlets within the country. Sea-air shipments enjoy 
this quality as the second segment of the journey is air, and 
what is applicable to direct air freight is also applicable to 
sea-air. Air freight shipments are urgent shipments, and are not 
meant to undergo warehousing, stockpiling, inventory tracing, 
etc. In addition, the recurrence of air freight shipments is 
much higher than that of ocean. Therefore, the number of air 
shipments 'passing through' the destination warehouse to the end 
users is much greater and, hence, the average cost per 'stay 
time' at the warehouse is lower, per shipment, than that for 
ocean. The air/ocean stockpiling cost ratio is 4: 1, i. e ocean 
stockpiling costs are four times as much as air, on average. 
Insurance coverage rates, applicable to FOB value, vary from 0.211 
to 0.311 to 0.511, depending on the mode of transport used. In 
ocean, the B/L maximum liability, in case of loss and damage, 
partial or total, is limited by the Hague-Visby Rules and the 
Brussels Protocol of 1968 to a maximum of 2 SDR (Special Drawing 
Rights) which is equivalent to US$ 2.00/kg. Such a low liability 
limit forces the shipper and consignee to seek additional 
insurance as per FOB value, and therefore a higher insurance 
premium is levied on declared value in excess of US$ 2.00 per kg. 
In air freight, the airline's maximum liability, as set by the 
Warsaw Convention, is not to exceed US$ 20.00 per kg, covering 
damage and loss, partial or total, including excessive delays. 
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Since this is considered to be a sufficient cover, no additional 
insurance coverage is required unless the value of the shipment 
exceeds the US$ 20.00 per kg. Then the value is declared on the 
Air Waybill and a premium is levied on the excess value declared. 
In sea-air, additional coverage is required to cover the ocean 
segment of the journey. Further, freight forwarders provide a 
blanket coverage to their pick-up and delivery activities, 
whether at export centres at origin ex factory to 'ready for 
carriage, delivery at carrier's export gateways' receiving bays, 
or at sea-air transfer ports from the time they collect shipments 
from shipping line container terminals to the time of delivery to 
the airline, or at airports of final destination, from the time 
they collect shipments to delivery time at the consignee's door. 
Freight forwarders construct their rates and charges to include 
the premium of the blanket insurance and, therefore, no premium 
is charged separately to shippers and consignees. Despite the 
adequate airline coverage, shippers and consignees seek 
additional insurance from specialised brokers or insurance 
institutions. These brokers and insurers are fully aware of the 
airline coverage and therefore apply a much lower rate on air 
freight of 0.2% and slightly higher on sea-air at 0.3% and 0.5% 
on all-ocean. 
As for interest, the consignee opens a letter of credit (L/C) 
through his bank in favour of the shipper. The L/C specifies a 
date of order delivery to the carrier who issues an Air Waybill 
(AWB) in case of direct air or a Bill of Lading (B/L) in case of 
direct ocean and a Combined Transport Document (CTD) in case of 
sea-air, on receipt of the ordered shipment. The shipper 
negotiates the L/C with the consignee's bank correspondent in his 
country and submits the required originals of the carrier 
transport documents, invoices and packing lists and cashes the 
CIF value of the goods. From the date of payment to the shipper, 
the bank extends a credit line to the consignee (at an averaged 
interest rate of 12% pa) for settlement that varies with the mode 
of transport used; 30 days for air freight, 45 days for sea-air 
and 90 days for all-ocean. 
The total delivered value of the shipment, including duties, 
becomes quite important to the consignee when related to the 
total distribution costs ex factory to consignee's door. 
Ocean total distribution costs of US$ 8,331.00 represents 25.8% 
of total delivered value. 
Sea-air total distribution costs of US$ 8,567.00 represents 26.3% 
of total delivered value. 
Air total distribution costs of US$ 10,249.00 represents 29.9% of 
total delivered value. 
Immediately, the convertibility of ocean freight to sea-air is 
clearly seen, as the sea-air mode transport total delivered 
costs, differs by a fraction of a percentage point, 0.7%, higher 
than that of all-ocean. Further, the sea-air mode offers a 
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number of advantages over all ocean mode, namely: 
1. Transit time is cut by almost 50-11; (17 days vs. 33 days) 
2. Arrival of the shipment into the airport nearest to the 
consignee, rather than into the port most convenient to the 
shipping lines. 
3. Faster and much less costly customs clearances and 
deliveries from airports as against sea ports. 
These advantages constitute important considerations to the f inal 
consignee who is concerned to supply the goods to the market 
place as soon as possible. The faster the goods are sold, faster 
is the capital replenished. on the other hand, convertibility to 
direct air becomes also possible when the speed of delivery (5 
days vs. 33 days) is considered against the percentage increase 
in total delivered product value of only 5.9ou over that of ocean. 
In conclusion, low density products, having medium value, are 
readily convertible from the ocean mode to the sea-air mode as 
the difference between the two modes, total distribution cost is 
negligible, while conversion to the direct air mode depends on 
whether the speed of delivery is essential to the consignee and 
justifies an increase of total delivered cost of 5.991k. 
Model Case Studv No. 2- low density/high value shipment 
15 cbm/1,200 kgs. FOB Value: US$ 34.00/kg. 
Product: Toys 
Origin: Hong Kong 
Des tination: Frankfurt 
Monetary Unit: US Dollars 
Chargeable weight unit: Kilosltonneslcubic metr es 
Mode of transport Sea Air Sea-air 
1. As per letter of credit: 90 30 45 
credit line (days) 
2. Average ex factory to consignee's 33 5 17 
door transit time (days) 
7. Gross deadweight (kgs) 1200 1200 1200 
8. Shipment volume (cbm) is 15 115 
9. Gross chargeable volume weight (kgs) 15,000 2,500 2,500 
10. Freight rate per kg (US$) 0.18 2.70 1.70 
Total distribution cost (US$) Sea Air Sea-air 
1. Ex factory value including warehousing 40,000 40,000 40,000 
and insurance costs 
2. Packaging cost at origin 400 400 400 
3. Ex factory to ready for carriage cost 400 400 400 
4. FOB Value 40,800 40,800 40,800 
5. Freightage - export gateway to import 2,700 6,750 4,250 
gateway - port to port or airport 
6. Customs clearances, pick-ups & deliveries 1,815 726 1,089 
ex factory to consignee's door 
7. Insurance, port of origin to consignee's 225 90 135 
door 
8. Warehousing and stockpiling at 280 70 70 
destination 
9. Ifiterest on capital tied up at an average 1,224 490 734 
12k p. a. 
10. CIF value (cost/insurance/freight) 47,044 48,926 47,078 
11. Duty rate of 12% on CIF values 5,645 5,871 5,649 
12. Total distribution cost 12,689 14,797 12,727 
13. Total product cost plus delivery to 52,689 54,797 52,727 
consignee's warehouse. 
14. % increase/decrease over direct ocean. - + 4.0%- + 0.07V 
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In this model, the high value of the shipment is highlighted, 
while its low density is similar to that in Model case No. 1. 
The impact of high value products is seen when total distribution 
cost is related to the total value of the delivered shipment. 
Ocean total distribution cost of US$ 12,689.00 represent 24. Ok of 
the total cost of the delivered product. 
Sea-air total distribution costs of US$ 12,727.00 represents 
24.1*1 of the total cost of the delivered proddct. 
Air total distribution cost of US$ 14,797.00 represent 27. Ot of 
the total cost of the delivered product. 
The convertibility from the ocean mode to the sea-air mode is 
inevitable as the difference is only 0.070-. between them, ' in 
relation to the total value of the delivered product. While the 
convertibility from the ocean mode to the direct air mode can be 
termed as acceptable because the difference in total delivered 
costs of the two modes of only 40ý should be outweighed by the 
speed of air delivery. In conclusion; the higher the value of 
low density cargo, the lower is the difference in the total 
distribution cost, in relation to the delivered product value of 
the three modes, especially that of sea-air. 
Model Case Studv No. 3- medium density/high value shipment 
6 cbm/1,200 kgs. FOB Val ue: US$ 42.17/kg. 
Pro duct: imitation Jewellery 
origin: Hong Kong 
Des tination: Frankfurt 
Mon etary Unit: US Dollars 
Chargeable weight unit: Kilosltonneslcubic metres 
Mode of transport Sea Air Sea-air 
1. As per letter of credit: 90 30 45 
credit line (days) 
2. Average ex factory to consignee's 33 5 17 
door transit time (days) 
7. Gross deadweight (kgs) 1200 1200 1200 
8. Shipment volume (cbm) 6 6 6 
9. Gross chargeable volume weight (kgs) 6,000 1,200 1,200 
10. Freight rate per kg (US$) 0.18 2.70 1.70 
Total distribution cost (US$) Sea Air Sea-air 
1. Ex factory value including warehousing 50,000 50,000 50,000 
and insurance costs 
2. Packaging cost at origin 300 300 300 
3. Ex factory to ready for carriage cost 300 300 300 
4. FOB Value 50,600 50,600 50,600 
5. Freightage - export gateway to import 1,080 3,240 2,040 
gateway - port to port or airport 
6. Customs clearances, pick-ups & deliveries 2,250 900 1,350 
ex factory to consignee's door 
7. Insurance, port of origin to consignee's 280 112 168 door 
8. warehousing/stockpiling at destination 280 70 70 
9. Interest on capital tied up at 12% p. a. 1,518 607 910 
10. CIF value (cost/insurance/freight) 56,008 55,529 55,138 
11. Duty rate of 12% on CIF values 6,720 6,663 6,616 
12. Total distribution cost 12,728 12,192 11,754 
13. Total product cost plus delivery to 62,728 62,192 61,754 
consignee's warehouse. 
14. t increase/decrease over direct ocean. - - I. OW - 1.6%- 
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In this model, the density and the value of the shipment is 
highlighted. The impact of both is as follows: 
Ocean total distribution cost of US$ 12,728.00 represent 20.3t of 
the total cost of the delivered product. 
Sea-air total distribution costs of US$ 11,754.00 represent 19. Ot 
of the total cost of the delivered product. 
Air total distribution costs of US$ 12,192.00 represent 19.6t of 
the total cost of the delivered product. 
The convertibility from the ocean mode to the air and sea-air 
mode is clearly seen as inevitable because both result in lower 
than ocean total cost of the delivered product. Air is lower by 
1.01i and sea-air by 1.611. 
In conclusion; the higher the value of medium density cargo, the 
higher is the ocean mode total cost of delivered product vis-a- 
vis the sea-air and direct air totals. This is a case where the 
sea-air and direct air modes are less costly than the ocean mode. 
Model Case Studv No. 4- high density/low value shipment 
3 cbm/1,200 kgs. FOB Value: US$ 4.00/kg. 
Product: Metal spare parts 
origin: Hong Kong 
Destination: Frankfurt 
Monetary Unit: US Dollars 
Chargeable weight unit: Kilosltonneslcubic metres 
Mode of transport Sea 
1. As per letter of credit: 90 
creait line (days) 
2. Average ex factory to consignee's 
door transit time (days) 
7. Gross deadweight (kgs) 
8. Shipment volume (cbm) 
9. Gross chargeable volume weight (kgs) 
10. Freight rate per kq (US$) 
Total distribution cost (UM 
1. Ex factory value including warehousing 
and insurance costs 
2. Packaging cost at origin 
3. Ex factory to ready for carriage cost 
4. FOB Value 
5. Freightage - export gateway to import 
gateway - port to port or airport 
6. Customs clearances, pick-ups & deliveries 
ex factory to consignee's door 
7. Insurance, port of origin to consignee's 
door 
8. Warehousing and stockpiling at 
destination 
9. Interest on capital tied up at an average 
12% p. a. 
10. CIF value (cost/insurance/freight) 
11. Duty rate of 121r on CIF values 
12. Total distribution cost 
13. Total product cost plus delivery to 
consignee's warehouse 
14. t increase/decrease over direct ocean. 
33 
1200 
3 
3,000 
0.18 
Sea 
4,000 
400 
400 
4,800 
540 
Air Sea-air 
30 45 
5 17 
1200 1200 
3 3 
1,200 1,200 
2.70 1.70 
Air Sea-air 
4,000 4,000 
400 400 
400 400 
4,800 4,800 
3,240 2,040 
214 85 128 
26 11 16 
96 24 24 
144 48 72 
5,820 8,208 7,008 
698 985 840 
2,518 5,193 3,848 
6,518 9,193 7,848 
+ 41. Ot + 20.4 W 
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In model case No. 4, the density of the shipment is high and its 
value is low. The impact of high density and low value is as 
follows: 
Ocean total distribution cost of US$ 2,518.00 represent 38.60-. of 
the total cost of the delivered product. 
Sea-air total distribution costs of US$ 3,848.00 represent 49.011 
of the total cost of the delivered product. 
Air total distribution cost of US$ 5,193.00 represent 56.5% of 
the total costýof the delivered product. 
This is a case where the conversion of all ocean to other modes 
is very costly. Both direct air and sea-air total delivered 
costs are 41.0% and 20.4% higher than that of ocean, 
respectively. 
In conclusion; the lower the value of high density cargo, the 
higher are the differences in the total distribution costs among 
the three modes, with a much lower ocean mode total cost of 
delivered product vis-&-vis the sea-air and direct air modes. 
Convertibility becomes much less viable, and, therefore, the all 
ocean mode assumes dominance. 
Model Case Studv No. 5- high density/medium value shipment 
4 cbm/1,200 kgs. FOB Value: US$ 8.00/kg. 
Product: Electronic spares and tools 
Origin: Hong Kong 
Des tination: London 
Monetary Unit: US Dollars 
Chargeable weight unit: Kilosltonneslcu bic metres 
Mode of transport Sea Air Sea-air 
1. As per letter of credit: 90 30 45 
credit line (days) 
2. Average ex factory to consignee's 33 5 17 
door transit time (days) 
7. Gross deadweight (kgs) 1200 1200 1200 
8. Shipment volume (cbm) 4 4 4 
9. Gross chargeable volume weight (kgs) 4,000 1,200 1,200 
10. Freight rate per kg (US$) 0.18 2.70 1.70 
Total distribution cost (US$) Sea Air Sea-air 
1. Ex factory value including warehousing 9,000 9,000 9,000 
and insurance costs 
2. Packaging cost at origin 300 300 300 
3. Ex factory to ready for carriage cost 300 300 300 
4. FOB Value 9,600 9,600 9,600 
5. Freightage - export gateway to import 720 3,240 2,040 
gateway - port to port or airport 
6. Customs clearances, pick-ups & deliveries 427 171 256 
ex factory to consignee's door 
7. Insurance, port of origin to consignee's 53 21 32 
door 
B. Warehousing and stockpiling at 128 32 32 
destination 
9. Interest on capital tied up at an average 288 96 144 
12% p. a. 
10. CIF value (cost/insurance/freight) 11,216 13,160 12,104 
11. Duty rate of 12% on CIF values 1,345 1,579 1,452 
12. Total distribution cost 3,561 5,739 4,556 
13. Total product cost plus delivery to 12,561 14,739 13,556 
consignee's warehouse. 
14. t increase/decrease over direct ocean. - + 17.3% + 7.996 
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Model case No. 5 highlights high density and medium value. The 
impact of both is as follows: 
Ocean total distribution cost of US$ 3,561.00 represent 28.3% of 
the total cost of-the delivered product. 
Sea-air total distribution costs of US$ 4,556.00 represent 33.6% 
of the total cost of the delivered product. 
Air total distribution cost of US$ 5,739.00 represent 38.9% of 
the total cost of the delivered product. 
Again, the lower the value of high density cargo, the higher the 
difference in costs among the three modes of transport. The 
lowest total cost, whether that of distribution or delivered 
product, is clearly shown in the ocean mode, and, therefore, the 
convertibility from the ocean mode to the air or sea-air mode is 
subject to careful considerations of the conclusions and 
advantages listed under Model Case No. 1, as the difference 
between the ocean mode total delivered cost, in relation to that 
of sea-air, is 7.911, and 17.3% over that of air freight -a 
relatively high percentage when considering the per kg FOB value 
of the product. Adding the sea-air 7.9t to the total delivered 
product value means an increase of over 10. Ot on the product FOB 
value or US$ 0.83 per kg (sea-air total distribution cost of US$ 
4,556.00 less ocean total distribution cost of US$ 3,561.00 US$ 
995.00, divided by 1,200 kgs, the weight of the shipment US$ 
0.83 per kg increase in FOB value) ,a cost which may not be 
competitive in the market place and, therefore, the end user may 
be quite reluctant to convert to the sea-air mode. The direct 
air freight mode is ruled out as the increase in total delivered 
cost is very high at 17.3t, to consider conversion. 
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Model Case Study No. 6- high density/high value shipment 
3 cbm/1,200 kgs. FOB Value: US$ 22.00/kg. 
Product: Electronic generators and engines 
Origin: Hong Kong 
Destination: London 
Monetary Unit: US Dollars 
Chargeable weight unit: Kilosltonneslcubic 
Mode of transport 
1. As per letter of credit: 
credit line (days) 
2. Average ex factory to consignee's 
door transit time (days) 
7. Gross deadweight (kgs) 
8. Shipment volume (cbm) 
9. Gross chargeable volume weight (kgs) 
10. Freight rate per kg (US$) 
Total distribution cost (US$) 
1. Ex factory value including warehousing 
and insurance costs 
2. Packaging cost at origin 
3. Ex factory to ready for carriage cost 
4. FOB Value 
5. Freightage - export gateway to import 
gateway - port to port or airport 
6. Customs clearances, pick-ups & deliveries 
ex factory to consignee's door 
7. Insurance, port of origin to consignee's 
door 
8. Warehousing and stockpiling at 
destination 
9. Interest on capital tied up at an average 
12%r p. a. 
10. CIF value (cost/insurance/freight) 
11. Duty rate of 12k on CIF values 
12. Total distribution cost 
13. Total product cost plus delivery to 
consignee's warehouse. 
14. k increase/decrease over direct ocean. 
metres 
Sea Air 
90 30 
33 5 
1200 
'3 
3,000 
0.18 
Sea 
26,000 
200 
200 
26,400 
540 
Sea-air 
45 
17 
l? 00 1200 
3 3 
1,200 1,2*00 
2.70 1.70 
Air Sea. -air 
26,000 26,000 
200 
200 
26,400 
3,240 
200 
200 
26,400 - 
2,040 
1,175 470 705 
145 58 87 
216 54 54 
792 264 396 
29,268 30,486 29,682 
3,512 3,658 3,561 
6,780 8,144 7,243 
32,780 34,144 33,243 
4.2%- 
Model case No. 6, represents the counterpart of Model Case No. 1- 
Here the density is high instead of low and the value is high 
instead of medium. The impact of high value reduces the negation 
of high density cargo to convertibility. 
Ocean total distribution costs of US$ 6,780.00 reflect 20.716 of 
the total cost of the delivered product. 
Sea-air total distribution costs of US$ 7,243.00 reflect 21.8-06 of 
the total cost of the delivered product. 
Air total distribution cost of US$ 8,144.00 reflect 23.8! k of the 
total cost of the delivered product. 
High value shipments reduce the differences in total costs of distribution and delivery among the three modes of transport, - and 
therefore enhance the possibilities of convertibility from the 
ocean mode to the sea-air and direct air mode. The differences between ocean total costs of delivery, in relation to that of 
sea-air is 1.40t, and 4.2". - in the case of direct air. Both differences can be positively considered in the light of the 
advantages and conclusions cited under Case No. 1, especially the 
speed of delivery. 
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In summary, the conclusions of the six model cases, as depicted 
on the following page, demonstrate that: 
The higher the value of medium to low density cargo, the lower 
are the differences in the total costs of distribution and 
delivery among the three modes, and, therefore, the 
convertibility from the ocean mode to the sea-air or direct air 
mode is easier. 
The lower the value of medium to high density cargo, the greater 
are the differences in total cost of distribution and delivery 
among the three modes, and, therefore, the convertibility from 
the ocean mode to the sea-air or direct air mode is much less 
viable. 
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Chapter 11 
Conclusions 
This study has established, for the first time, the importance 
and role of the sea-air mode in international trade, previously 
underestimated, and now growing rapidly. 
Sea-air started attracting its traf f ic f rom pure ocean f reight in 
the early 1980s with only a trickle of cargo. By 1994 the total 
sea-air volume for that year, uplifted by air from the six world 
major sea-air hubs of Miami, Seattle, Los Angeles, Singapore, 
Vancouver and the U. A. E. was as follows: 
Miami: 256,000 tonnes 
Seattle: 57,000 tonnes 
Los Angeles: 100,000 tonnes 
Singapore/Vancouver: 15,000 tonnes 
U. A. E. 25,000 tonnes 
Total 453,000 tonnes 
As the sea-air mode assumes the role of direct air at transfer 
hubs, it becomes, therefore, an important factor in the present 
and future development of the air freight industry. Its current 
contribution is shown through its ability to convert 453 thousand 
tonnes from the ocean mode to the direct air freight mode, thus 
generating new and additional revenues to the airline industry 
(computed at an average of US$ 1.10/kg in 1994) of approximately 
US$ 500 million. In 1994, the Freight Load Factor reached 55.5% 
(Table 5, page 18) of the total available world scheduled 
international air cargo capacities as compared to 51.1t in 1982. 
Control over the cargo flow already lost to the freight 
forwarder, became crucial to the airline industry in order to 
maintain their clientele. In previous chapters, attempts were 
made to identify measures adopted by the airline industry to 
regain control over the air cargo flow and its clientele (Chapter 
3). The airline industry was forced to modify and extend its 
role from the air carriage of cargo from one airport to another, 
to the total distribution of cargo flow ex factory to consignee's 
door, thus becoming fully involved in the total logistics chain 
of air cargo through the use of other means of transport, besides 
aircraft, such as trucks and railways. In short, they became 
involved with intermodality. 
Many major world airlines operate their own trucking system 
from/to their air gateway hubs in all six regions of the world, 
and directly interface with shippers and consignees. Further, a 
great number of airlines use the services of their country's 
railway system for pick up and delivery of air consignments from/ 
to their major airport cargo hub, such as Us air carriers, the 
Canadians, the Japanese and, to a lesser extent, the Europeans. 
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The airline industry has succeeded in penetrating deep into the 
air-land intermodality which was the exclusive domain of the 
freight forwarders and the NVOCCs (Non Vessel Owning Common 
Carriers). Competition continues in full force between the 
airlines and the freight forwarders over the control of air cargo 
flow and its clientele'. 
However, while the airline industry successfully penetrated the 
air-land intermodality, it has so far been unable to prevail on 
sea-air which remains exclusively under the control of the 
freight forwarder and the NVOCCs, simply because the ocean sector 
of the sea-air mode, operated by many major shipping lines. 
provides numerous frequencies and rate alternatives that the 
airlines cannot provide. 
This study has further analysed the economic characteristics and 
operational patterns of this particular logistic chain by 
detailed examination of the major transfer hubs and sea-air 
flows. The key common factors are: 
1. The general pattern of international trade between the Asia 
Pacific region and Europe, the Americas and Canada takes the 
form largely of a single direction, as does the sea-air 
cargo traffic flow from the markets of supply in the Asia 
Pacific region to the markets of demand in Europe, South and 
Central America. However, to North America and Canada, the 
cargo flow remains in a single direction, but via sea-land 
intermodality. Incoming cargoes to gateway ports, of North 
America and Canada, are further carried inland through 
efficient railways and trucking systems. 
Sea-air hubs flourish around: 
a. A terminator port of high volume, high frequency 
shipping lines, located about halfway between the Asia 
Pacific region's gateway ports and those of Europe and 
the Americas, which is also an intermediary port 
cutting half the ocean transit time between the markets 
of supply of the Asia Pacific and the markets of demand 
of Europe and the Americas. 
b. A freely competitive market that allows the interplay 
of supply and demand to determine, among other things 
the level of transport costs. 
C. A "free of restriction, government policy offering open 
skies to world air carriers and free entries to the 
market place by world transport operators. 
An excerpt from a circular by 'Expeditors International' a North American forwarder to his worldwide 
network citing KLM's direct contact with shippers and consignees, and threatening to counter attack. Quote: 
"it seems that KLM came out in the open and declared their intention that they will be dealing direct with the shipper. Mr. Jacques Ancher, Executive Vice President and head of KLM Cargo was 
quoted: 'The customer is demanding this. More and more they want to talk to carriers like us. They 
need a meaningful dialogue so that the way we work together reflects the tremendous changes their 
own industries are going through,. Mr. Ancher stresses. 'The problem today is that the forwarder 
can be the customer or the intermediary or even the competitor, or all three,, he added. It is 
unfortunate that he sees us as competitors, and is willing to knock on our customers door directly. 
We are sure that KLM is not even equipped to be a Global Logistics Provider, but if this is their 
choice to reward their customers (the Forwarders/Logistics Providers) we surely will have our own 
plans to counter attack that. " 
Unquote. 
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d. A market characterised by the availability of skilled 
labour and vast areas of land around gateway ports and 
airports for use by carriers and transport operators at 
moderate costs. 
Future growth depends on developments of world trade and more 
especially on the interplay of commodity value, density, as well 
as transit time and total distribution costs. 
The combined sea-air mode is attracting larger portions from the 
ocean mode of transport as seen in the six case studies examined. 
They prove that, in the light of the total cost distribution 
concept, high value and medium to low density cargo can be 
converted to the air freight mode if the speed of the delivery 
becomes paramount. The same portions of cargo are readily and 
easily convertible to the sea-air mode, as the total distribution 
costs of both are almost the same. Moreover, sea-air offers 
numerous added advantages, such as cutting the ocean delivery 
time by almost 5011 and, therefore, replenishing capital much 
faster than through the ocean mode, at virtually no extra costs. 
Therefore, in decision making, the choice of a transport mode 
becomes a function of the total distribution cost, commodity 
value and transit time (see Figure 22 on page 236). 
1. The total distribution cost is a function of the mode of 
transport and the density of the consignment (the ratio of 
its volumetric measurement in relation to its gross weight) . 
2. The lower the density of a shipment, the lesser are the 
differences in total distribution costs among the three 
modes of transport. In this case, the choice of mode 
becomes a function of shipment density and transit time. 
3. The higher the density of a shipment, the much wider are the 
differences in total distribution costs of the three modes. 
The choice of a mode becomes a function of total 
distribution cost and transit time. 
4. The higher the commodity value of the shipment, the lesser 
are the differences in total distribution costs, among the 
three modes of transport, and they become a small fraction 
of its value at destination. The choice of a mode becomes 
a factor of commodity value and transit time. 
5. The lower the commodity value of the shipment, the higher 
are the differences in total distribution costs, among the 
three modes of transport, and the higher is the 
consideration of the cost factor, as it may become a burden 
to the commodity value at the destination. It may inflate 
the value to such an extent that it renders it unsaleable to 
end users. The choice of a mode becomes a function of the 
total distribution cost and transit time. 
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In conclusion, the growth and development of sea-air cargo at 
transfer hubs opened the doors of the air freight industry to 
newcomers such as 'freight forwarders, becoming integrators', 
new, all-cargo specialist carriers and scheduled airlines 
operating additional cargo flights to and from airports of sea- 
air transfer hubs. 
The impact of the newcomers was to stabilise the direct air 
freight cost from the transfer hub. Costs had risen drastically 
from the time of the "fill in" unutilised capacities' rates of 
US$ 0.65 per kg, applicable to sea-air cargo on the sector 
Dubai/London in 1985 to US$ 1.10 per kg in 1995, for the same 
sector. This increase took place at all major sea-air hubs of 
the world for many reasons; the scarcity of air cargo space from 
Singapore, the suspension of Air Canada freighter services from 
Vancouver, the down-grading of Cargolux freighter services from 
Seattle, the emergence of huge air export of the ready-made 
garments industry in the U. A. E., competing with sea-air cargo for 
space, while Los Angeles and Miami followed the'trend of higher 
air freight rates. 
Sea-air cargo was able to, not only survive this hurdle and 
absorb the higher costs of air freight, but large portions were 
diverted to other nearby airports, searching for available cargo 
capacities at even much higher rates. 
This was not an exceptional case. In the U. A. E., the increase in 
air freight costs started after the Gulf War and continued its 
gradual increase to reach US$ 1.25 in 1993, for the same sector 
Dubai/London. The same year witnessed the entry into the market 
by Air HongKong's twice weekly B747 freighters to Manchester and 
Brussels, which later increased to five weekly flights in 1994, 
Gulf Air's five B757 regular weekly freighter services to 
Brussels and the upgrading of Lufthansa Cargo flights to 17 per 
week from their new cargo hub at Sharjah International Airport. 
By the end of 1994, Lufthansa Cargo flights to and from Sharjah 
Airport grew to 45 per week (see Section 6.3 page 135). These 
developments were a stabilising factor which brought down the 
rates to US$ 1.10 per kg from 1994 onward (see Section 8.2.2, 
page 168). 
Future trends and issues : 
The future trends of sea-air intermodality depend largely on the 
development of trade links between the major economic blocs of 
the world, especially those of Asia-Pacific, Europe and the US, 
which are also the major manufacturing and consuming regions of 
the world. The trade patterns that will emerge from these 
developments will be an important factor in the development of 
the current sea-air hubs, the growth of some, the decline and 
disappearance of others and the emergence of new ones. 
In Singapore, the air-to-air phenomenon is gradually replacing 
the sea-air mode at much higher costs. Singapore is a model sea- 
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air hub having the infrastructure and all the requisite 
characteristics. In addition, it is characterised by a high 
degree of flexibility and elasticity. Its flexibility is shown 
by its ability to change roles within a very short period of 
time. In the case of sea-air cargo flow to Europe, the 
availability of air cargo space motivates sea-air originating 
from the surrounding Pacific Rim countries, while the scarcity of 
air cargo capacities motivates the air to air phenomenon from the 
same origin points at much higher costs than that of the sea-air 
mode, at more or less the same transit time of sea-air, because 
the 'air to air, mode involves 'waiting time, for air cargo space 
availability at Singapore Airport. 
Therefore, the criteria of flexibility in the choice of a 
transport mode is determined solely by transit time. The 
shipper's objective is to deliver goods to end users 'in time,. 
Considerations of cost become important as the availability of 
air cargo space from Singapore becomes abundant and, therefore, 
the sea-air mode takes precedence as its transit time becomes 
similar to that of the 'air-to-air' mode when space was scarce. 
The elasticity of Singapore Airport is manifested by the 
availability of options due mainly to its 'Open Skies' policy 
and, therefore, the presence of a multiplicity of scheduled and 
charter flights to destinations other than Europe and North 
America. The availability of high frequencies to New Zealand and 
Australia provide healthy grounds for the development and growth 
of sea-air cargo flow to these areas. 'Air to air' replaces sea- 
air when air cargo capacities become scarce. Sea-air regains its 
grounds as air cargo space becomes abundant. The temporary 
disappearance of the sea-air mode via Singapore, on the 
Europe/North America route, is compensated by its strong presence 
on the Australia/New Zealand route. 
The U. A. E. is very similar to Singapore in its highly developed 
infrastructure and all other characteristics of a model sea-air 
transfer hub. It differs from Singapore by the availability of 
air cargo capacities at all times. However, the 'air-to-air' 
mode is virtually non-existent due to the absence of a highly 
developed air export trade from the U. A. E. and the surrounding 
states. 
Other sea-air markets have emerged strongly during 1994: 
The formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States 'CIS' 
comprises mainly landlocked states with very poor infrastructure 
and outdated overland road and rail links from the Black Sea 
ports to the densely populated cities inland. This had a 
positive impact on the sea-air mode via the U. A. E. ports in 1993 
and 1994. Over sixteen charter airlines established their bases 
at Sharjah International Airport and operated a total of over a 
thousand flights per month to approximately 75 destinations in 
the CIS. Various types of cargo aircraft are used, ranging from 
the AN12, with a capacity of 12 tonnes, to the popular IL76 with 
a capacity of 40 tonnes to the huge AN 124 offering a capacity of 
120 tonnes per flight. 
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Almost all flights took off, as per Sharjah Airport Authority 
records, at full cargo capacity. This development gave sea-air 
a boost in volumes and tonnage. 
On the European route, sea-air volumes are forecasted to grow 
dramatically at a rate of 12t per annum to certain regions in 
Europe, such as the Scandinavian countries, Ireland, Scotland, 
Portugal, Spain, Southern France and the newly emerging 
democracies of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania. 
The factors behind this forecast are: 
Direct ocean sailings from the Pacific Rim of the Far 
East to Ireland, Scotland and Finland are not dense, 
and consume an average of 28 - 35 days per sailing. 
2. The gateway ports of some of those European countries 
are plagued by bureaucracy and red tape, especially 
those of Portugal and Spain. 
3. Scandinavia, Finland and the ex-Eastern bloc countries 
are almost landlocked, and cargoes must undergo either 
an all-water trans-shipment at the gateway ports of 
Antwerp and Rotterdam, or an overland one. In both 
cases, all ocean transit time increase drastically. 
In 1994, Lufthansa pioneered the first African Air Cargo hub for 
sea-air arriving at the U. A. E. ports. They initiated a once 
weekly DC8 freighter service from Sharjah to Nairobi, Kenya. 
Nairobi was declared a cargo hub by Lufthansa, and its African 
partner, Kenya Airways. This re-distribution centre was 
scheduled to provide a once weekly 15 tonnes capacity, B 727 
freighter service to: 
Entebbe Uganda. 
Lusaka Zambia. 
Bajoumbura - Burundi. 
Kigali - Rwanda. 
Dar Es Salaam - Tanzania. 
Addis Ababa - Ethiopia. 
Khartoum - Sudan. 
Johannesburg - South Africa. 
With the exception of Dar Es Salaam, all other cities are either 
landlocked, such as Entebbe, Lusaka, Bajoumbura and Kigali or 
have very slow overland connections from their own ports, such as 
Khartoum, Addis Abbaba and Johannesburg. Dar-Es-Salaam, itself 
a port, is not served regularly or directly by shipping lines of 
the Asia Pacific region, but served indirectly by Ned Llyod 
Shipping Line's once-monthly sailing via Bahrain with an ocean 
transit time of 20 days, and by feeder services from Aden, 
Djibouti and the U. A. E. ports. The feeders have very poor 
frequencies of one or two voyages every 45 days and cargo 
originating in the Pacific Rim countries may reach Dar Es Salaam 
in 65 to 70 days, or more. 
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The success of the Nairobi Cargo hub may induce other carriers to 
enter the market. Its failure will, however, force the operators 
to search for other options that would decrease total transport 
costs and total transit time of the sea-air journey. Most 
observers anticipate a partial failure of this route due to 
mainly two factors: 
one weekly DC8 freighter is not enough to uplift the 
pile up of goods sitting at Sharjah Airport. Further, 
cargoes have to undergo a second week of waiting time 
for the next flight, thus equating sea-air transit time 
with that of all ocean. 
2. At Nairobi Airport, an East African Airways 727 
freighter operates only in cases of availability of a 
full load of 13 - 15 tonnes to any one destination. 
Two or more destinations cannot be served with one 
flight having a number of stopovers en route due mainly 
to the political unrest in many of the African 
countries and the lack of bilaterals. 
The alternative could be the Port of Durban in South Af rica, 
which is more convenient for this breakthrough. The voyage time 
of the shipping lines from the Pacific Rim ports to Durban could 
be equal to that of the U. A. E., and the heavy cost of the air 
lift from Sharjah to Nairobi could be replaced by a very low cost 
of overland connection from Durban to Johannesburg. From 
thereon, air-lift to many landlocked countries such as Uganda, 
Zambia, Rwanda, Burundi, etc. could be done at reasonable costs. 
The current ocean routes connecting the Asia Pacific with Africa 
are constructed via Europe. ocean freight is directed to the 
European ports of Antwerp, Rotterdam and Marseille, and then 
trans-shipped to shipping lines serving Africa's main ports. 
There are few direct sailings from the Pacific Rim countries to 
the main African ports of the Atlantic ocean. 
The exceptions are the ports of South Africa, especially that of 
Durban, which fully qualifies to become a sea-air transfer hub, 
having six monthly direct and regular sailing frequencies from 
the Pacific Rim countries. There are many ports on the South 
and North African Coasts that may qualify to become a sea-air 
transfer hub, such as the ports of Abidjan (Ivory Coast), Lome 
(Togo), Free Town (Sierra Leone), Douala (Cameroun), Maputo 
(Benin), Conakry (Guinea), Port 'Harcourt (Nigeria), Dakar 
(Senegal), Liberville (Gabon) and Brazaville (Congo), all having 
an average of two direct sailing frequencies per month from the 
Pacific Rim. 
The main gateway ports of the former French colonies of Dakar, 
Liberville, Abidjan, Conakry, Bamako, Bangui and Brazaville are 
either served direct or via the Port of Marseille by SAGA 
transport, a subsidiary of the French SAGA group. 
It is premature to analyse their potential, as factors of 
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political unrest, governmental bureaucracy, poor infrastructure 
and overland connections. In addition, the scardity of regular 
flights from adjacent-to-port, airports, hinders any attempt to 
start a sea-air hub at these ports. 
The air routes to Africa from the Pacific Rim countries are very 
rare, besides the few direct flights to Cairo and Addis Ababa, 
from different points in the Pacific Rim. Singapore provides the 
only regular and direct connection with the main cities of South 
Africa. Therefore, air cargo must first fly to a European 
airport for further connections on flights to the main African 
gateway airports. The transit time is acceptable and within a 
time frame of 6-8 days, but the cost of air freight is very 
high, at an average cost of US$ 7.00 per kg, as follows: 
US$ 3.00/kg, for the first sector; Asia Pacific to Europe 
US$ 4.00/kg, for the second sector; Europe to Africa 
Sea-air via the U. A. E., using the Lufthansa/East African Airways 
hub at Nairobi, averages US$ 3.15 per kg, as follows:: 
US$ 0.40/kg for the ocean sector; Asia Pacific to U. A. E. 
US$ 1.25/kg for the second segment; Sharjah/Nairobi (air) 
US$ 1.50/kg for the third sector; Nairobi/final destination (air) 
at an average transit time of 28 days versus 6-8 days for pure 
air freight via Europe. 
Transit time and air costs could be cut at the port of Durban as 
a proposed alternative to the U. A. E. Ocean transit time remains 
the same, while air costs can be reduced by almost all the costs 
of the U. A. E. /Nairobi segment, as it is replaced by the overland 
connection cost from Durban to Johannesburg. This ranges from 
US$ 0.10 - US$ 0.15 per kg. The total cost of sea-air via Durban 
could be as low as US$ 2.00 per kg. The cost breakdown is as 
follows: 
US$ 0.40/kg for the ocean sector; Asia Pacific to Durban. 
US$ 0.10/kg for the second segment; overland to Johannesburg 
US$ 1.50/kg for the 3rd sector; Johannesburg/final destination 
(air). 
The total transit time is also reduced to 20 days via Durban. 
Durban is poised, therefore, to assume the role of the first sea- 
air hub in Africa. With the removal of the apartheid regime, 
many world airlines, who refrained from operating to South Africa 
in the past, are now eager to establish bases at Johannesburg 
Airport. 
With respect to Vladivostok, it is bound to disappear from the 
sea-air cargo scene due to the following factors: 
Its port of Vostochny was served by a joint Japanese and 
Korean service of one shipping line which operated a once- 
weekly sailing from Japanese and Korean ports. 
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2. Russian governmental bureaucracy and red tape. In addition, 
the very poor infrastructure and overland connections to the 
airport of Vladivostok resulted in delays of 4-5 days 
between the port and airport. 
3. The Russian government's subsidised fuel policy, which 
supplied the Russian Airlines, especially Aeroflot, with 
cheap fuel before 1993, was terminated. Aircraft fuel 
prices were subjected to open market forces and gradually 
equalled international price levels. 
Because cheap, subsidised fuel was the prime reason that afforded 
Aeroflot the luxury of an empty leg return flight from Maastricht 
in Europe to Vladivostok via Moscow, the termination of the 
subsidy resulted in the eventual decline and disappearance of 
sea-air via Vladivostok, beginning in early 1993. 
On the westerly route, Vancouver and Seattle will continue to act 
as gateway ports for the transfer of sea-air traf f ic to airports 
with ample cargo capacities, at the added costs of overland 
connections such as Toronto Airport in Canada and Atlanta and 
Miami in the U. S. A. 
As far as San Francisco is concerned, sea-air cargo is most 
likely to grow and develop on the San-Francisco - Europe route as 
air cargo capacities are made available by the European carriers 
in addition to El Al, who are active in attracting this type of 
low return cargo. Growth on the route to South and Central 
America is very limited because air cargo capacities are provided 
largely by the American carriers who have no interest in sea-air 
cargo. The lack of interest is mainly due to the presence of 
high-return, domestic-made exports, and because of the limited 
capacity offered by the type of aircraft (B763 and B767) 
operating on this route. 
South and Central American sea-air cargo will continue to be 
diverted to Los Angeles and Miami, and, therefore, limited growth 
is forecasted via San Francisco as a sea-air hub. 
Los Angeles as a sea-air hub is active on two main routes. The 
route to Europe and the route to South and Central America. 
Despite the introduction of new technology and fast container 
ships, the ocean journey from Japan, South Korea and Taiwan to 
Central and Northern Europe is still consuming an average of 30 
to 35 days, because of the many ports of call en route. 
The route to Europe is limited to the air cargo capacities made 
available by those airlines interested in sea-air cargo. The 
present imbalance of trade between Los Angeles air exports in 
relation to air imports to and from Europe makes it difficult for 
airlines to operate additional freighter services. 
Increased freighter capacities cannot be economically justified 
through the dense carriage of air cargo on only one sector and 
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especially when that cargo is largely sea-air and produces much 
lesser revenue to the airline concerned. 
The only possibility for air cargo capacities to increase between 
Europe and Los Angeles lies in balancing the current directional 
imbalance of trade, i. e. by increased air imports into Los 
Angeles Airport, a case which is not likely to happen in the near 
future. 
Therefore the possibilities of growth in sea-air cargo bound for 
Europe lies basically in the overland feeder services to 
alternative airports in the U. S. A, where air cargo capacities are 
available in abundance. 
The route to South and Central America using ocean services, 
including the transfer of containers to South American shipping 
lines at Los Angeles or Miami, take an average of 45 days even to 
the present day in 1994. Direct ocean services from Europe and 
the Far East are comparatively very slow and unreliable (see page 
246). 
As well, direct air cargo capacity on regular flights from Europe 
and the Far East to Central and South America are very limited 
and very costly. 
Given the 'just in time, market value of goods to the consignee, 
the bureaucratic delays in the final stages of delivery give more 
reason to the consignee to order the consignments from the 
shippers at origin, either by direct and costly air freight, or 
via the sea-air mode. The sea-air mode of transport is becoming 
largely the primary choice to Latin America and is practised via 
Miami and Los Angeles. 
Miami is poised to become the biggest sea-air hub in the world. 
The factors supporting this statement are: 
1. The availability of unlimited air cargo space to almost all 
gateways to South and Central America, in addition to 
Western Europe. 
2. The presence of a great number of air carriers operating 
from/to Miami Airport providing the necessary dense flight 
frequencies and therefore a competitive rate structure which 
is bound to attract sea-air cargo. 
3. The presence of a large Latin American population in the 
Florida area, that requires air imports of such products as fresh produce, cut flowers, foodstuffs, garments, souvenirs 
and other related items from their countries of origin, on daily basis. This factor provides air carriers with a 
marginal return leg revenue that offsets the imbalance of a 
unidirectional traffic. 
4. The relatively long ocean transit time from the Asia-Pacific 
to South American countries located on the Southern Coast of 
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the Atlantic, such as Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina, that 
entails using of the Panama Canal. Equally long ocean 
transit time and fewer shipping line frequencies connect the 
Asia-Pacific with South American countries located on the 
Northern Coast of the Pacific Ocean, such as Ecuador, Peru 
and Chile. 
5. The bureaucracy and red tape of South and Central American 
governments results in long delays at their gateway ports. 
Overland connections, whether by truck or rail are old and 
antiquated. The general infrastructure of the majority of 
the Latin American countries is very poor. 
6. The awareness of Miami Airport Authorities, in 1992, of the 
importance of developing the Port and Airport of Miami as a 
transfer hub to South and Central America, and to points 
further inland within North America and Europe, prompted the 
construction of a US$ 500 million cargo facility programme. 
All these factors add up to an exceptional sea-air cargo growth 
rate forecast of over 20%ý p. a. for the next 5 years, as of 1994. 
With respect to the global sea-air cargo scene, world air cargo 
capacities will continue to be available and plentiful, because 
the 1994 freight load factor shows that over 40-06 of the 
available world air cargo capacity has not been utilised. With 
the new entries of freighter services into the markets of the 
sea-air hubs, additional fresh cargo capacities become available. 
The future trend as forecasted by many major Asia-Pacific region 
forwarders is that of continuous growth of sea-air traffic at an 
average rate of 12? c per annum', especially with the anticipated 
take over of Hong Kong by mainland China, in mid 1997. Hong Kong 
is expected to play a major role as an export gateway, in 
addition to the main Chinese ports of Shanghai and Xiamen. The 
prospects of Japan and South Korea continuing their sea-air cargo 
flow via North American ports, especially those of Los Angeles, 
Seattle and Miami are seen as experiencing a moderate growth rate 
of Bli per annum. 
The high cost of skilled labour in Japan and South Korea has 
forced both to establish parallel industries in Indo-China, 
Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam and China. Those industries are 
presumed to contribute an additional 1811 per annum, on average, 
to the current global sea-air traffic via the U. A. E. for the 
European markets and via Los Angeles and Miami for South and 
Central American markets. 
The gradual increase in sea-air rates and the high rate of growth 
of its traffic, are likely to produce an additional revenue of 
over 1 billion US Dollars to the airline industry per year, as of 
1999. 
All forecasts are made by the Asia-Pacific region freight forwarders, and those of the Indian 
subcontinent (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka), and those of Thailand, Malaysia, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia and Taiwan, during interviews with them. 
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Appendix B: 
Percentage share distribution of 
international air cargo capacity by region 
(1974 - 1994) 
1974 1979 1984 1989 1993, 1994' 
Europe : Wide-bodied 19 .6 22 .7 
21 
.0 
21 
.5 
20.2 20 .5 
Narrow-bodied 3 .1 
2 
.9 
2 
.6 
2 
.5 
2.7 2 .7 
i share of total intl capacity 22. 7*-. 
---- 
25. 
----- 
6% 
---- 
23. 
----- 
6ý- 
---- 
24 
---- . 
0% 
---- 
22,9%ý 
-------- 
23 . ----- 
2% 
---- 
North America Wide-bodied 55 .4 
40 
.8 
34 .3 
34 
.1 
35,8 35 .5 
Narrow-bodied 5 .1 
4 .8 5 .1 
5 
. 
C, 5.2 5 .2 
sh are 
- 
of 
- 
total 
- 
intl- capacity 
-_ 
60. 5-o, - 
-_ __45 , 
6% 
-- - _39.4-ý5 -- - 
39. 
-7 
ý- 
- - 
41 
-. - 
0% 
- -- 
40.7% 
Asia Pacific : Wide-bodied 11 .0 17 .9 
19 
.3 
21 
.0 
22.8 23 .2 
Narrow-bodied 0 .7 0 .9 0. 8 0 .8 (). 9 0 .8 
capacity share of total intl 11. 76 
---- 
18 . ----- 
8% 
---- 
20. 
----- 
15- 
---- 
21. 
---- 
8% 
---- 
23 
. 
7% 
-------- 
24 . ----- 
0% 
---- 
Middle East Wide-bodied 1 .3 4 .1 6 .6 6 .2 5ý6 
5 .5 
Narrow-bodied 0 .3 0 .4 
0 
.4 0. 3 Oý4 0. 
3 
share of total intl capacity 
--- 
1. 
----- 
61. - 
---- 
4. 
----- 
S*-. 
---- 
7. 
----- 
0*6 
---- 
6. 
---- 
5ý- 
---- 
6.0ý 
-------- 
5. 
----- 
8% 
---- 
Latin America Wide-bodied 1 .3 
2 
.2 
4 
.3 3 .4 2.7 
2 
.6 
Narrow-bodied 0 .7 1. 0 1 .0 0 .8 0.9 
0 .9 
share of total intl capacity 2 .0 
3. 2o-, S. 31 4. 2% 3,6%i 3. 5o-o 
--------------------------------------- 
Africa : Wide-bodied 
----- 
1 
---- 
.1 
----- 
1 
---- 
.8 
----- 
4 
---- 
.0 
---- 
3 
---- 
.2 
-------- 
2.3 
----- 
2 
---- 
.3 
Narrow-bodied 0 .4 
0 .5 0 .6 0. 6 O. S 0 .5 5ý- . share of total intl capacity 1. 5ýý- 1 
2. 3% 4, 61 3 2ý 8% , 2. 89. 
Source: Computed from figure 2, page 26 and Appendix 3.1 and our worksheets. 
1.1993 figures are indicative for -. he year 1994. 
2.1994 figures are estimated. 
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Appendix C. 
Percentage distribution of international 
scheduled air cargo traffic in million TKs performed 
by region and average annual growth rate 
Region Region's performance: annual growth rate 
1969 1979 1989 1993* 1994** 
Euroi: )e" 
International Freight TK Performed 2,930 7,955 16,620 19,050 20,380 
k share of world international TKs 48.0%- 42.1% 37.0%- 34.3%- 3 3.816 
Rate of annual growth --- 11. It 7.7? k 6.51; 7.0% 
North America 
International Freight TK Performed 1,800 3,535 8,300 9,750 10,590 
t share of world international TKs 29.5% 18.7% 18.5%- 17.5%- 17.6t 
Rate of annual growth --- 6.7%- 8.6%- 7. Ok 7.6k 
Asia & Pacifi2 
International Freight TK Performed 630 4,330 14,100 20,150 22,265 
t share of world international TKs 10.3%, 22.9%; 31.4%- 36.2k 36.8! k 
Rate of annual growth --- 2 1.1% 13.8%; 11.0%; 10.5% 
Middle East 
International Freight TK Performed 210 1,320 2,420 2,820 3,005 
k share of world international TKs 3.4k 7.0%; S. 4! k 5.1%- 5.01; 
Rate of annual growth --- 19.8! k 7.4%- 5.0% 6.5% 
Latin America & Caribbean 
International Freight TK Performed 340 1,100 2,250 2,600 2,750 
t share of world international TKs 5.6% 5.8% 5. Olk 4. Tk 4.6%- 
Rate of annual growth --- 12.2%; 6.4% 6.0%- 6.0%; 
Africa 
International Freight TK Performed 190 660 1,210 1,230 1,310 
% share of world international TKs 3. Vk 3.5% 2.7! k 2.2! k 2.2%, 
Rate of annual growth --- 12.9% 7. Vk 6.5%- 6.5%- 
World 6,100 18,900 44,900 55,600 60,300 
Annual growth rate --- 12.1%, 9.21; 7.5%- 8.5% 
Tource: ICAO Circular 158-AT157,222-AT190, PIO JU194 
1. Includes CIS countries 
1993 figures are indicative for 1994 figures. 
1994 figures are forecasted, as per ICAO forecast of annual growth rate. 
1969 TKs for Europe include an estimate of USSR of 230 million TKs - actual 
figure excluding USSR is 2700 million TKs. 
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Appendix D. 
Load factors by region at actual 
and an assumed 100% passenger load factor 
(TKs in billions) 
Region 1974 1979 1984 1989 1993* 1994** 
Europe 
1. %; share of total intl capacity 22.7t 25.6t 23.6t 24-0%; 22.9k 23.2t 
2. Freight TKs available. 5.5%- 9.6 12.0 18.7 23.5 25.1 
3. TKs performed. 5.0%- 7.9 10.5 16.6 19.0 20.4 
4. Freight Load Factor 91. Ok 82.3% 87.5% 88.7t 80.8k 81.2k 
S. Unutilised capacities. 19.0ý 17.7% 12.5% 11.3% 19.2% 18.8k 
North America 
1. t share of total intl capacity 60.5k 45.6% 39.4t 39.7! k 41.0% 40.7% 
2. Freight TKs available. 14.6! k 17.1 20.0 30.9 42.0 44.0 
3. TKs performed. 3.1%- 3.6 5.3 8.3 9.8 10.6 
4. Freight Load Factor 21.2t 21.0% 26.5k 26.8k 23.3k 24.1k 
5. Unutilised capacities. 78.8t 79. Ok 73.5t 73.2t 76.7k 75.9k 
Asia & Pacific 
1. k share of total intl capacity 11. Wk 19.0% 20.1t 21.8k 23.7% 24. Ok 
2. Freight TKs available. 2.8%- 7.1 10.2 17.0 24.3 25.9 
3. TKs performed. 2.1%- 4.3 8.8 14.1 20.2 22.3 
4. Freight Load Factor 74.2k 60.6t 86.3! k 82.9t 83.1t 86.1W 
S. Unutilised capacities. 25.8t 39.4k 13.7t 17.1t 16.9% 13.9t 
Middle East 
1. % share of total intl capacity 1.6%- 4.5%; 7. OW 6.5V 6.0%- 5.8% 
2. Freight TKs available. 0.4%- 1.7 3.6 5.1 6.1 6.3 
3. TKs performed. 0.3%; 1.3 1.7 2.4 2.8 3.0 
4. Freight Load Factor 75.0k 60.7t 47.2t 47.1t 45.9t. 47.6t 
5. Unutilised capacities. 25. Ok 39.3t 52.8% 32.9! k 54.1k 52.4% 
Latin America & Caribbean 
1. k share of total intl capacity 2.0%; 3.2%- 5.3! k 4.2%; 3.6t 3.5k 
2. Freight TKs available. 0.5% 1.2 2.7 3.3 3.7 3.8 
3. TKs performed. 0.4%- 1.1 1.6 2.3 2.6 2.8 
4. Freight Load Factor 80. Ot 91.6W 59.3% 69.7%- 82.2t 73.8k 
S. Unutilised capacities. 20.01 8.4! k 40.7t 30.3t 17.8k 26.2t 
Af rica 
1. ?k share of total intl capacity 1.5%- 2.3%- 4.6! k 3.896 2.8% 2.8k 
2. Freight TKs available. 0.4%; 1.0 2.3 3.0 2.9 3.0 
3. TKs performed. 0.3k 0.7 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 
4. Freight Load Factor 75. Ok 70.0k 47.81 40.01 41.4% 43.3% 
S. Unutilised capacities. 25. Ok 30. Ok 52.2% 60.0% 58.6t 66.7k 
Total TKs performed 11.2 18.9 28.9 44.9 55.6 60.3 
Total freight TKs available 24.2 37.6 50.8 78.0 102.4 108.1 
Source : Computed as per Tables in Chapter 2 and Appendices B and C. 
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11 pendix AP 
The technique adopted is detailed as follows: 
A. Average available cargo capacities per annum were calculated 
by taking cargo capacity per type of aircraft designated 
use, passengers, combis and pure freighters as officially 
declared by manufacturers and confirmed through interviews 
with the airlines. Airline's confirmation of actual figures 
of loadable cargo capacities were applied, when noticeably 
different from the manufacturers declared figures. 
Capacities were multiplied by an averaged number of total 
flights per annum, taking into consideration ICAO findings 
of peak to trough variations in flight frequencies to 
stabilise traditionally during the month of September at 
8.3t of total frequencies per annum. 8.3t multiplied by 12 
months = 99.611, thus reducing seasonal variation to less 
than half a percentage point at 0.04t. 
Example; KLM has 3 wide-bodied, PAX flights/week from 
Vancouver to Amsterdam, during September, with a bellyhold 
declared actual capacity of 10 tonnes per flight. Available 
capacity per annum is reached, therefore, by multiplying 3 
flights x 52 weeks x 10 tonnes = 1,560 tonnes, rounded to 
1,600 tonnes of available average air cargo capacity per 
annum. This formula of assessing available cargo 
capacities, per month of September frequencies, and per type 
of aircraft designated use is applied throughout this 
research, unless otherwise, specifically mentioned in the 
Table footnote, in which case, the reasons for higher/lower 
capacities are described. 
B. Airlines confirmed that air cargo capacities depended 
largely on distance f lown in terms of f lying hours, and 
therefore, fuel requirements came first. The longer the 
range, the more the fuel requirement and the less is the 
capacity left for air cargo, with a given passenger load 
factor. Therefore, in the Tables showing air cargo capacity 
available, per airline, figures of the same aircraft with 
the same designated use, may differ from one airline to 
another, depending on whether these airlines are operating 
a non-stop long range rout. e or availing a stop enroute, 
whereby re-fuelling takes place and, therefore, a high air 
cargo capacity at the starting point of the flight. The 
variations in air cargo capacities available may vary ± Sk 
of the average payload, especially onboard mixed flights, 
passengers and cargo. 
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The abbreviations used in all airline cargo capacities, 
tabulations in Chapter 5, regarding the type of aircraft and its 
designated use, are decoded as per class of service available on 
the flights. 
Class of service available on the flight 
BBF Pure freighter flights carrying loose cargo. 
BBQ Mixed configuration (combi) aircraft: carrying loose load 
cargo on the passenger deck. 
LLF Pure freighter flights carrying containerised cargo (ULD's). 
LLJ Passenger flights operated by wide-bodied aircraft carrying 
containerised cargo. 
LLQ Mixed configuration (combi) aircraft carrying containerised 
cargo on the passenger deck. 
LPF Pure freighter flights carrying con tainerised/palletised 
cargo. 
LPJ Passenger flights operated by wide-bodied aircraft carrying 
containerised/palletised cargo. 
LPQ Mixed configuration (combi) aircraft carrying 
containerised/palletised cargo on the passenger deck. 
PPF Pure freighter flights carrying palletised cargo. 
PPJ Passenger flights operated by wide-bodied aircraft: carrying 
palletised cargo. 
PPQ Mixed configuration (combi) aircraft carrying palletised 
cargo on the passenger deck. 
Source :- ABC Air Cargo Guide 
The decoding of aircraft general designator codes and average 
cargo payload capacity, per type of aircraft designation, 
reflected the codes, as is declared by the manufacturers and 
confirmed by the airlines from actual experience. Airlines 
confirmation of actual payload capacities were adopted in case 
they differed markedly from the manufacturer's declared cargo 
payload. Average cargo capacities of pure freighter services 
were computed on the basis of a long range, non-stop flight of 7 
to 8f lying hours. In the cases of passenger or mixed wide- 
bodied flights, air cargo capacity was computed on 
' 
the basis of 
a long range 7-8f lying hours with an average passenger payload 
factor of 75t 
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Description Code Average cargo 
----------- ------ 
capacity/flight 
--------------- 
McDonnell Douglas DC-8 (all series) DC8 6 tonnes 
McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Freighter D1F 60 tonnes 
McDonnell Douglas DC-10 (mixed config) D1M 20 tonnes 
McDonnell Douglas DC-10 all series-PAX D10 10 tonnes 
McDonnell Douglas DC-8 Freighter D8F 40 tonnes 
McDonnell Douglas DC-8 (mixed config) D8M 12 tonnes 
McDonnell Douglas MD-11 Freighter MlF 60 tonnes 
McDonnell Douglas MD-11 pax Mil 10 tonnes 
McDonnell Douglas MD-11 (mixed config) Mim 15 tonnes 
McDonnell Douglas MD-80 (all series) M80 6 tonnes 
McDonnell Douglas MD-87 (all series) M87 6 tonnes 
Airbus Industrie A310 all series 310 8 tonnes 
Airbus Industrie A319-A321 pax 32S 8 tonnes 
Airbus Industrie A330 330 8 tonnes 
Airbus Industrie A340 all series 340 9 tonnes 
Boeing 707 freighter 70F 40 tonnes 
Boeing 727 freighter 72F 15 tonnes 
Boeing 727 mixed 72M 6 tonnes 
Boeing 737-200 freighter 73F 30 tonnes 
Boeing 737-200 mixed 73M 6 tonnes 
Boeing 737-300 733 8 tonnes 
Boeing 737-400 734 8 tonnes 
Boeing 737-500 735 8 tonnes 
Boeing 737 all series pax 737 6 tonnes 
Boeing 747-300 mixed 74D 30 tonnes 
Boeing 747-400 mixed 74E 30 tonnes 
Boeing 747 freighter all series 74F 100 tonnes 
Boeing 747 SP 74L 12 tonnes 
Boeing 747 mixed 74M 30 tonnes 
Boeing 747-300 pax 743 10 tonnes 
Boeing 747-400 pax 744 22 tonnes 
Boeing 747 pax all series 747 10 tonnes 
Boeing 757 freighter 75F 38 tonnes 
Boeing 757 pax 757 8 tonnes 
Boeing 767-300/300er 763 8 tonnes 
Boeing 767 all series 767 10 tonnes 
Boeing 777 777 10 tonnes 
Lockheed L1011 Tristar all series (PAX) L10 5 tonnes 
Lockheed L1011 500 series (PAX) L15 8 tonnes 
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A Appendix E-1: &kl 
Scheduled international flights 
(Freighters, Combis and Passenger) 
from Vancouver Airport to major gateway hubs in Europe 
(Available average cargo capacities rounded to the nearest 100 tonnes)* 
Airline A/C type Days of the week 
flights operate 
Cargo capacity 
per annum 
Destination 
KIM 747 LPJ 1,3,6 1500 AMSTERDAM 
CANADIAN PAC IFIC D10 LPJ 1,3,5,6, 1500 FRANKFURT 
747 LPJ 3,4,5,6,7 2500 of 
LUFTHANSA D10 LPJ 1,3,5,6, 1500 it 
747 LPJ 3,4,5,6,7 2000 of 
747 PPF 7 4900 of 
AIR CANADA 74E LPQ 1,3,5,6 5900 LONDON 
747 LPJ 2,4 1000 it 
767 LPJ 2,4,7 1500 
BRITISH AIRWAYS 747 LPJ Daily 3400 
CANADIAN PAC IFIC 763 LPJ Daily 2800 
AIR CANADA 767 LPJ 2,5 1000 PARIS 
Total available cargo capacity per annum, 
Vancouver to major Eur opean gateways 29,500 tonnes 
Source Air Cargo timetabl e, Number 440, September 1994. 
Notes Air Canada freighter service was suspended in early 1992 and was 
replaced by a once weekly freighter sex-vice by Lufthansa. 
Federal Express has been discounted from the ana lysis (refer 
detailed explanati on under Appendix E-4) 
LPJ : Wide-bodied PAX flights carrying containerised/palletised cargo in their 
under-deck holds. 
PPF : Pure freighter flights carrying containerised/palletised cargo. 
LPQ : mixed configuration (combi) aircraft carrying containerised/palletised 
cargo on the passenger deck. 
Capacities of each airline is calculated with utmost accuracy possible. 
Aircraft of the same type, with similar operations (freighter or 
passengers) may have varying degrees of available air cargo capacities due 
to the sector flown (long or short range) and fuel requirements. More fuel 
requirements means less available air cargo capacity on the sector flown. 
This is applied for calculation of air cargo capacities in all the 
following tables appearing in this study. 
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Appendix E-2: av 
Scheduled international flights 
(Freighters, Combis and Passenger) 
from Toronto Airport to major gateway hubs in Europe 
(Available average cargo capacities rounded to the nearest 100 tonnes) 
Airline A/C type Days of the week Cargo capacity Destination 
flights operate per annum 
Air Canada 767 LPJ1 4,7 1000 Berlin 
767 LPJ 1,4,5,7 2000 Dusseldorf 
763 LPJ 1,2,5,6 1500 Glasgow 
M11 LPJ 3,5 1000 Helsinki 
767 LPJ 2,7 1000 London 
747 LPJ 1,3,5,6,7 2500 
74M LPJ 1,5 3000 
767 LPJ 2,6 1000 Lyon 
D10 LPJ 3,5,7 1100 Madrid 
767 LPJ 1,2,5,6 2000 Manchester 
74M LPQ 7 1500 Paris 
747 LPJ 1 500 of 
310 LPJ 2,6 Boo Prague 
767 LPJ 6 500 Vienna 
767 LPJ 3,5,6 1500 Zurich 
M11 LPJ Daily 3400 
Canadian Pacific 763 LPJ 1,3,6 1200 Manchester 
763 LPJ 2,5,7 1200 Milan 
763 LPJ 2,4,5,6,7 1900 Munich 
763 LPJ 1,2,4,5,6,7 2300 Paris 
763 LPJ Daily 2600 Rome 
Lufthansa 747 LPJ Daily 3400 Frankfurt 
767 LPJ 2,4,5,6,7 2500 Munich 
KIM 747 LPJ 1,2,4,5 2000 Amsterdam 
74M LPQ 3,6,7 4400 it 
British Airways 747 LPJ Daily 3400 London 
Air France 74F LLF 7 4900 Paris 
763 LPJ Daily 3400 of 
Alitalia M11 LPJ 2,5,4,7 2000 Rome 
Swissair M11 LPJ Daily 3400 Zurich 
Finnair Mil LPJ 3,5 1000 Helsinki 
Air Portugal 310 LLJ 4,7 800 Lisbon 
Air India 744 LLJ 2,5,6 3400 London 
Iberian D10 LPJ 3,5,7 1100 Madrid 
Czechoslovakian 310 LPJ 2,6 800 Prague 
Balkan 767 LLJ 5 500 Sofia 
Total available cargo capacity per annum, 
Toronto to major European gateways 71,100 tonnes 
Source Air Cargo timetable, Number 440, September 1994. 
Notes Federal Express has been discounted from the analysis (refer 
detailed explanation under Appendix E-4). 
Codes LLF : Pure freighter flights carrying containerised (ULDs) cargo. 
LPJ : Wide-bodied PAX flights carrying con taineri sed/pall etised 
cargo in their under-deck holds. 
LPQ : Mixed configuration (combi) aircraft carrying 
containerised/palletised cargo on the passenger deck. 
259 
911-pendix E-3: '&y 
Scheduled international flights 
(Freighters, Combis and Passenger) 
from Montreal Airport to major gateway hubs in Europe 
(Available average cargo capacities rounded to the nearest 100 tonnes) 
Airline A/C type No. of flights Cargo capacity Destination 
per week per annum 
Air Canada 767 LPJ 7 2,900 
D10 LPJ 2 900 
767 LPJ 4 1,700 
747 LPJ 6 3,100 
74M LPQ 1 1,600 
310 LLJ 1 400 
Canadian Pacific 763 LPJ 2 800 
Air Canada 767 LPJ 1 400 
M11 LPJ 7 3,400 
KLM 747 LPJ 5 2,600 
Olympic Airways 747 LLJ 2 1,100 
Lufthansa 310 LPJ 6 2,400 
Lufthansa 340 LPJ 1 400 
Tap 310 LPJ 2 800 
British Airways 744 LPJ 7 8,000 
Iberian D10 LPJ 2 900 
Air France 74F LLF 2 10400 
Air France 744 LPJ 7 8,000 
CSA 310 LLJ 1 400 
Alitalia M11 LPJ 2 1,000 
Lot Polish 767 LPJ 1 400 
Swiss Air M11 LPJ 7 3,400 
Total available cargo capacity per annum, 
Montreal to major European gateways 50,600 tonnes 
London 
Madrid 
Nice 
Paris 
11 
Prague 
Rome 
Warsaw 
Zurich 
Amsterdam 
Athens 
Frankfurt 
Frankfurt 
Lisbon 
London 
Madrid 
Paris 
Paris 
Prague 
Rome 
Warsaw 
Zurich 
Source Air Cargo timetable, Number 440, September 1994. 
Notes Federal Express has been discounted from the analysis (refer 
detailed explanation under Appendix E-4). 
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Appendix E-4 
Scheduled international flights from Seattle 
(Freighters, Combis and Passenger) 
to major gateway hubs in Europe 
(Available average cargo capacities rounded to the nearest 100 tonnes) 
Airline A/C type Days of the week Cargo capacity Destination 
flights operate per annum 
Martinair 767 LPJ 2,3,6 1,600 Amsterdam 
D1F 1 3,000 
Scandinavian 763 LPJ Daily 2,800 Copenhagen 
Northwest D10 LPJ 1,3,5,6,7 2,000 Frankfurt 
United Airlines 763 LPJ 1,2,3,5,6 2,000 London 
British Airways 767 LPJ Daily 3,400 
Cargolux 747 F 1,2,3 12,500* Luxembourg 
Federal Express D1F 1,2,3,4,5 17,500 Brussels 
Total available cargo capacity per annum, 
Seattle to major European gateways 44,800 tonnes 
less Fedex 17,500 tonnes 
Total available cargo capacity per annum, 
Seattle to European gateways, excluding Fedex 27,300 tonnes 
Source : Air Cargo timetable, Number 440, September 1994. 
Note: Martinair upgrades one additional freighter flight per week during season 
of 43 weeks. 
Cargolux additional frequency per week occurs over 30 weeks per annum. 
1. LPJ, Passenger flights operated by wide-bodied aircraft carrying 
containerised (ULDs)lpalletised cargo 
2. F, all freighter series 
3. Federal Express flights and available cargo capacities are dropped from 
total available capacity to sea-air cargo, as Fedex specialises in fast 
courier services, moving parcels and pouches, mainly door to door. 'In 
1990, Federal Express carried documents or packages not exceeding 68 kgs 
or 3.3 metres in length and width combined. Xt offered services including 
'Overnight Letter', ýPriority One' (delivery within USA by 10.30 the next 
business day) and ýStandard Air,, which offered delivery no later than the 
second working day. Forwarders and other middle men were cut out. I 
Doganis, Rigas, 1992, 'Flying Off Course, The Economics of Xnternational 
Air2ines', Routledgef London, pp 320 -321. 
Further, Fedex weight limit per package of 68 kgs is applicable to door to 
door pick up and deliveries. While airport to airport air freight movement 
is not limited (source; Federal Express brochures, schedules & 
periodicals). 
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Appendix E-5: 
Scheduled international flights 
(Freighters, Combis and Passenger) 
from Atlanta Airport to major gateway hubs in Europe 
(Available average cargo capacities rounded to the nearest 100 tonnes) 
Airline A/C type No. of flights Cargo capacity Destination 
per week per annum 
European Carriers: 
KLM 74M LPQ 5 7,400 
Sabena L10 LPJ 7 1,800 
Lufthansa 340 LPJ 7 2,800 
Lufthansa 74F PPF 2 9,800 
British Airways D10 LPJ 7 2,800 
Swiss Air 74D LPQ 4 6,200 
Swiss Air 743 LPJ 2 1,000 
Swiss Air M11 LPJ 1 500 
Total available cargo capacity per annum, 
from Atlanta to major European gateways 
on European Carriers 32,300 
Percentage of total ca pacity 51.4% 
North American Carriers: 
Northwest 747 LPJ 5 2,500 
Delta Airlines L15 LPJ 7 2,800 
Delta Airlines L15 LPJ 7 2,800 
United Airlines 340 LPJ 7 2,800 
Delta Airlines 763 LPJ 7 2,800 
Delta Airlines L15 LPJ 7 2,800 
Delta Airlines L15 LPJ 14 5,600 
Delta Airlines L15 LPJ 7 2,800 
Delta Airlines L15 LPJ 7 2,800 
Delta Airlines 763 LPJ 7 2,800 
Total available cargo capacity per annum, 
from Atlanta to major European gateways 
on North American Carr iers 30,500 
Total available cargo capacity per annum, 
Atlanta to major European gateways 62,800 
Amsterdam 
Brussels 
Frankfurt 
11 
London 
Zurich 
Zurich 
Zurich 
Amsterdam 
to 
Brussels 
Frankfurt 
11 
to 
London 
Madrid 
Paris 
Rome 
Source Air Cargo timetable, Number 440, September 1994. 
Notes Federal Express has been discounted from the analysis (refer 
detailed explanation under Appendix E-4). 
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Appendix E-6: 
Scheduled international flights 
(Freighters, Combis and Passenger) 
from Boston Airport to major gateway hubs in Europe 
(Available average cargo capacities rounded to the nearest 100 tonnes) 
Airline A/C type No. 
per 
of flights 
week 
Cargo capacity 
per annum 
Destination 
European Carriers: 
Sabena 310 LPJ 6 2,400 Brussels 
Lufthansa 340 LPJ 7 2,800 Frankfurt 
British Airways 747 LPJ 14 6,900 London 
Virgin Atlantic 747 LPJ 7 3,500 19 
Air France 74F LLF 2 9,800 Paris 
Alitalia M11 LPJ 7 3,500 Rome 
Swiss Air 74D LPQ 1 1,500 Zurich 
Swiss Air 743 LPJ 6 2,400 if 
Total available cargo capacity per annum, 
Boston to major Europe an gateways 
on European Carriers 32,800 
Percentage of total capacity 57.0% 
North American Carriers: 
Delta Airlines D10 LPJ 7 2,800 
Northwest D10 LPJ 7 2,800 
United Airlines 340 LPJ 7 2,800 
Northwest D10 LPJ 6 2,400 
Northwest D10 LPJ 7 2,800 
American Airlines 763 LPJ 7 2,800 
Northwest D10 LPJ 7 2,800 
Northwest D10 LPJ 6 2,400 
TWA 767 LPJ 7 2,800 
Total available cargo capacity per annum, 
Boston to major Europe an gateways 
on North American Carriers 24,400 
Total available cargo capacity per annum, 
Boston to major Europe an gateways 57,200 
Amsterdam 
H 
Frankfurt 
it 
Glasgow 
London 
it 
Paris 
if 
Source Air Cargo timetable, Number 440, September 1994. 
Notes Federal Express has been discounted from the analysis (refer 
detailed explanation under Appendix E-4 
Codes: LPJILLJ - Pax flights carrying containerised/palletised cargo 
LPQ - Combi flights carrying containerised/palletised cargo 
PPFILPF - Pure freighter flights carrying containerised/palletised cargo 
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Appendix E-7. 
Freighters and mixed flights from Miami 
to major gateway hubs in Europe 
(Available cargo capacities rounded to the nearest 100 tonnes) 
Airline A/C type Number of flights Cargo capacity Destination 
per week per annum 
Martinair 747 LPJ 1 500 Amsterdam 
767 LPJ 3 1,500 to 
2,000 
L. T. U Airlines L15 LPJ 2 800 Dusseldorf 
Lufthansa 74F PPF 4 20,000 Frankfurt 
747 LPJ 7 3,500 
74M LPQ 7 10,500 
Lufthansa 767 LPJ 3 1,500 Munich 
Lufthansa 767 LPJ 3 1,500 Vienna 
37,000 
Finnair M11 LPJ 1 500 Helsinki 
British Airways 747 LPJ 7 3,500 London 
767 LPJ 7 3,500 
7,000 
Virgin Atlantic 747 LPJ 5 2,500 
Iberian 747 LPJ 7 3,500 Madrid 
D10 LPJ 3 11500 go 
51000 
Lauda Air 763 LPJ 3 1,200 to 
Lauda Air 763 LPJ 3 1,400 to 
2,600 
Air France 74F LLF 1 5,000 Paris 
340 LPJ 5 2,500 it 
7,500 
Total available cargo capacity per annum, 
Miami to major Europea n gateways 
carried by European ca rriers 64,900 
American Airlines Mil LPJ 7 3,500 Brussels 
American Airlines 763 LPJ 7 2,800 London 
American Airlines 763 LPJ 7 2,800 It 
American Airlines 763 LPJ 7 2,800 Paris 
11,900 
United Airlines 763 LPJ 7 2,800 It 
TWA LIO LPJ 7 1,800 Madrid 
Total available cargo capacity per annum, 
Miami to major European gateways 
carried by US carriers 16,500 
Total available cargo capacity per annum, 
Miami to major European gateways 81,400 
El Al 74F LPF 1 5,200 Amsterdam 
Source Air Cargo timetable, Number 440, September 1994. 
Notes Federal Express has been discounted from the analysis (refer 
detailed explanation under Appendix E-4. 
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Appendix E-8: 
Scheduled international flights 
(Freighters, Combis and Passenger) 
from New York Airport to major gateway hubs in Europe 
(European Carriers) 
(Available average cargo capacities rounded to the nearest 100 tonnes) 
Airline A/C type No. 
per 
of flights 
week 
Cargo capacity 
per annum 
Destination 
KLM 74M LPQ 7 10300 Amsterdam 
KLM 747 LPJ 7 3,500 Amsterdam 
Sabena 74D LPQ 7 10300 Brussels 
SAS 763 LPJ 7 2,800 Copenhagen 
Lufthansa 74F PPF 6 29300 Frankfurt 
Lufthansa 340 LPJ 21 8,300 it 
British Airways 747 LPJ 28 14000 London 
Virgin Atlantic 747 LPJ 21 10300 01 
Iberian 747 LPJ 7 3500 Madrid 
Alitalia 74F LPF 3 14600 Milan 
Alitalia 74M LPQ 7 10300 of 
Air France 747 LPJ 7 3,500 Paris 
Air France 744 LPJ 7 8,000 
Air France 74F LLF 6 29300 
Air France 763 LPJ 7 2,800 
Alitalia 747 LPJ 10 4,900 Rome 
Alitalia 74F LPF 2 9,800 Rome 
Alitalia D10 LPJ 7 2,800 Rome 
Total available cargo capacity per annum, 
from New York to major European gat eways 
on European carr iers 178,300 
Percentage of total capacity 47.0% 
Source Air cargo timetable, Number 440, September 1994. 
Notes Federal Express has been discoun ted from the analysis (refer 
detailed explanation under Appendix E-4). 
Codes 
LPJILLJ - Pax flights carrying containerised/palletised cargo 
LPQ - Combi flights carrying containerised/palletised cargo 
PPFILPF - Pure freighter flights carrying containerised/palletised cargo 
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Appendix E-9: 
Scheduled International flights 
(Freighters, Combis and Passenger) 
from New York Airport to major gateway hubs in Europe 
(North American Carriers) 
(Available average cargo capacities rounded to the nearest 100 tonnes) 
Airline A/C type No. of flights Cargo capacity Destination 
per week per annum 
Delta Airlines 763 LPJ 7 2,800 Amsterdam 
Delta Airlines 310 LPJ 7 2,800 Copenhagen 
Delta Airlines L15 LPJ 7 1,800 
Delta Airlines 763 LPJ 7 2,800 
Delta Airlines 763 LPJ 7 2,800 
Delta Airlines 763 LPJ 7 2,800 Paris 
Delta Airlines 763 LPJ 7 2,800 Rome 
Northwest 747 LPJ 14 7,000 Amsterdam 
American Airlines 763 LPJ 7 2,800 Brussels 
American Airlines 763 LPJ 28 11000 if 
American Airlines M11 LPJ 14 7,000 
American Airlines 763 LPJ 7 2,800 
United Airlines 767 LPJ 7 2,800 Brussels 
United Airlines 340 LPJ 21 8,300 Frankfurt 
United Airlines 767 LPJ 21 8,300 London 
United Airlines 763 LPJ 7 2,800 Madrid 
United Airlines 747 LPJ 7 3,500 it 
TWA L10 LPJ 1 300 of 
TWA 747 LPJ 7 3,500 it 
TWA LIO LPJ 7 2,800 if 
TWA 767 LPJ 6 2,400 Milan 
TWA 747 LPJ 4 2,000 If 
TWA 747 LPJ 14 7,000 Rome 
TWA 767 LPJ 6 2,400 Rome 
Continental A/L 747 LPJ 7 3,500 of 
Continental A/L 747 LPJ 7 3,500 if 
Continental A/L 747 LPJ 3 1,500 it 
Continental A/L D10 LPJ 4 1,600 
Continental A/L D10 LPJ 7 2,800 
Federal Express 72F LPF 4 2,900 
Federal Express D1F LPF 5 14600 it 
Canadian Pacific 763 LPJ 3 1,100 
US Air 767 LPJ 7 2,800 
Total available cargo capacity per annum, 
from New York to major European gateways, 
on N. American carrier s 129,600 
Percentage of total ca pacity 34.0% 
Source: Air Cargo timetable, Number 440, September 1994. 
Notes Federal Express has been discounted from the analysis (refer 
detailed explanation under Appendix B-4). 
Delta Airlines operate 74D LPQ flights on a code-sharing basis with 
Sabena, and are therefore not included to avoid a double counting. 
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'Appendix E-10: M. e 
Scheduled international flights 
(Freighters, Combis and Passenger) 
from New York to major gateway hubs in Europe 
(on carriers other than European and North American) 
(Available average cargo capacities rounded to the nearest 200 tonnes) 
Airline A/C type No. of flights Cargo capacity Destination 
per week per annum 
El Al 74F LPF 6 29,300 Amsterdam 
Singapore A/L 744 LPJ 3 3,400 Amsterdam 
Tower Air 747 LLJ 1 600 Amsterdam 
Biman D10 LLJ 2 1,100 Amsterdam 
PIA 74M LPQ 2 2,900 Amsterdam 
Royal Jordanian L15 LLJ 5 2,000 Amsterdam 
DHL Cargo D8F LLF 5 9,800 Brussels 
Saudia 74F LPF 2 9,800 Brussels 
Singapore A/L 744 LPJ 4 2,000 Frankfurt 
PIA 747 LPJ 2 1,000 
PIA 70F LPF 1 1,500 
PIA 74M LPQ 1 1,500 
PIA 310 LPJ 4 1,600 
Kuwait Airways 747 LLJ 1 600 
Air India 744 LLJ 7 3,500 London 
Kuwait Airways 747 LPJ 3 1,500 it 
PIA 74M LPQ 1 1,500 Paris 
Total available cargo capacity per annum, from 
New York to major European gateways on carriers 
other than North American and European 73,600 
Percentage of total capacity 19.0% 
Source Air Cargo timetable, Number 440, September 1994. 
Notes Federal Express has been discounted from the analysis (refer 
detailed explanation under Appendix E-4). 
Codes: LPJILLJ - Pax flights carrying containerised/palletised cargo 
LPQ - Combi flights carrying containerised/palletised cargo 
PPFILPF - Pure freighter flights carrying containerised/palletised cargo 
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Appendix F-1 &IF 
Total air cargo (tonnes) loaded/offloaded 
by airlines operating scheduled international services 
at Los Angeles Airport 
Airlines 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
European Carriers 
Air France 23,700 24,700 21,000 21,700 24,400 
Alitalia 14,100 12,100 12,500 8,100 14,100 
AOM (UTA) 280 200 160 - 600 
UTA 420 300 240 - 900 
British Airways 23,000 19,200 18,900 18,000 20,500 
Cargolux - - - 1,000 14,500 
Iberia 3,700 2,300 2,100 1,900 - 
KIM 16,600 12,600 13,300 13,200 13,000 
Lauda 1,000 800 
LTU International - - 200 500 800 
Lufthansa 33,700 27,400 19,400 18,400 16,300 
Matinair 1,700 5,200 2,400 3,300 3,100 
SAS 7,800 6,600 5,100 5,500 3,500 
Swissair 5,700 7,200 7,800 10,300 11,400 
Virgin 5,600 9,400 8,800 8,800 10,300 
Finnair 2,600 2,700 - - - 
Total 138,900 129,900 111,900 111,700 134,200 
El AP (26,400) (18,800) (10,700) (14,000) (15,800) 
US Carriers2 
American Airlines 63,200 64,300 65,400 71,300 76,600 
Delta Airlines 76,800 80,200 83,100 76,800 76,500 
Northwest 46,700 45,500 48,600 49,400 77,500 
Continental 36,200 37,500 38,200 40,500 51,600 
US Air 14,000 13,900 14,100 14,800 14,800 
TWA 26,400 28,100 30,200 25,200 24,000 
United 107,600 106,000 109,000 119,500 110,200 
Total2 370,300 375,500 388,600 397,500 431,200 
Source : Los Angeles Aixport Authority, release of April 1995. 
1. El Al carries sea-air cargo a nd cargo bound for Israel and Europe. 
2. US carriers, total figures include air cargo loadedloffl oaded at Los 
Angeles Airport - from1to all airports they serve (Far 
EastlEuropelUSAICanadalSouth and Cent ral America, etc. ). The seven US 
carriers, together, provide a total a ir cargo capacity of 50,500 tonnes 
from Los Angeles Aizport to Europe per annum - Appendix F-3, and therefore 
their combined air carriage of cargo cannot exceed their declared scheduled 
cargo capacities. 
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Allappendix F-2. 
Air exports/imports 
between Los Angeles Airport and Europe 
(rounded to the nearest hundred tonnes) 
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
U. K. 
Exports 22,100 22,400 29,500 22,600 23,600 
Imports 7,300 7,100 10,800 8,700 9,200 
Total 29,400 29,500 40,300 31,300 32,800 
Export of total 75.2% 75.9% 73.2% 72.2% 72.0% 
Germany 
Exports 15,600 18,000 17,700 16,900 15,900 
Imports 9,000 9,400 8,500 9,500 10,200 
Total 24,600 27,400 26,200 26,400 26,100 
Export of total 63.4% 65.7% 67.6% 64.0% 60.9% 
France 
Exports 8,000 6,000 10,500 9,800 9,100 
Imports 4,200 3,900 5,100 6,600 6,400 
Total 12,200 9,900 15,600 16,400 15,500 
Export of total 65.6% 60.6% 67.3% 59.8% 58.7% 
Italy 
Exports 6,200 6,900 8,400 6,100 5,400 
Imports 6,100 6,400 6,000 7,600 10,400 
Total 12,300 13,300 14,400 13,700 15,800 
Export % of total 50.4% 51.9% 58.3% 44.5% 34.2% 
Netherlands 
Exports 6,800 7,100 8,600 7,600 6,200 
Imports 3,000 3,200 3,300 4,200 4,300 
Total 9,800 10,300 11,900 11,800 10,500 
Export % of total 69.4% 68.9% 72.3% 64.4% 59.0% 
Switzerland 
Exports 4,300 4,200 5,000 4,700 4,900 
Imports 1,500 1,700 1,700 1,700 2,500 
Total 5,800 5,900 6,700 6,400 7,400 
Export % of total 74.1% 71.2% 74.6% 73.4% 66.2% 
Sweden 
Exports 2,000 2,400 2,500 1,800 1,800 
Imports 800 800 800 800 800 
Total 2,800 3,200 3,300 2,600 2,600 
Export % of total 71.4% 75.0% 75.8% 69.2% 69.2% 
Belcri 
Exports 2,800 2,800 3,500 2,900 3,100 
Imports 1,500 500 1,700 2,300 2,000 
Total 4,300 3,300 5,200 5,200 5,100 
Export % of total 65.1% 84.8% 67.3% 55.8% 60.8% 
Spain 
Exports 2,500 3,300 3,600 3,600 2,000 
Imports 500 600 600 600 1,000 
Total 3,000 3,900 4,200 4,200 3,000 
Export of total 83.3% 84.6% 85.7% 85.7% 66.7% 
Norway 
Exports 700 1,000 900 800 700 
Imports 200 200 200 500 200 
Total 900 1,200 1,100 1,300 900 
Export of total 77.8% 83.3% 81.8% 61.5% 77.8% 
Source: Compiled1tabulated from data released by U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau 
of the Census, IM145 & EM 545, Trade Inflo, 7311-X Grove Road, Frederick. MD21701. 
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Appendix F-2. 
Air exports/imports 
between Los Angeles Airport and Europe 
(rounded to the nearest hundred tonnes) 
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Ireland 
Exports 200 200 1,000 1,900 1,900 
Imports 400 400 400 400 400 
Total 600 600 1,400 2,300 2,300 
Export % of total 33.3% 33.3% 71.4% 82.6% 82.6% 
Dermark 
Exports 1,000 1,000 1,300 1,400 900 
Imports 400 600 400 600 800 
Total 1,400 1,600 1,700 2,000 1,700 
Export of total 71.4% 62.5% 76.5% 70.0% 
52.9% 
Austria 
Exports 1,200 1,300 1,100 1,500 900 
Imports 400 400 600 600 700 
Total 1,600 1,700 1,700 2,100 1,600 
Export of total 75.0% 76.5% 64.7% 71.4% 
56.3% 
Turkey 
Exports 800 1,000 700 500 300 
Imports 700 800 1,300 700 2,600 
Total 1,500 1,800 2,000 1,200 2,900 
Export % of total 53.3% 55.6% 35.0% 41.7% 10.3% 
Finland 
Exports 400 700 500 300 400 
Imports 300 300 200 300 200 
Total 700 1,000 700 600 600 
Export % of total 57.1% 70.0% 71.4% 50.0% 66.7% 
Greece 
Exports 300 400 300 300 300 
Imports 100 100 - 100 100 
Total 400 500 300 400 400 
Export % of total 75.0% 80.0% 100.0% 75.0% 75.0% 
Portugal 
Exports 200 300 200 200 200 
Imports 300 400 300 400 300 
Total Soo 700 Soo 600 500 
Export % of total 40.0% 42.9% 40.0% 33.3% 40.0% 
Luxembourq 
Exports - - - - 
500 
Imports - 100 - 
Total - 100 
Soo 
Export % of total - - - - 
100.0% 
Others 
Exports 2,100 2,300 300 400 200 
Imports 1,900 2,300 - - 200 
Total 4,000 4,600 300 400 400 
Export of total 52.5% 50.0% 100.0% 100.0% 66.7% 
Total 
Exports 77,200 81,300 95,600 83,300 78,300 
Imports 38,600 39,100 42,000 45,600 52,300 
Total 115,800 120,400 137,600 128,900 130,600 
Export of total 66.7% 81.8% 89.5% 84.4% 67.6% 
Source: Compiledl tabulated from data released by U. S. t. of Commerce, Bureau 
of the Census, IM1 45 & EM 545, Trade Inflo, 7311-X Grove Road, Frederick MD21701. 
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Appendix F-3: 
Scheduled international flights from 
Los Angeles to major gateway hubs in Europe 
(Available average cargo capacities rounded to the nearest 100 tonnes) 
(1994) 
Airline A/C type No. of flights 
per week 
Cargo capacity 
per annum 
Destination 
European Carriers: 
Martinair 767 LPJ 1 500 Amsterdam 
Martinair 747 LPJ 4 2,000 Amsterdam 
KLM 747 LPJ 4 2,000 Amsterdam 
KLM 74M LPQ 4 6,200 Amsterdam 
Lufthansa 747 LPJ 7 3,500 Frankfurt 
Lufthansa 74F LPF 2 9,800 Luxembourg 
Lufthansa 767 LPJ 3 1,200 Munich 
Lufthansa 767 LPJ 3 1,200 Vienna 
LTU M11 LPJ 2 1,000 Dusseldorf 
Swiss Air M11 LPJ 2 1,000 Geneva 
Swiss Air M11 LPJ 7 3,500 Zurich 
Virgin Atlantic 744 LPJ 7 8,000 London 
British Airways 744 LPJ 14 16,000 London 
British Airways 767 LPJ 4 1,600 Manchester 
Cargolux 74F LPF 3 15,600 Luxembourg 
Iberian 747 LPJ 7 3,500 Madrid 
Alitalia 74F LPF 2 9,800 Milan 
Alitalia M11 LPJ 4 2,000 Milan 
Alitalia M11 LPJ 7 2,000 Rome 
Alitalia 74F LPF 1 4,900 Rome 
Air France 74F LLF 1 4,900 Paris 
Air France 744 LPJ 3 3,300 Paris 
Air France 74E LLQ 7 10,500 Paris 
AOM French A/L DIO LPJ 3 1,200 Paris 
Lauda Air 763 LPJ 3 1,200 Munich 
Lauda Air 763 LPJ 3 1,200 Vienna 
Lauda Air L15 LPJ 7 3,500 Nice 
SAS & Finn Air operate regular frequencies from other points in the US; in 
agreement with US carriers (UA, AA & TWA) they air lift their cargo from Los 
Angeles Aiz-port to points such as New York for further on-carriage by air on SAS 
and Finn Air regular international flight sex-vices to their countries in Europe. 
Total available cargo capacity per annum, 
Los Angeles to major European gateways 
on European Carriers 121,100 
Percentage of total capacity 65.0% 
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North American Carriers: 
Northwest 747 LPJ 7 3,500 Amsterdam 
United Airlines 767 LPJ 7 2,800 Amsterdam 
United Airlines 744 LPJ 7 8,000 Frankfurt 
United Airlines 74E LLQ 1 1,500 Frankfurt 
United Airlines 763 LPJ 7 2,800 London 
United Airlines 767 LPJ 7 3,500 London 
United Airlines 763 LPJ 3 1,200 Paris 
TWA 763 LPJ 7 2,800 Paris 
TWA L10 LPJ 4 1,000 Paris 
US AIR 767 LPJ 7 2,800 Frankfurt 
Delta Airlines M11 LPJ 7 3,500 Frankfurt 
Continental A/L D10 LPJ 1 400 London 
Continental A/L D10 LPJ 4 1,600 Madrid 
Continental A/L 747 LPJ 3 1,500 Madrid 
American Airlines 763 LPJ 7 2,800 London 
American Airlines 763 LPJ 7 2,800 Paris 
"WA LIO LPJ 7 2,000 London 
"WA 767 LPJ 3 1,500 Milan 
"WA 747 LPJ 3 1,500 Milan 
"WA 747 LPJ 6 3,000 Rome 
Total available cargo capacity per annum, 
Los Angeles to major European gateways 
on North American Carriers 50,500 
Percentaqe of total ca pacity 27.1% 
Other Carriers: 
LY1 74F LPF 3 14,700 Amsterdam 
Total available cargo capacity per annum, 
Los Angeles to major European gateways 186,300 
Source Air Cargo timetable, Number 440, September 1994. 
Note Air cargo capacity figures do not include provisions for low season 
from1to Los Angeles Airport, as many major airlines such as 
Lufthansa, Martinair, El Al etc. resort to 'chartering' during high 
seasons, adding twice to three times as much air capacity to their 
regular schedules. 
Federal Express has been discounted from the analysis (refer detailed 
explanation under Table 4, Appendix 11). 
El Al (LY) of Israel operate via Amsterdam to Tel Aviv, carrying air export 
cargo bound for Israel, and whatever balance of available capacity is used 
for sea-air cargo which is off-loaded in Amsterdam for further distribution 
to various European destinations. 
codes: LPTILLJ - Pax flights carrying containerised/palletised cargo 
LPQ - Combi flights carrying containerised/palletised cargo 
PPFILPF - Pure freighter flights carrying containerised/palletised cargo 
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Appendix F-4. 
Freighters and mixed flights from Los Angeles 
to major gateway airports in South and Central America 
(Available average cargo capacities rounded to the nearest 100 tonnes - 1994) 
Airline A/C type No. of 
flts/week 
Cargo capacity 
per annum 
Destination 
Aerolineas Argentinas 31OLLJ 3 1200 Bogota 
Aerolineas Argentinas 31OLLJ 6 2400 Buenos Aires 
Aerolineas Argentinas 31OLLJ 3 1200 Lima 
Challenge Air Cargo 75FLPF 1 2000 Caracas 
Challenge Air Cargo 75FLPF 1 2000 Manaus 
Challenge Air Cargo 75FLPF 1 2000 Sao Paulo 
SAETA 31OLLJ 2 800 Guayaquil 
SAETA 31OLLJ 2 800 Quito 
United Airlines 763LPJ 7 2800 Sao Paulo 
Delta Airlines L1OLPJ 1 300 Sao Paulo 
Delta Airlines 743LLJ 2 800 Sao Paulo 
Delta Airlines 743LLJ 2 800 Riodejaneiro 
Delta Airlines DIOLPJ 1 400 RicdeJaneiro 
VARIG D1OLLJ 2 800 Lima 
VARIG 743LPJ 1 400 Lima 
VARIG D1FLPF 1 3000 Manaus 
VARIG D1OLLJ 2 800 Riodejaneiro 
VARIG 743LLJ 4 1600 Riodejaneiro 
VARIG D1FLLJ 2 6000 Riodejaneiro 
VARIG DIOLLJ 2 800 Sao Paulo 
VARIG 743LLJ 4 1600 Sao Paulo 
Lan Chile 767LPJ 2 1000 Lima 
Lan Chile 767LPJ 2 1000 Santiago 
Lan Chile D8FLPF 2 4000 Santiago 
VASP M11LLJ 3 1500 Riode, 7aneiro 
VASP M11LLJ 3 1500 Sao Paulo 
Avianca 744LLJ 2 2200 Caracas 
Korean Air 744LLJ 3 3300 Sao Paulo 
Japan Airlines 747LPJ 2 1000 Sao Paulo 
Total 43,000 
To Central America/ Caribbean 
Qantas* 74MLPQ 2 3000 Papeete 
Air New Zealand* 747LLJ 2 1000 Papeete 
Air France* 744LLJ 3 3300 Papeete 
Aeromexpress* DBFLPF 5 10000 Mexico City 
Malaysia Airlines* 744LLJ 2 1000 Mexico City 
Delta Airlines L1OLPJ 7 2100 San Juan 
American Airlines DIOLPJ 7 2800 San Juan 
VARIG D1FLPF 2 6000 Panama 
Aviateca LlOLPJ 7 2200 Guatemala 
Mexicana D8FLPF 2 4000 Mexico 
TACA D1FLPF 2 6000 San Salvador 
Lan Chile DBFLPF 2 4000 Panama 
Total 42,400 
Source Air cargo timetable, Number 440, Septe-mber 1994. 
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Appendix F-5: 
Total air cargo (tonnes) loaded/offloaded 
by international airlines operating between 
Los Angeles Airport and SouthlCentral America 
Airlines 1 1990 1 1991 1 1992 1 1993 1 1994 
S. American Carriers 
Aerolineas (Argentina) 1,800 1,700 1,900 1,700 3,000 
Lan Chile (Chile) 4,800 5,100 5,800 5,500 7,000 
SAETA (Ecuador) 400 400 700 600 500 
VARIG (Brazil) 7,000 7,100 7,900 9,700 11,100 
VASP (Brazil) 1,800 1,600 1,900 1,700 1,900 
Challenge Air Cargo (us) - - - 1,600 3,200 Avianca (Colombia) 500 600 700 600 600 
Total 16,300 16,500 18,900 21,400 27,400 
C. American Carriers 
Aeromexpress (Mexico) 3,500 3,300 3,800 3,800 4,300 
Aeromexico (Mexico) 3,400 2,800 3,800 3,800 800 
Aviateca (Guatemala) 300 300 400 1,700 100 
Mexicana (Mexicana) 5,800 6,100 6,700 6,500 9,000 
TACA Intnl (El Salvador) 2,800 3,000 3,300 4,500 5,400 
Total 15,800 15,500 18,000 20,300 19,600 
Others' 
United A/L 108,200 105,300 109,000 119,500 110,200 
Delta A/L 81,300 80,200 83,100 76,800 76,500 
Qantas 21,900 21,700 22,100 22,700 25,200 
Air NZ 11,200 11,500 11,700 11,700 18,000 
Air France 20,900 21,500 21,000 21,700 24,300 
Malaysia 10,500 11,800 14,800 11,800 10,300 
Japan A/L 40,100 42,500 44,900 39,000 47,600 
Korean A/L 78,300 82,900 87,500 102,500 108,800 
Source: Los Angeles Airport Authority, release of April 1995. 
Other airlines, figures include total cargo handled (loadedloffloaded) on 
all their worldwide internationa l routes fromlt(? LAX. Therefore, the air 
cargo capacities made available, by those airlines to SouthlCentral America 
must be taken into consideration as cargo uplift from Los Angeles Airport 
cannot exceed the cargo capaciti es speci fied in App endix F-4, page 271. 
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Appendix F-6. 
Domestic made air exports from Los Angeles Airport 
to South and Central America 
(rounded to the nearest hundred tonnes) 
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
South America 
Brazil 1,100 1,300 2,000 2,000 2,700 
Argentina 300 300 1,500 1,300 1,500 
Chile ' 600 600 1,100 1,000 1,100 
Columbia 100 100 100 200 400 
Others 100 Soo 300 300 400 
Total 2,200 2,800 5,000 4,800 6,100 
Central America 
Mexico 2,600 2,500 2,500 2,800 3,000 
Puerto Rico 800 900 800 900 1,000 
Guatemala 100 100 100 200 200 
San Salvador 800 1,000 900 1,000 1,200 
Panama 1,200 1,200 1,300 1,300 1,200 
Tahiti 300 300 400 400 400 
Others 100 100 200 100 200 
Total 5,900 6,100 6,200 6,700 7,200 
Source: U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, IM145 & EM 545, Trade 
Inflo, 7312-X Grove Road, Frederick, MD 21701. 
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Appendix F-7. &V 
Air exports/imports between Los Angeles Airport 
and South America by country 
(rounded to the nearest hundred tonnes) 
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Brazil 
Exports 1,100 1,300 2,000 2,000 2,700 
Imports 500 800 1,700 1,800 2,100 
Total 1,600 2,100 3,700 3,800 4,800 
Export %- of total 68 . 
80-i 61.9-, c 54.116 52.616 56.3'0-. 
Argentina 
Exports 300 300 1,500 1,300 1,500 
Imports 300 300 200 100 200 
Total 600 600 1,700 1,400 1,700 
Export % of total 50.0%; 50.0 -136 88.29,16 92.916 88.216 
Chile 
Exports 600 600 1,100 1,000 1,100 
Imports 1,300 1,500 2,200 3,000 2,800 
Total 1,900 2,100 3,300 4,000 3,900. 
Export % of total 31.6%; 28.60-. 33.306 25.0% 28.2%; 
Columbia 
Exports 100 100 100 200 400 
Imports 300 300 300 300 400 
Total 400 400 400 500 800 
Export 1; of total 25 . 001 25. Oi 25.016 40.0% 50.096 
Peru 
Exports 100 100 100 100 200 
Imports 1,000 1,100 900 1,300 2,200 
Total 1,100 1,500 1,000 1,400 2,400 
Export % of total 9.0 -0i 6.70-. 10.0%ý 7.116 8.3% 
Ecuador 
Exports --- 100 --- --- --- Imports 300 400 1,000 1,300 1,600 
Total 300 500 1,000 1,300 1,600 
Export t of total - 1-116 20.0%; --06 --9116 --Sk 
Others 
Exports 300 300 100 100 200 
Imports 700 800 300 200 100 
Total 1,000 1,100 400 300 300 
Export % of total 30.0% 27.3% 25.0% 33.3% 66.7% 
Total 
Exports 2,500 2,800 4,900 4,700 6,100 
Imports 4,400 5,200 6,600 8,000 9,400 
Total 6,900 8,000 11,500 12,700 15,500 
Export % of total 36.2% 35.0% 42.6% 37.0% 39.4% 
Source: Compiled1rabulated from data released by U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau 
of the Census, IM145 & EM 545, Trade Inflo, 7311-X Grove Road, Frederick MD21701. 
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All&k-lpendix F-8: 
Scheduled international flights 
from San Francisco 
to major gateway hubs in Europe 
(Available average cargo capacities rounded to the nearest 100 tonnes) 
Airline A/C type No. of flights 
per week 
Cargo capacity 
per annum 
Destination 
European Carriers: 
Lufthansa 74M LPQ 1 1,500 Frankfurt 
74F PPF 2 10,000 11 
747 LPJ 7 3,500 of 
KLM 747 LPJ 1 500 Amsterdam 
74M LPQ 3 4,500 it 
British Airways 747 LPJ 14 7,000 London 
Virgin Atlantic 747 LPJ 14 7,000 London 
Cargolux 74F LPF 2 10fooo Luxembourg 
Lufthansa 74F PPF 2 10,000 Luxembourg 
Air France 74M LPQ 4 6,000 Paris 
Air France 74F LPF 2 10fooo Paris 
Total available cargo capacity per annum, 
San Francisco to major European gateways 
on European Carriers 69,400 
Percentage of total capacity 51.7% 
North American Carriers: 
United Airlines 747 LPJ 7 3,500 Amsterdam 
767 LPJ 7 3,500 London 
747 LPJ 7 3,500 11 
763 LPJ 2 800 if 
D10 LPJ 7 3,500 Frankfurt 
74E LPQ 1 1,500 
744 LPJ 7 3,500 
Northwest D10 LPJ 7 3,500 
747 LPJ 4 2,000 Amsterdam 
TWA 767 LPJ 7 3,500 Lisbon 
Delta Airlines 310 LPJ 7 2,800 
American Airlines 767 LPJ 7 3,500 London 
TWA L10 LPJ 7 1,800 of 
United Airlines 747 LPJ 7 3,500 Madrid 
American Airlines 767 LPJ 7 3,500 Manchester 
TWA 767 LPJ 7 3,500 Milan 
American Airlines 767 LPJ 7 3,500 Paris 
American Airlines L10 LPJ 7 1,800 it 
United Airlines 763 LPJ 4 1,600 it 
TWA 767 LPJ 7 3,500 Rome 
United Airlines 747 LPJ 7 3,500 Zurich 
American Airlines 767 LPJ 7 3,500 
Total available cargo capacity per annum, 
San Francisco to major European gateways 
on North American Carr iers 64,800 
Total available cargo capacity per annum, 
San Francisco to major European gateways 134,200 
El Al 74F LPF 3 15,000 Amsterdam 
Source Air Cargo timetable, Number 440, September 1994. 
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Appendix G-1 
Freighters and mixed flights from Miami 
to major gateway hubs in Europe 
(Available cargo capacities rounded to the nearest 100 tonnes) 
Airline A/C type Number of flights 
per week 
Cargo capacity 
per annum 
Destination 
Martinair 747 LPJ 1 500 Amsterdam 
767 LPJ 3 1,500 
2,000 
L. T. U Airlines LIS LPJ 2 800 Dusseldorf 
Lufthansa 74F PPF 4 20,000 Frankfurt 
747 LPJ 7 3,500 
74M LPQ 7 10,500 
Lufthansa 767 LPJ 3 1,500 Munich 
Lufthansa 767 LPJ 3 1,500 Vienna 
37,000 
Finnair M11 LPJ I Soo Helsinki 
British Airways 747 LPJ 7 3,500 London 
767 LPJ 7 3,500 
7,000 
Virgin Atlantic 747 LPJ 5 2,500 
Iberian 747 LPJ 7 3,500 Madrid 
DIO LPJ 3 1,500 
5,000 
Lauda Air 763 LPJ 3 1,200 
Lauda Air 763 LPJ 3 1,400 
2,600 
Air France 74F LLF 1 5,000 Paris 
340 LPJ 5 2,500 if 
7,500 
Total available cargo capacity per annum, 
Miami to major European gateways 
carried by European carriers 64,900 
American Airlines M11 LPJ 7 3,500 Brussels 
American Airlines 763 LPJ 7 2,800 London 
American Airlines 763 LPJ 7 2,800 It 
American Airlines 763 LPJ 7 2,800 Paris 
11,900 
United Airlines 763 LPJ 7 2,800 
TWA L10 LPJ 7 1,800 Madrid 
Total available cargo capacity per annum, 
Miami to major European gateways 
carried by us carriers 16,500 
Total available cargo capacity per annum, 
Miami to major European gateways 81,400 
El Al 74F LPF 1 5,200 Amsterdam 
Source : Air Cargo timetable, Number 440, September 1994. 
278 
Appendix G-2. W 
Freighters and mixed flights from Miami 
to major gateway hubs in S. America 
(Available cargo capacities rounded to the nearest 100 tonnes) 
Airline A/C type Number of flights Cargo capacity Destination 
per week per annum 
Amerjet Intl 72F PPF 1 800 Antigua 
Amerjet Intl 72F PPF 2 1,600 Barbados 
Amerjet Intl 72F PPF 1 Boo San Juan 
3,200 
Arrow Air D8F LPF 1 2,000 Asuncion 
Arrow Air D8F LPF 2 4,000 Buenos Aires 
Arrow Air D8F LPF 6 12,000 Panama City 
Arrow Air D8F LPF 3 6,000 Quito 
Arrow Air D8F LPF 6 12,000 San Juan 
Arrow Air D8F LPF 3 6,000 Santiago 
42,000 
Ladeco Cargo 70F LPF 3 6,000 Asuncion 
Ladeco Cargo 70F LPF 1 2,000 Buenos Aires 
Ladeco Cargo 70F LPF 4 8,000 Iquique 
Ladeco Cargo 70F LPF 1 2,000 Montevideo 
Ladeco Cargo 70F LPF 7 14,000 Santiago 
32,000 
Tampa Airlines D8F LPF 7 14,000 Bogota 
Tampa Airlines D8F LPF 3 6,000 Caracas 
Tampa Airlines DBF LPF 7 14,000 Medellin 
34,000 
TransBrasil 767 LLJ 4 2,000 Brasilia 
TransBrasil 767 LLJ 7 3,500 Riodejaneiro 
Transbrasil 767 LLJ 7 3,500 Sao Paulo 
9,000 
VASP M11 LLJ 1 Soo Riodejaneiro 
VASP M11 LLJ 3 1,500 Sao Paulo 
VASP M11 LLJ 3 1,500 Sao Paulo 
3,500 
VARIG D1F LPF 1 3,000 Riodejaneiro 
767 LPJ 7 3,500 Riodejaneiro 
VARIG D1F LPF 1 2,500 Sao Paulo 
Varig 767 LPJ 1 Soo Manaus 
DIO LLJ 7 3,500 Sao Paulo 
13,000 
LAN Chile 767 LPJ 7 3,500 Buenos Aires 
Lan Chile 70F LPF 1 2,000 Iquique 
DBF LPF 2 4,000 Iquique 
LAN Chile D8F LPF 3 6,000 Santiago 
70F LPF 1 2,000 Santiago 
767 LPJ 7 3,500 Santiago 
LAN Chile D8F LPF 1 2,000 Montevideo 
23,000 
Fine Air Cargo D8F LLF 5 10,000 Caracas 
Fine Air Cargo D8F LLF 2 4,000 Guatemala City 
Fine Air Cargo D8F LLF 2 4,000 Managua 
Fine Air Cargo D8F LLF 3 6,000 Panama City 
Fine Air Cargo D8F LLF 3 6,000 San Jose 
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Fine Air Cargo D8F LLF 2 4,000 San Pedro 
34,000 
Fast Air Carrier 70F LPF 6 12,000 Panama City 
Fast Air Carrier 70F LPF 4 8,000 Iquique 
Fast Air Carrier 70F LPF 1 2,000 Montevideo 
Fast Air Carrier 70F LPF 4 8,000 Santiago 
30,000 
LAB 70F LPF 3 6,000 La Paz 
LAB 310 LPJ 4 1,600 La Paz 
LAB 310 LPJ 1 400 Manaus 
LAB 70F LPF 3 6,000 Santa Cruz 
LAB 310 LPJ 3 1,200 Santa Cruz 
15,200 
Aerovias Colombia D8F LPF 7 14,000 Bogota 
Aerovias Colombia D8F LPF 2 4,000 Medellin 
18,000 
Aeromar Cargo D8F LPF 6 12,000 San Domingo 
70F BBF 6 12,000 San Domingo 
L10 LPJ 6 1,500 San Domingo 
25,500 
Million Air Cargo 70F LPF 2 4,000 Quito 
Million Air 70F LPF 7 14,000 Bogota 
18,000 
Others 
ServicdeTransport 70F LPF 3 6,000 Buenos Aires 
Aerolineas 747 LLJ 7 3,500 Buenos Aries 
Del Sur 70F LPF 5 10,000 Buenos Aires 
Aviateca D8F PPF 2 4,000 Guatemala City 
Tikal Jets D8F LPF 2 4,000 Guatemala City 
Aeroperu D10 LLJ 7 3,500 Lima 
CompaniaDeAviacon D10 LLJ 4 2,000 Lima 
Aeronaves DelPeru 70F LPF 2 4,000 Lima 
Export AirDelPeru D8F LPF 1 2,000 Lima 
Central American D8F LPF 1 2,000 Managua 
Lineas Aereas D8F LPF 2 4,000 Medellin 
Pacific Intl 72F LPF 3 2,300 Panama City 
Air Caribbean 72F BBF 2 900 Panama City 
COPA 73F LPF 5 7,500 Panama City 
Andes Airlines D8F LPF 1 2,000 Quito 
SAETA 310 LLJ 7 2,800 Quito 
Airborne Express D9F LPF 5 10,000 San Juan 
TACA Intl. A/L 767 LLJ 7 3,500 San Salvador 
SantaCruz Air DBF PPF 1 2,000 Santa Cruz 
Aerochago A/L D8F PPF 3 6,000 San Domingo 
Lineas Aereas D8F PPF 7 14,000 Bogota 
Avianca 767 LLJ 3 1,500 Bogota 
97,500 
Challenge 75F LPF 5 10,000 Guatemala City 
Challenge 75F LPF 6 12,000 Bogota 
Challenge 75F LPF 5 10,000 Caracas 
Challenge 75F LPF 2 4,000 La Paz 
Challenge 75F LPF 4 8,000 Lima 
Challenge 75F LPF 2 4,000 Manaus 
Challenge 75F LPF 6 12,000 Panama City 
Challenge 75F LPF 6 12,000 Quito 
Challenge 75F LPF 6 12,000 San Jose 
challenge DBF PPF 7 14,000 San Jose 
Challenge 75F LPF 5 10,000 San Pedro 
Challenge 75F LPF 4 8,000 San Salvador 
Challenge D8F LPF 2 4,000 San Salvador 
Challenge 75F LPF 2 4,000 Sao Paulo 
124,000 
280 
American Airlines AB3 LPJ 7 2,800 Antigua 
American Airlines 763 LPJ 7 2,800 Asuncion 
American Airlines 763 LPJ 7 2,800 Bogota 
American Airlines AB3 LPJ 7 2,800 Bogota 
American Airlines Mil LPJ 7 3,500 Buenos Aires 
American Airlines 767 LPJ 7 3,500 Caracas 
American Airlines AB3 LPJ 7 2,800 Caracas 
American Airlines AB3 LPJ 7 2,800 Lima 
American Airlines AB3 LPJ 7 2,800 Panama City 
American Airlines 763 LPJ 7 2,800 Riodejaneiro 
American Airlines AB3 LPJ 7 2,800 San Juan 
American Airlines 763 LPJ 7 2,800 Santiago 
American Airlines mil LPJ 7 3,500 Santiago 
American Airlines 767 LPJ 7 3,500 San Domingo 
American Airlines AB3 LPJ 7 2,800 San Domingo 
American Airlines 763 LPJ 7 2,800 Sao Paulo 
47,600 
United Airlines 763 LPJ 7 2,800 Sao Paulo 
United Airlines 747 LPJ 7 3,500 Buenos Aires 
United Airlines 763 LPJ 7 2,800 Riodejaneiro 
United Airlines 763 LPJ 7 2,800 Santiago 
11,900 
Delta Airlines 767 LPJ 7 3,500 Riodejaneiro 
Delta Airlines D10 LPJ 7 3,500 Sao Paulo 
7,000 
Total available cargo capacity per annum, 
Miami to major S. American gateways 588,400 
Source : Air Cargo timetable, Number 440, September 1994. 
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APpendix H-1 
Freighters and mixed flights from Singapore 
to major gateway hubs in Europe 
(Available cargo capacities rounded to the nearest 100 tonnes) 
Airline A/C type Number of flights 
per week 
Cargo capacity 
per annum 
Destination 
KIM 74M LPQ 5 7,500 Amsterdam 
747 LPJ 4 2,000 
74F LPF 2 10,000 
19,500 
Garuda 747 LPJ 3 1,500 
744 LPJ 1 1,100 
2,600 
Indonesian 744 LPJ 1 1,100 Frankfurt 
M11 LPJ 1 500 of 
Indonesian 744 LPJ 1 1,100 Madrid 
M11 LPJ 1 500 11 
Indonesian M11 LPJ 1 500 Paris 
747 LPJ 1 500 to 
Indonesian 747 LPJ 1 500 Rome 
Indonesian Mil LPJ 1 Soo Zurich 
747 LPJ 1 500 Zurich 
5,700 
Quantas 744 LLJ 5 5,500 Frankfurt 
Quantas 744 LLJ 7 7,700 London 
Quantas 744 LLJ 7 7,700 Manchester 
Quantas 744 LPJ 2 2,200 Rome 
23,100 
Lufthansa 74M LPQ 4 6,000 Frankfurt 
747 LPJ 3 1.500 11 
7,500 
Air France 744 LPJ 1 1,100 Paris 
74E LLQ 3 4,500 
340 LPJ 1 400 
6,000 
Alitalia 747 LPJ 2 1,000 Rome 
Swissair M11 LPJ 7 3,500 Geneva 
Royal Brunei 767 LPJ 2 800 London 
British Airways 744 LPJ 7 7,700 London 
Cargolux 74F LPF 3 15,000 Luxembourg 
SAS 763 LPJ 6 2,400 Copenhagen 
30,400 
Singapore A/L 744 LPJ 5 5,500 Amsterdam 
74F LPF 1 5,000 It 
Singapore A/L 744 LPJ 2 2,200 Brussels 
74F LPF 4 20,000 to 
Singapore A/L 744 LPJ 3 3,300 Copenhagen 
74F LPF 2 10,000 It 
Singapore A/L 74F PPF 1 5,000 Frankfurt 
744 LPJ 7 3,500 if 
Singapore A/L 74F LPF 1 5,000 London 
744 LPJ 7 7,700 11 
Singapore A/L 744 LPJ 2 2,200 Madrid 
Singapore A/L 744 LPJ 3 3,300 Manchester 
Singapore A/L 744 LPJ 2 2,200 Rome 
Singapore A/L 743 LPJ 2 1,000 Vienna 
Singapore A/L 744 LPJ 7 7,700 Zurich 
83,600 
Total available cargo capacity per annum 
Singapore to major Eur opean gateways 178,400 
Source : Air cargo timetable, Number 440, September 1994. 
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Appendix H-2: '&V 
Freighters and mixed flights from Singapore 
to major gateway hubs in AustralialN. Zealand 
(Available cargo capacities rounded to the nearest 100 tonnes) 
Airline A/C type Number of flights 
per week 
Cargo capacity 
per annum 
Destination 
KLM 747 LPJ 2 1,000 Sydney 
Quantas 767 LLJ 4 2,000 Adelaide 
Quantas 74L LLJ 7 4,200 Brisbane 
Quantas 763 LLJ 7 2,800 Cairns 
Quantas 763 LLJ 5 2,000 Darwin 
Quantas 744 LPJ 7 7,700 Melbourne 
Quantas 763 LLJ 14 5,600 Perth 
Quantas 763 LLJ 5 2,000 Sydney 
Quantas 767 LLJ 5 2,500 Sydney 
Quantas 744 LPJ 14 15,400 Sydney 
Quantas 74L LLJ 7 4,200 Sydney 
48,400 
British Airways 744 LPJ 2 2,200 Auckland 
British Airways 744 LPJ 2 2,200 Brisbane 
British Airways 744 LPJ 3 3,300 Melbourne 
British Airways 744 LPJ 3 3,300 Perth 
British Airways 744 LPJ 3 3,300 Sydney 
14,300 
Air France 744 LPJ 1 1,100 Perth 
74E LLQ 1 1,500 of 
2,600 
Gulf Air 767 LLJ 3 1,500 Melbourne 
Gulf Air 767 LLJ 3 1,500 Sydney 
3,000 
Air N. Z. 767 LLJ 4 2,000 Auckland 
Air N. Z. 767 LLJ 1 500 Christchurch 
2,500 
Singapore A/L 743 LPJ 3 1,500 Adelaide 
Singapore A/L 74F LPF 2 10,000 Auckland 
Singapore A/L 743 LPJ 6 3,000 Auckland 
Singapore A/L 743 LPJ 4 2,000 Brisbane 
Singapore A/L 310 LPJ 1 400 Darwin 
Singapore A/L 743 LPJ 1 500 Darwin 
Singapore A/L 743 LPJ 3 1,500 Christchurch 
Singapore A/L 743 LPJ 4 2,000 Melbourne 
Singapore A/L 74D LPQ 3 4,500 Melbourne 
Singapore A/L 310 LPJ 3 1,200 Perth 
Singapore A/L 743 LPJ 3 1,500 Perth 
Singapore A/L 747 LPJ 1 Soo Perth 
Singapore A/L 74F LPF 2 10,000 Sydney 
Singapore A/L 744 LPJ 7 7,700 Sydney 
46,300 
Total available cargo capacity per annum 
Singapore to major Aus tralian/N. Z. gateways 118,100 
Singapore A/L 744 LPJ 1 1,100 Cape Town 
Singapore A/L 744 LPJ 1 1,100 Durban 
Singapore A/L 744 LPJ 4 4,400 ichannesburg 
6,600 
South African A/L 747 LLJ 1 500 Cape Town 
South African A/L 747 LLJ 3 1,500 ichannesburg 
2,000 
Total available cargo capacity per annum 
Singapore to South Africa 8,600 
source Air Cargo timetable, Number 440, September 1994. 
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Appendix I-1 
Freighters and mixed flights 
from Dubai to major gateway hubs in Europe 
(Available cargo capacities rounded to the nearest 100 tonnes) 
Airline A/C type Number of flights 
per week 
Cargo capacity 
per annum 
Destination 
KLM 310 LPJ 7 2,800 Amsterdam 
74F LPF 3 15,000 of 
17,800 
Malaysia A/L 74E LLQ 1 1,500 Amsterdam 
Malaysia A/L M1F LPF 1 1,500 to 
Malaysia A/L 74E LLQ 2 3,000 Brussels 
Malaysian A/L 74E LLQ 2 3,000 Rome 
9,000 
Singapore A/L 74F LPF 1 5,000 Amsterdam 
Singapore A/L 74F LPF 3 15,000 Brussels 
Singapore A/L 74F LPF 2 10,000 Copenhagen 
Singapore A/L 74F LPF 1 5,000 London 
Singapore A/L 74F LPF 1 5,000 Basle 
40,000 
Biman A/L D10 LLJ 2 1,000 Amsterdam 
Biman Airlines D10 LLJ 5 2,500 London 
3,500 
Air Hong Kong 74F LPF 7 35,000 Brussels 
Air Hong Kong 74F LPF 5 25,000 Manchester 
60,000 
Lufthansa AB3 LPJ 4 1,600 Frankfurt 
Lufthansa 310 LPJ 2 800 
2,400 
Royal Brunei 767 LPJ 2 1,000 Frankfurt 
Royal Brunei 767 LPJ 2 11000 London 
2,000 
Cathay Pacific 74F LPF 5 2,500 Frankfurt 
Cathay Pacific 74F LPF 3 15,000 London 
Cathay Pacific 74F LPF 2 10,000 Paris 
27,500 
Emirates Airlines 310 LPJ 5 2,000 Frankfurt 
Emirates Airlines 310 LPJ 7 2,800 London 
Emirates Airlines AB3 LPJ 7 2,800 
Emirates Airlines AB3 LPJ 4 1,600 Manchester 
Emirates Airlines 310 LPJ 3 1,200 Nice 
Emirates Airlines 310 LPJ 3 1,200 Paris 
Emirates Airlines 310 LPJ 3 1,200 Rome 
Emirates Airlines AB3 LPJ 2 800 Rome 
13,600 
Royal Nepal 310 LLJ 3 1,200 Frankfurt 
Royal Nepal 310 LLJ 2 800 London 
2,000 
Air Lanka 340 LLJ 2 900 London 
Air Lanka L10 LLJ 2 500 London 
Air Lanka 340 LLJ 2 900 Rome 
2,300 
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Pakistan Intl. 747 LPJ I Soo London 
Pakistan Intl. 74M LPQ 1 11500 London 
2,000 
Air France 74F LLF 2 10,000 Lyon 
Air France 74F LLF 7 35,000 Paris 
Air France 74M LLQ 1 15,000 Paris 
Air France 310 LPJ 2 800 Paris 
60,800 
Alitalia DBF PPF 3 6,000 Rome 
Alitalia AB3 LPJ 3 1,200 Rome 
7,200 
British Airways 767 LPJ 7 3,500 London 
Olympic Airways AB3 LLJ 2 800 Athens 
Cargolux 74F LPF 2 10,000 Luxembourg 
China Airlines 74F LPF 3 15,000 Luxembourg 
Vietnam Airlines 763 LLJ 2 800 Paris 
Swiss Air 310 LPJ 4 1,600 Zurich 
Total available cargo capacity per annum 
Dubai to major E uropean gateways 281,000 
Source Air Cargo timetable, Number 440, September 1994. 
Note Computation of this table of airline cargo capacities was made on 
the assumption that all flights are texminator flights. However, 
research and Interviews with all airli nes transiting U. A. E. Airports 
revealed actual air cargo capacities made available were averaged 
and tabulated separately for each of the three major U. A. E. airports 
analysed in this section. 
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Appendix 1-2 
Airline flights were divided into two classes 
1. Terminator flights 
2. Transit flights 
All airlines were interviewed and actual capacities of terminator 
flights were averaged over 50 weeks, rather than 52 weeks, taking 
care of a possible margin of error of 2 weeks of frequencies or 
S*i of the total. 
Airlines transiting Dubai Airport on their way back to Europe, 
from the sub-continent of India and the Far east, were also 
interviewed, and an average capacity available per week, on 
their flights, was drawn and averaged over 50 weeks per annum. 
These interviews were updated in March 1995 with the same 
airlines. The air cargo capacity figures detailed below are the 
most likely and realistic figures: 
A. Terminator flights - Dubai International Airport 
capacities available on the return leg to Europe, from 
Dubai. 
Airline Air carcro capacity(tonnes p. a) 
1. Emirates Airlines 
Operate 35 passenger flights per 
week using Airbus 300 series, each 
having an average available air 
cargo capacity of 8 tonnes. 
35 x8x 50 = 
Kuwait Airways 
14,000 
Operate 2 B707s, freighter flights 
per week, each with an average 
available air cargo capacity of 
35 tons. 
35 x2x 50 = 3,500 tonnes. 
Operate daily, Airbus, passenger 
flights, each with an average available 
air cargo capacity of 8 tonnes. 
8x7x 50 = 2,800 tonnes 
Total available air cargo capacity 
3,500 + 2,800 = 6,300 
Alitalia 
Operate 2 B747 combis per week, 
each having an average available 
air cargo capacity of 35 tonnes. 
35 x2x 50 = 3,500 
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4. Swiss Air 
Operate 8 Airbus 300 series passenger 
flights per week, each having 
an average available air cargo 
capacity of 8 tonnes. 
8x8x 50 = 3,200 
S. Royal Jordanian 
(terminators & transit flights, 
originating in India) 
Operate 2 nos B707s, freighters, 
per week, and 6 L1011/Airbus 
300 series passenger flights/week. 
They have, totally, an average available 
air cargo capacity of 125 tonnes per week. 
125 x 50 = 6,300 
6. Middle East Airlines 
(terminators and transit flights 
originating Sydney, Australia) 
Operate 5 passenger flights per week, 
using B707/Airbus 300 series, totally 
having an average available air cargo 
capacity of 40 tonnes per week. 
40 x 50 = 2,000 
7. Olympic 
Operate 3 nos B737s passenger flights 
(sometimes upgraded for 3 months 
or so to Airbus 300 series) per week, each with 
an average available air cargo 
capacity of 3 tonnes. 
8x2x 50 = 800 
8. Others 10,000 
Total capacity available, sea-air carriers 46,100 
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Appendix 1-3 
B. Transit flights via Dubai: 
Capacities available on the return leg to Europe, from 
Dubai. 
Airline Air-carcro capacity(tonnes p. a) 
1. KLM 
(transit - originating Far East points) 
Operate 7 B747 pure freighter per week 
and 7 Airbus 300 passenger flights (of 
which only 3 uplift cargo from Dubai). 
Each freighter having an average available 
air cargo capacity of 8 tonnes at Dubai. 
Each passenger flight having an average 
available air cargo capacity of 6 tonnes at Dubai. 
7x8x 50 = 2,800 tonnes per annum 
3x6x 50 = 900 tonnes per annum 
a total of 3,700 
2. Cargolux 
(transit - other Middle East points) 
Operate 1 B747 pure freighter per week, 
each having an average available air 
cargo capacity of 70 tonnes at Dubai. 
70 x1x 50 = 3,500. 
3. Air France 
(transit - originating Bangkok) 
Operate 3 Airbus passenger flights 
per week and 5 B747s freighters per 
week, totally having an average available 
air cargo capacity of 250 tonnes per week. 
250 x 50 = 12,500 
4. Cathay Pacific 
(transit - originating HongKong) 
Operate 8 B747 freighter per week, 
each having an average available air 
cargo capacity of 8 tonnes at Dubai. 
8x8x 50 = 3,200 
5. Singapore Airlines 
(transit - originating Singapore) 
Operate 6 B747 pure freighter per week, 
each having an average available air 
cargo capacity of 8 tonnes at Dubai. 
8x6x 50 = 2,400 
6. Lufthansa Airlines 
(transit - originating India) 
Operate 7 Airbus passenger flights per 
week, each having an average available 
air cargo capacity of 8 tonnes. 
8x7x 50 = 2,800 
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7. British Airways 
(transit - originating Muscat) 
Operate 7 passenger flights per week, 
using Airbus 300, each having an average 
available air cargo capacity of 8 tonnes. 
8x7x 50 = 2,800 
8. China Airlines 
(transit - originating Taipei) 
Operate 5 B747 pure freighter per week, 
each having an average available air 
cargo capacity of 7 tonnes at Dubai. 
7x5x 50 = 1,800. 
9. Air Hong Kong 
(transit - originating HongKong) 
do not allocate any space, but offer their 
space to the local market as and when 
available, due to offloading of Dubai destined 
cargo, or when sometimes space becomes 
available from the origin point itself. 
Operate 5 B747 freighters per week, 
each having an average available 
air cargo capacity of 8 tonnes. 
8x5x 50 = 2,000 
Total capacity available, sea-air carriers 34,700 
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Appendix 1-4 &V 
Freighters and mixed flights 
from Sharjah to major gateway hubs in Europe 
(Available cargo capacities rounded to the nearest 100 tonnes) 
Airline A/C type Number of flights Cargo capacity Destination 
per week per annum 
Gulf Air 75F PPF 6 12,000 Brussels 
Lufthansa 74F PPF 14 70,000 Frankfurt 
DBF PPF 3 6,000 if 
TMA 70F LPF 7 14,000 London 
Royal Jordanian 70F LPF 4 8,000 Maastricht 
Total available cargo capacity per annum 
Sharjah to major European gateways 110,000 
Source Air Cargo timetable, Number 440, September 1994. 
Note Computation of this table of airline cargo capacities was made on 
the assumption that all flights are terminator flights. However, 
research and interviews with all airlines transiting U. A. E. Airports 
revealed actual air cargo capacities made available were averaged 
and tabulated separately for each of the three major U. A. Z. airports 
analysed in this section. 
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Appendix 1-5 
Sharjah Airport total air exports were mainly directed to CIS 
countries through the services of 16 regular CIS charter airlines 
uplifting over 50,000 tonnes of cargo in 1994, from a total of 
84,400 tonnes of air exports. The balance of 34,400 tonnes were 
destined west-bound, to Europe and North America. The main 
providers of air cargo capacities on the western route are : 
Airline 
1. Lufthansa 
Operate 6 B747s 
freighter/week, 
average availab 
6x 100 x 50 = 
1x 40 x 50 = 
Air carcro capacity (tonn s 1: ). a) 
freighters and 1 DC8 
terminators, having an 
le air cargo capacity of: 
30,000 tonnes 
2,000 tonnes 
All these flights start from Germany 
and return from Sharjah Airport to 
the same point of origin. 
Lufthansa also operates 7 B747S freighters 
and 1 DC8 freighter per week that transit 
Sharjah originating from Far East/Indian 
sub-continent points. They are usually 
filled with originating cargo. The 
DC8 freighter is unable to provide any 
available air cargo space at Sharjah, while 
the 7 B747s provide an average air cargo 
capacity of 5 tonnes per flight. 
5x7x 50 = 1,800 tonnes 
Total air cargo capacity available out of 
Sharjah; 32,000 + 1,800 33,800. 
2. Gulf Air 
Operates 6 weekly freighter frequencies 
from Sharjah Airport to Brussels, where the 
DHL trucking system took over the 
re-distribution to the whole region of 
Europe. Gulf Air uses a B757 freighter 
with a payload capacity of 40 tonnes/flight. 
40 x6x 50 = 12,000 
3. TMA (Trans Mediterranean Airline) 
Operate 7 weekly frequencies, utilising 
B707 freighters via Beirut, for onward 
air carriage to destinations in Europe, 
such as Basle, Frankfurt, Amsterdam, 
Paris and London, availing an air cargo 
capacity of 14,000 tonnes, but TMA made 
available 50-16 of this capacity for Beirut 
domestic air exports, and therefore Sharjah 
Airport gets only 7,000 tonnes of available 
air cargo capacity. 7,000 
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4. Royal Jordanian Airlines 
applies the same policy as TMA, and avails 
only 50% of its capacity to Sharjah Airport. 
They operate 4 weekly B707 freighters. 
40 x4x 50 = 8,000 tonnes, 5001 of which is 4,000 
S. Others 10,000 
Therefore, the total air cargo capacity, available on the western 
route is 66,800 tonnes per annum. 
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Appendix 1-6. 
Freighters and mixed flights 
from Abu Dhabi to major gateway hubs in Europe 
(Available cargo capacities rounded to the nearest 100 tonnes) 
Airline A/C type Number of flights 
per week 
Cargo capacity 
per annum. 
Destination 
Gulf Air 767 LLJ 3 1,500 Amsterdam 
Gulf Air 767 LLJ 2 1,000 Frankfurt 
Gulf Air 340 LLJ 2 500 London 
Gulf Air 767 LLJ 7 3,500 London 
Gulf Air 767 LLJ 2 1,000 Manchester 
Gulf Air 767 LLJ 3 1,500 Paris 
Gulf Air 767 LLJ 2 11000 Zurich 
10,000 
Garuda Indonesia 747 LPJ 6 3,000 Amsterdam 
Garuda Indonesia 747 LPJ 3 1,500 London 
Garuda 747 LPJ 3 1,500 London 
Garuda Indonesia M11 LPJ 1 500 Frankfurt 
Garuda Indonesia 747 LPJ I Soo Madrid 
Garuda Indonesia 747 LPJ 1 500 Vienna 
7,500 
Emirates Airlines 310 LPJ 5 2,000 London 
Emirates A/L AB3 LPJ 3 1,200 London 
3,200 
Air France 310 LPJ 2 800 Paris 
Air France 74F LLF 1 51000 Paris 
5,800 
Air Lanka L10 LLJ 3 800 Amsterdam 
KLM 747 LPJ 2 1,000 Amsterdam 
Lufthansa AB3 LPJ 3 1,200 Frankfurt 
British Airways 767 LPJ 7 3,500 London 
Cargolux: 74F LPF 5 35,000 Luxembourg 
Swiss Air 310 LPJ 5 2,000 Zurich 
Total available cargo capacity per annum 
Abu Dhabi to major European gateways 70,000 
Source Air Cargo timetable, Number 440, September 1994. 
Note Computation of this table of airline cargo capacities was made on 
the assumption that all flights are terminator flights. However, 
research and interviews with all airlines transiting U. A. E. Airports 
revealed actual air cargo capacities made available were averaged 
and tabulated separately for each of the three major U. A. E. airports 
analysed in this section. 
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Appendix 1-7. 
The main providers of air cargo capacities f rom Abu Dhabi Airport 
to Europe and North America are. 
Airline Air cargo cal: )acity (tonnes p. a) 
1. Gulf Air 
with 50k of its declared capacity 
(Table 137, above) made available 
for the western route. 5,000 
2. Garuda 2,000 
3. Emirates Airlines 2,000 
4. Air France 5,800 
5. British Airways 3, tOO 
6. Cargolux 3,500 
7. Swiss Air 2,000 
8. Lufthansa 1,200 
9. KLM 1,000 
26,000 
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Ampppendix J 
Major World Ports 
Analysis of container traffic 
Tonnage: in millions. containers : in millions 
Port 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 19931 1994 2 
Sincrapore 
No. of loaded containers 2.1 2.8 3.6 4.3 5.2 6.5 7.7 9.1 
No. of empties 0.5 0.6 1.2 0.9 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.1 
Total 2.6 3.4 4.8 5.2 6.4 7.6 8.9 10.2 
Total container tonnage 38.4 51.3 65.2 76.7 90.7 109.0 128.6 141.1 
Containerisation degree 74.1% 76.6% 78.1% 81.2% 83.8% 86.7% 87.1% 90.0% 
(% of general cargo) 
Honq Kong 
No. of loaded containers 2.8 3.4 3.7 4.2 5.2 6.5 7.6 8.7 
No. of empties 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Total 3.5 4.0 4.4 5.1 6.2 7.6 8.7 9.8 
Total container tonnage 17.2 20.8 21.6 24.6 30.2 33.6 37.6 41.3 
Containerisation degree 32.6% 34.3% 35.1% 37.4% 38.1% 39.0% 40.1% 41.0% 
(% of general cargo) 
Kaoshiunq (Taiwan) 
No. of loaded containers 2.3 2.6 2.8 2.9 3.3 3.6 3.9 4.2 
No. of empties 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.5 
Total 2.8 3.1 3.4 3.5 3.9 4.0 4.3 4.7 
Total container tonnage 9.9 9.9 9.5 10.0 12.2 11.3 11.6 11.9 
Containerisation degree 61.3% 54.1% 57.9% 57.3% 59.5% 61.1% 62.3% 63.0% 
(% of general cargo) 
Rotterdam 
No. of loaded containers 1.7 1.8 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.6 
No. of empties 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Total 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.7 2.8 3.0 
Total container tonnage 24.8 27.4 30.5 30.5 31.0 34.4 36.6 38.8 
Containerisation degree 51.7% 50.9% 51.0% 51.4% 50.5% 52.7% 53.1% 54.5% 
(% of general cargo) 
Kobe 
No. of loaded containers 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 
No. of empties 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Total 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.6 
Total container tonnage 29.6 33.3 36.7 38.8 39.0 38.7 39.1 39.2 
Containerisation degree 
M of general cargo) 
Hamburq 
No. of loaded containers 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.6 1.8 1.8 2.1 2.4 
No. of empties 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 
Total 1.1 1.2 1.3 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.9 
Total container tonnage 12.1 13.5 14.2 19.6 21.4 22.5 24.2 25.8 
Containerisation degree 49.1% 53.5% 53.9% 67.6% 71.2% 74.6% 75.0% 75.1% 
(% of general cargo) 
Los Ancreles 
No. of loaded containers 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.7 
No. of empties 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 
Total 1.6 1.6 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 
Total container tonnage 
Containerisation degree 
M of general cargo) 
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Appendix J: 
Major World Ports 
Analysis of container traffic 
Tonnage: in millions. containers : in millions 
Port 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
1 
1992 19931 1994 2 
Loncr Beach 
No. of loaded containers 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.3 1-5 1.6 1.6 
No. of empties 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0*3 0.3 
Total 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.9 
Total container tonnage 24.1 26.7 27.9 29-9 30.7 34.7 37.1 39.3 
Containerisation degree 88.0% 88.6% 89.0% 90.1% 89. 
-9 
96 90.9% 91.2% 91.4% 
M of general cargo) 
Tokvo 
No. of loaded containers 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 
No. of empties 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Total 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.0 
Total container tonnage 
Containerisation degree 
M of general cargo) 
Yokohama 
No. of loaded containers 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 
No. of empties 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Total 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.0 
Total container tonnage 18.5 20.4 21.5 23.6 25.4 26.9 82.2 87.2 
Containerisation degree 35.0% 36.6% 36.7% 38.2% 41.4% 42.4% 42.8% 43.2% 
(% of general cargo) 
Antwerr) 
No. of loaded containers 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 
No. of empties 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Total 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.0 
Total container tonnage 12.9 13.9 15.1 16.5 18.9 19.7 21.4 23.1 
Containerisation degree 32.6% 52.6% 35.8% 38.0% 41.7% 43.4% 45.1% 45.8% 
M of general cargo) 
Keelunq 
No. of loaded containers 1.5 1.4 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 
No. of empties 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Total 1.9 1.8 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.6 
Total container tonnage 11.3 11.2 11.5 12.8 13.9 15.0 15.8 16.6 
Containerisation degree 77.3% 100% 73.3% - 77.9% 80.0% 81.3% 81.9% 
(% of general cargo) 
San Juan 
No. of loaded containers - 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.1 
No. of empties 1.1 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.6 
Total 5.5 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 
Total container tonnage - 5.6 6.1 6.3 7.3 7.8 8.2 8.6 
Containerisation degree 64.2% 61.6% 65.2% 64.2% 81.7% 82.0% 82.1% 82.0% 
(% of general cargo) 
Dubai Ports(Rashid 
Jebel Ali) 
No. of loaded containers 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.7 
No. of empties 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Total 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.7 2.0 
Total container tonnage 7.1 7.4 9.3 13.3 15.2 16.4 24.1 28.4 
Containerisation degree 56.2% 55.5% 58.4% 59.0% 62.1% 60.1% 61.0% 63.5% 
M of general cargo) 
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Appendix i W 
Major World Ports 
Analysis of container traffic 
Tonnage: in millions. containers : in millions 
Port 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 19931 1994 2 
Oakland 
No. of loaded containers 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 
No. of empties 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Total 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 
Total container tonnage 12.4 12.7 12.8 13.4 14.5 18.1 19.5 20.8 
Containerisation degree 93.1% 94.3% 95.2% 96.5% 97.3% 98.0% 98.0% 98.0% 
M of general cargo) 
Felixstowe 
No. of loaded containers 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 
No. of empties 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Total 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 
Total container tonnage 9.5 11.4 11.8 12.7 12.7 13.0 13.1 13.7 
Containerisation degree - - - 80.2% 80.4% 80.5% 80.6% 80.7% 
M of general cargo) 
Bremen 
No. of loaded containers 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 
No. of empties 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Total 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 
Total container tonnage 9.8 10.4 11.6 11.4 12.1 12.6 13.2 13.8 
Containerisation degree 52.2% 53.8% 57.3% 58.7% 60.0% 63.6% 63.7% 64.1% 
M of general cargo) 
Pusan 
No. of loaded containers 1.5 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.5 
No. of empties 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 
Total 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.9 
Total container tonnage 34.4 40.0 40.2 42.4 42.2 44.7 47.8 50.6 
Containerisation degree 81.7% 86.5% 89.2% 87.9% 81.5% 91.0% 92.3% 93.0% 
M of general cargo) 
Naqova 
No. of loaded containers 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.2 
No. of empties 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Total 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.4 
Total container tonnage 9.9 11.6 13.8 15.4 17.4 19.2 22.0 24.7 
Containerisation degree 25.2% 27.0% 28.6% 31.3% 31.8% 34.3% 35.3% 34.9% 
M of general cargo) 
Keelanq 
No. of loaded containers 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 
No. of empties 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Total 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.0 
Total container tonnage 4.9 6.2 7.3 9.2 12.2 13.9 17.5 21.6 
Containerisation degree 57.8% 59.2% 62.5% 63.5% 67.4% 70.6% 74.1% 76.8% 
M of general cargo) 
Bancrkok 
No. of loaded containers 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.4 
No. of empties 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Total 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.6 
Total container tonnage 6.2 7.9 8.7 10.0 11.5 12.7 14.8 16.6 
Containerisation degree - - - - - - M of general cargo) 
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Appendix i 'W 
Major World Ports 
Analysis of container traffic 
Tonnage: in millions. containers : in millions 
Port 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993" 19942 
Manila 
No. of loaded containers 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 
No. of empties 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Total 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 
Total container tonnage 6.9 8.6 10.1 11.3 12.0 13.3 15.2 17.4 
Containerisation degree - - - - - - 
(% of general cargo) 
New York (N. J. ) 
No. of loaded containers 
No. of empties 
Total 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 
Total container tonnage 11.8 12.2 12.5 - - 
Containerisation degree 88.7% 99.7% 92.7% - 
M of general cargo) 
Tansonq Priok 
(Indonesia) 
No. of loaded containers 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.1 
No. of empties 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Total 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.2 
Total container tonnage 2.2 4.1 5.2 5.7 6.4 7.7 8.3 9.6 
Containerisation degree - - - - - - - - 
(% of general cargo) 
Algeciras (Spain) 
No. of loaded containers 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.8 
No. of empties 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Total 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.9 
Total container tonnage 4.3 4.2 3.5 4.9 6.6 7.0 7.3 7.9 
Containerisation degree 77.6% 76.8% 61.5% 71.0% 71.9% 72.4% 73.4% 75.1% 
M of general cargo) I I 1 
-1 
1 1 1 
-1 Source ISL Shipping Statistics Yearbook, institute of Shipping and 
Logistics (ISL), Bremen, October 1993. 
Notes Figures 1987 to 1992 were derived from ISL Yearbook 1993. 
1. &2 Figures for 1993 and 1994 were derived from related periodicals and 
tested against ISL figures, and average percentage changes per year 
over six years (1987 - 1992) - periodicals such as the ITCHCA Annual 
Review, world of cargo handling, London, March 1995. 
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a 7% Appendix K-1 
World Airports highest % annual growth 
1980 - 1994 split into three 5 yr periods 
passengers, freight tonnes AIC movements 
( in 1000s 
Airport 1 1980 19 84 Average 1985 198 9 Average Average annual % annual t 1990 1994 annu: l % 
N. American I increasel increasel incr ase 
BALTIMORE USA 
A/C movmnts 205 268 6.1 
Passengers 3,794 7,000 16.9 
Frt tonnes 64 106 12.9 
DALLAS USA 
A/C movmnts 452 540 3.9 
Passengers 21,215 33,307 11.4 
Frt tonnes 251 359 8.6 
LA GUARDIA USA 
A/C movmnts 312 342 1.9 
Passengers 17,069 19,886 3.3 
Frt tonnes 67 97 8.9 
NEWARK INTL USA 
A/C movmnts 196 333 14.0 
Passengers 10,032 22,773 25.4 
Frt tonnes 116 237 20.7 
VANCOUVER CANADA 
A/C movmnts 276 242 -2.5 
Passengers 7,370 6,817 -1.5 
Frt tonnes 219 262 3.9 
PHILADELPHIA USA 
A/C movmnts 330 349 1.1 
Passengers 9,398 10,996 3.4 
Frt tonnes 178 160 -2.0 
BOSTON USA 
A/C movmnts 288 360 5.0 
Passengers 14,289 19,148 6.8 
Frt tonnes 208 282 7.1 
DETROIT USA 
A/C movmnts 261 355 7.2 
Passengers 9,621 14,240 9.6 
Frt tonnes 126 161 5.6 
285 245 
8,174 10,350 
119 231 
562 699 
37,104 47,565 
390 532 
-2.8 
5.3 
18.9 
HONOLULU USA 
348 349 
20,542 23,158 
106 107 
380 365 
28,557 29,928 
286 449 
302 295 
10,245 12,803 
151 138 
4.91 731 853 
5.6 48,515 52,601 
7.3 557 725 
0.061 354 338 
2.5 22,754 20,808 
0.2 117 93 
-0.8 379 436 
1.0 22,255 27,996 
11.41 505 860 
236 325 7.5 
6,714 7,313 1.8 
273 124 -10.9 
353 374 
11,370 14,809 
157 263 
378 388 
0,450 22,272 
302 341 
380 374 
5,607 21,500 
170 179 
A/C movmnts 246 341 7.71 368 404 
Passengers 13,611 16,061 3.6 16,639 22,617 
Frt tonnes 169 207 4.5 216 364 
LOS ANGELES USA 
A/C movmnts 521 542 0.8 546 637 
Passengers 32,473 36,694 2.6 37,648 44,967 
Frt tonnes 799 835 0.9 843 1,130 
MIAMI USA 
A/C movmnts 451 343 -4.8 327 373 
Passengers 20,586 19,968 -0.6 19,849 23,385 
Frt tonnes 601 568 -1.1 562 , 797 
NEWYORK(JFK) USA 
A/C movmnts 312 290 -1.4 286 305 
Passengers 26,379 28,490 1.6 28,945 30,323 
Frt tonnes 1,212 1,121 -1.5 1,105 1,372 
318 297 
7,601 11,066 
121 182 
1.21 407 403 
6.0 16,290 17,372 
13.5 404 480 
0.51 425 471 
1.8 22,936 25,360 
2.6 363 476 
-0.3 388 485 
7.6 22,585 26,798 
1.11 192 329 
2.01 407 363 
7.2 23,368 22,474 
13.7 375 396 
3.31 678 690 
3.9 45,810 51,050 
6.8 1,164 1,545 
2.81 414 558 
3.6 25,837 30,203 
8.4 967 1,333 
1.31 302 342 
1.0 29,787 28,799 
4.8 1,322 1,443 
-0.5 
5.0 
-1.7 
3.3 
1.7 
6.0 
-0.9 
-1.7 
-4.0 
3.0 
5.2 
14.1 
-1.3 
9.1 
10.0 
-0.2 
1.3 
3.8 
2.2 
2.1 
6.2 
5.0 
3.7 
14.3 
-2.2 
-0.8 
1.1 
0.4 
2.3 
6.5 
7.0 
3.4 
7.6 
2.7 
-0.7 
1.8 
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SEATTLE/TAC USA 
A/C movmnts 209 230 2.0 235 335 
Passengers 8,958 10,974 4.5 11,467 15,241 
Frt tonnes 241 213 -2.3 208 294 
CHICAGO USA 
A/C movmnts 707 746 1.1 754 780 
Passengers 42,262 47,333 2.4 48,469 59,130 
Frt tonnes 798 746 -1.3 736 985 
DULLES USA 
A/C movmnts 161 199 4.7 208 225 
Passengers 2,450 4,385 15.8 5,077 10,179 
Frt tonnes 39 62 11.9 70 157 
8.5 355 353 -0.1 
6.6 16,240 20,973 5.8 
8.3 252 415 12.9 
0.7 811 882 1.8 
4.4 59,936 66,435 2.2 
6.8 987 1,256 5.5 
1.61 242 285 3.6 
20.110,236 11,555 2.6 
24.8 174 276 11.7 
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Appendix K-2 
World Airports highest % annual growth 
1980 - 1994 split into three 5 yr periods 
passengers, freight tonnes & AIC movements 
1000S 
Airport 
European 
I 1980 1984 Average annual 
increa. ý 
19 85 1989 Average 
annual V 
increase 
1990 1994 Average 
annual % 
increase 
LONDON(LHR) U. K. 
A/C movmnts 260 300 1.0 309 368 3.8 390 425 1.8 
Passengers 19,897 28,751 2.7 31,310 39,588 5.3 42,635 51,728 4.3 
Frt tonnes 439 566 2.4 599 757 5.3 774 1,047 7.1 
LONDON(LGW) U. K. 
A/C movmnts 140 162 3.1 167 205 4.5 203 191 -1.2 
Passengers 9,459 13,669 8.9 14,885 21,150 8.4 21,050 21,212 0.2 
Frt tonnes 124 160 5.8 170 217 5.5 229 237 0.7 
MANCHESTER U. K. 
A/C movmnts 82 93 2.8 96 74 -4.6 155 168 1.7 
Passengers 4,191 5,658 7.0 6,054 10,059 13.2 10,146 14,814 9.2 
Frt tonnes 26 33 5.6 35 73 21.7 81 97 3.9 
BIRMINGHAM U. K. 
A/C movmnts ---- ---- -- 64 92 8.8 93 95 0.4 
Passengers ---- ---- -- 1,634 3,333 21.0 3,492 4,949 8.3 
Frt tonnes 3 5 13.7 6 is 30.0 23 20 -2.6 
PARIS(CDG) FRANCE 
A/C movmnts 102 135 6.4 143 213 9.8 242 325 6.9 
Passengers 9,816 13,595 7.7 14,642 20,275 7.7 22,508 28,680 5.5 
Frt tonnes 410 506 4.7 530 611 3.1 647 898 7.8 
PARIS(ORLY) FRANCE 
A/C movmnts 191 166 -2.6 161 205 5.5 202 216 1.4 
Passengers 15,408 17,257 2.4 17,671 24,118 7.3 24,330 26,617 1.9 
Frt tonnes 196 218 2.2 223 280 5.1 288 319 2.2 
LYON FRANCE 
A/C movmnts 52 54 0.5 56 77 7.5 75 77 0.5 
Passengers 2,478 2,577 0.8 2,598 3,630 7.9 3,734 4,257 2.8 
Frt tonnes 59 25 -11.7 22 30 7.3 32 35 1.9 
STOCKHOLM SWEDEN 
A/C movmnts 85 149 15.0 171 254 9.7 258 230 -2.2 
Passengers 4,306 7,815 16.3 9,088 14,077 11.0 14,822 13,420 -1.9 
Frt tonnes 60 73 4.4 76 104 7.4 96 92 -0.8 
GOTHENBURG SWEDEN 
A/C movmnts ---- ---- --- 44 57 5.9 55 56 0.4 
Passengers 1,424 1,830 5.7 1,934 2,802 9.0 2,870 2,938 0.5 
Frt tonnes 18 26 9.4 29 26 -2.1 25 21 -3.2 
OPORTO PORTUGAL 
A/C movmnts 12 13 1.0 13 27 21.5 31 34 1.9 
Passengers 394 506 5.7 534 1,009 17.8 1,199 1,897 11.6 
Frt tonnes 7 12 11.7 13 15 3.1 10 21 22.0 
FARO PORTUGAL 
A/C movmnts 15 19 5.0 20 21 1.0 23 30 6.1 
Passengers 912 1,495 12.8 1,687 2,440 8.9 2,629 3,509 6.7 
Frt tonnes 1 1 0.0 1 2 20.0 2 3 10.0 
PALMADE SPAIN 
A/C movmnts 73 75 0.5 75 97 5.9 97 118 4.3 
Passengers 7,105 8,491 3.9 8,822 11,516 6.1 11,319 14,142 5.0 
Frt tonnes 81 29 -12.9 26 21 -3.8 20 17 -3.0 
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MADRID SPAIN 
A/C movmnts 129 117 -1.9 115 155 7.0 171 211 4.7 
Passengers 10,037 10,539 1.0 10,644 14,246 6.8 15,869 18,427 3.2 
Frt tonnes 158 185 3.4 191 233 4.4 250 213 -3.0 
BASEL Swiss 
A/C movmnts 84 90 1.4 91 44 -10.3 49 105 22.9 
Passengers 834 980 3.5 1,014 1,543 10.4 1,777 2,150 4.0 
Frt tonnes 28 16 -9.1 14 27 21.4 29 29 --- 
ZURICH Swiss 
A/C movmnts 159 171 1.4 173 211 4.4 220 240 1.8 
Passengers 7,446 8,786 3.6 9,102 11,653 5.6 12,277 14,538 3.7 
Frt tonnes 164 214 6.1 227 274 4.1 271 337 4.9 
COLOGNE GERMANY 
A/C movmnts 38 48 4.9 50 85 14.0 97 121 4.9 
Passengers 1,914 1,952 0.4 1,960 2,623 6.8 3,027 3,956 6.1 
Frt tonnes 53 78 9.0 84 163 18.8 176 265 10.1 
FRANKFURT GERMANY 
A/C movmnts 210 220 1.0 223 300 6.9 311 364 3.4 
Passengers 16,409 18,953 3.1 19,540 25,868 6.5 28,713 35,122 4.5 
Frt tonnes 663 795 4.0 827 1,193 8.9 1,226 1,402 2.5 
DUSSELDORF GERMANY 
A/C movmnts 88 91 0.6 91 135 9.7 137 176 5.7 
Passengers 6,899 7,727 2.4 7,912 10,405 6.3 11,559 13,995 4.2 
Frt tonnes 39 43 2.1 44 51 3.2 52 54 0.8 
NURENBURG GERMANY 
A/C movmnts 16 23 7.7 24 36 10.0 41 75 16.6 
Passengers 755 868 3.0 894 1,283 8.7 1,443 1,880 6.1 
Frt tonnes 10 11 3.4 12 17 8.3 19 36 17.9 
SAARBRUCKEN GERMANY 
A/C movmnts 16 13 -3.6 12 15 5.0 13 13 --- 
Passengers 160 161 0.1 162 225 7.8 235 305 6.0 
Frt tonnes 0 0 0.0 0 0 --- 2 2 --- 
OSLO NORWAY 
A/C movmnts 96 106 2.2 109 133 4.4 135 152 2.5 
Passengers 3,493 4,855 7.8 5,233 6,442 4.6 6,356 9,345 9.4 
Frt tonnes --- --- --- 54 59 1.9 67 69 0.6 
AMSTERDAM HOLLAND 
A/C movmnts 184 197 1.4 200 236 3.6 246 300 4.4 
Passengers 9,170 10,958 3.9 11,385 15,338 6.9 16,198 23,559 9.1 
Frt tonnes 326 432 6.5 461 610 6.5 630 874 7.7 
ROTTERDAM HOLLAND 
A/C movmnts 127 91 -5.7 86 108 5.1 ill 114 0.5 
Passengers 329 268 -3.7 258 275 1.3 297 360 4.2 
Frt tonnes 11 2 -23.8 2 2 --- 3 5 13.3 
VIENNA AUSTRIA 
A/C movmnts 82 83 0.3 83 103 4.8 110 153 7.8 
Passengers 2,658 3,402 5.6 3,592 4,881 7.2 5,495 7,730 8.1 
Frt tonnes 42 45 1.5 45 59 6.2 65 89 7.4 
COPENHAGEN DENMARK 
A/C movmnts 161 171 1.2 173 213 4.6 213 229 1.5 
Passengers 8,425 9,225 1.9 9,400 11,622 4.7 11,787 13,330 2.6 
Frt tonnes 165 172 0.9 174 158 -1.8 168 234 7.9 
BRUSSELS BELGIUM 
A/C movmnts ill 113 0.4 113 175 11.0 NR 226 --- 
Passengers 5,010 5,486 1.9 5,590 6,882 4.6 NR 11,342 --- 
Frt tonnes 173 177 0.4 177 323 16.5 NR 395 --- 
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DUBLIN IRELAND 
A/C movmnts 96 89 -1.6 87 113 6.0 NR 130 --- 
Passengers 2,579 2,579 0.0 2,579 5,086 19.4 NR 6,742 --- 
Frt tonnes 40 42 0.9 43 47 1.9 NR 60 --- 
TOULOUSE FRANCE 
A/C movmnts 49 54 2.0 55 80 9.1 70 NR --- 
Passengers 1,181 1,784 10.2 1,966 2,872 9.2 2,930 NR --- 
Frt tonnes 13 17 6.4 18 27 10.0 29 NR --- 
BORDEAUX FRANCE 
A/C movmnts 65 60 -1.5 60 72 4.0 72 58 -3.9 
Passengers 1,003 1,420 8.3 1,537 2,342 10.5 2,350 2,427 0.7 
Frt tonnes 14 12 -3.6 11 15 7.3 14 18 5.7 
MARSEILLES FRANCE 
A/C movmnts 86 91 1.1 92 214 26.5 NR 100 --- 
Passengers 3,253 4,001 4,6 4,185 4,609 2.0 4,674 4,831 0.7 
Frt tonnes 29 39 7.4 42 44 0.9 49 62 5.3 
NICE FRANCE 
A/C movmnts 65 83 5.4 88 132 10.0 142 127 -2.1 
Passengers 2,839 3,747 6.4 3,987 5,436 7.3 5,475 6,212 2.7 
Frt tonnes 17 19 2.0 20 29 9.0 31 31 --- 
HELSINKI FINLAND 
A/C movmnts 88 87 -0,2 87 122 8.0 132 125 -1.1 
Passengers 3,159 4,328 7.4 4,648 7,479 12.2 7,950 6,587 3.4 
Frt tonnes 31 43 7.6 47 66 8.1 67 86 5.7 
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Appendix K-3 
World Airports highest % annual growth 
1980 - 1994 split into three 5 yr periods 
passengers, freight tonnes AIC movements) 
( in 1000s 
Airport 
AsiaPacificl 
1980 1984 Average, 
annual 2 
increase 
1985 9 198 Average 
annual t 
increase 
1 990 1994 Average 
annual " 
increase 
SEOUL S. KOREA 
A/C movmnts ---- ---- --- 24 39 12.5 48 183 56.3 
Passengers 3,506 5,627 12.1 6,307 13,878 24.0 16,821 27,333 12.5 
Frt tonnes 182 312 14.3 357 607 14.0 644 1,029 12.0 
SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 
A/C movmnts 32 63 19.6 76 98 5.8 109 159 9.2 
Passengers 3,307 7,078 22.8 8,692 12,973 9.8 14,406 21,644 10.0 
Frt tonnes 123 307 30.1 399 587 9.4 630 1,026 12.6 
BANGKOK THAILAND 
A/C movmnts 53 73 7.6 79 117 9.6 120 160 6.7 
Passengers 4,462 6,091 7.3 6,536 12,669 18.8 14,329 21,012 9.3 
Frt tonnes 110 155 8.2 168 350 21.7 406 590 9.1 
HONG KONG HONG KONG 
A/C movmnts ---- ---- --- 74 112 10.3 123 160 6.0 
Passengers 6,607 9,151 7.7 9,856 16,204 12.9 18,688 25,948 7.8 
Frt tonnes 260 392 10.2 433 751 14.7 825 1,308 11.7 
NEW TOKYO JAPAN 
A/C movmnts 59 75 5.1 78 119 10.5 125 124 -0.2 
Passengers 7,949 10,890 7.4 11,696 16,978 9.0 19,257 23,750 4.7 
Frt tonnes 433 671 11.0 745 1,356 16.4 1,390 1,604 3.1 
JAKARTA INDONESIA 
A/C movmnts NR NR -- 62 90 9.0 92 141 10.6 
Passengers NR NR 3,933 7,419 17.7 7,526 12,664 13.6 
Frt tonnes NR NR 57 146 31.2 173 256 9.6 
NADI FIJI 
A/C movmnts 21 21 0.0 21 30 8.6 31 41 6.4 
Passengers 483 575 3.8 597 694 3.2 785 941 4.0 
Frt tonnes 7 8 4.9 9 13 8.9 14 19 7.1 
PUSAN S. KOREA 
A/C movmnts NR NR -- NR NR --- 44 52 3.6 
Passengers NR NR 2,214 4,831 23.61 5,704 7,678 6.9 
Frt tonnes NR NR 44 86 19.1 104 133 5.6 
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Appendix K-4 
Airport 
LatinAmerica 
Caribbean 
World Airports highest % annual growth 
1980 - 1994 split into three 5 yr periods 
passengers, freight tonnes & AIC movements) 
( in 1000s ) 
1980 1984 Average 1985 1989 Average 1990 1994 Average annual 11 annual V annual % 
increase increase increase 
CANCUN MEXICO 
A/C movmnts -- 
Passengers 728 
Frt tonnes 2.7 
GUADALAJARA MEXICO 
A/C movmnts -- 
Passengers 2,666 
Frt tonnes 10.0 
MAZATLAN MEXICO 
A/C movmnts 
Passengers -- 
Frt tonnes 2.0 
P. VALLARTA MEXICO 
A/C movmnts -- 
Passengers 880 
Frt tonnes 2 
RIO BRAZIL 
A/C movmnts 
Passengers -- 
Frt tonnes 99 
QUITO ECUADOR 
A/C movmnts 
Passengers -- 
Frt tonnes 15 
SAO PAULO BRAZIL 
A/C movmnts 
Passengers 
Frt tonnes 
CALI COLOMBIA 
A/C movmnts -- 
Passengers 579 
Frt tormes -- 
8.8 21.1 28 37.6 58.3 11.0 
1,194 12.8 1,369 1,958 8.6 2,962 4,428 9.9 
3.7 7.4 4.1 6.8 13.2 8.0 -- -- 
75.5 37.1 -10.1 46.9 140.3 39.8 
2.920 1.9 2,977 3,153 1.2 3,508 5,283 10.1 
16.7 13.4 19.2 17 2.3 22 -- -- 
27.3 16.2 -8.1 16.5 27.1 12.8 
902 792 -2.4 826 673 -3.7 
4.0 20.0 4.5 3.8 -3.1 3.8 -- -- 
24.0 17.6 -5.3 17.6 34.9 19.7 
1,100 5.0 1,155 1,381 3.9 1,426 1,613 2.6 
3.0 10.0 3.3 2.8 -3.0 3.2 -- -- 
28.6 98.4 48.8 95 77.8 -3.6 
-- 5,718 6,847 3.9 5,600 3,953 -5.9 
166 13.5 188.4 216.4 3.0 148 153.6 0.8 
-- -- -- 18.0 -- 18.1 NR -- 
-- -- 1,278 1,618 5.3 1,552 NR 
26 14.7 30.2 15.1 -10 21.0 NR 
-- -- 73.4 100 7.2 151 123 -3.7 
4,206 6,738 12.0 5,775 7,701 6.7 
38.4 318.6 145.9 362.8 379 0.9 
-- 83.2 -- 76.0 NR -- 
1,050 16.3 1,221 1,239 0.3 1,375 NR 
11.5 -- 15 26 14.7 40 NR 
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Appendix K-5 
World Airports highest % annual growth 
1980 - 1994 split into three 5 yr periods 
passengers, freight tonnes & AIC movements) 
(in 1000s) 
Airport 
Af rica 
I 
1980 1984 Av. a-a' % increase 1985 1989 ,. annual 
Av 
increase 
1990 1994 Av. annual increase 
MAPUTO MOZAMBIQUE 
A/C movmnts 13 16 7.2 18 28 11.1 30 21 -6.0 
Passengers 289 270 -1.7 265 339 5.6 373 355 -1.0 
Frt tonnes 7 7 -0.7 7 4 -8.6 4 7 15.0 
ILHADOSAL CAPE VERDE 
A/C movmnts 7 7 0.2 7 7 --- 7 8 2.9 
Passengers 82 108 6.5 115 163 8.3 164 325 19.6 
Frt tonnes 91 148 12.7 2 2 --- 1 2 20.0 
LUANDA ANGOLA 
A/C movmnts 25 30 4.1 31 30 -0.6 28 NR --- 
Passengers 651 1,078 13.1 1,220 1,437 3.6 1,334 NR --- 
Frt tonnes 51 75 9.1 82 -- --- -- NR --- 
KINSHASA ZAIRE 
A/C movmnts 19 22 3.7 23 28 4.3 27 NR --- 
Passengers 381 490 5.7 516 555 1.4 525 NR --- 
Frt tonnes 39 75 18.8 89 89 --- 77 NR --- 
CAIRO EGYPT 
A/C movmnts NR NR -- 58 79 7.2 81 NR --- 
Passengers NR NR 6,235 7,516 4.1 7,159 NR --- 
Frt tonnes 47 93 20.0 112 97 -2.7 103 NR --- 
JERBA TUNISIA 
A/C movmnts NR NR -- 5.2 6.9 6.5 6.9 NR --- 
Passengers 434 491 2.6 504 673 6.7 650 NR --- 
Frt tonnes 0.3 0.5 14.3 0.6 1.5 30.0 1.5 NR --- 
MONASTIR TUNISIA 
A/C movmnts NR NR -- 10 16.1 12.2 15 NR --- 
Passengers NR NR 1,006 1,893 17.6 1,715 NR --- 
Frt tonnes 0.9 2.3 32.7 3.1 1.5 -10.3 1.7 NR --- 
SFAX TUNISIA 
A/C movmnts 1.8 2.4 6.8 2.7 2.1 -4.4 3.6 4.1 2.8 
Passengers 24 37 10.7 41 39 -1.0 42 77 16.7 
Frt tonnes 0.3 1.2 53.0 1.8 0.3 -16.7 0.5 0.3 -8.0 
TUNIS TUNISIA 
A/C movmnts 27 27 -0.3 27 32 3.7 31 40 5.8 
Passengers 1,661 1,960 3.6 2,030 2,314 2.8 2,150 2,847 6.5 
Frt tonnes 16 17 2.2 18 23 5.5 27 23 -3.0 
ADDIS ABABA ETHIOPIA 
A/C movmnts 25 34 6.9 36 30 -3.3 37 NR --- Passengers 170 288 12.7 325 NR --- 480 NR --- Frt tonnes 12 32 31.0 41 NR --- 30 NR --- 
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World Airports highest % annual growth 
1980 - 1994 split into three 5 yr periods 
passengers, freight tonnes & AIC movements) 
(in 1000s) 
Airport 
Middle Eastj 
1980 1984 Av.. annual 
crease 
1985 198 9 AV annual 'k increas t 1990 1994 Av. annual increase 
TURKEY ISTANBUL 
A/C movmnts 39 50 5.7 53 80 10.2 91 151 13.2 
Passengers 1,879 3,063 12.6 3,505 NR --- 6,233 10,226 12.8 
Frt tonnes 43 86 20.0 96 NR --- 85 121 8.5 
MADRAS INDIA 
A/C movmnts 16 22 7.0 23 27 3.5 31 34 1.9 
Passengers 902 1,434 11.8 1,603 1,945 4.3 1,768 2,606 9.5 
Frt tonnes 39 34 -3.0 33 45 7.3 43 69 12.1 
BOMBAY INDIA 
A/C movmnts 54 63 3.4 65 72 2.1 78 89 2.8 
Passengers 4,342 6,600 10.4 7,286 8,293 2.8 7,968 9,955 5.0 
Frt tonnes 95 161 14.4 184 220 3.9 199 214 1.5 
CALCUTTA INDIA 
A/C movmnts NR NR -- 27 30 2.2 27 25 -1.5 
Passengers 1,270 1,734 7.3 1,860 2,418 6.0 2,164 2,335 1.6 
Frt tonnes 18 29 12.0 32 41 5.6 38 41 1.6 
N. DELHI INDIA 
A/C movmnts 54 54 0.0 54 67 4.8 70 74 1.1 
Passengers 2,762 4,171 10.2 4,596 5,959 5.9 5,407 6,524 4.1 
Frt tonnes 65 107 12.8 121 143 3.6 135 177 6.2 
KUWAIT KUWAIT 
A/C movmnts NR NR -- 32 30 -1.3 NR NR --- 
Passengers 2,009 2,461 4.5 2,572 2,882 2.4 1,412 NR --- 
Frt tonnes 46 70 10.1 77 85 2.1 46 NR --- 
DHARAN S. ARABIA 
A/C movmnts NR NR -- 42 27 -7.1 25 35 8.0 
Passengers NR NR -- 3,538 2,532 -5.7 2,540 3,432 7.0 
Frt tonnes 37 71 18.6 85 53 -7.5 55 59 1.4 
COLOMBO SRI LANKA 
A/C movmnts NR NR -- 83 NR --- NR 21 --- 
Passengers 3,668 6,730 16.7 7,853 7,327 -1.3 7,466 2,151 -14.2 
Frt tonnes 30 100 45.5 146 167 2.9 173 70 -11.9 
JEDDAH S. ARABTA 
A/C movmnts NR NR -- 83 NR --- NR 77 --- 
Passengers 3,668 6,730 16.7 7,853 7,327 1.3 7,446 9,345 5.1 
Frt tonnes 30 100 45.5 1 146 167 2.9 173 178 0.6 
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Appendix L 
The emphasis here is on actual total weight permissible for safe 
take-offs. Therefore, the volume usable capacity becomes a 
neutral factor once the maximum total take-off weight of an 
aircraft is reached. For example : the maximum total take-off 
weight of the specially designed B747-20OF freighter aircraft is 
377.8 tonnes with a maximum net payload of 123.4 tonnes, and a 
maximum usable volume capacity of 682 cubic metres. In practice, 
the loadable capacity by weight and volume is calculated as 
follows: 
Dry operating weight including the weight of the empty 
aircraft plus a maximum of 3000 kgs (3 tonnes) allowance for 
weight of three crew, their baggage, water and food 
supplies, emergency supplies, aircraft spares and other 
requirements including provýsions for other airline staff to 
board the freighter. Total 154.4 tonnes. 
2. Maximum zero fuel weight; means dry operating weight and 
maximum net payload at zero fuel in the tanks. Total 267.6 
tonnes. 
3. The net payload becomes as follows : 
Maximum zero fuel weight 267.6 tonnes 
less dry operating weight 154.4 tonnes 
Maximum net payload 113.2 tonnes 
4. Fuel and oil total weight, at maximum net payload capacity 
becomes : 
Total maximum take-off weight 377.8 tonnes 
less zero fuel weight 267.6 tonnes 
Total fuel/oil weight 110.2 tonnes 
In actual weight terms, the weight of a litre of fuel depends on 
its density, ranging from 0.785 to 0.820 in relation to weather 
conditions such as temperature and level of humidity at the time 
of take-off. An average fuel density of 0.8 would mean that 
1.250 litres is taken to equal 1 kg, or 1250 litres =1 tonne. 
The B747-20OF consumes 17,000 to 17,500 litres per block hour at 
full load with an average speed of 447 knots or 515 miles/hr. In 
tonnes it consumes 17,500 litres -- 1,250 = 14 tonnes per hour. At maximum net payload of 113.2 tonnes and maximum fuel/oil of 
110.2 tonnes, the range becomes 110.2 tonnes - 14, =7 hours 52 
minutes of flying time, which includes approximately 1 hour of 
fuel as reserve. 
The maximum net weight payload is further precisely verified by 
the maximum landing weight of the aircraft B747-70OF = 285.6 
tonnes as detailed on the following page: 
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1. Dry operating weight 
2. Surplus trip range fuel 
of minimum 20 minutes 
3. Reserve fuel of one hour 
4. Net weight payload 
Maximum landing weight 
154.4 tonnes 
4.0 tonnes 
14.0 tonnes 
113.2 tonnes 
285.6 tonnes 
The net weight payload is af actor of 
range and fuel requirement. The longer 
fuel requirement at take-off and the 
payload. 
the maximum air sector 
the range, the more the 
lesser the net weight 
All the f igures used in this analysis are declared by the 
manufacturers. The only disputable figures are those pertaining 
to maximum net payload and maximum usable volume capacity. The 
maximum total take-off weight of the aircraft cannot be increased 
due to structural limitations which also applies to floor load 
tolerance per square unit of measurement, i. e. per square meter 
or square foot. Each square section of the aircraft floor has a 
different permissible maximum load. The load must be spread with 
varying weights as per floor section limitations, and in order to 
maintain balance of the aircraft. 
Questionnaires 
I 
I Questionnairefor sea-airfreiglitfonvarders 
ACCORDING TO THE BEST OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE, PLEASE TICK IN THE 
APPROPRIATE BOX. THIS QUESTIONNAIRE IS DESIGNED TO HELP PREPARE AN 
ACADEMIC STUDY ON SEA-AIR TRANSPORT. YOUR ASSISTANCE IS VERY HIGHLY 
APPRECIATED. 
NAME & ADDRESS OF ORGANISATION: - 
1. COUNTRY : CITY : 
2. ARE YOU A SEA-AIR OPERATOR? 
1-1 YES 1-1 NO 
3. WHEN DID YOUR COMPANY BEGIN USING SEA-AIR SERVICES? 
WITHIN THE LAST 5 YEARS 
WITHIN THE LAST 10 YEARS 
FOR OVER 10 YEARS 
4. DO YOU OFFER SHIPPERS/EXPORTERS? 
SEA-AIR SERVICES, ALL INCLUSIVE COST DOOR TO DOOR 
1_ 1 COST PER SERVICE OR PART THEREOF 
5. DO YOU OFFER VARIOUS SEA-AIR TRANSFER POINTS? 
1- 1 YES 1:: l NO 
6. DO YOU OFFER SEA-AIR SERVICES VIA? 
a. VANCOUVER YES NO 
b. SEATTLE YES NO 
C. LOS ANGELES YES NO 
d. SAN FRANCISCO YES NO 
e. SHARJAHr DUBAI, U. A. E. YES NO 
f. SINGAPORE YES NO 
g. VLADIVOSTOK YES NO 
h. HONGKONG YES NO 
WHICH AIRPORT DO YOU UTILISE THE MOST? 
2 
WHICH SEA PORT DO YOU UTILISE THE MOST? 
10. PLEASE SPECIFY THE ALTERNATE SEA PORT THAT YOU UTILISE. 
11. DO YOU ISSUE SEA-AIR SCHEDULES? 
1- 1 YES 1_1 NO 
12. WHAT ATTRACTS THE SHIPPER? 
SHORT TRANSIT TIME 
COST INCENTIVES 
BOTH COST AND TIME 
13. NATURE OF COMMODITIES, PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOLUME: 
a) GARMENTS 
b) TEXTILES 
c) COMPUTERS (RELATED PARTS) 
d) FOOTWEAR : 
e) ELECTRONIC PRODUCTS 
f) MISC. (COSMETICS, NOVELTIES, TOYS ETC. 
g) GEN. COMMODITIES VALUE OVER $ 4.00/KG 
h) GEN. COMMODITIES VALUE OVER $ 8.00/KG 
i) GEN. COMMODITIES VALUE OVER $ 12.00/KG 
j) GEN. COMMODITIES VALUE OVER $ 16.00/KG : 
k) GEN. COMMODITIES VALUE OVER $ 20.00/KG : 
14. CONCERN OF THE SHIPPER/SUPPLIER RE SEA-AIR SERVICES 
IS DELIVERY TIME AT FINAL DESTINATION 
VERY IMPORTANT IMPORTANT 
NOT IMPORTANT 
IS TOTAL COST OF SEA-AIR SHIPPING TO FINAL DESTINATION 
VERY IMPORTANT IMPORTANT 
NOT IMPORTANT 
j 
15. DOES THE SHIPPER/ SUPPLIER EXPORT 
ONE MAJOR COMMODITY 
A VARIETY OF COMMODITIES OF THE SAME NATURE 
A VARIETY OF COMMODITIES OF A DIFFERENT NATURE 
16. DO YOU THINK THAT SEA-AIR CARGO IS 
ORIGINALLY AIR CARGO 
ORIGINALLY SEA CARGO 
BOTH OF THE ABOVE 
ADDITIONAL TO THE ABOVE, DUE TO INCREASE IN TRADE 
17. ORDERS ARE BY AIR, SOME SEA-AIR AND SOME OCEAN, DEPENDING ON 
DEMAND IN COUNTRY OF DESTINATION 
SEASONALITY OF COMMODITY 
INTRODUCTION OF A NEW COMMODITY 
TO SAVE ON STORAGE CHARGES AT CONSIGNEE MARKET 
ALL FOUR OF THE ABOVE REASONS 
18. WHAT IN YOUR OPINION MAKES A SUPPLIER/SHIPPER CHOOSE TO USE 
DIRECT AIR FREIGHT, OR SEA-AIR OR ONLY OCEAN SHIPPING - DURING 
LAST YEAR? 
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTION FROM CONSIGNEE 
URGENCY OF ORDER NEED AT DESTINATION 
LETTER OF CREDIT TIME LIMIT 
SEASONALITY OF COMMODITY EXPORTED 
COMPETITION AT CONSIGNEE'S MARKET 
OTHERS, PLS. SPECIFY 
19. CONSIDERING DIRECT AIR FREIGHT FROM YOUR AREA TO NORTH, SOUTH & 
CENTRAL EUROPE? 
OUT OF THE AIRPORT OF 
TO CENTRAL EUROPE: 
AVERAGE COST PER KG 
us s 1.00 US $ 1.50 
US $ 1.25 US $ 2.00 
OTHERS, PLS. SPECIFY 
4 
AV 
us 
ER 
$ 
AGE COST PER KG 
1.00 US $ 1.50 
US $ 1.25 US $ 2.00 
OTHERS, PLS. SPECIFY 
AVE GE COST PER KG 
us 
R 
s 
A 
1.00 US $ 1.50 
US $ 1.25 US $ 2.00 
f- I OTHERS, PLS. SPECIFY 
C) TO SOUTH EUROPE: 
AVERAGE COST PER KG 
us s 1.00 US $ 1.50 
US $ 1.25 US $ 2.00 
OTHERS, PLS. SPECIFY 
AVERAGE TRANSIT TIME 
2 DAYS 1-1 3 DAYS 4 DAYS 6 DAYS 
OTHERS, PLS. SPECIFY 
20. CONSIDERING DIRECT CONTAINERISED SHIPPING FROM FAR EAST TO THE 
COUNTRY MAIN PORT: 
a) EX JAPAN PORT OF 
COST OF 20' CONTAINER: 
COST OF 40' CONTAINER: 
TRANSIT TIME : DAYS 
TERMINAL CHARGES: 
DOCUMENTATION CHARGES: 
FORWARDING CHARGES: 
TO: 
b) EX TAIWAN PORT OF TO: 
COST OF 20' CONTAINER: 
COST OF 40' CONTAINER: 
TRANSIT TIME : DAYS 
TERMINAL CHARGES: 
DOCUMENTATION CHARGES: 
b 
c) EX S. KOREA PORT OF TO: 
COST OF 20' CONTAINER: 
COST OF 40' CONTAINER: 
TRANSIT TIME : DAYS 
TERMINAL CHARGES: 
DOCUMENTATION CHARGES: 
FORWARDING CHARGES: 
d) EX HONG KONG PORT OF TO: 
COST OF 20' CONTAINER: 
COST OF 40' CONTAINER: 
TRANSIT TIME : DAYS 
TERMINAL CHARGES: 
DOCUMENTATION CHARGES: 
FORWARDING CHARGES: 
21. AVERAGE RATE PER KG IN US $ FROM THE FOLLOWING AIRPORTS TO THE 
FOLLOWING DESTINATIONS 
FROM: VANCOUVER: 
TO PER 100 KG PER 250 KG PER 500 KG 
AMS 
BRU 
CPH 
OSL 
STO 
MAD 
BCN 
HEL 
LIS 
PAR 
LON 
FRA 
ROM 
SNN 
GLA 
FROM: SEATTLE: 
TO PER 100 KG PER 250 KG PER 500 KG 
AMS 
BRU 
CPH 
OSL 
STO 
MAD 
BCN 
HEL 
LIS 
PAR 
LON 
FRA 
b 
FROM: LOS ANGELES: 
TO PER 100 KG PER 250 KG PER 500 KG 
AMS 
BRU 
CPH 
OSL 
STO 
MAD 
BCN 
HEL 
LIS 
PAR 
LON 
FRA 
ROM 
SNN 
GLA 
FROM: SAN FRANCISCO: 
TO PER 100 KG PER 250 KG PER 500 KG 
AMS 
BRU 
CPH 
OSL 
STO 
MAD 
BCN 
HEL 
LIS 
PAR 
LON 
FRA 
ROM 
SNN 
GLA 
22. DO YOU EXPERIENCE'BACKLOGS AT THE AIRPORT OF ORIGIN 
1-1 YES 1-1 NO 
23. IF YES IS IT BECAUSE OF 
LIMITED CARGO FLIGHTS 
INCREASE OF SEA-AIR VOLUME 
LIMITED AIRPORT FACILITIES 
INCREASED VOLUME OF LOCAL PRODUCTS FOR EXPORT 
24. IN CASE OF BACKLOGS DO YOU 
DIVERT THE CARGO TO OTHER AIRPORTS 
WAIT FOR OTHER CARGO FLIGHT SPACE 
CO-LOAD WITH ANOTHER AGENT 
25. DO YOU WAIT FOR SPACE TILL IT IS AVAILABLE? 
26. IF YES HOW MANY DAYS ON AN AVERAGE DO YOU WAIT? 
DAYS 
DO YOU PAY THE AIRPORT -DEMURRAGE CHARGES IN CASE OF DELAY? 
b) 1-1 YES 1-1 NO 
c) IF YES HOW MUCH PER 100 KG 
US $ PER 100 KG 
27. IN CASE OF DELAY DUE TO SPACE LIMITATIONS, DO YOU RECEIVE A 
CLAIM FROM CONSIGNEE/SHIPPER 
I- I YES 1-1 NO 
IF YES HOW MUCH DO THEY CLAIM FOR A DAY PER 100 KG 
US $ PER 100 KG 
29. DO YOU BOOK CARGO ON RELEVANT AIRLINES, TO POINTS IN EUROPE 
1 TO 5 DAYS IN ADVANCE 
2 TO 10 DAYS IN ADVANCE 
3 TO 15 DAYS IN ADVANCE 
OTHERS, PLS. SPECIFY 
30. PLS. NAME THE QUARTER OF THE YEAR WHEN SPACE TO EUROPE IS VERY 
TIGHT 
1ST QUARTER 2ND QUARTER 
3RD QUARTER 4TH QUARTER 
31. IN CASE OF NO SPACE BEING AVAILABLE TO EUROPE, WHAT DO YOU DO? 
32. WHAT PERIOD OF THE YEAR SHOWED PEAK VOLUME 
1ST QUARTER 2ND QUARTER 
3RD QUARTER 4TH QUARTER 
33. HOW DO YOU TRANSPORT YOUR SEA-AIR CARGO 
REGULAR CARGO FLIGHTS 
REGULAR PAX FLIGHTS 
COMBI FLIGHTS 
CHARTER CARGO FLIGHTS 
34. DURING THE LAST 2 YR., WHAT % OF SEA-AIR CARGO WAS TRANSPORTED 
I 
BY REGULAR CARGO FLTS BY REGULAR PAX FLTS 
b 
35. WHO DOES THE UNLOADING FROM THE SHIPPING LINE CONTAINERS TO THE 
AIRPORT WAREHOUSE? 
AIRPORT STAFF 
YOUR OWN STAFF 
HANDLING AGENT 
AIRLINE 
36. WHO DOES THE PALLETISATION? 
HANDLING AGENTS AIRLINE 
YOUR OWN STAFF OTHERS PLS. SPECIFY 
37. HOW LONG DOES THE SEA-AIR CARGO REMAIN IN TRANSIT? 
LESS THAN 6 HRS BETN. 6 & 12 HRS 
MORE THAN 12 HRS OTHERS - PLS. SPECIFY 
38. HANDLING OF SEA & AIR SHIPMENT 
DOES THE CARGO ARRIVE STRICTLY IN CONTAINERS 
1-1 YES 1-1 NO 
b) WHAT PERCENTAGE OF IT IN 20'CONTAINERS % 
c) WHAT PERCENTAGE IN 40' CONTAINERS % 
d) WHAT PERCENTAGE OF IT IN OTHERS, 
PLS. SPECIFY 
39. IF SHIPMENT ARRIVES STRICTLY IN CONTAINERS, THEN WHAT 
a) FCL % b) LCL % c) OTHERS 
40. WHAT DOCUMENTS ARE NEEDED TO CUSTOM CLEAR SEA-AIR SHIPMENT FROM 
THE PORT TO THE AIRPORT 
PACKING LIST + INVOICE + ORIGINAL B/L 
INVOICE + ORIGINAL B/L 
COMBINED TRANSPORT DOCUMENTS (CTD) 
OTHERS, PLS. SPECIFY 
41. HOW DOES SEA-AIR SHIPMENT MOVE IN TRANSIT FROM PORT TO AIRPORT 
WITHOUT PAYING ENTRY DUTIES BY: 
BANK GUARANTEE TO CUSTOMS AUTHORITY 
FORWARDERS GUARANTEE TO CUSTOMS AUTHORITY 
CUSTOMS HOUSE BROKER GUARANTEE 
OTHER MEANS, PLS. SPECIFY 
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42. DURING THE HANDLING OF SEA-AIR CARGO IN THE LAST TWO YEAR. S, DID 
YOU EXPERIENCE 
a) ARRIVAL OF DAMAGED CARGO 
b) DAMAGE IN TRANSIT % 
c) THEFT % 
d) VOLUME/WEIGHT DISRUPTION % 
43. HOW DO YOU RATE FACILITIES OF AIRPORTS AND SEA PORTS AS SEA-AIR 
INTERCHANGE HUB? 
AIRPORT 
44. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
SEA PORT 
GOOD V GOOD EXCELLENT 
GOOD V GOOD EXCELLENT 
GOOD V GOOD EXCELLENT 
GOOD V GOOD EXCELLENT 
GOOD V GOOD EXCELLENT 
GOOD V GOOD F---j EXCELLENT 
BEING A SEA-AIR OPERATOR WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE 
FLAT RATE FOR SEA-AIR CARGO 
COMMODITY RATE 
FIXED RATE FOR FIXED PERIODS 
OTHERS; PLS. SPECIFY 
45. IN YOUR OPINION HOW COULD SEA-AIR DEVELOP FURTHER? 
I 
Questionnalrefor Far East sea-airfreightforwarders 
ACCORDING TO THE BEST OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE, PLEASE TICK IN THE 
APPROPRIATE BOX. THIS QUESTIONNAIRE IS DESIGNED TO HELP PREPARE AN 
ACADEMIC STUDY ON SEA-AIR TRANSPORT. YOUR ASSISTANCE IS VERY HIGHLY 
APPRECIATED. 
NAME & ADDRESS OF ORGANISATION: - 
1. COUNTRY : CITY : 
2. DO YOU OFFER SHIPPERS /EXPORTERS? 
SEA-AIR SERVICE, ALL INCLUSIVE COST DOOR TO DOOR 
COST PER SERVICE, OR PART THEREOF 
3. DO YOU OFFER VARIOUS SEA-AIR TRANSFER POINTS? 
YES NO 
4. DO YOU OFFER SEA-AIR SERVICES VIA? 
1. SEATTLE YES NO 
2. LOS ANGELES YES NO 
3. SINGAPORE YES ! 
-I 
NO 
4. VLADIVOSTOK YES NO 
5. U. A. E. YES NO 
5. CONSIDERING SEA-AIR SERVICES FROM YOUR AREA TO EUROPE VIA 
DIFFERENT SEA-AIR. HUBS: 
Port of Origin 
Europe 
Via Cost 
(US$) 
Transit time 
(to final destination) 
Destinantion 
points 
Seattle 
Los Angeles 
Singapore 
Vladivostok 
U. A. E. 
2 
6. CONSIDERING DIRECT CONTAINERIZED SHIPPING FROM FAR EAST TO THE 
SEA-AIR HUB: EX PORT OF 
To Western Europe Scandinavian Portugal/Spain 
countries 
Cost of 201 
container (US$) 
Cost of 401 
container (Us$) 
Transit time 
(days) 
Documentation 
charges 
Forwarders 
, charges 
7. DO YOU USE SEA-AIR SCHEDULES? 
YES NO 
8. RANK THE FOLLOWING IN ORDER OF ATTRACTIVENESS TO THE SUPPLIER? 
SHORT TRANSIT TIME 
LOWER TRANSPORTATION COST 
11 LOWER INSURANCE COST 
FLEXIBILITY 
SHORT TRANSIT TIME & LOWER TRANSPORTATION COST 
9. NATURE OF COMMODITIES, PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOLUME: 
a) GARMENTS 
b) TEXTILES 
c) COMPUTERS (RELATED PARTS) 
d) FOOTWEAR : 
e) ELECTRONIC PRODUCTS 
f) MISC. (COSMETICS, NOVELTIES, TOYS ETC.: 
g) GEN. COMMODITIES VALUE OVER $ 4.00/KG : 
h) GEN. COMMODITIES VALUE OVER $ 8.00/KG 
i) GEN. COMMODITIES VALUE OVER $ 12.00/KG : 
j) GEN. COMMODITIES VALUE OVER $ 16.00/KG : 
k) GEN. COMMODITIES VALUE OVER $ 20.00/KG : 
% 
% 
% 
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10. CONCERN OF THE SHIPPER/SUPPLIER RE SEA-AIR SERVICES 
IS DELIVERY TIME AT FINAL DESTINATION 
VERY IMPORTANT 
IMPORTANT 
NOT IMPORTANT 
b) IS TOTAL COST OF SEA-AIR SHIPPING TO FINAL DESTINATION 
VERY IMPORTANT 
IMPORTANT 
NOT IMPORTANT 
IF THERE WERE NO SEA-AIR SERVICES, HOW WOULD THE BULK OF CARGO 
TRAVEL? 
BY AIR BY SEA BOTH AIR & SEA 
12. FOR THE ORDERS OF SEA-AIR PLS. RANK THE FOLLOWING IN ORDER OF 
IMPORTANCE 
DEMAND IN COUNTRY OF DESTINATION 
INTRODUCTION OF A NEW COMMODITY 
TO SAVE ON STORAGE CHARGES AT CONSIGNEE MARKET 
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTION FROM CONSIGNEE 
URGENCY OF ORDER NEED AT DESTINATION 
LETTER OF CREDIT TIME LIMIT 
SEASONALITY OF COMMODITY EXPORTED 
COMPETITION AT CONSIGNEE'S MARKET 
13. CONSIDERING DIRECT AIR FREIGHT FROM YOUR AREA TO EUROPE, OUT OF 
THE AIRPORT 
A) TO WESTERN EUROPE (AVERAGE COST/KG IN $): 
HIGH RATE LOW RATE 
B) TO SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES (AVERAGE COST/KG IN $): 
HIGH RATE LOW RATE 
C) TO PORTUGAL & SPAIN (AVERAGE COST/KG IN $): 
HIGH RATE LOW RATE 
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14. DO YOU EXPERIENCE BACKLOGS AT THE AIRPORT OF ORIGIN TO EUROPE? 
YES NO 
15. IF YES IS IT BECAUSE OF : 
LIMITED CARGO FLIGHTS 
LIMITED CARGO CAPACITY 
LIMITED AIRPORT CAPACITY 
16. PLS. NAME THE QUARTER OF THE YEAR WHEN SPACE TO EUROPE IS VERY 
TIGHT 
11 1ST QUARTER 
11 3RD QUARTER 
2ND QUARTER 
11 4TH QUARTER 
17. BEING A SEA-AIR OPERATOR WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE 
FLAT RATE FOR SEA-AIR CARGO 
COMMODITY RATE 
FIXED RATE FOR FIXED PERIODS 
OTHERS, PLS. SPECIFY 
18. IN YOUR OPINION HOW COULD SEA-AIR DEVELOP FURTHER? 
I 
Questionnairefor importers using sea-air 
ACCORDING TO THE BEST OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE, PLEASE TICK IN THE 
APPROPRIATE BOX. THIS QUESTIONNAIRE IS DESIGNED TO HELP PREPARE AN 
ACADEMIC STUDY ON SEA-AIR TRANSPORT. YOUR ASSISTANCE IS VERY HIGHLY 
APPRECIATED. 
NAME & ADDRESS OF ORGANISATION: - 
1. WHEN DID YOUR COMPANY BEGIN USING SEA-AIR SERVICES? 
WITHIN THE LAST 5 YEARS 
WITHIN THE LAST 10 YEARS 
FOR OVER 10 YEARS 
2. WHAT ARE YOUR REASONS FOR USING SEA-AIR? PLEASE RANK IN ORDER 
OF ATTRACTIVENESS 
SHORT TRANSIT TIME 
LOWER TRANSPORTATION COST 
LOWER INSURANCE 
SAVINGS ON STORAGE/STOCK PILING 
1 1 SHORT TRANSIT *TIME AND LOWER TRANSPORTATION COST 
3. NATjRE OF COMMODITIES, PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOLUME: 
a) 3EN. COMMODITIES VALUE LESS THAN $ 4.00/KG % 
b) 3EN. COMMODITIES VALUE OVER $ 4.00/KG % 
c) 3EN. COMMODITIES VALUE OVER $ 8.00/KG % 
d) 3EN. COMMODITIES VALUE OVER $ 12.00/KG % 
e) GEN. COMMODITIES VALUE OVER $ 16.00/KG % 
4. IS TOTAL COST OF SEA-AIR SHIPPING TO FINAL DESTINATION 
1 1 VERY IMPORTANT IMPORTANT NOT IMPORTANT 
5. IS DELIVERY TIME AT FINAL DESTINATION 
VERY IMPORTANT IMPORTANT NOT IMPORTANT 
2 
6. FOR SEA-AIR ORDERS PLEASE RANK THE FOLLOWING IN THEIR ORDER OF 
IMPORTANCE 
11 DEMAND IN COUNTRX OF DESTINATION 
INTRODUCTION OF A NEW COMMODITY 
TO SAVE ON STORAGE CHARGES 
URGENCY OF ORDER NEED AT DESTINATION 
LETTER OF CREDIT TIME LIMIT 
SEASONALITY OF COMMODITY IMPORTED 
COMPETITION AT YOUR MARKET 
7. HOW MANY SEA-AIR SHIPMENTS DO YOU HAVE PER YEAR? 
5 SHIPMENTS 10 SHIPMENTS 
MORE THAN 10 SHIPMENTS: PLS. SPECIFY 
8. WHAT IS THE AVERAGE SIZE OF YOUR SEA-AIR SHIPMENTS? 
300 KGS 500 KGS 
MORE THAN 500 KGS : PLS. SPECIFY 
9. AS SEA-AIR SHIPMENT ARRIVES AT DESTINATION AIRPORT, CLEARANCE 
AND DELIVERY TO YQUR DOOR OR WAREHOUSE 
SAME DAY (EXCEPT WEEKENDS) 2 DAYS 
MORE THAN 2 DAYS 
10. ACCORDING TO YOUR EXPERIENCE, AVERAGE SEA-AIR TRANSIT TIME FROM 
THE FAR EAST TO YOUR DOOR : 
16 DAYS 18 DAYS 20 DAYS 
HAVING SET AN AVERAGE TIME, HOW FREQUENT ARE THE DELAYS TO THE 
ABOVE AVERAGE : 
ONCE PER YEAR TWICE A YEAR 
MORE THAN TWICE A YEAR; PLS. SPECIFY: 
12. HOW LONG ARE THE DELAYS 
2 DAYS 3-4,.. DAYS MORE THAN 4 DAYS 
j 
13. PLEASE NAME THE QUARTER OF THE YEAR WHICH SHOWED PEAK VOLUME 
I 1ST QUARTER 
I 3RD QUARTER 
2ND QUARTER 
4TH QUARTER 
14. DOES THE SEA-AIR CONCEPT HELP YOUR DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
SAVING ON STORAGE 
DIRECT DELIVERIES TO YOUR CLIENTS 
NONE OF THE ABOVE 
IF YES, THEN IS IT : 
VERY IMPORTANT IMPORTANT NOT IMPORTANT 
15. IF THERE WERE NO SEA-AIR SERVICES, HOW WOULD YOU IMPORT YOUR 
CARGO? 
BY AIR BY SEA BOTH OF THE ABOVE 
PLEASE SPECIFY THE REASON: 
16. WHEN WOULD YOU USE SEA-AIR SERVICES - PLEASE RANK THE FOLLOWING 
IN THE ORDER OF ATTRACTIVENESS : 
WHEN TRANSPORTATION COST IS HALF OF DIRECT AIR 
WHEN TRANSIT TIME IS HALF THAT OF SHIPPING LINES 
WHEN THERE IS INSUFFICIENT AIR CAPACITY AT ORIGIN 
17. IN YOUR OPINION SEA-AIR COST IS : 
LESS THAN DIRECT AIR BY 25% 
LESS THAN DIRECT AIR BY 50% 
OTHERS, PLEASE SPECIFY 
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18. IN YOUR OPINION SEA-AIR TRANSIT TIME IS : 
FASTER THAN SHIPPING LINES BY 25% 
FASTER THAN SHIPPING LINES BY 50% 
OTHERS, PLEASE SPECIFY 
19. IN YOUR OPINION WHAT PERCENTAGE OF COST AND TRANSIT TIME MAKES 
YOU DECIDE ON USE OF SEA-AIR ? 
COST IN RELATION TO DIRECT AIR % LESS 
TRANSIT TIME IN RELATION TO ALL SEA % LESS 
** ** * ******** ***** *** 
1 
Questionnairefor sea-air seaport hub 
ACCORDING TO THE BEST OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE, PLEASE TICK IN THE 
APPROPRIATE BOX. THIS QUESTIONNAIRE IS DESIGNED TO HELP PREPARE AN 
ACADEMIC STUDY ON SEA-AIR TRANSPORT. YOUR ASSISTANCE IS VERY HIGHLY 
APPRECIATED. 
NAME & ADDRESS OF PORT: - 
1. COUNTRY : 
MANAGEMENT : 
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT 
AUTHORITIES 
PRIVATE 
OTHERS 
3. HOURS OF OPERATION 
24 HRS 18 HRS 
CITY : 
YES 
YES 
YES 
NO 
NO 
NO 
LESS THAN 18 HRS 
4. DO YOU HAVE A SEA-AIR CARGO DEPT.? 
YES NO 
IF YES, PLS. SUPPLY THE FOLLOWING DETAILS 
NUMBER OF STAFF 
WHEN ESTABLISHED 
NUMBER OF SALES REPS SELLING SEA-AIR METHOD 
HOW DO THEY MARKET SEA-AIR CARGO TRANSPORTATION? 
BY ATTRACTING NEW SERVICES 
BY PROVIDING SPECIAL RATES & CHARGES 
BY GIVING INCENTIVES TO FREIGHT FORWARDERS 
2 
6. WHO DOES THE HANDLING? 
SEA PORT AUTHORITY 
SHIPPING LINE 
PRIVATE COMPANIES 
OTHERS 
7. DO YOU HAVE SEA-AIR STATISTICS ? 
YES NO 
IF YES THEN BY 
1-1 DESTINATION COMMODITY VOLUME 
8. WHO CONTROLS THE SEA PORT WAREHOUSE? 
SEA PORT MANAGEMENT 
HANDLING AGENT 
SHIPPING LINE 
FORWARDERS 
9. DO YOU SUPERVISE LOADING/UNLOADING OF SEA-AIR CARGO? 
YES NO 
10. IF NO WHO PROVIDES THE SERVICE 
HANDLING AGENT 
SEA-AIR FORWARDERMPERATORS 
SHIPPING LINE 
OTHERS 
DOES THE FORWARDER HAVE ACCESS TO THE WAREHOUSE AT SEA PORTS? 
1-1 YES 1-1 NO 
12. WHO CERTIFIES NO OF PIECES PER SHIPMENT 
a) HANDLING AGENT YES NO 
b) FORWARDER YES NO 
c) SEA PORT AUTHORITY YES NO 
d) OTHERS YES NO 
13. HOW LONG DOES IT TAKE TO TRANSPORT THE CONTAINER FROM SEA PORT 
TO MAIN AIRPORT? 
1 TO 4 HOURS 
4 TO 6 HOURS 
6 TO 12 HOURS 
3 
14. HOW FAR IS THE SEA PORT - WHICH HANDLES THE SEA-AIR CARGO - FROM 
THE AIRPORT? 
LESS THAN 10 MILES 
BETWEEN 10 & 20 MILES 
BETWEEN 20 & 40 MILES 
BETWEEN 40 & 60 MILES 
MORE THAN 60 MILES 
15. FOR HOW LONG DOES*THE SEA-AIR CARGO REMAIN IN TRANSIT? 
LESS THAN 6 HRS 
BETWEEN 6 AND 12 HRS 
MORE THAN 12 HRS 
OTHERS 
16. HANDLING OF SEA-AIR SHIPMENT 
A) ARRIVAL OF CARGO 
a) DOES THE CARGO ARRIVE STRICTLY IN CONTAINERS 
YES NO 
b) WHAT PERCENTAGE OF IT IS IN 20' CONTAINER % 
c) WHAT PERCENTAGE IN 40' CONTAINER % 
d) WHAT PERCENTAGE IN OTHERS (PLS. SPECIFY) % 
4 
17. IF CARGO ARRIVES STRICTLY IN CONTAINERS, THEN WHAT PERCENTAGE 
a) FCL % b) LCL % c) OTHERS % 
18. SEA-AIR VOLUME IN TONNES 
a) 1988 b) 1989 
c) 1990 d) 1991 
19. NATURE OF COMMODITIES, PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOLUME: 
a) GARMENTS % 
b) TEXTILES % 
c) COMPUTERS (RELATED PARTS) % 
d) FOOTWEAR :% 
e) ELECTRONIC PRODUCTS % 
f) OTHERS SUCH AS COSMETICS, NOVELTIES, TOYS ETC.: % 
20. WHAT IS THE FREIGHT CAPACITY AVAILABLE AT YOUR MAIN SEA PORT? 
21. IF THERE WAS ANY INCREASE, WAS IT BECAUSE OF SEA-AIR? 
YES NO 
22. ONCE SEA-AIR CARGO REACHES THE MAIN SEA PORT TERMINAL: 
a) DO YOU TRANSPORT IT TO AIRPORTS 
b) TO WAREHOUSE 
23. IF TO WAREHOUSE THEN WHAT IS 
a) AVERAGE TIME IN WAREHOUSE 
b) WAREHOUSE FREE TIME ALLOWED BY SEA PORT AUTHORITIES 
6 12 HRS 12 - 24 HRS 
24 48 HRS MORE THAN 72 HRS (PLS. SPECIFY) 
24. WHAT DEMURRAGE CHARGE AFTER FREE TIME ALLOWANCE 
11 PER TONNE 11 PER CBM 
PER TEU OTHERS (PLS. SPECIFY) 
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25. IF YOU CHARGE DEMURRAGE DID YOU INCREASE THE CHARGES DURING THE 
IAST 4 YEARS? 
YES NO 
26. IF YES THEN BY WHAT PERCENTAGE? 
1991 % 
1990 % 
1989 % 
1988 % 
27. WHAT PERIOD OF THE YEAR SHOWED THE HIGHEST YIELD FROM DEMURRAGE: 
11 1ST QUARTER 
11 3RD QUARTER 
11 2ND QUARTER 
11 4TH QUARTER 
28. WHO CUSTOM CLEARS SEA-AIR CARGO? 
LICENSED CUSTOM HOUSE BROKER LICENSED FRT FORWARDER 
SHIPPING LINE AIRLINE 
OTHERS PLS. SPECIFY 
29. WHAT DOCUMENTS ARE NEEDED TO CUSTOM CLEAR SEA-AIR CARGO PORT TO 
AIRPORT 
PACKING LIST ý INVOICE + B/L ORIGINAL 
INVOICE + B/L ORIGINAL 
PACKING LIST + B/L ORIGINAL 
COMBINED TRANSPORT DOCUMENTS 
OTHERS PLS. SPECIFY 
30. HOW DOES SEA-AIR CARGO MOVE IN TRANSIT FROM PORT TO AIRPORT 
WITHOUT PAYING ENTRY DUTIES BY: 
BANK GUARANTEE TO CUSTOMS AUTHORITY 
FORWARDERS GUARANTEE TO CUSTOMS AUTHORITY 
CUSTOMS HOUSE BROKER GUARANTEE 
OTHER MEANS, PLS. SPECIFY 
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31. DURING WHAT HOURS OF THE DAY SHOULD TRANSIT CUSTOMS CLEARANCE BE 
DONE 
BETWEEN 8.00 AM - 5.00 PM 
BETWEEN 8.00 AM - 12 MIDNIGHT 
AFTER 5.00 PM AT AN EXTRA COST OF US$ PER HOUR 
OTHERS, PLS. SPECIFY 
1 
32. KINDLY LIST THE MAJOR SHIPPING LINES CALLING AT YOUR PORT EX FAR 
EAST PER FORTNIGHT: 
1. 6. 
2. 7. 
3. 8. 
4. 9. 
5. 10. 
33. SHIPPING LINES CALLING DIRECT (NON-STOP) FROM THE FAR EAST TO 
YOUR PORT PER FORTNIGHT: 
NUMBER 
NAMES : 
1. 6. 
2. 7. 
9. 
10. 
AVERAGE NO. OF DAYS PER TRIP FROM CLOSING TIME: 
1. KOREA 
2. JAPAN 
3. TAIWAN 
4. HONGKONG 
5. SINGAPORE 
6. OTHERS 
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34. SHIPPING LINES CALLING VIA VANCOUVER OR WITH ONE OR MORE STOPS 
PER TRIP PER FORTNIGHT. 
NUMBER 
NAMES OF SHIPPING LINES 
I. 6. 
2. 7. 
3. 8. 
4. 9. 
5. 10. 
35. WHICH PERIOD OF THE YEAR WITNESSES THE HIGHEST CONGESTION 
1ST QUARTER 11 2ND QUARTER 
11 3RD QUARTER 4TH QUARTER 
36. WHAT IS THE AVERAGE DELAY PER ANNUM IN DAYS BEFORE ACTUAL 
BERTHING 
1-2 DAYS 3-5 DAYS 
116-7 DAYS MORE THAN 7 DAYS 
37. IS IT BECAUSE OF 
a) LIMITED CAPACITY? YES NO 
b) INCREASE OF SEA-AIR VOLUME YES NO 
c) INCREASE OF NORMAL CARGO YES NO 
38. DO YOU DIVERT BACKLOGS TO OTHER SEA PORTS 
YES NO 
38. IF YES HOW FAR IS THE OTHER SEA PORT 
0- 50 MILES 50 - 100 MILES 
MORE THAN 100 MILES 
40. WHAT IS THE AVERAGE CAPACITY PER SHIP 
1000 TEUS 1200 TEUS 
1300 TEUS MORE THAN 1300 TEUS 
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41. HOW LONG DOES IT TAKE TO OFF LOAD 1300 TEUS AND MOVE TO THE PORT 
WAREHOUSE 
12 - 24 HRS 24 - 48 HRS 
48 - 72 HRS MORE THAN 72 HRS 
42. ARE SHIPPING LINES IN GENERAL FULLY AWARE OF THE SEA-AIR CARGO 
MOVEMENT 
YES NO 
43. IF YES, WHAT STEPS AND MEASURES HAVE THEY TAKEN TO ENCOURAGE AND 
FACILITATE THIS MOVEMENT 
a) DO THEY LOAD SEA-AIR CONTAINER LAST, AT ORIGIN IN ORDER TO 
OFF LOAD FIRST AT POINT OF DESTINATION 
YES NO 
b) RANDOM LOADING AT ORIGIN 
YES NO 
44. DO SHIPPING LINES OFF LOAD SEA-AIR CONTAINERS 
a. ON PRIORITY BASIS 
YES NO 
b. ON PRIORITY IF REQUESTED BY THE FORWARDER 
YES NO 
c. IN CASE OF PRIORITY OFF LOADING, AT WHAT ADDITIONAL COST 
US$ PER TEUS NO CHARGE 
OTHERS - PLS. SPECIFY 
45. WHO HANDLES LCL SEA-AIR CARGO 
SHIPPING LINE FORWARDERS 
OTHERS - PLS. SPECIFY 
46. WHO BREAK-BULK SEA-AIR LCL CARGO: 
SHIPPING LINE FORWARDERS 
OTHERS - PLS. SPECIFY 
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47. ARE PORT AUTHORITIES FULLY AWARE OF THE TIME ELEMENT REQUIRED 
fOR THE SEA-AIR CARGO MOVEMENT 
YES NO 
48. WHAT STEPS OR MEASURES ARE ADOPTED TO IMPROVE ON MOVEMENT 
LONGER WORKING HRS 
OTHERS - PLS. SPECIFY 
ADDITIONAL SHIFTS 
49. IN CASE OF ADDITIONAL WORKING HRS 
US$ MORE PER TEUS 
OTHERS - PLS. SPECIFY 
NO CHARGE 
*********** ** * ** 
I 
Questionnalrefor sea-air airport hub 
ACCORDING TO THE BEST OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE# PLEASE TICK IN THE 
APPROPRIATE BOX. THIS QUESTIONNAIRE IS DESIGNED TO HELP PREPARE AN 
ACADEMIC STUDY ON SEA-AIR . TRANSPORT. YOUR ASSISTANCE IS VERY HIGHLY 
APPRECIATED. 
NAME & ADDRESS OF AIRPORT: - 
1. COUNTRY CITY 
2. MANAGEMENT 
a) GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT 
AUTHORITIES YES NO 
b) PRIVATE YES NO 
c) OTHERS YES NO 
3. HOURS OF OPERATION 
1- 124 HRS I- 1 18 HRS LESS THAN 18 HRS 
4. ANY OPERATIONAL RESTRICTION? 
YES NO 
IF YES PLS. SPECIFY: 
5. IS THE CARGO DEPT. UNDER THE MANAGEMENT OF THE AIRPORT? 
1-1 YES 1-1 NO 
6. DO YOU HAVE A SEA-AIR CARGO DEPT.? 
YES NO 
IF YES, PLS. SUPPLY THE FOLLOWING DETAILS 
NUMBER OF STAFF 
WHEN ESTABLISHED 
NUMBER OF SALES REPS SELLING SEA-AIR METHOD: 
7. HOW DO THEY MARKET SEA-AIR CARGO TRANSPORTATION? 
BY ATTRACTING NEW SERVICES 
BY PROVIDING SPECIAL RATES & CHARGES 
BY GIVING INCENTIVES TO FREIGHT FORWARDERS 
2 
8. WHO DOES THE HANDLING? 
11 AIRPORT AUTHORITY 
AIRLINE 
PRIVATE COMPANIES 
OTHERS 
9. DO YOU HAVE SEA-AIR STATISTICS ? 
YES NO 
IF YES THEN BY: DESTINATION COMMODITY VOLUME 
10. WHO CONTROLS THE AIRPORT WAREHOUSE? 
AIRPORT MANAGEMENT 
HANDLING AGENT 
AIRLINE 
FORWARDERS 
11. DO YOU SUPERVISE LOADING/UNLOADING OF SEA-AIR CARGO? 
1-1 YES 1-1 NO 
12. WHO PROVIDES CARGO HANDLING 
HANDLING AGENT 
11 SEA-AIR FORWARDERVOPERATORS 
AIRLINE 
OTHERS 
13. DOES THE FORWARDER HAVE ACCESS TO THE WAREHOUSE AT AIRPORTS? 
1-1 YES 1-1 NO 
14. WHO-CERTIFIES NO OF PIECES PER SHIPMENT 
a) HANDLING AGENT YES NO 
b) FORWARDER YES NO 
c) AIRPORT AUTHORITY YES NO 
d) OTHERS YES NO 
i 
15. WHO DOES THE UNLOADING OF THE CARGO FROM THE SHIPPING LINE 
CONTAINERS TO THE WAREHOUSE? 
a) AIRPORT STAFF YES NO 
b) HANDLING AGENT YES NO 
c) FORWARDERS YES NO 
d) OTHERS YES NO 
16. DURING PREVIOUS YEARS HAVE YOU EXPERIENCED ANY 
DAMAGED CARGO, THEFT, ETC. 
YES NO 
IF YES, THEN WHAT PERCENTAGE? 
188 189 % 190 191 
17. WHO DOES THE PALLETIZATION? 
a) HANDLING AGENTS YES NO 
b) SEA-AIR FWDR/OPR YES NO 
c) AIRPORT AUTHORITY YES NO 
d) OTHERS YES NO 
18. HOW LONG DOES IT TAKE TO TRANSPORT THE CONTAINER FROM SEA PORT 
TO MAIN AIRPORT? 
1 TO 4 HOURS 
11 4 TO 6 HOURS 
6 TO 12 HOURS 
IF MORE THAN 12 HOURS, PLS. SPECIFY 
19. HOW FAR IS THE SEA PORT - WHICH HANDLES THE SEA-AIR CARGO - FROM 
THE AIRPORT? 
LESS THAN 10 MILES 
BETWEEN 10 & 20 MILES 
BETWEEN 20 & 40 MILES 
BETWEEN 40 & 60 MILES 
MORE THAN 60 MILES 
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20. 
21. 
FOR HOW LONG DOES THE SEA-AIR CARGO REMAIN IN TRANSIT? 
LESS THAN 6 HRS 
BETWEEN 6 AND 12 HRS 
MORE THAN 12 HRS 
OTHERS, PLS. SPECIFY 
HANDLING OF SEA-AIR SHIPMENT (ARRIVAL OF CARGO) 
a) DOES THE CARGO ARRIVE STRICTLY IN CONTAINERS 
YES NO 
b) WHAT PERCENTAGE OF IT IS IN 201 CONTAINER: % 
c) WHAT PERCENTAGE IN 401 CONTAINER: % 
d) WHAT PERCENTAGE IN OTHERS (PLEASE SPECIFY) % 
22. IF CARGO ARRIVES STRICTLY IN CONTAINERS, THEN WHAT PERCENTAGE 
a) FCL % b) LCL % c) OTHERS % 
23. SEA-AIR VOLUME IN TONNES 
a) 1988 b) 1989 
c) 1990 d) 1991 
24. NATURE OF COMMODITIES, PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOLUME: 
a) GARMENTS : 
b) TEXTILES :% 
C) COMPUTERS (RELATED PARTS) % 
d) FOOTWEAR :% 
e)-ELECTRONIC PRODUCTS % 
f) OTHERS (MISC. ) SUCH AS COSMETICS, NOVELTIES, TOYS ETC. 
25. WHAT IS THE FREIGHT CAPACITY AVAILABLE AT YOUR MAIN AIRPORT? 
b 
26. IF THERE WAS ANY INCREASE, OVER THE LAST 4 YR., WAS IT BECAUSE 
OF SEA-AIR? 
1-1 YES NO 
27. IF YES WHAT PERCENTAGE OF IT WAS THROUGH REGULAR FLIGHTS AND 
WHAT PERCENTAGE WAS CHARTER FLIGHTS? 
1988 % REGULAR % CHARTER 
1989 % REGULAR % CHARTER 
1990 % REGULAR % CHARTER 
1991 % REGULAR % CHARTER 
28. WHAT % WITH CARGO FLIGHTS AND WHAT % WAS PAX FLIGHTS 
1988 % CARGO % PAX 
1989 % CARGO % PAX 
1990 % CARGO % PAX 
1991 % CARGO % PAX 
29. DO YOU EXPERIENCE BACKLOGS? 
I YES II NO 
30. IF YES, IS IT BECAUSE OF 
a) LIMITED CAPACITY? YES NO 
b) INCREASE OF SEA-AIR VOLUME YES NO 
c) LOW RATE YES NO 
31. WHICH PERIOD OF THE YEAR SHOWED THE HIGHEST SEA-AIR ACTIVITY? 
1ST QUARTER 11 2ND QUARTER 
1 1 3RD QUARTER 11 4TH QUARTER 
32. DO -YOU DIVERT BACKLOGS TO OTHER AIRPORTS? 
1-1 YES 1-1 NO 
33. IF YES HOW FAR IS THE OTHER AIRPORT 
0- 50 MILES 50 - 100 MILES 
MORE THAN 100 MILES 
b 
34. WHAT PERCENTAGE HAS BEEN DIVERTED LAST YEAR TO OTHER AIRPORTS 
BY TRUCK % BY TRAIN 
35. DO YOU HAVE AN 'OPEN SKY POLICY"? 
YES NO 
36. ARE AIRPORT AUTHORITIES FULLY AWARE OF THE TIME ELEMENT REQD. 
FOR SEA-AIR CARGO MOVEMENT 
YES NO 
37. WHAT MEASURES WERE ADOPTED TO IMPROVE MOVEMENT 
LONGER WORKING HRS ADDITIONAL SHIFTS 
OTHERS - PLS. SPECIFY 
38. IN CASE OF ADDITIONAL WORKING HRS 
US$ MORE PER TONNE NO CHARGE 
OTHERS - PLS. SPECIFY 
39. ONCE SEA-AIR CARGO REACHES THE MAIN AIRPORT CARGO TERMINAL: 
a) AVERAGE TIME IN WAREHOUSE 
b) WAREHOUSE FREE TIME ALLOWED BY AIRPORT AUTHORITY 
6 12 HRS 12 - 24 HRS 
24 48 HRS MORE THAN 72 HRS (PLS. SPECIFY) 
40. WHAT DEMURRAGE CHARGE AFTER FREE TIME ALLOWANCE 
I- I PER TONNE 11 PER CBM 
1-1 PER TEU 1-1 OTHERS (PLS. SPECIFY) 
41. WHAT ARE THE AVG. DEMURRAGE CHARGES LEVIED BY AIRPORT 
AUTHORITIES 
PER DAY US$ PER MONTH US$ 
PER YEAR 
42. WHAT PERIOD OF THE YEAR SHOWED THE HIGHEST YIELD FROM DEMURRAGE: 
1ST QUARTER 
3RD QUARTER 
I 2ND QUARTER 
11 4TH QUARTER 
43. WHO CUSTOM CLEARS SEA-AIR CARGO? 
LICENSED CUSTOM HOUSE BROKER LICENSED FRGT FORWARDER 
SHIPPING LINE AIRLINE 
OTHERS PLS. SPECIFY 
44. WHAT DOCUMENTS ARE NEEDED TO CUSTOM CLEAR SEA-AIR CARGO PORT TO 
AIRPORT 
PACKING LIST + INVOICE + B/L ORIGINAL 
INVOICE + B/L ORIGINAL 
PACKING LIST + B/L ORIGINAL 
COMBINED TRANSPORT DOCUMENTS 
OTHERS PLS. SPECIFY 
45. HOW DOES SEA-AIR CARGO MOVE IN TRANSIT FROM PORT TO AIRPORT 
WITHOUT PAYING ENTRY DUTIES BY: 
BANK GUARANTEE TO CUSTOMS AUTHORITY 
FORWARDERS GUARANTEE TO CUSTOMS AUTHORITY 
CUSTOMS HOUSE BROKER GUARANTEE 
OTHER MEANS, PLS. SPECIFY 
46. DURING WHAT HOURS OF THE DAY SHOULD TRANSIT CUSTOMS CLEARANCE BE 
DONE 
BETWEEN 8.00 AM 5.00 PM 
BETWEEN 8.00 AM 12 MIDNIGHT 
AFTER 5.00 PM AT AN EXTRA COST OF US$ PER HOUR 
OTHERS, PLS. SPECIFY 
47. PLS. ATTACH A LIST OF SCHD. PAX FLIGHTS FROM YOUR AIRPORT TO: 
CITIES IN CENTRAL TYPE OF A/C FLTS/DAY FLTS/WEEK 
& NORTHERN EUROPE 
ý! I u 
48. PLS. ATTACH A LIST OF SCHD CARGO FLIGHTS FROM YOUR AIRPORT TO: 
CITIES IN CENTRAL TYPE OF A/C FLTS/DAY FLTS/WEEK 
& NORTHERN EUROPE 
49. FROM AVLBL STATISTICS (PUBLISHED OR ON RECORD) PLS. NAME 10 
CLASSES OF COMMODITIES EXPORTED FROM YOUR AIRPORT, WITH TONNAGE 
COMMODITY CLASS TINAGE 88 T'NAGE 89 T'NAGE 90 TINAGE 91, 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
TOTALS 
50. PLEASE NAME MAIN COMMODITIES THAT ARE PRODUCED IN YOUR AREA AND 
EXPORTED BY AIR, AND IF POSSIBLE: 
COMMODITY CLASS T'NAGE 88 T'NAGE 89 T'NAGE 90 T'NAGE 91 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
TOTALS 
51. DO YOU AIR EXPORT COMMODITIES FROM OTHER AREAS IN YOUR COUNTRY 
THROUGH YOUR AIRPORT FACILITY? 
YES NO 
52. IF YES WHAT IS THE TONNAGE 
1988 TONNAGE 
1990 TONNAGE 
1989 TONNAGE 
1991 TONNAGE 
53. WHAT ARE THE MAIN CLASSES OF THIS COMMODITY? 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
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54. WHERE FROM DO THEY ARRIVE AT YOUR AIRPORT? 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
55. MEANS OF TRANSPORT FROM OTHER AREAS OF YOUR COUNTRY TO YOUR 
AIRPORT? 
T'NAGE 88 T'NAGE 89 T'NAGE 90 T'NAGE 91 
1. BY AIR 
2. OVERLAND 
3. RAIL 
4. OTHER MEANS 
(PLS. SPECIFY) 
56. OF THE COMMODITIES ARRIVING BY OCEAN AND THEN RE-EXPORTED BY AIR 
FROM YOUR MAIN AIRPORT 
WHAT T'NAGE FROM T'NAGE 88 T'NAGE 89 T'NAGE 90 T'NAGE 91 
1. JAPAN 
2. S. KOREA 
3. TAIWAN 
4. HONGKONG 
5. SINGAPORE 
6. OTHERS 
57. NATURE OF THESE COMMODITIES AND RELEVANT TONNAGE EX FAR EAST 
COMMODITY CLASS T*'NAGE 88 TINAGE 89 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9., 
10. 
TINAGE 90 T'NAGE 91 
** ** * *** ** ** ** * ** ** 
Reports on questionnaires 
1 
SEA-AIR REPORT BAS41) ON INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM 
FREIGHT FORWARDERS OF TAIPEI, TAIWAN 
The following information has been condensed from interviews and 
questionnairesfrom 12 to 16 Freight Forwarders in Taipei. Their contacts were 
established through introductions from the Freight Fonvarding Industry in the 
Sea-Air hubs ofSeattle, Los Angeles, and the UnitedArab Emirates: 
Freight Forwarders in Taipei offer Shippers/Exporters, either type of Sea-Air 
service, 'All inclusive cost door to dooe, or 'Cost per service'. They also offer a 
variety of Sea-Air ft-ansfer points like Seattle, Singapore, and the UAR A few 
via Los Angeles, but not through Vladivostok. 
The Sea-Air rates/transit times, as per the forwarders is as per the Mowing 
details: 
to Western Europe via Seattle, the rate is from US$ 1.60 to 2.00, widi a bmsit 
time (to the final destination) of between 16 - 22 days. 
to Western Europe via the U. A. E, the rate is from US$ 1.60 to 2.00, widi a transit 
time (to the final destinationj Of between 15 - 19 days. 
to Western Europe via Singapore, the rate is from US$ 2.20 to 2.80, widi a transit 
time (to the final destination) of between 6-II days. 
Sea-Air destined for South America is sent via Los Angeles, with the rate ranging 
between US$ 1.60 to US$ 2.80. The transit time here is between 14 - 23 days. 
As far as direct containerised sMpping goes, the Freight Forwarders provided 
rates/transit times through the U. A. E. Sea-Air hub, which was as Mows: 
to Western Europe for a 20'container the rates ranged from US$ 1300 - 1500, & 
for a 40'container, from US$ 2600 - 3000. The transit time being 25 - 32 days. 
to the Scandinavian Countries, for a 20'container the mtes ranged from US$ 1400 
- 1900, & for a 40' container, from US$ 2700 - 2800. The transit time being 
between 30 - 35 days. 
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to Portugal & Spain, for a 20'container the rates ranged from US$ 1325 - 1900, & 
for a 40' container, from US$ 2650 - 2800. The transit time being between 25 - 
35 days. 
Docmnentation charges was stated as US$ 10.00. 
For All Air rates., the Freight forwarders provided the following information: 
to Western Europe the Wgh rate was from US$ 3.00 - 3.80 per kg, & the low rate 
ranged from US$ 2.80 - 3.50 per kg. 
to the Scandinavian Countries, the Mgh rate was from US$ 3.20 - 4.8 per kg, & 
the low rate ranged from US$ 2.80 - 4.30 per kg. 
to Portugal & Spain, the Wgh rate was from US$ 3.00 - 5.0 per kg, & the low rate 
ranged from US$ 2.90 - 4.20 per kg. 
All the Freight Forwarders in Taiwan operated with the use of Sea-Air schedules. 
The majority agreed that in the order of importance, what the supplier was looking 
for was: 
Short transit time & lower tmnsportation cost. 
2. Lower transportation cost. 
3. Short Transit time. 
4. Flexibility 
5. Lower insurance cost. 
The bulk of the type of commodities that were transported was mainly computer 
related parts, which made up 60% to 70% of the total volume. The rest was made 
up of Garments, textiles, & General Commodities (of values ranging between 
US$ 4/kg - US$ 20/kg), of about 10% each of the total volume, with the 
percentage varying in small arnounts, from forwarder to forwarder. 
The Freight Forwarders all agreed that for the Sliipper/Supplier, -delivery time mid 
the total cost of Sea-Air shipping, to the final destination, were very important 
factors. Most were of the opinion that if there were no Sea-Air service, the bulk- 
of the cargo would travel by both Air & Sea. 
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For the orders of Sea-Air, they. ranked the following in their order of importance 
as below: 
I. Specific instruction from consignee. 
2. Urgency of order need at destination. 
I Seasonality of commodity exported. 
4. Letter of credit time limit. 
5. Competition at consignee's market. 
6. Demand in country of destination. 
7. Introduction of a new commodity. 
8. To save on storage charges at consignee market.. 
Most of the Freight Forwarders experienced backlogs at the Airport of origin, to 
Europe, mainly because of limited cargo capacity, and to an extent limited Airport 
capacity. 
The I st Quarter & the 4th Quarter of the year (esp. the 4th), was considered die 
period when space to Europe is very fight. Most Freight Forwarders would prefer 
a flat rate for Sea-Air cargo. 
1 
SEA-AIR REPORT BASED ON INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM 
FREIGHT FORWARDERS OF SINGAPORE 
The following information has been condensed from interviews and 
questionnaires from 12 to 16 Freight Forwarders in Singapore. Their 
contacts were established through introductionsfrom the Freight Forwarding 
Industry in the Sea-Air hubs of Seattle, Los Angeles, and the United Arab 
Emirates: 
Some Freight Forwarders in Singapore offer Shippers/Exporters, 'All inclusive 
cost door to door' type of Sea-Air service, and some 'Cost per service'. They 
also offer a variety of Sea-Air transfer points like Seattle, Singapore, and the 
U-A-E. A few via Los Angeles, but not through Vladivostok. 
The Sea-Air rates/transit times, as per the forwarders is as per the following 
details: 
to Western Europe via Seattle, the rate is US$ 1.95, with a transit time (to the 
final destination) of between 16 - 19 days. 
to Western Europe via the U. A. E, the rate is from US$ 1.50 to 1.85, with a 
transit time (to the final destination) of between 12 and a half - 19 days. 
to Western Europe via Singapore, the rate is from US$ 2.00 to 2.90,, with a 
transit time (to the final destination) of between 7- 12 days. 
There was no data for Sea-Air sent via Los Angeles. 
j& 0 is far as direct containerised shippLnZ goes, the Freight Forwarders provided 
Mtes/transit times through the U. A. E. Sea-Air hub, which was as follows: 
to Western Europe for a 20'container the rates ranged from US$ 1300 - 1500, 
& for a 40' container, from US$ 2600 - 3000. The transit time being 25 - 32 
days. 
to the Scandinavian Countries, for a 20' container the rates ranged from US$ 
1400 - 1900, & for a 40' container, from US$ 2700 - 2800. The transit time 
being between 30 - 35 days. 
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to Portugal & Spain, for a 20'container the rates ranged from US$ 1325 - 1900, 
& for a 40' container, from US$ 2650 - 2800. The transit time being between 
25 - 35 days. 
For All Air rates, the Freight forwarders provided the fbHowing information: 
to Western Europe the Wgh rate was from US$ 3.00 - 3.80 per kg, & the low 
rate ranged from US$ 2.80 - 3.50 per kg. 
to the Scandinavian Countries, the Mgh rate was from US$ 3.20 - 4.8 per kg, & 
the low rate ranged from US$ 2.80 - 4.30 per kg. 
to Portugal & Spain, the Wgh rate was from US$ 3.00 - 5.0 per ýg, & the low 
rate ranged from US$ 2.90 - 4.20 per kg. 
All the Freight Forwarders in Singapore operated with the use of Sea-Air 
schedules. The majority agreed that in the order of importance, what the 
supplier was looldng for was: 
I. Short transit time & lower transportation cost. 
2. Lower trunsportation cost. 
I Flexibility 
4. Short Transit tftne. 
5. Lower insurance cost. 
The Freight Forwarders all agreed that for the Shipper/Supplier, delivery time 
was an important factor and the total cost of Sea-Air shipping, to the final 
destination, was a very important factor. Most were of the opinion that if there 
were no Sea-Air service, the bulk of the cargo would travel by both Air & Sea. 
For the orders of Sea-Air, they ranked the following in their order of 
importance as below: 
I. Urgency of order need at destination. 
2. Specific instruction from consignee. 
3. Seasonality of commodity exported. 
4. Letter of credit time limit. 
5. Demand in country of destination. 
6. Competition at consignee's market. 
7. To save on storage charges at consignee market. 
S. Tntroductinn nf a new commoditv. .. 
3 
Some of the Freight Forwarders did not experience backlogs at the Airport of 
origin, to Europe, while some did, mainly because of limited cargo capacity. 
The 3rd Quarter & the 4th Quarter of the year were considered the period when 
space to Europe is very tight. Some Freight Forwarders would prefer a flat rate 
for Sea-Air cargo, and some a fixed rate. 
In order to improve the Sea-Air service, the Freight Forwarders recommended 
fastet ships, to improve on the transit time. Air rates also required to be 
lowered. They also complained that they lost out in the exchange rate as they 
paid in Singapore dollars. 
* **** * ** **************** **** *** * 
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SEA-AIR REPORT BASED ON INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM 
FREIGHT FORWARDERS OF SEOUL, SOUTH KOREA 
Yhe following information has been condensed from interviews and 
questionnairesfrom 12 to 16 Freight Forwarders in Seoul. Their contacts were 
established through introductions from the Freight Forwarding Industry in the 
Sea-Air hubs ofSeattle, Los Angeles, and the UnitedArab Emirates: 
Freight Forwarders in Seoul offer Shippers/Exporters, either type of Sea-Air 
service , All inclusive cost door to 
door', or 'Cost per service'. They also offer a 
variety of Sea-Air transfer points like Seattle, Singapore, Los Angeles and die 
UAR 
'Me Sea-Air rates/transit times, as per the forwarders is as per die foUoNvfiig 
details: 
to Western Europe via Seattle, the rate is from US$ 1.60 to 1.70, vAdi a transit 
time (to the final destination) of between 17 - 19 days. 
to South America via Seattle, the rate is US$ 2.30, widi a transit time (to the fmal 
destination) of 20 days. 
to Western Europe via the U. A. E, the rate is from US$ 1.80 to 1.90, wifli a transit 
time (to the final destination) of between 21 - 24 days. 
to Western, Europe via Singapore, the rate is from US$ 2.20 to 3.00, wifli a transit 
time (to the final destination) of 8- 12 days. 
Sea-Air destined for Soutli America is sent via Los Angeles, witli die rate ranging 
between US$ 2.80 to US$ 3.20. The transit time here is between 18 - 21 days. 
As far as direct containerised shippin goes, die Freight Forwarders provided 
rates/transit times through the U. A. E. Sea-Air hub, which was as follows: 
to Western Europe for a 20'container die rates ranged from US$ 1200 - 1500, & 
for a 40' container, US$ 2400. Ilie transit the being 26 - 28 days. 
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to the Scandinavian Countries, for a 20' container the rate given %-as US$ 1500, & 
for a 40'container, US$ 3000. The transit time being between 30 - 32 days. 
Document charges were US$ 5.00 on an average. 
For All Air rates,, the Freight forwarders provided the fflowirig ffifonnation: 
to Western Europe the high rate was from US$ 2.50 - 3.00 per kg, & the low rate 
ranged from US$ 1.90 - 2.70 per kg. 
to the Scandinavian Countries, the high rate was from US$ 2.55 -3.00 per kg, & 
the low rate ranged from US$ 2.00 - 2.70 per kg. 
to Portugal & Spain, the Iiigh rate was from US$ 2.55 - 3.20 per kg, & die low 
rate ranged from US$ 2.00 - 2.90 per kg. 
The Freight Forwarders in Korea operated with the use of Sea-Air schedules. The 
majority agreed that in the order of importance, what the supplier was looking for 
was: 
1. Short transit time & lower transportation cost. 
2. Lower transportation cost. 
3. Short Transit time. 
4. Flexibility 
5. Lower insurance cost. 
The bulk of the type of commodities that were transported was mainly 
electronics/computer related parts & Garments/textiles. Also a large part of die 
volume were General Commodities (of values ranging between US$ 4/k-g - US$ 
20/kg), varying in small amounts from forwarder to forwarder. 
The Freight Forwarders all agreed that for flie SWpper/Supplier, delivery time and 
the total cost of Sea-Air sWpping, to the final destination, were very important 
factors. They were divided in their opinion that if there were no Sca-Air service, 
the bulk of the cargo wotdd travel by bodi Air & Sea or all air. 
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For the orders of Sea-Air, they ranked the following in their order of importance 
as below: 
I. Urgency of order need at destination. 
2. Specific instruction from consignee. 
3. Demand in country of destination. 
4. Seasonality of commodity exported. 
5. Letter of credit time limit. 
6. To save on storage charges at consignee market. 
7. Introduction of a new commodity. 
8. Competition at consignee's market. 
Some of the Freight Forwarders experienced backlogs at the Airport of origin, to 
Europe, mainly because of limited cargo flights. 
Ile 4th Quarter of the year was considered the period when space to Europe is 
very tight. Freight Forwarders would prefer a flat rate for Sea-Air cargo. 
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SEA-AIR REPORT BASED ON INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM 
FREIGHT FORWARDERS OF TOKYO, JAPAN 
The following information has been condensed from interviews and 
questionnaires from 12 to 16 Freight Forwarders in Tokyo. Their contacts 
were established through introductionsfrom the Freight Forwarding Industry 
in the Sea-Air hubs ofSeattle, Los Angeles, and the UnitedArab Emirates: 
Freight Forwarders in Tokyo offer Shippers/Exporters, either type of Sea-Air 
service, I All inclusive cost door to dooe, or 'Cost per service. They also offer 
a variety of Sea-Air transfer points like Seattle, Los Angeles, Vladivostok. One 
Freight Forwarder also offered the Sea-Air hubs of Singapore and the U. A. E. 
The Sea-Air rates/transit times, as per the forwarders is as per the following 
details: 
to Western Europe via Seattle, the rate is from US$ 1.45 to 2.50, widi a transit 
time (to the final destination) of between 13 - 17 days. 
to Western Europe via the U. A. E, the Freight forwarders did not provide any 
data of either rates or transit time. 
to Western Europe via Singapore, the rate is US$ 2.35, witli a transit the (to 
the final destination) of 12 days. 
Sea-Air destined for Soudi America is sent via Los Angeles, widi die rate being 
US$ 3.00 to Brazil, and US$ 3.50 to Argentina. The transit time liere is 
between 16 - 18 days. 
The rate for Sea-Air via Vladivostok to Europe ranges from US$ 2.50 to 3.00, 
with a transit time of between 07 - 10 days. 
As far as direct containerised shipping goes, the Freight Forwarders provided 
rates/transit tfines through the Seattle Sea-Air hub, which was as follows: 
to Westem Europe for a 20' contafiier the rate was US$ 1800, & Confcrence 
rate was US$ 2500. And for a 40'container Conference rate was US$ 4000. 
The transit time being 32 days. 
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to Seattle for a 20' container the rate was US$ 1300, & Refrigerator rate was 
US$ 950. And for a 40' container, nonnal rate was US$ 1900 & Refrigerator 
rate was US$ 1300. The transit time being 9 days. 
to the Scandinavian Countries, for a 20'container the rate given was US$ 2700. 
Conference rate was US$ 4000,1& Non Conference rate US$ 1600 - 1700. 
And for a 40' container, Conference rate was US$ 8000, and non conference as 
US$ 3200. The transit time being 32 days. 
to Portugal/Spain, for a 20' container the rate given by one Freight Fonvarder 
was US$ 2500, with a transit time of 32 days. 
For All Air rates, the Freight forwarders provided the fbHowing infonnation: 
to Western Europe die Wgh rate was from US$ 5.65 - 7.8 per kg, & die low 
rate ranged from US$ 2.60 - 3.50 per kg. 
to the Scandinavian Cotintries, the Mgh rate was from US$ 7.00 -9.55 per kg, 
& the low rate ranged from US$ 4.35 - 5.20 per kg. 
to Portugal & Spain, the 1-dgh rate was from US$ 6.55 - 8.7 per kg, & die low 
rate ranged from US$ 4.10 - 6.95 per kg. 
The Freight Forwarders fii Tokyo operated with the use of Sea-Air schedules. 
The majority agreed that in the order of attractiveness, what die supplier was 
looking for was: 
1. Short transit thne & lower transportation cost. 
2. Lower transportation cost. 
3. Short Transit time. 
4. Flexibility 
5. Lower msurance cost. 
The bulk of the type of commodities that were transported was electronic 
products & computer related parts. Also a large part of die volume wcre 
General Commodities of value over US$ 20/kg. 
The Freight Forwarders all agreed that for the Shipper/Supplier, delivery time 
and the total cost of Sea-Air shipping, to die fuial destination, were very 
important factors. They were also of the opinion that if there were no Sea-Air 
s .q ervice. the hilk of the carLyn wonld travel Whntli Air &. Sea. 
3 
For the orders of Sea-Air, they ranked the following in their order of 
importance as below: 
1. Specific instruction from consignee. 
2. Urgency of order need at destination. 
, -3. Seasonality of commodity exported. 
4. Competition at consignee's market. 
5. Introduction of a new commodity. 
6. Demand in country of destination. 
7. Letter of credit time limit. 
8. To save on storage charges at consignee market. 
I 
None of the Freight Forwarders experienced backlogs at the Airport of origin, 
to Europe. 
nie I st Quarter & the 4th Quarter of the year (esp. the 4th), was considered die 
period when space to Europe is very tight. All Freight Forwarders would 
prefer a flat rate for Sea-Air cargo. 
** *** * ********** ** **** **** *** 
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SEA-AIR REPORT BASED ON INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM 
FREIGHT FORWARDERS OF HONGKONG 
The following information has been condensed from interviews and 
questionnaires from 12 to 16 Freight Forwarders in HongKong, Their 
contacts were established through introductionsfrom the Freight Forwarding 
Industry in the Sea-Air hubs ofSeattle, Los Angeles, and the UA. E. 
Some Freight Forwarders in HongKong offer Shippers/Exporters, 'All inclusive 
cost door to doo?, type of Sea-Air service, and some 'Cost per service'. Tliey 
also offer a variety of Sea-Air transfer points like Seattle, Singapore, Los 
Angeles and the U. A. E, but not through Vladivostok. 
The Sea-Air rates/transit times, as per the forwarders is as per the following 
details: 
to Western Europe via Seatfle, the rate is from US$ 1.35 to 1.90, widi a transit 
time (to the final destination) of between 18 - 22 days. 
to Western Europe via the U. A. E, the rate is from US$ 1.50 to 2.00, with a 
transit time (to the final destination) of between 15 - 16 days. 
to Western Europe via Singapore, the rate is US$ 3.00, but we had no data for 
the transit time. 
Sea-Air destined for South America is sent via Los Angeles. One Freight 
forwarder also used LA as a hub for goods to Europe, with the rate being US$ 
1.70, the transit time here is between 15 - 17 days. Sea-Air to South America 
via Los Angeles is at the rate of US$ 1.80, with a transit time of 12 days. "- 
Aa 
,- far as direct containerised shippin goes, the Freight Forwarders provided 
rates/transit times through the U. A. E. Sea-Air hub, Which was as fbHows: 
to Western Europe for a 20'container the rates ranged from US$ 1150 - 1500, 
and for a 40'container, from US$ 2300 - 3000. Ilie transit time being 19 - 30 days. 
to the Scandinavian Countries, for a 20' container the rates ranged from US$ 
1300 - 1650. & for a 40' container. from US$ 2900 - 3300. Ilie transit time 
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to Portugal for a 20' container the rates ranged from US$ 1950 -2100, die 
transit time being 33 - 40 days. For a 20'container to Spain, from US$ 1200 - 
1500. The transit time being between 21 - 30 days. 
Documentation charges are standard at HK $ 50 (i. e. US$ 6.60) 
For All Air rates, the Freight Forwarder's provided die fbllowirýg infonnation: 
to Westem Europe the Iiigh rate was from US$ 3.20 - 3.95 per kg, & die low 
rate ranged from US$ 2.50 - 3.15 per kg. 
to the Scandinavian Countries, the WgIi rate was from US$ 3.35 4.20 pcr kg, 
& the low rate ranged from US$ 2.60 - 3.40 per kg. 
to Portugal & Spain, the high rate was from US$ 3.35 - 4.20 pcr kg, & die low 
rate ranged from US$ 2.60 - 3.40 per kg. 
All the Freight Forwarders in HongKong operated with die use of Sca-Air 
schedules. Ibe majority agreed that in die order of attractiveness, what die 
supplier was looking for was: 
1. Short transit thne & lower transportation cost. 
Lower transportation cost. 
3. Short Transit time. 
4. Flexibflity 
5. Lower hisurance cost. 
The nature of the coimnodifies that were transportcd varied froin Forwarder to 
Forwarder, but for the main it included Gannents/Textiles - between 60 & 75% 
-& General Commodities (of values ranging bctwecn US$ 4.00/k-g - US$ 
20.00/kg). 
The Freight Forwarders all agreed that for die Sliipper/Supplier, delivcry time 
and the total cost of Sea-Air sliipping, to die fuial destination, wcre vcry 
important factors. Iliere was a mixed opinion of how cargo would move if 
there were no Sea-Air service. Ilie majority said that die bulk- of die cargo 
would travel by Air, wliile some diouglit that it would go by bodi air tuid sea. 
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For the orders of Sea-Air, they ranked the following fii their order of 
importance as below: 
1. Urgency of order need at destination. 
2. Specific instruction from consignee. 
3. Demand in country of destination. 
4. Letter of cre&it time limit. 
5. Seasonality of commodity exported. 
6. To save on storage charges at consignee market. 
7. Competition at consignee's market. 
8. Introduction of a new commodity. 
The Freight Forwarders were divided in their opinion on whether they 
experienced backlogs at the Airport of origin. 
The 4th Quarter of the year was considered the period when space to Europe is 
very tight. Some said that the 2nd & 3rd were fight too. Most Freight 
Forwarders would prefer a flat rate for Sea-Air cargo. 
Some points that were made by the Freight Forwarders, that had a bearing on 
Sea-Air from Far East to Europe are: 
All air rates dropped by nearly 20% in 1991/1992, and sWppers preferred that 
to Sea-Air. One FREIGUT FORWARDER stated that in 1992 Air rate 
reduced by $ 2.00. 
Shipping Lines began providing faster service. 
Portugal & Spain are better connected throughout the American West Coast, 
rather than U. A. E., because with the U. A. E. hub, Sea-Air has to transit one 
more European point on the way to Portugal/Spain. 
The Freight Forwarders of the Far East reconnnend the rates via different 
transit points. The decision on which route to choose rests with the client. 
A way to improve Sea-Air would be to increase flights out of the hub, and a 
lower cost from the hub, shorten the transit time. 
